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A bstract
This dissertation constitutes a discussion of Nagarjuna’s Madhyamaka as 
contained in his six main philosophical works. It presents a synoptic pre­
sentation of the main topics Nagarjuna investigates. Particular emphasis is 
put on an analysis of the philosophical content of Nagarjuna’s Madhyamaka. 
Apart from discussing the soundness of Nagarjuna’s arguments for particular 
conclusions I also want to examine to which extent Nagarjuna’s philosophy 
forms a coherent philosophical system rather than a collection of individual 
ideas.
The dissertation consists of four parts. In the first part (chapter 2) I dis­
cuss the central concept of Madhyamaka philosophy, the notion of svabhava. 
This is a notion of considerable complexity; for the purposes of understanding 
Nagarjuna’s arguments I argue that it is particularly important to distinguish 
two of its conceptual dimensions: an ontological and a cognitive one.
The second part (chapters 3 and 4) discusses some properties of the form 
of Nagarjuna’s arguments, properties which are, however, also intricately 
connected with their contents attempting to establish the Madhyamaka the­
ory of emptiness. The two topics investigated are the place of negation in 
Nagarjuna’s philosophical assertions and his use of the argumentative frame­
work known as the catuskoti or tetralemma. An analysis of the background 
of these formal aspects is indispensable for an understanding of Nagarjuna’s
3
4arguments presented in the following chapters.
The third part (chapters 5 to 9) discusses Nagarjuna’s arguments dealing 
with particular topics, such as causation, motion, the self, epistemology, 
and language. Here Nagarjuna sets out to establish the absence of svabha- 
va in areas which are particularly central to our cognitive interaction with 
the world. He investigates both the world around us (for the examples of 
causation and motion), the subjective world (the self) as well as the way in 
which the two are connected (by our epistemic faculties and by language).
The final fourth part (chapter 10) attempts to present a concise synoptic 
overview of Nagarjuna’s conclusions described in the preceding chapters and 
sets out to evaluate them from a systematic point of view. I also discuss how 
these various conclusions form a coherent philosophical whole and attempt 
to evaluate some of them in the light of the contemporary philosophical 
discussion.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The following pages contain an investigation of Nagarjuna’s philosophy from 
a systematic perspective, Considering Nagarjuna’s important place in Bud­
dhist philosophy as well as in Indian thought more generally it is not surpris­
ing that his works have given rise to an enormous number of commentaries, 
studies and analyses in Asia, and, more recently, also in the West. A large 
amount of these takes the form of commentaries on specific texts, follow­
ing their structure and analysing individual passages in considerable detail. 
While the importance and usefulness of such commentaries is beyond dispute, 
the present work sets out to approach Nagarjuna’s philosophy from a differ­
ent perspective. The idea is to present a synoptic overview of Nagarjuna’s 
arguments concerning different philosophical problems in order to present an 
account of the whole of his philosophy, showing how its individual parts fit 
together as elements of a single philosophical project. In order to achieve this 
it is not sufficient to give a mere paraphrase of Nagarjuna’s arguments (as is 
frequently found in the secondary literature). We will have to analyse their 
philosophical contents, examine actual as well as possible objections, deter­
mine whether the arguments can in fact be made to work, and, if so, what
13
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kind of philosophical conclusion they support. Comparatively little work has 
been done in this direction. Since a great part of the contemporary Western 
studies of Nagarjuna are primarily interested in philological, historical or re­
ligious aspects of his works, genuinely philosophical studies have been rare. 
The aim of the present study is to help closing this gap.
The following pages should be of interest both to philosophers looking 
for a systematic account of Nagarjuna’s philosophical position, as well as 
to Indologists and scholars of Buddhist studies interested primarily in the 
philosophical aspects of Nagarjuna’s works. To make this material as acces­
sible as possible to readers with little or no background in Indian philosophy
1 generally use English equivalents of technical Indian philosophical terms 
(such as ‘object’ for dharma, ‘emptiness’ for sunyatd, ‘primary existence’ for 
dravyasat and so forth), providing the Sanskrit term in brackets if necessary. 
The only case where I have systematically violated this policy concerns the 
term svabhava. My reason for this is that there is no single term used in 
Western philosophy which covers the different aspects of its meaning in the 
Madhyamaka context in a satisfactory manner. But given that all of chapter
2 is dedicated to a discussion of how we are to understand the notion of sva- 
bhava the reader should have a sufficiently clear conception of its meaning 
when he encounters it again in later chapters. For the benefit of Indologists 
and Buddhist scholars the Sanskrit and Tibetan (and occasional Pali) of all 
quotations is given in the footnotes. Some material and references in the 
footnotes will be particularly relevant to philosophers, some are of more his­
torical or philological interest. I have made no attempt to differentiate the 
‘philosophical’ and ‘Indological’ footnotes but trust in the reader’s discern­
ment to find the material which interests him.
Different kinds of readers might prefer different routes through the ma-
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terial presented here. Those interested in a step-by-step introduction to Na­
garjuna’s philosophy should read the chapters in numerical order. Readers 
with previous acquaintance with Madhyamaka material interested in what I 
have to say on a particular Nagarjunian topic will prefer to go directly to 
the relevant chapter. For those wanting to get straight at the philosophical 
content I recommend finishing the introduction, followed by chapter 2, then 
immediately jumping to chapter 10. After this it is possible dip into any of 
chapters 3 to 9 for more specific discussion of topics one finds interesting.
I.1  Nagarjuna the philosopher
Nagarjuna, one of the greatest thinkers in the history of Asian philosophy 
remains an enigma. Despite the existence of various legendary accounts of 
his life passed down in Buddhist literature1 contemporary scholars agree on 
hardly any details concerning him. It is unclear when he lived (although 
some time during the first three centuries A.D. is most likely),2 where he 
worked (almost all places in India have been suggested),3 what he wrote 
(the Tibetan canon attributes 116 different texts of very diverse content and 
quality to him),4 and even how many Nagarjunas there were in the first place 
(up to four different ones have been distinguished).5 
1Walleser (1923), Dowman (1985).
2Mabbett (1998, 332). For an extensive list of references see Ruegg (1981, 4-6, note 
11).
3Walser (2005, 67).
4A similarly high number of works in listed in the Chinese canon (Lindtner 1982, 9). 
5The most common view distinguishes only three Nagarjunas: the Madhyamaka
philosopher, the tantric adept, who possibly flourished around 400 A.D.(Lindtner 1982,
II, note 12) and the alchemist, who might be placed in the seventh century (Walser 2005, 
69, 75-79), (Eliade 1969, 415-416). For criticism of the thesis of multiple Nagarjunas see 
Hua (1970).
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Recent research by Joseph Walser suggests that Nagarjuna may have 
written the Ratnavali sometime between 170 and 200 A.D. in the area around 
present-day AmaravatT.6 This conclusion is based on two facts. Firstly there 
is a variety of evidence connecting Nagarjuna with the Satavahana dynasty.7 
This is not very helpful on its own, as this dynasty spanned several centuries. 
However, in verse 232 of the Ratnavali Nagarjuna mentions a depiction of the 
Buddha sitting on a lotus (padmapitha). Given that such images were only 
available during the late part of the dynasty in the Eastern Deccan Walser 
comes to the tentative conclusion that Nagarjuna composed the text during 
the reign of king Yajna Sri Satakarni (about 175 to 204 A.D.).8 Of course 
none of this can be regarded as hard evidence, especially as the necessary 
detour via art history (in order to find the earliest date for the type of 
depictions of the Buddha Nagarjuna describes) introduces a whole new range 
of complexities and uncertainties. Nevertheless, given our present inability 
to find out the time and place of Nagarjuna in any other way determining 
them approximately based on the support of a variety of historical data such 
as suggested by Walser is surely to be preferred to not determining them at 
all.
1.2 N agarjuna’s works
Assuming we resolve the uncertainty about Nagarjuna’s time and place by 
locating him in the second century A.D. in the Eastern Deccan, how do we 
deal with the multitude of works ascribed to him? Our present investigation 
will be based primarily on six of Nagarjuna’s works:
6Walser (2005, 61).
7Walser (2005, 293, note 26).
8Walser (2005, 86).
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1. the ‘Fundamental Verses on the Middle Way’ (Mulamadhyamakakarika, 
MMK)
2. the ‘Sixty Stanzas on Reasoning’ ( Yuktisastikd, YS)
3. the ‘Seventy Stanzas on Emptiness’ (Sunyatasaptati, SS)
4. the ‘Dispeller of Objections’ ( VigrahavyavartanT VV)
5. the ‘Treatise on Pulverization’ ( Vaidalyaprakarana, VP)
6. the ‘Precious Garland’ (Ratnavali, RA)
This set, the so-called Yukti-corpus, is well-known in the Tibetan tradi­
tion where is it called the ‘collection of the six texts on reasoning’ (rigs pa ’i 
tshogs drug).9 We cannot be assured that all six texts were indeed composed 
by Nagarjuna; apart from the MMK, where Nagarjuna’s authorship is taken 
to be true by definition, the attribution of every other one has been ques­
tioned.10 However, apart from the fact that all these texts were attributed to 
Nagarjuna by a variety of Indian11 and Tibetan Madhyamaka authors they 
also expound a single, coherent philosophical system. For the purposes of 
this discussion we will therefore identify Nagarjuna with the author of the 
Yukti-corpus.
9See e.g. Bu ston’s History of Buddhism (Obermiller 1931, I, 50-51).
10Warder (1973, 79) notes that the authorship of Nagarjuna for texts other than the
MMK ‘has not been established beyond doubt and we ought not to assume it1. For
comments on the authorship of the YS see Tola and Dragonetti (1995b, 19-20), for the
SS Tola and Dragonetti (1995b, 54-55). The attribution of the VV is questioned in Tola
and Dragonetti (1998) (but see Ruegg (2000, 115, note 10)), that of the VP in Tola and
Dragonetti (1995a, 7-15) and Pind (2001). For the RA see Walser (2005, 271-278). 
^Including Bhaviveka, CandrakTrti, Santaralrsita and KamalasTla. See Lindtner (1982,
10-11, note 9).
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The texts under consideration are all written in verse. In some cases they 
are accompanied by an autocommentary in prose; though the status of these 
autocommentaries is not always unproblematic.12 As the present inquiry is 
intended to be a study of Nagarjuna’s Madhyamaka the texts of the Yukti- 
corpus constitute the basis of our discussion. It is nevertheless not possible 
to provide a philosophically satisfactory exposition of Nagarjuna’s thought 
based exclusively on these texts. This is because their versified form often 
leads to a very condensed expression of arguments which requires a variety 
of details to be filled in. In itself this is hardly surprising given tha t Indian 
philosophical texts (unlike their Western counterparts) were generally not in­
tended to provide the reader with a self-contained exposition of the author’s 
thoughts. Instead their versified form provided the structure of the argument 
to be memorized, which would then be elaborated by written commentaries 
and by a teacher’s oral explanations. The reader of Nagarjuna’s works will 
frequently encounter passages in which Nagarjuna asserts that a certain po­
sition is deficient and ought not to be accepted, without giving the reason 
why this is the case. Sometimes this difficulty can be solved by considering 
the remainder of Nagarjuna’s texts. In other cases it is necessary to fill in 
the missing details in order to arrive at a philosophically coherent account 
of Nagarjuna’s arguments. Such filling in (much like the filling in of missing 
parts when restoring a painting) always involves an element of conjecture. In 
these cases I consulted the Indian, Tibetan, and contemporary Western com­
ment arial literature in order to reconstruct the missing step in the argument
12Despite substantial Indian support the auto commentary on the MMK, the Akutobhaya 
is not regarded as genuine by contemporary researchers (Lindtner 1982, 15-16, note 33). 
The auto commentary on the SS is regarded as authentic by Lindtner (1982, 31), Tola and 
Dragonetti (1995b, 57-58) disagree. There seems to be no dispute about the authenticity 
of the autocommentaries on the VV and VP.
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in a way which would be likely to be acceptable to a Madhyamika. My way 
of determining such acceptability is to consider both systematic and doctri­
nal coherence. To achieve systematic coherence I attempted to fill in the 
missing details in the argument in such a way that it can be made to work. 
Doctrinal coherence is aimed at by avoiding any assumptions which disagree 
with the bulk of Madhyamaka literature. As Madhyamaka authors present 
different opinions when interpreting Nagarjuna (especially when dealing with 
the more subtle points) doctrinal coherence is to be regarded as a guiding 
principle, rather than as a goal which can be realized completely. In the cases 
where this principle did not provide sufficient guidance the reconstructions 
presented are those which I regard as philosophically most successful. As we 
have no way of determining the manner in which Nagarjuna himself intended 
to spell out the argument a filling-in based on the methodological principles 
just mentioned appears to be the most we can hope for in a philosophical 
exposition of Nagarjuna’s thought.
1.3 The philosophical study of Nagarjuna in 
the W est
Western interest in Nagarjuna as a philosopher is a comparatively recent 
phenomenon, going back little more than a century.13 In itself this consti­
tutes only a part of Nagarjunian scholarship, a substantial portion of which 
concerns itself with problems of philology, textual history or the study of
13The earliest systematic Western treatment of Madhyamaka more generally is to be 
found in the works of the Jesuit missionary Ippolito Desideri (1684-1733). Desideri pub­
lished a number of works in Tibetan in which he attempted a refutation of Tibetan Bud­
dhism from the perspective of Roman Catholicism. See Desideri (1981-1989).
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religion. A concise overview of the specifically philosophical investigation 
of Nagarjuna in the West has been presented by Andrew Tuck.14 Tuck ar­
gues tha t its history can be divided into three phases, corresponding to three 
Western philosophical frameworks against which Nagarjuna used to be inter­
preted. First there is the Kantian phase, then the analytic phase, which was 
finally succeeded by a Post-Wittgensteinian one.15 A clear example from the 
first phase is Theodore Stcherbatsky’s The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana 
which was first published in 1927.16 Stcherbatsky’s interprets Nagarjuna as 
dividing the world into appearance and reality, the former corresponding to 
samsara, the realm of cyclic existence, the latter to nirvana, liberation. In 
his attem pt to defend Nagarjuna against the charge of nihilism, especially 
clear in the exposition given by La Vallee Poussin,17 Stcherbatsky ascribes to 
Nagarjuna the assumption of an absolute noumenal reality which underlies 
the constantly changing and ephemeral world of phenomena. The further 
development of this Kantianization of Nagarjuna is presented in what is still 
a basic texts of Buddhist studies, T.R.V. M urti’s 1955 The Central Philoso­
phy of Buddhism.18 As M urti’s exposition of Nagarjuna is considerably more 
detailed than Stcherbatsky’s the fundamental difficulties of interpreting Na­
garjuna according to a Kantian framework become more readily apparent. 
He observes that ‘the relation between the two [i.e. the Absolute and the 
world of phenomena] is not made abundantly clear. This may be said to 
constitute a drawback in the Madhyamika conception of the Absolute.’19 On
i4 (1990).
15(1990, 16-30).
16Stcherbatsky (1968).
17(1908, 101).
18<The position occupied by the Madhyamika in Indian philosophy is similar to that of
Kant in modern European philosophy [ ...] ’ (Murti 1955, 123).
19(1955, 237).
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the other hand we might want to argue that the reason for this ‘drawback’ 
is not a defect in the Madhyamaka position but in the choice of interpreta­
tive framework. To conceive of Nagarjuna’s Madhyamaka as a theory where 
an indescribable Absolute grounds the world of appearances means reading 
assumptions into it which Nagarjuna does not share, thereby resulting in an 
unsatisfactory theory.
The second, analytic phase of Western studies of Nagarjuna can be re­
garded as starting shortly after the publication of M urti’s book, with Richard 
Robinson’s 1957 article ‘Some Logical Aspects of Nagarjuna’s System’.20 He 
sets out to analyse some of Nagarjuna’s arguments using the resources of 
modern symbolic logic, the ultimate aim being ‘to transcribe the Kdrikas en­
tirely, chapter by chapter, into logical notation, thus bringing to light formal 
features which do not appear from the consideration of examples taken out 
of context and listed topically’.21 The shift from the Kantian to the analytic 
reading of Nagarjuna which Robinson’s paper inaugurates brings with it a 
shift in the aspects of his thought receiving most attention. The focus is 
shifted from an investigation of the primarily metaphysical problem of the 
relation between samsara and nirvana to the logical aspects of Nagarjuna’s 
thought: his use of quantification and negation as well as the mechanics of 
the notorious form of argument known as the ‘tetralemma’ (catuskoti).
If one considers the bigger picture, however, once again the limitations 
of the reading of Nagarjuna during the analytical phase become apparent. 
Many of his views, concerning, for example, the rejection of a foundationalist 
ontology or the difficulties of assuming a world conforming to the structure 
of the language we use to refer to it contradict assumptions of analytic phi­
20Robinson (1957).
21 (1957, 307).
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losophy of the first half of the twentieth century. While the employment of 
certain tools dear to analytic philosophers could be seen as presenting Na­
garjuna’s arguments more clearly it was also evident that Nagarjuna would 
have had little regard for the goals aimed at by analytic philosophers. Nei­
ther the attempts to develop a logically perfect language for describing the 
world nor that or grounding our knowledge of the world on the supposedly 
secure foundation of sense-data could find much favour with Madhyamikas. 
Analytic philosophy with its specific set of philosophical assumptions was 
helpful in trying to understand Nagarjuna, but only up to a point.
In fact by a rather curious turn in the third, Post-Wittgensteinian phase 
of interpreting Nagarjuna the paragons of analytic philosophy were now 
identified which Nagarjuna’s opponents, such as the Abhidharmikas and 
Naiyayikas.22 Works such as Frederick Streng’s Emptiness23 or Chris Gud- 
munsen’s Wittgenstein and Buddhism24 set out to stress the close similarities 
between Nagarjuna and in particular the later Wittgenstein and his criticism 
of analytic philosophy. While the relation between samsara and nirvana 
had been the chief concern for the Kantian readers of Nagarjuna, and that 
of the logical consistency of svabhava or substance for analytic interpreters 
such as Robinson25 the new key term of the Post-Wittgensteinian phase was 
pratltyasamutpada or dependent origination. This was regarded primarily 
as reflecting the underlying idea of a Wittgensteinian philosophy of language 
according to which language, and in particular the language of philosophical 
statements could not be regarded as independent of the interrelated nature
22Tuck (1990, 78).
23 (1967).
24'there is not nearly as much difference in the roles of Wittgenstein and Nagarjuna as
one might imagine’ (1977, 68).
25Robinson (1967, 41).
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of conceptual thought and conventional language. Words were not supposed 
to gain their meaning by referring to something outside of the system of lan­
guage; the relation of words to their referents is not seen as being indicative 
of ontological status but is solely of practical value.
Looking at the way in which the Western study of Nagarjuna was influ­
enced by the philosophical fashions of the day we may be worried that work 
following the Post-Wittgensteinian phase will later appear to be a similar 
example of trying to shoe-horn Nagarjuna’s thought into a fundamentally 
alien framework. While it is certainly not possible (nor indeed desirable) 
to proceed with our investigation and to leave behind our specific interests, 
expectations and concerns there is no reason to panic. The fact that each 
interpretation takes place against a specific conceptual framework does not 
mean that successive interpretations might not lead to a deeper and more 
comprehensive understanding of Nagarjuna’s thought. In fact the litera­
ture published over the last decades suggests that the study of Nagarjuna 
is becoming more mature.26 First of all most authors now try to treat Na­
garjuna’s writings as expressing a single, unified system of thought, rather 
than as a quarry of cryptical verses from which individual isolated samples 
can be extracted to suit one’s idiosyncratic interpretation. There finally ap­
pears to be an agreement that any interpretation of Nagarjuna should cohere 
with his assertions in all the works which can be plausibly ascribed to him. 
Secondly, and more importantly, it has become evident tha t Nagarjuna is 
worthy of philosophical investigation in his own right. There is no more
26Amongst the most philosophically sophisticated contemporary commentaries on Na- 
garjuna’s texts the works by Kalupahana (1991), Tola and Dragonetti (1987), (1995a), 
(1995b), Garfield (1995), and Bugault (2001) have to be mentioned. Some of the best 
monographs are Huntington (1989) and Siderits (2003) (and, to a lesser extent, Wood 
(1994) and Burton (1999)).
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need to legitimate a study by setting out to show him to be a proto-Kant, 
proto-Wittgenstein or proto-Derrida. While such comparisons may be of 
hermeneutic use for those primarily acquainted with the Western tradition 
most writers on the topic now agree that it is no more necessary to put on a 
Kantian lens to understand Nagarjuna than it is to wear a Nagarjunian lens 
to understand Kant. Therefore, even though we cannot interpret Nagarju­
na free of the preconceptions and concerns of our own time we are justified 
in expecting that the more mature study of his works will provide us with 
more accurate and stable knowledge of his philosophy than was previously 
possible.
1.4 O verview
Even a casual acquaintance with Madhyamaka literature makes it evident 
that the central philosophical concept discussed is that of emptiness (sunyata). 
The main difficulty in explaining what this concept means is tha t it is a 
purely negative one: emptiness is the emptiness of something and indicates 
that something is not there. This absent something is what the Madhyamaka 
authors refer to by the term svabhava, sometimes translated as ‘inherent exis­
tence’ or ‘own being5. For this reason the term ‘emptiness’ is often glossed as 
‘empty of inherent existence’ (svabhavasunya). A good way of understanding 
the Madhyamaka notion of emptiness is therefore to provide a clear concep­
tion of what they mean by svabhava. This is what chapter 2 sets out to 
do.
Even if we restrict ourselves to Nagarjuna’s Madhyamaka, svabhava turns 
out to be a very complex concept. It unifies two very different aspects, an 
ontological and a cognitive one. The ontological aspect of svabhava is the
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one discussed in most detail in the contemporary commentarial literature. 
The basic idea here is that an object has svabhava if it possesses its nature in 
an intrinsic manner. In order to spell out this still rather imprecise idea we 
have to differentiate three distinct ontological understandings of svabhava, 
all of which play some role in Nagarjuna’s arguments. The first is the under­
standing of svabhava as essence, as a property an object cannot lose without 
ceasing to be that very thing, the second an understanding as substance, as 
something which does not depend on anything else, and the third as what I 
have called absolute svabhava, as a property which is regarded as the true or 
final nature of things.
Even though I argue that understanding svabhava as substance occupies 
the most important place in Nagarjuna’s arguments we would be ill-advised 
to regard svabhava simply as some variant of the concept of substance found 
in the Western philosophical tradition. This is because svabhava has an im­
portant additional cognitive component which is completely absent from the 
concept of substance as it is usually conceived. The notion of svabhava is 
regarded as a conceptual superimposition, as something which is automat­
ically projected onto a world of objects which actually lack it. Unlike the 
notion of substance, svabhava is not just a theoretical concept of ontology, 
but a cognitive default, an addition the mind unwittingly makes when trying 
to make sense of the world. This cognitive understanding of svabhava makes 
clear why Madhyamaka, metaphysics (unlike metaphysics in the Western tra­
dition) is not a purely theoretical enterprise but something which also has 
to be put into practice. If svabhava is an automatic mistaken superimposi­
tion we cannot just get rid of it by going through arguments attempting to 
show that svabhava does not exist. We will also have to train ourselves out 
of the automatic habit of projecting svabhava onto a world which lacks it.
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This point can be illustrated by considering two different ways of studying 
higher-dimensional geometry. It is, for example, possible to prove various 
facts about a four-dimensional cube without having any idea of what such 
a cube would look like. We simply regard it as a theoretical entity which is 
defined in a certain way, and then proceed to prove further facts on the basis 
of this definition. On the other hand we could also try to develop a spatial 
intuition for the fourth dimension, that is try to get an idea of what such 
a cube would look like. We could, for example, imagine the ways in which 
a two-dimensional creature living on a plane could form the conception of 
a cube by extrapolating from a square and similarly try to extrapolate a 
four-dimensional cube from a three-dimensional one. It is evident that this 
latter attem pt at enlarging our spatial intuition is not just about proving 
theorems, but requires certain exercises for enlarging our imagination.27 In 
the same way for the Madhyamaka the removal of the superimposition of sva­
bhava is not just about working through philosophical arguments, but also 
requires certain exercises to effect a cognitive shift which keeps the mistaken 
projection of svabhava from occurring.
A great part of Nagarjuna’s writings consists of the investigation of in­
dividual phenomena in order to argue that they do not exist with svabhava. 
Before we can turn to the examination of these arguments, however, it is 
necessary to deal first with some formal aspects of Nagarjuna’s arguments. I 
call these aspects ‘formal’ because they all have to do with negation, which 
is generally regarded as a formal notion. Nevertheless this adjective is also 
somewhat misleading if one regards as ‘formal’ those aspects of an argument 
which are independent of its content. For in the discussion of Nagarjuna
27The Victorian mathematician Charles Howard Hinton spent considerable time devel­
oping such exercises. See e.g. Hinton (1904).
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the point is precisely that there are certain presuppositions made by the 
traditional Indian theory of negation which conflict with the contents of his 
philosophical conclusions. In order to formulate his philosophy Nagarjuna 
must therefore come up with an adapted conception of negation which coun­
ters these presuppositions.
The main difficulty involved here (which is addressed in chapter 3) is the 
assumption of the Naiyayikas, who elaborated the standard Indian account 
of negation, tha t the constituents of negative statements must always refer 
to real entities. A statement like 'there is no po t’ is always to be understood 
along the lines of 'there is not pot at a particular place’. In this case both 
the pot and the place exist, it is only that the former does not occur at the 
latter. But Nagarjuna obviously cannot interpret his statement ‘there is no 
svabhava' along these lines, as he does not want to assert that svabhava is a 
real entity existing anywhere else.
The second important formal issue, taken up in chapter 4, is the well- 
known catuskoti or tetralemma. This is a rather puzzling form of argument, 
frequently employed by Nagarjuna, which consists of the rejection of four 
positions: a statement, its negation, their conjunction, and their disjunction. 
An important prerequisite for making sense of the tetralemma is to realize 
that the various negations occurring in it are not all of the same type. Some 
are implicational negations (paryudasapratisedha) which make an assertion 
about the object referred to ('the apple is not red’ implies that it is some 
other colour), while others are non-implicational (prasajyapratisedha) and do 
not make such an assertion (‘the force of gravity is not red’ does not imply 
that it is some other colour). Once the interrelations between these two 
kinds of negation have been taken into account it becomes clear tha t Nagar­
juna uses this form of argument in order to reject all the possible alternative
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statements one can make about an entity on the assumption that it exists 
with svabhava. If all these alternatives turn out to be inapplicable we can 
conclude that the initial assumption was wrong and that there is no svabhava 
to be found in that entity.
Having examined these formal aspects of Nagarjuna’s arguments (which 
are intricately connected with the contents of his philosophy) and taking into 
account the clarification of the different aspects of the notion of svabhava the 
reader will be able to understand Nagarjuna’s discussions of the emptiness 
of specific kinds of phenomena without too much difficulty. Chapters 5 to 9 
deal with the main topics Nagarjuna analyses in order to demonstrate their 
emptiness, that is, lack of svabhava. All of these play a major part in our 
cognitive interaction with the world and therefore constitute areas where we 
are particularly likely to mistakenly superimpose the existence of svabhava 
on phenomena which in fact lack it.
Chapter 5 deals with the central notion of causation. Nagarjuna’s analysis 
concentrates on two aspects, that of the identity or difference between cause 
and effect, and tha t of their temporal relation. Each can be spelt out in 
different ways. We can assume that cause and effect are fundamentally the 
same thing, or tha t they are different, or that are related as part and whole. 
Similarly the cause can be regarded as preceding the effect, as following it, 
or as being simultaneous with it. By rejecting all these different ways of 
conceiving of cause and effect Nagarjuna attempts to demonstrate that our 
underlying assumptions about causation are deficient. Causation is not a 
mind-independent, objective relation which connects objects ‘which are there 
anyway’. It is rather something which would not exist without a substantial 
mental contribution; it is a conceptually constructed relation which would 
not exist without the conceptualizing mind. This also entails that the objects
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connected by such a relation cannot exist in a mind-independent way since 
their existential dependence on a cause holds via a relation which is not itself 
mind-independent.
Chapter 6 deals with the concept of motion. This might strike one as 
hardly as central a notion as those discussed in the other chapters. We do, 
however, have to take into account that according to the Indian world-view 
motion is not just something which characterizes billiard-balls, chariots or the 
planets but also the person moving through successive rounds of rebirth. It is 
therefore essential to keep in mind that when Nagarjuna speaks of a ‘mover’ 
this can refer to a person crossing the street as well as to one crossing from 
this life to the next. To this extent this discussion is also connected with 
tha t of a person, which will be discussed in the following chapter.
On one level Nagarjuna’s arguments attempt to establish the absence of 
an objective, mind-independent existence of the spatio-temporal location of 
motion. But in fact his conclusions are more far-reaching than that. When 
discussing the relation between mover and motion he regards his arguments 
as a template which can be employed in a variety of contexts. Motion con­
stitutes an important illustration of Nagarjuna’s point, but his exposition is 
not confined to it. The point to be illustrated is concerned with the relation 
between individuals and the properties they instantiate. Nagarjuna uses the 
example of motion to argue tha t the standard analysis of phenomena into in­
dependently existent individuals and properties (as encountered for example 
in the Nyaya-Vaisesika theory of dravya and guna) is deficient and should 
be rejected. It is to be replaced by a view which regards individuals and 
properties as linguistically or conceptually mediated projections of at best 
pragmatic importance, but not as objective features of a mind-independent 
reality.
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In the examination of the self considered in chapter 7 Nagarjuna moves 
from the investigation of outer phenomena, such as causation or motion, to 
the most important example of a subjective entity. Following Buddhist tradi­
tion Nagarjuna rejects the view of a substance-self, an essentially unchanging 
unifier of our mental life distinct from our body on the one hand and our 
psychological states on the other, a self which is an agent whose decisions 
shape our life. Apart from the familiar investigation into the relation of a 
substance-self and its parts well-known from Buddhist literature Nagarjuna 
also seeks to refute the substance-self by a different type of argument. This 
concerns the worry of the opponent that if there are properties of the self 
there also must be a self which is the bearer of such properties. Given Nagar­
juna’s theory of individuals and properties there is, however, no necessity to 
draw this conclusion. Individuals and properties are seen as linguistic or con­
ceptual artefacts, rather than as fundamental constituents of reality which 
exist in dependence on one another. Accepting that there are properties of 
the self does not force him to accept the existence of a substance (dravya) 
as their bearer on which they depend for their existence. The conception 
of self emerging as an alternative is that of a process-self, something which 
is a sequence of physical and psychological events but mistakenly assumes 
that it is no such sequence, but a substance-self. As in the case of emptiness 
of objects where the superimposition of svabhava on phenomena had to be 
overcome, correcting the mistaken self-awareness of the process-self cannot be 
based solely on working through arguments demonstrating the non-existence 
of the substance-self, that is a self existing with svabhava. Since viewing 
itself as a substance-self is the self’s cognitive default, establishing a correct 
self-awareness can only be achieved by continuous practice.
The self and the world are connected in the theory of knowledge which is
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the topic of chapter S. For Nagarjuna the discussion of epistemology entails 
both examining yet another kind of phenomena for existence by svabha­
va (by investigating whether the means we employ to acquire knowledge of 
objects are intrinsically such means, and whether the objects are intrinsically 
such objects) as well as establishing an epistemological framework to explain 
how emptiness can be known. In this discussion Nagarjuna’s intellectual 
interaction with the Naiyayikas is particularly pronounced. They provide the 
source of the idea that means and objects of knowledge can be established 
‘from their own side’, a view which Nagarjuna understandably rejects. He 
concentrates on an examination of the different ways in which we could find 
out that particular putative means of knowledge are indeed such means. Both 
the idea that these means are in some way self-established, or that the means 
and objects of knowledge mutually establish one another are rejected by Na­
garjuna. His aim is to show that there are no epistemic procedures which are 
intrinsically and essentially means of knowledge, and tha t their objects are 
not independently existing reals. Essentialism about epistemic procedures is 
thus replaced by contextualism: procedures can give us knowledge in some 
contexts, but not in others without ceasing to be means of knowledge. This 
turns out to be exactly the epistemology the proponent of emptiness needs. 
For if everything is empty there is obviously nothing which is a means of 
knowledge intrinsically, by svabhava. But if that means that there are no 
means of knowledge at all this leads to the problem that emptiness could not 
be known, contrary to Nagarjuna’s assertion. It is therefore essential to come 
up with an account of epistemology like the contextualist one which allows 
for means of knowledge but does not assume that they exist intrinsically.
A philosophical system which is concerned as much with the way in which 
our conceptual and linguistic conventions shape our view of the world as
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Madhyamaka is will have something to say on the philosophy of language. 
Somewhat surprisingly discussions of language do not occupy a great part of 
Nagarjuna’s writings. The greatest part of the Madhyamaka philosophy of 
language is a later development. Nevertheless it is possible to extract some of 
Nagarjuna’s views on the more important issues in this area from the extant 
sources. This is the subject-matter of chapter 9. A central and well-known 
assertion in this context is Nagarjuna’s pronouncement that he (and, we may 
conclude, the Madhyamika in general) does not hold a thesis or position. The 
commentarial tradition has supplied us with a variety of ways of understand­
ing this statement. I want to argue that the most coherent reading in the 
context of Nagarjuna’s philosophy as a whole is to understand it as a seman­
tic pronouncement. W hat Nagarjuna means when he says tha t he has no 
thesis is tha t he has no thesis which should be interpreted by a particular 
semantic theory. This theory, which I call the ‘standard picture’, assumes 
that the world of referents is endowed with a mind-independent structure 
and that our language manages to latch onto the world not just by force 
of convention, but by the existence of some objectively existent structural 
similarity between language and world. Both of these assumptions, tha t of a 
‘ready-made’ world and of an objective reference relation, are incompatible 
with Nagarjuna’s theory of emptiness as each would entail the existence of 
entities with svabhava. Once again the interconnectedness of Nagarjuna’s 
philosophy becomes evident. The doctrine of emptiness, which arises pri­
marily in the context of a metaphysical and cognitive discussion demands 
an adaptation not only of the standard view of epistemology, but also of the 
standard view of semantics. Ultimately the Madhyamika will have to explain 
both the structuring of the world as well as the reference relation in terms 
of conventions and speaker intentions in order to avoid re-introducing the
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notion of svabhava by the back door.
The aim of the final chapter 10 is not just to bring all the parts of the 
discussion together, but to step back from the texts to assess Nagarjuna’s 
thought systematically. The objective is to examine both the plausibility of 
Nagarjuna’s conclusions as well as to establish that his philosophy is not a 
disparate collection of arguments but a coherent philosophical project the 
different components of which are interconnected in intricate ways. In some 
instances I also set out to relate Nagarjuna’s conclusions to the contempo­
rary discussion of the matters he deals with. Here my aim is not so much 
what is sometimes called ‘comparative philosophy’ but an investigation of 
the question which aspects of contemporary philosophy might be of interest 
to one aiming to enlarge Nagarjuna’s Madhyamaka from a theory of purely 
historical interest to a philosophical system with systematic appeal. The 
chapter is divided into sections dealing with the main problems Madhyama­
ka thinking investigates: metaphysics, personal identity, epistemology, and 
language and truth. I have also added a section on ethics, a topic which 
Nagarjuna treats at length but which, I argue, is discussed by him with less 
emphasis on problems arising from a specifically Madhyamika point of view 
than would justify a longer treatment in the context of this discussion.
Chapter 2 
Interpretations of svabhava
The notion of svabhava provides the central conceptual point around which 
the greatest part of Nagarjuna’s Madhyamaka revolves. Although it is never 
used in the sutras and is rare in the Pali canon the term svabhava, often 
translated as ‘inherent existence’ or ‘own-being’ acquired a dominating role 
in the thought of the Madhyamika. Despite its centrality, its status is fun­
damentally negative: one, if not indeed the central concern of Madhyamaka 
argumentation is to demonstrate that, despite our intuitions to the contrary, 
svabhava does not exist. The notion of emptiness (sunyatd) denotes precisely 
the absence of svabhava.
There are various difficulties to be faced when trying to get a clear idea 
of what svabhava as a philosophical concept entails. First of all, like many 
philosophically central terms svabhava is used in a variety of ways in different 
philosophical traditions. The early Buddhist Abhidharma metaphysics uses 
svabhava in a different way from the later Madhyamikas, their use is in turn 
different from DharmakTrti’s use of the concept, as well as from the Yogacara 
notion of the ‘three natures’ (trisvabhava).
A second problem consists in presenting a clear explication of a concept
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which is taken to be vacuous and in fact, if clearly examined, inconsistent. 
When looking at the Madhyamaka arguments it is often quite hard to at­
tribute anything like a defensible philosophical theory to the proponents of 
svabhava at all, as these often appear to be conveniently set up straw men.1
A final difficulty is the fact that the concept of svabhava does not have 
any straightforward equivalent amongst the concepts discussed in the history 
of Western philosophy. This is not to say that it is a fundamentally alien 
concept, but merely that it combines a number of features which we do not 
see thus combined in the Western context. In order to get a clear conception 
of svabhava it is essential to appreciate that it incorporates three important 
conceptual dimensions: an ontological dimension, a cognitive dimension, and 
a semantic dimension. This chapter will attempt to spell out the first two 
of these three different aspects of svabhava. The semantic dimension will 
be taken up in the discussion of Nagarjuna’s view of language in chapter 9. 
Our focus will be on Nagarjuna’s use of the term svabhava though we will 
sometimes refer to later Madhyamaka authors. I do not claim that the above 
analysis will be adequate for the understanding of svabhava in other Buddhist 
schools of thought. By explaining how the three aspects of svabhava hang 
together I also hope to be able to address the second difficulty, that is, give 
a clear account of what a proponent of svabhava asserts and why this might 
be a philosophical position to be taken seriously,
2.1 The ontological dim ension
Conceiving of svabhava as an ontological concept is no doubt the interpre­
tation most commonly found in the contemporary commentarial literature,
1See Robinson (1972, 326).
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and one which gave rise to translations using such metaphysical terms as 
essence,2 nature,3 substance4 or aseity5. In the Madhyamaka literature af­
ter Nagarjuna we find a useful distinction between three different senses of 
svabhava in Candralurti’s commentary on the MMK,6 a distinction which 
is already partly present in earlier Abhidharma literature. We will refer to 
the three senses distinguished by Candraklrti by the terms essence-svabhava, 
substance-svabhava, and absolute-svabhava, respectively.7
2.1.1 Essence- svabhava
Already in the early Buddhist literature we encounter an understanding of 
svabhava as a specific characterizing property of an object. One characteristic 
passage from the Milindapahha (composed between 150 B.C.E. and 200 A.D.) 
asserts:8
2Garfield (1995, 89), Komito (1987, 69).
3Napper (1989, 65).
4Lopez (1987, 445-446).
5Ruegg (1981, 9).
6This distinction is still alive in contemporary dGe lugs commentarial textbook litera­
ture. See the annotated translation of dKon mchogs ’jigs med dbang po’s Grup pa'i m tha’i
m am  par bzhag pa rin po che’i phreng ba given in Sopa and Hopkins (1976, 122).
7Sopa and Hopkins (1976, 122) refer to these as phenomena’s ‘conventionally existent
nature’, their ‘true or independent existence’, and their ‘real and final nature’. Further
attempts at differentiating the different usages of svabhava in Candraklrti can be found
in Schayer (1931, xix, 55, note 41), who distinguishes four different senses, as well as in
de Jong (1972, 3) and May (1959, 124, note 328), who distinguish two. Although there are
obvious connections with the senses distinguished here the relations between the different
senses discussed by the three authors and, in Schayer’s case, the distinctness of the four
senses given by him are too unclear to make an attempt at comparison worthwhile.
8maranan ti kho maharaja etam aditthasaccanam tasaniyam thanam [...] maranass ’
eso maharaja sarasabhdvatejo tassa saras abhavatejena sakilesd satta maranassa tasanti
bhayanti (Trenckner 1928, 149). For a translation see Davids (1890, 211).
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Death, great king, is a condition which causes fear amongst those 
who have not seen the truth, [...] This, o king, is the power of 
the specific quality (sarasa-sabhdva) of death, because of which 
beings with defilements tremble at death and are afraid of it.
Although at this early stage svabhava does not yet constitute a clearly defined 
piece of philosophical terminology it is apparent that it denotes a feature by 
which a particular phenomenon is to be individuated, thereby rendering it 
knowable and nameable. This understanding of svabhava is made more pre­
cise by the Sarvastivadins identification of svabhava and svalaksana,9 the 
specific quality which is unique to the object characterized and therefore al­
lows us to distinguish it from other objects. Objects have specific qualities 
as their own (svabhava) because they are distinguished from the qualities of 
other objects (parabhava) .10 In this context svabhava is understood as an 
antonym to the common characteristics (samanyalaksana) which are instan­
tiated by all phenomena.11
This understanding of svabhava as the specific quality of objects is fur­
ther restricted by CandrakTrti’s identification of svabhava with the essential 
property of an object.12 Every essential property will be part of the specific
91 svabhava is precisely their own characteristic, a common characteristic, on the other
hand, is the impermanence of compounded phenomena.’ svabhava evaisam svalaksanam
samanyalaksanam tu anityata samskrtdnam. Bhasya on Vasubandhu (1970-1973, 6:14).
For further references see Williams (1981, 243).
10svabhdvena parabhdvaviyogatah. (Vasubandhu 1970-1973, 1:18).
11According to the Buddhist interpretation these characteristics are being impermanent,
unsatisfactory, and devoid of self (Ronkin 2005, 114-115).
12Note that this sense of svabhava is not to be equated with that of an haecceity or
quiddity. An haecceity or ‘individual essence’ is a property only a single individual can
have (the socratesness of Socrates is a stock example). But svabhava in the sense discussed
here is shareable. The svabhava of fire is heat, a characteristic which cannot just be
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quality of an object, but a specific quality need not be an essential property. 
The specific quality of an object is the unique combination of properties which 
distinguishes the object from all others. An essential property is something 
an object cannot lose without ceasing to be that very object. Nagarjuna 
observes tha t ‘ svabhava [in the sense of essence] cannot be removed, like the 
heat of fire, the fluidity of water, the openness of space’.13
To consider a different example: assume for example that for some reason 
all existing samples of gold weighed more than 10 grams. In this case ‘weigh­
ing more than 10 grams’ is a part of the specific quality of gold, since we use 
this property together with others to distinguish samples of gold from other 
things. But even though we never come across a lighter piece of gold in this 
world, ‘weighing more than 10 grams’ is a property any particular sample of 
gold could lose without ceasing to be gold — cutting a piece of 10 grams in 
half does not transform it into another kind of metal. Therefore ‘weighing 
more than 10 grams’ would be part of the specific quality of gold, but not 
part of its essential nature.
In interpreting svabhava as essence Candraklrti notes th a t14
For, in common usage, heat is called the svabhava of fire, because 
it is invariable in it. The same heat, when it is apprehended in 
water, is not svabhava, because it is contingent, since it has arisen
instantiated by fire, but also for example by water {even though heat does not constitute
the svabhava of water).
13 na hi svabhavah, sakyo vinivartayitum yathagner usnatvam apdrn dravatvam akasasya
niravaranatvam. VV(S) 82:14-15.
^agner ausnyam hi loke tad avyabhicdritvat svabhava ity ucyate \ tad evausnyam
apsupalabhyamdnam parapratyayasambhutatvdt krtrimatvan na svabhava iti. PP 241:8-
9. A similar characterization of solidity (khara) as the invariable specific quality and thus
svabhava of earth is given in Sthiramati’s Madhyantavibhdgatikd (Williams 1981, 242-243),
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from other causal conditions.
Heat is a property which is always instantiated by fire (and, for Candraklrti at 
least, every instantiation of fire is also an instantiation of heat).15 Water, on 
the other hand, can be either hot or cold and requires some special conditions 
(apart from just being water) to heat it up. Although not stated explicitly, 
the notion of essence-svabhava also appears to include a modal element: if fire 
lost the property of heat it would no longer be fire. Water, however, can cool 
down and still remain water. This conception of svabhava therefore agrees 
very well with a common understanding of an essence or essential property 
in contemporary metaphysics which conceives of them as the properties an 
object cannot lose without ceasing to be that very object.
The notion of essence-svabhava is not one Nagarjuna frequently employs 
in his arguments concerning svabhava.16 One of his rare references to this 
conception can be found in the Ekaslokasastra where he states17
because one, two and many each have its own bhava, therefore 
we call it svabhava. For example, earth, water, fire, and air are 
respectively hard, moist, hot, and moveable. Each has its own 
svabhava. And because the nature of every one of the things has
15Ames (1982, 170).
16Buddhapalita, on the other hand, clearly has the notion of essence-svabhava in mind 
when he claims that the aim of Nagarjuna was to teach the svabhava (ngo bo nyid) of 
dependent origination (Walleser 1913-1914b, 4:16-17). As dependent origination identi­
fied with emptiness is the exact opposite of svabhava this expression would constitute a 
contradictio in adiecto unless we realize that Buddhapalita wants to say that Nagarjuna
teaches the specific quality of dependent origination.
17Iyengar (1927, 160). Another translation of this passage of the sastra can be found
in Edkins (1893, 307-307). We might want to note, however, that Lindtner (1982, 16) 
classifies this text as ‘most probably not genuine’.
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its own specific quality (svalaksana) it is said that each has its 
svabhava.
Here svabhava appears to be identified with a quality each of the four elements 
cannot lose without ceasing to be what it is. It furthermore plays the role 
of an object’s specific quality (svalaksana)18 which allows the observer to 
individuate the elements and therefore reflects their essential qualities, i.e. 
their svabhava.19
2.1.2 Substance-svabhava
The notion of essence-svabhava just discussed which equates svabhava with 
the specific qualities of an object and contrasts them with those qualities it 
shares with other objects serves mainly epistemological purposes. It provides 
a procedure for drawing a line between a variety of objects with shared 
qualities and thereby allows us to tell them apart.
There is, however, a second understanding of svabhava which is of much 
greater importance in the Madhyamaka debate which considers svabhava to 
be a primarily ontological notion. Rather than seeing svabhava as the oppo­
site of shared qualities (samanyalaksana) it is contrasted with conceptually 
constructed or secondary (prajhaptisat) existents and equated with the mark 
of the primary ones (dravyasat). The distinction between primary and sec­
ondary existents constitutes the most fundamental ontological distinction 
drawn by the Sarvastivadins.20
18Some information on the conceptual relationship between svabhava and svalaksana
can be found in Ronkin (2005, 110).
19Nagarjuna might here have the Vaisesika conception of the five elements (bhuta) in
mind, all of which are substances (dravya) and are taken to have peculiar qualities which
distinguish them from the other elements. See Sharma (1960, 177).
20Williams (1981, 236-237).
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Primary existents constitute the irreducible constituents of the empiri­
cal world, secondary existents, on the other hand, depend on linguistic and 
mental construction for their existence. For the Sarvastivadin primary ex­
istents encompass primarily partless moments of consciousness out of which 
secondary existents, as for example medium-sized dry goods such as tables 
and chairs would be constructed. Although both classes of objects were taken 
as existents (sat), only the primary ones were assumed to possess svabhava.
On this understanding svabhava no longer denotes an individuating prop­
erty of objects by which they can be told apart from other objects (as it did 
when conceived in terms of essence) but an indication of ontological status.21 
To have svabhava means to exist in a primary manner, unconstructed and 
independent of anything else.22
This notion of svabhava, which we are going to call substance-svabhava is 
also the sense of svabhava most prominent in Nagarjuna’s arguments.23 The
21Ronlcin (2005, chapter 3) argues that there was a gradual move away from a basically
epistemological understanding of svabhava as a characteristic mark to individuate different
aspects of experience to an ontological understanding, where svabhava subsumes objects
with a particular ontological status.
22 In the contemporary commentarial literature we find occasional reference to the notion
of an intrinsic property to spell out the notion of svabhava (Tillemans (2001, 14, note 24),
Siderits (2004, 117)). Intrinsic properties are those which ‘things have in virtue of the
way they themselves are1, while extrinsic properties are had 'in virtue of their relations or
lack of relations to other things’ (Lewis 1986b, 61). While it is clear that all properties
constitutive of a primary existent must be intrinsic not all intrinsic properties characterize
a primary existent. For example the property of being the tallest man in the room is
extrinsic (since a man can only have it in relation to the other men in the room), while
that of being a man is intrinsic. However, a man does not exist by svabhava since he is
causally, mereologically, and conceptually dependent on a variety of factors.
23Hayes (1994, 311) distinguishes two senses of svabhava, svabhava in the sense of identity
and svabhava in the sense of independence, The former expresses the understanding as
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fifteenth chapter of the MMK, investigating the notion of svabhava begins by 
saying:
Svabhava cannot result from causes and conditions, because if 
it was produced from conditions and causes it would be some­
thing artificially created. But how could svabhava be artificially 
created, as it is not artificially created and not dependent on 
anything else? 24
Substance-svabhava is therefore taken to be something which does not 
depend on anything else. Candraklrti in fact takes MMK 15:2b to constitute 
the definition of svabhava:
This is the definition of it: Svabhava is not artificially created and 
not dependent on anything else.25
The notion of substance-svabhava as ‘something which does not depend 
on anything else’ is stronger than the one found in the Abhidharma liter­
ature, For the Abhidharmikas some objects which have primary existence
svalaksana, the latter as dravya. Hayes then goes on to argue that Nagarjuna equivocates
between these different readings, thereby rendering his arguments invalid (316). For some
comments on this see Taber (1998), Tillemans (2001), Siderits (2004, 135, note i).
24na sambhavah, svabhavasya yuktah pratyayahetubhih /  hetupratyayasambhutah sva-
bhavah krtako bhavet / /  svabhdvah, krtako nama bhavisyati punah katham /  akrtrimah
svabhavo hi nirapeksah paratra ca. MMK 15:1-2.
25tasya cedam laksanarn akrtrimah svabhavo hi nirapeksah paratra ca, PP 265:5-6. See
also CandrakTrti’s commentary on Aryadeva’s CS 12:13: 'Here ‘self’ is a self-existent ob­
ject which does not depend on other objects. The non-existence [of such an object] is 
selflessness.1 de la bdag ces by a ba ni gang zhig dngos po m am s kyi gzhan la rag ma las 
pa’i ngo bo rang bzhin ste [ de myed pa ni bdgag myed pa’o. (Candraklrti 1999, 321:1-2). 
See also Tillemans (1990, 126).
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(dravyasat) can be dependently originated. A conditioned object (samskrta 
dharma) will have svabhava but is still dependent on causes and conditions. It 
would be wrong, however, to assert26 that the Abhidharmika’s only criterion 
for absence of svabhava is having parts, so that all other forms of dependence 
would be compatible with an object being a primary existent. Walser27 cites 
a passage from the Theravadin Puggalapahhatti Atthakathd where one exam­
ple of objects existing through dependent designation (upddaya prajhapti, i.e. 
objects which do not exist in a primary way (dravyasat)) given is the mea­
suring of time and space through the revolution of the sun and the moon.28 
Now the division of time into days depending on the rising and setting of 
the sun is certainly no example of mereological dependence: the latter is not 
part of the former. It is rather the case that the concepts of day and night 
owe their existence to the rising and setting of the sun. This is why they are 
not primary existents but dependently designated, or, as we may also want 
to put it, conceptual constructs. For the Abhidharmika an object existing 
with svabhava does therefore not have to be independent of everything (in 
particular it can depend on its causes and conditions), on the other hand 
there are reasons distinct from having parts which explain why a thing is 
merely a secondary existent (prajhaptisat) and therefore lacking svabhava.
A view of svabhava which is not explicitly formulated by Nagarjuna but 
is nevertheless prominent in the Indian and Tibetan commentarial literature 
is that of findability under analysis.29 Candraklrti observes that
[...] worldly things exist without being analysed. When analysed,
26As done by Burton (1999, 90-92).
27 (2005, 242-243).
28For a discussion of tlie variety of ways in which the notion of prajnapti is understood
in Abhidharma literature see Priestley (1999, chapter 9).
29See Tillemans (2001, 5-6).
CHAPTER 2. INTERPRETATIO NS OF SVABHAVA 44
[however,] there is no self different from form and the other [four 
constituents] .30
The underlying idea is that whatever is not ultimately real disappears under 
analysis so that what we are left with must be an ultimately real object 
existing by its own nature. The reason why composite objects like a chariot 
or the self (atman) are not ultimately real is because they do not withstand 
logical analysis (rigs pas dpyad bzod pa). Once the chariot or the self are 
conceptually dissolved into the parts which constitute them the objects have 
disappeared and all we are left with are parts collectively conceptualized as 
a chariot or a self.31
Findability under analysis and independence of other objects imply one 
another. For assume some objects x  have been determined by analysis to be 
the ultimate constituents of some thing. If the existence of these xs in turn 
depended on the existence of some y only y ) but not x , could be a candidate 
for an ultimately real object. Conversely, if no ultimate constituent can be 
found under analysis (and if this is not due to practical limitations) it is 
because every potential candidate is again dependent on something else.
There are some conceptions of substance in Western philosophy which 
exhibit a certain amount of similarity with the notion of substance-svabhava 
just described. Descartes’s view of substance as something which does not 
require another thing for its existence32 springs to mind, as well as Wittgen­
stein’s theory of logically simple objects presented in the Tractatus.33 These 
objects, which are supposed to constitute the substance of the world are sim-
30 [...] avicaratasca laukikapadarthcinam astitvat \ yathaiva hi rupadivyatirekena
vicaryamana atma na sambhavati. PP 67:7-8; see Ruegg (2002, 117).
31Trenckner (1928, 27), Davids (1890, 44).
32Principes I, 51.
33Keyt (1963), Proops (2004).
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pie, unchanging and exist independently of one another and constitute a no­
tion which shares at least some important properties with the Sarvastivadin’s 
primary objects.
D ependence relations
In order to understand this ontological conception of substance-svabhava it 
is important to get a clear idea of what precisely is meant by the dependence 
of an object on another one. First of all it is important to distinguish two 
notions of ‘dependence1 which should not be confused. These are
• existential dependence: An object a existentially depends on objects 
falling under the property F  iff necessarily, if a exists there exists some­
thing falling under F.
• notional dependence: Objects falling under the property F  are notion- 
ally dependent on objects falling under the property G iff necessarily, 
if some object x falls under F  there will be a distinct object y falling 
under G.
Saying that a sprout depends existentially on its cause means that neces­
sarily, if a sprout exist there will be some objects falling under the property 
‘causes of the sprout’, such as a seed, soil, water, sunlight, and so on. Sim­
ilarly, if a complex physical object exists, so will all its parts; therefore the 
object existentially depends on its parts. Necessarily, if a book exists, so will 
each of its pages.
Notional dependence, on the other hand, is a quite different case. North­
ern England depends on Southern England, but we would hardly want to say 
tha t this dependence is existential. If due to some geological disaster all of 
Southern England were destroyed this would not affect the existence of the
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stretch of land now called Northern England. But it affects its description as 
Northern England, since now there would be nothing south of it which was 
also England. The concept Northern England therefore depends notionally 
on the concept Southern England, but the object in the world the concept 
‘Northern England’ picks out does not depend existentially on the object 
‘Southern England’ picks out.34
It is interesting to note that in the later dGe lugs commentarial tradition 
three varieties of existential dependence are distinguished: causal depen­
dence, when an object depends for its existence on its causes and conditions, 
mereological dependence, when an object depends on its parts, and thirdly 
conceptual dependence, postulating the dependence of an object on a basis 
of designation, a designating mind and a term used to designate the object.35 
These dependence relations are supposed to stand in a qualitative and doxo- 
graphical hierarchy. Causal dependence is seen as the coarsest understanding 
of dependent arising and is associated with the Vaibhasikas or Sarvastivadins, 
the Sautrantikas and the Cittamatrins; mereological dependence is a bit more 
subtle; the Svatantrika Madhyamikas are assumed to understand emptiness 
in terms of both causal and mereological dependence. The most subtle un­
derstanding which incorporates all three forms of dependence is associated 
with the Prasangika Madhyamikas,30
34A detailed discussion of different kinds of dependence relations can be found in Si­
mons (1987, chapter 8). Our notion of existential dependence is there called ‘generic 
dependence’.
35Ngag dbang dpal ldan (1797-?) refers to these three kinds of dependence in his (1964, 
154:6-155:1) (which constitutes commentary on the Grub mtha’ chen mo of ’Jams dbyangs 
bzhad pa (1648-1721)) as ’phrad ba (prdpya), Itos ba (apeksya) and brten pa (pratitya), 
respectively. See Magee (1999, 56-57), Hopkins (1983, 166-177), Komito (1987, 190),
Gyatso (2005, 20-21).
36Ngag dbang dpal ldan (1964, 154:6-155:1), Gyatso (2005, 33, 43-44, 59-62).
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There are a variety of examples from Nagarjuna’s works which show that 
both the notions of existential and notional dependence are employed in his 
arguments. Verse 13 of the SS asserts:37
The father is not the son, the son is not the father, 
those two cannot exist one without the other, 
those two cannot be simultaneous, 
likewise the twelve links of dependent origination,38
When saying that the son cannot exist without the father Nagarjuna 
obviously means that the son is existentially dependent on the father: if some 
person a exists there exists something falling under the property ‘father of 
a \ But claiming that the father cannot exist without the son cannot be a 
case of existential dependence as well. Abelard (that very man) could have 
existed without having ever fathered Astrolabius. But Abelard as a father 
depends notionally on Astrolabius: if nobody was subsumed by the concept 
‘son of Abelard’ Abelard would not fall under the concept ‘father’.
It is therefore evident that the ‘mutual dependence’ of father and son 
Nagarjuna postulates is based on two different dependence relations, the son 
depending existentially on the father, the father notionally on the son. For 
Nagarjuna’s argument, however, it is necessary that the two entities discussed 
are related by a symmetric dependence relation.39
37 pha bu ma yin bu pha min /  de gnyis phan tshun med min la /  de gnyis cig car yang
min Itar /  yan lag bcu gnyis de bzhin no. SS 13.
38The father-son example is also used in VV 49-50. See also MMK 8:12, 10:10.
390etke (1989, 11) claims that ‘the assumption of isomorphism or identity of logical
and causal dependence relations [which correspond to our notional and existential depen­
dence relations] explains a significant part of Nagarjuna’s arguments and simultaneously 
elucidates numerous apparent difficulties’.
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The difficulty disappears if we take into account that if some object x  is 
essentially F, and if it also depends notionally on some y being G , then x 
will also depend existentially on j/’s being G, since x has to have F  to exist 
at all (this is just what F  being an essential property of x means). Therefore 
if we assumed that Abelard was the father of Astrolabius essentially Abelard 
would indeed depend existentially on his son, since having Astrolabius as a 
son would be a property Abelard could not lose without being tha t very man.
Of course we might wonder now why we should assume tha t Abelard was 
essentially the father of Astrolabius. Even if we do not think tha t this is 
reasonable (because we think that a childless Abelard would have been the 
very same man) it is important to note that Nagarjuna intends the father- 
son example as an argumentative pattern in which different predicates can 
be substituted. For example we might think (as Nagarjuna’s opponent does) 
that cause and effect have their respective natures essentially. In this case 
it is then evident tha t the existential dependence between the two must be 
symmetric: the effect depends existentially on the cause, but the cause also 
depends existentially on the effect.
I hope this small example has convinced the reader of the importance of 
keeping the two different kinds of dependence relation apart when analyzing 
Nagarjuna’s thought.40 A more detailed discussion of how this distinction is
40The failure to distinguish between existential and notional dependence has resulted 
in considerable confusion in the contemporary commentarial literature, primarily in con­
nection with the so-called principle of coexisting counterparts (Taber 1998, 216) (Ruegg 
(1977) calls it ‘the principle of the complementarity of binary concepts and terms’) which 
is supposed to say that ‘a thing cannot be a certain type unless its counterpart exists simul­
taneously with it’. Far from being ‘a blatant contradiction of common sense’ (Taber 1998, 
238) it expresses an obvious truth about notional dependencies: something cannot be 
Northern England unless Southern England exists at the same time. It is only if we think 
that notional dependence is the very same thing as existential dependence that we can ac­
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put to work in his arguments will be found in chapters 5 to 9.
Returning to the understanding of svabhava in terms of substance we 
should note that for Candraklrti such substance-svabhava is qualified by its 
non-dependence on other objects, either existentially or notionally. This is 
evident from the examples Candraklrti gives for objects which are dependent 
on causes and conditions: the heat of water, the farther and nearer shore, 
long and short.41 While the heat of fire depends existentially on the causes 
which heat up the water, the concepts ‘farther shore’ and ‘long’ depend only 
notionally on the concepts ‘nearer shore’ and ‘short’. The farther shore would 
not cease to exist if the nearer shore did, nor would long objects decrease in 
length if short objects disappeared, but their descriptions as ‘farther shore’ 
or ‘long’ could no longer be employed.
It is evident tha t the notion of substance-svabhava is much stronger than 
tha t of essence-svabhava. In particular we can assert the existence of the sec­
ond without affirming that of the first. It could be the case that every object 
had some properties it could not lose without ceasing to be that very object 
(although in some cases it may be more difficult than in others to determine 
what these properties are) and therefore be endowed with essence-svabhava. 
But at the same time everything could in some way (either existentially or 
notionally) be dependent on something else so that substance-svabhava did 
not exist at all.
cuse Nagarjuna of being unable to distinguish ‘between saying that a thing exists at all and 
saying that it exists under a given description’ (Hayes 1994, 315). For more (unfortunately
not very clear) discussion of this matter see Taber (1998).
41PP 264:1.
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T he re jec tio n  of su b stan ce -svabhava
It is important to note that the elaborate Madhyamika criticism of the notion 
of svabhava is directed against this stronger notion of substance-svabhava, 
rather than against essence-svabhava. As the common conception of sva­
bhava was in terms of essential properties (a conception ‘well known5, as 
CandrakTrti charmingly puts it ‘to people, including cowherds and women5)42 
CandrakTrti explicitly distinguishes it from his notion of substance-svabhava: 
even though it is an essential property the heat of fire is no more the svabhava 
of fire than it is the svabhava of water.
Let it be recognized that heat, also, is not the svabhava of fire, 
because of its artificiality. Here one apprehends that fire, which 
arises from the conjunction of a gem and fuel and the sun or from 
the friction of two sticks, etc., is purely dependent on causes and 
conditions, but heat does not occur apart from fire. Therefore, 
heat, too, is produced by causes and conditions, and therefore is 
artificial; and because of its being artificial, like the heat of water, 
it is clearly ascertained that it is not svabhava.43
CandrakTrti does not attempt to refute the notion of essence-svabhava but 
asserts its existence in conventional terms (vyavahara). If something lacked 
the property of heat we would not call it fire.44 Candraklrti5s emphasis is on
42gopaldhganajanapvasiddham. PP 260:14.
43 yad etat ausnyam tad apy agneh svabhavo na bhavatiii grhyatam krtakatvat | iha mani- 
indhana-dditya-samagamad arani-nidharsanad escagn&r hetupratyaya-sdpeksa taivopalab- 
hyate | na cdgni-vyatiriktam ausnyam sambhavati \ tasmad ausnyam api hetupratyaya- 
janitam \ tatasca krtakam \ krtakatvac capamausnyavat svabhavo na bhavatfbi sphutam
avasiyate. PP 260:9-13.
44Schayer (1931, xix) argues that the Madhyamika denies the existence of essence-sva­
bhava. As everything is causally produced ‘there is no property which could never be
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establishing that essence-svabhava ‘does not deserve to be called svabhava,45 
and is distinct from the notion of substance-svabhava Nagarjuna deals with. 
Unlike substance-svabhava, however, CandrakTrti has no difficulties in agree­
ing with the usefulness of essence-svabhava as a concept for everyday usage.46
For the Abhidharmikas substance-svabhava does exist; it is the intrinsic 
and essential quality of ultimately real objects (dravya). The justification for 
the assumption of such objects is evident if we consider the case of objects 
consisting of parts.47 A partite object cannot exist by svabhava since it exists 
only in dependence on its parts. For the same reason its parts cannot exist 
by svabhava either as long as they have parts in turn. For the defender of 
substances this regress must stop somewhere, because even though it might 
be possible to have a chain of explanations stretching back infinitely (if we 
explain the properties of the whole by the properties of the parts and then 
in turn provide an explanation of their properties in terms of their parts) 
a chain of dependency relations must terminate ultimately, tha t is the hier­
archy of dependency relation must be well-founded.48 The Abhidharmikas 
consider the entities which are the foundation of the mereological dependency 
relation to be ultimately real objects which have their properties essentially 
and intrinsically. These objects exist by substance-swab/mm.
missing from a particular object’ (55, note 41). While the Madhyamika will accept this 
the important point to get is that saying some property is part of the essence-svabhava of 
an object of type X  does not mean it could never be missing from that object, but that
if it was missing we would not consider it to be of type X .
45nayam svabhavo bhavitum arhati. PP 260:15.
46Ames (1982, 170).
4TSiderits (2004, 118-119).
48See Burton (1999, 109-111), Walser (2005, 243-244).
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The Indian and Tibetan Madhyamaka literature contains a variety of 
ways for classifying arguments against the existence of substance-svabhava.49 
A five-fold classification distinguishes the following kinds:
1. the diamond slivers50
2. the refutation of the production from existent or non-existent 51
3. the refutation of the four kinds of production52
4. the argument from dependent origination53
5. the ‘neither one nor many’ argument54
1), the diamond slivers, so called because of the power ascribed to this 
argument in refuting substance-svabhava analyses four ways in which an ob­
ject could be causally produced: by itself, by another object, by both, or 
without a cause.55 This argument will be discussed in detail in section 5.3 of 
chapter 5.
2), the refutation of the production from the existent or non-existent 
concerns the temporal relation between cause and effect.66 It will be discussed 
in section 5.4 of chapter 5.
49Most classifications distinguish either four or five kinds of arguments; there are also 
slight variations concerning which arguments are subsumed under which heading. For
details see Tillemans (1984, 371-372, note 16).
50 vajrakana, rdo rje gzegs.
51 sadasatutpadapratisedha, yod med skye ’gog.
52 catuskotyutpadapratisedha, mu bzhi skye ’gog.
53pratityasamutpadahetu, rten cing ’brel ba’i gtan tshigs.
54 ekanekaviyogahetu, gcig du bral gyi gtan tshigs.
55Hopkins (1983, 132-150, 639-650).
56Tillemans (1984, 361). The temporal reading of this argument is not always so clear. 
Sometimes (1984, 361) it is argued that the diamond slivers and the refutation of the 
production from the existent or non-existent are to be distinguished by the fact that the 
first analyses the cause, the second the effect. This analysis then investigates whether a
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3), the refutation of the four kinds of production is generally taken to 
refer to an argument that considers the numerical relations between cause 
and effect: many causes creating one effect, many causes creating many 
effects, one cause creating many effects, one cause creating one effect. It is 
the only one of the five argument which is does not have a textual basis in 
Nagarj una’s works; we therefore do not discuss it here any further.57
4), the argument from dependent origination considers the compatibility 
of substance-svabhdva with a variety of dependence relations such as those 
considered in the previous section.58
5), the ‘neither one nor many argument’ will be discussed below.59 In the 
following discussion I will also examine two arguments against the existence 
of substance- svabhava which we find in Nagarj una’s works but which are not 
included in the classification given above: the property argument and the 
argument from change.
The property argument
One problem with the assumption of primary existents endowed with sub- 
stance-svabhava becomes evident once we analyse them in terms of the fa­
miliar distinction between individuals and properties. According to classical 
Buddhist ontology there are different kinds of primary existents (mahabhutas: 
earth, water, fire, wind) which are distinguished by different qualities.60 This 
list is sometimes enlarged to a list of six elements or dhatvs by adding space
cause produces an existent, a non-existent, a both existent and non-existent or a neither
existent nor non-existent effect. See Hopkins (1983, 151-154).
57Some discussion is in Hopkins (1983, 155-160).
58See Hopkins (1983, 161-173).
59See Hopkins (1983, 176-196).
eoLa Vallee Poussin (1988-1990, 68-70), Dhammajoti (2004, 147-148).
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and consciousness.61 It is this list of six Nagarjuna’s account in chapter five 
of the MMK is based on.62 The problem he discusses, however, is indepen­
dent of our willingness to assume the existence of primary ‘fire-atoms’ and 
so forth. It arises whenever we assume that there are different categories of 
primary existents distinguished by different properties.63
We can easily conceive of ordinary individuals as lacking some qualities 
which they in fact possess; for example we can conceive of a red apple as 
lacking the property of redness and being green instead. In the case of 
primary existents, however, this is not possible. If we abstract the property of 
heat from a fire-atom there is nothing left, unless we believe in a propertyless 
‘bare particular’ which could act as the individual instantiating the property 
of heat.
Nagarjuna considers this possibility in the case of space:64
No space is evident prior to the characteristic (laksana) of space.
If it existed prior to the characteristic it would follow that it was 
without the characteristic.65
Thus assuming that a ‘space-atom’ existed first without its characteristic and
61La Vallee Poussin (1988-1990, 88).
62MMK 5:7.
63See Siderits (2003, 120-123).
64The ontological status of space is a controversial issue in the Buddhist philo­
sophical literature. Whilst not being one of the four mahabhutas (Dhammajoti 2004, 
148-149) the Abhidharmakosabhasya nevertheless includes it together with these in 
a list of six elements (dhatvs) (La Vallee Poussin 1988—1990, 88). Moreover, the 
*Abhidharmamahahavibhasasastra argues that space can be a dominant condition (adhi- 
patipratyaya) for the mahabhutas and therefore possesses svabhava (Dhammajoti 2004,
384). Problems with properties of the mahabhutas will therefore equally apply to space. 
®5nakasam vidyate kimcit purvam dkdsalaksanat /  alaksanam prasajyeta sydt pui'vam
yadi laksandt. MMK 5:1.
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only later acquired it, in the way in which an apple can exist without the 
property of redness which is only acquired once the apple is ripe commits 
us to the existence of a propertyless bare particular. This is due to the fact 
that unlike ordinary objects such as apples primary existents have all their 
properties essentially. Since the only essential characteristic of space is its 
particular space-nature a space-atom without this characteristic it is like a 
knife without a handle which has lost its blade: there is nothing left. For 
Nagarjuna introducing bare particulars at this point is not an option; he 
claims that ‘an object without characteristics is not to be found anywhere’.66
Why does Nagarjuna reject the notion of a bare particular? Bare particu­
lars do not appear to be straightforwardly contradictory entities, in fact their 
existence is postulated by metaphysicians claiming that individuals must be 
more than just bundles of properties.67
The problem seems to be this. Let us assume that there was indeed a 
bare particular left over once we abstracted the property of heat from a fire- 
atom. Assume furthermore that this particular would have its nature (its 
bare-particular-ness) intrinsically and essentially. In this case heat could not 
be its svabhava as well, since something cannot have two different svabhd- 
vas. Its further characterization by heat would therefore be superfluous for 
establishing its status as a primary existent.
Alternatively we could assume that the bare particular did not have its 
nature intrinsically and essentially, but dependent on something else. We 
could then ask again whether this something else has its property essentially, 
and so on.68 In this case we get into a regress which the opponent of Na­
garjuna has to terminate somewhere, since he wants to establish tha t some
G6alaksano na kascic ca bhavah, samvidyate kvacit. MMK 5:2a.
67Armstrong (1997, 109-110, 123-126).
68PP 130:5-13, Siderits (2003, 121).
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objects (i.e. the true primary existents) exist by svabhava and are therefore 
not dependent on anything else, We therefore end up with the first possibility 
again, as the various properties which make up the supposed svabhava of the 
primary elements fire, water and so forth are superfluous in characterizing 
these foundational objects as primary existents, as these objects are already 
existent as such.
This is what Nagarjuna means when he says that
The occurrence of a characteristic is neither in the uncharacter­
ized nor in the characterized. It does not proceed from something 
other than those with or without characteristics.69
If we regard the bare particular as characterized by its bare-particular-ness 
intrinsically and essentially, any further characteristic is superfluous for be­
stowing the status of a primary existent. If we do not regard it as so char­
acterized, however, we end up in an infinite regress without establishing any 
primary existents at all. Since these possibilities are mutually exclusive the 
notion of a bare particular seems to be facing a problem.
The proponent of bare particulars might now be inclined to say that all 
this shows is that the pluralist theory of the six primary elements was mis­
taken and tha t we have to assume that there is only one kind of primary 
existent, namely bare particulars having their nature intrinsically and essen­
tially. They constitute the ‘pure stuff’ of the world which is then ‘flavoured’ 
by such properties as heat, wetness etc. in order to form fire-, water- and 
other atoms.
Bracketing the difficulty of how these different bare particulars are to be 
told apart the most important problem with this is that Nagarj una’s oppo­
69 nalaksane laksanasya pravrttir na salaksane /  salaksanalaksanabhyam napy anyatra 
pravartate. MMK 5:3.
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nent also wants to argue that the primary existents are mind-independent, 
that they exist whether or not any conscious beings are around. But while 
this has a certain plausibility for objects which can be distinguished by their 
properties (such as the four mahabhutas or the fundamental particles of con­
temporary physics) a bare particular from which all characteristics have been 
abstracted away bears the mark of the mind’s handiwork. Bare particulars 
are nothing we are immediately (or even mediately) acquainted with — they 
are conceptual fictions, theoretical entities introduced in the course of con­
structing an ontological theory, but hardly anything we would supposed exists 
‘from its own side’, independent of conscious minds.
If Nagarj una’s opponent does not want to postulate the existence of 
bare particulars he might try to solve the problem of properties of pri­
mary existents by arguing that primary existents are property-particulars, 
rather than things characterized by properties. This is the dual of the bare- 
particular view, for we now assume properties without bearers, rather than 
bearers without properties. As a matter of fact ontological theories based 
on property-particulars (also called tropes) have become relatively popular 
in the recent metaphysical discussion.70 The fundamental idea here is that 
the redness of an apple is not regarded as one thing inhering in different red 
objects. The redness of the apple, that of a tomato and that of a postbox are 
rather regarded as three distinct property-particulars which are sufficiently 
similar to be classified under the common name ‘red’.
Nagarjuna is clear on his rejection of property-particulars71 but unfortu­
nately not very explicit on his reasons for doing so. A plausible reason for
70See Williams (1953) for an early example, Bacon (1995) for a more recent discussion.
71 In the absence of the characterized the characteristic does also not exist.
laksyasydnupapattau ca laksanasyapy asambhavah. MMK 5:4b.
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Nagarjuna’s rejection is provided by Marks Siderits.72 If we assume that the 
different primary existents, such as fire- and water-atoms are just property 
particulars of heat, wetness and so forth we face the problem of how the 
different atoms are to be individuated.73 We obviously cannot say that two 
fire-atoms are different because the property of heat is instantiated in differ­
ent bearers, as this would get us back to the scenario discussed earlier on. It 
seems that the best we can do is individuate clusters of property-particulars, 
as in saying that in one cluster heat is associated with wetness (as in hot 
water), in another with solidity (as in a red-hot iron ball) and tha t in this 
way the two property-particulars of heat are individuated. However, now 
the problem is that the independence of primary existents is compromised, 
as we now have to rely on distinct property-particulars to tell them apart. 
Therefore their existence as distinct primary existents is not any quality 
they possess from their own side, but only something they have dependent 
on occurring on clusters with other property-particulars.
It now becomes evident that whatever analysis of primary existents in 
terms of individuals and properties we propose seems to face fundamental 
difficulties. If we treat the primary existents and their properties as distinct 
and independent entities (as we do in the case of ordinary objects) we realize 
that the two cannot be independent at all, since we cannot conceive of a 
primary existent without its characteristic property. If, on the hand we 
subsume primary existents under one side of the individual-property divide, 
that is if we assume tha t they are either bare particulars (individuals without 
properties) or tropes (properties without individuals) it becomes evident that 
neither of these can play the desired role of mind-independent foundational
72(2003, 122-123).
73 A discussion of different ways of individuating tropes is in Schaffer (2001).
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objects existing from their own side.
Given that Nagarjuna regards these options as exhaustive74 he consid­
ers the above difficulties as a reductio of the notion of a primary existent. 
For him the primary existents and the properties they instantiate have to 
be regarded as existentially dependent on one another. If the properties did 
not exist there would be no particulars to characterize, in the absence of the 
particulars there would be no characterizing properties. But in this case a 
fundamental property of primary existents is no longer fulfilled, namely that 
these existents should be independent of all other objects.75 Depending for 
their existence on the properties characterizing them the supposed primary 
existents cannot produce the foundation for a hierarchy of dependence rela­
tions. It therefore turns out that the only satisfactory way of understanding 
the relation between primary existents and their properties has to deny that 
there are primary existents in the first place.
The m ereological argument
In the same way in which applying the framework of individual and prop­
erty to primary existents leads to problems, Nagarjuna argues, conceiving 
of them in terms of parts and wholes entails difficulties. Ordinary objects 
are either mereologically complex (i.e. they have proper parts) or they are 
mereologically simple, that is they are atomic, partless things. Primary ex­
istents, however, the Madhyamika argues, are neither complex nor simple. 
As everything must be either complex or simple, the notion of a primary 
existent is thereby reduced to absurdity.
While this ‘neither one nor many argument’76 is mentioned by Nagarjuna
74MMK 5:3, 5.
75MMK 5:4-5.
76 ekanekaviyogaheiu, gcig du bral gyi gtan tshigs.
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at several places77 it does not play a prominent role in his arguments and is 
not spelt out in great detail. The later Tibetan commentarial literature, on 
the other hand, contains quite an extensive development of this argument for 
refuting substance-sva&hava.78 We will use some of these materials in order 
to formulate the details of the argument which can at best be said to be 
implicitly present in Nagarjuna’s texts.
It seems to be clear that we do not want to say that primary existents 
are partite phenomena. This is because partite phenomena depend for their 
existence on their parts, and primary existents are not supposed to be existen- 
tially dependent on anything. For any object with parts it is at best possible 
that its parts are primary existents, but the composite object itself cannot 
be. This denial of the primary nature of partite entities is a well-entrenched 
Buddhist position which can be traced back to some of the earliest textual 
material79 and provides the reason for Nagarjuna’s denial that any candidate 
for a primary existent, whether causally produced or not, can regarded as 
having parts.80
The other alternative, that primary existents could be atomic is also 
denied by Nagarjuna. In RA 1:71 he claims:
Because of having many parts it is not simple; there is nothing 
which is partless.81
77SS 32ab; RA 1:71. VP 33-39 also contains a mereological discussion which is of 
relevance in this context. Unfortunately this material is relatively opaque and also set in 
the specific context of the rejection of the notion of the parts of a syllogism. Its usefulness in 
explicating Nagarjuna’s understanding of the ‘neither one nor many argument’ is therefore 
limited.
7 8 ?
79See Siderits (2003, chapter 1) for a discussion of this ‘Buddhist reductionism’.
80 'dus byas dang ni ’dus ma byas /  du ma ma yin gcig ma yin. SS 32ab.
81 naiko ’anekapradesatvan napradesas ca kascana. rGyal tshab dar ma rin chen in his
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Unfortunately Nagarjuna does not give us an argument here for why he 
thinks that nothing is partless. Considering the secondary literature we can 
come up with at least two different accounts of what the argument might 
have been. Their difference is mainly due to different understandings of the 
word pradesa (phyogs), here translated as ‘part’.
Tucci82 reads pradesa as denoting a straightforward mereological part or 
side of an object and assumes that Nagarjuna here refers to the well-known 
Yogacara argument against the existence of atoms.83 In a nutshell the idea is 
tha t if we assume that atoms can conglomerate to form macroscopic objects, 
individual atoms must touch one another, like neighbouring mustard-seeds in 
a heap. But if we now regard the side (pradesa) of an atom where it touches 
its right neighbour as spatially coinciding with the side where it touches its 
left neighbour the entire conglomeration of atoms will collapse to a single 
spatial point. If we regard them as spatially distinct, on the other hand, the 
atom must be seen as spatially extended and therefore cannot be atomic.
A more comprehensive understanding of the notion of part in the ‘neither 
one nor many argument’ which we find for example in Tsong kha pa subsumes 
under it not just mereological parts, but also temporal stages and aspects 
(m am  pa).84 This allows us to run a more general argument than is possible 
on the purely mereological interpretation.
The question investigated in this case is the relationship between the 
parts, stages or aspects of a primary existent and the primary existent itself.85
commentary explicitly regards this verse as a statement of the ‘neither one nor many
argument’. See Hopkins (1998, 103).
32(193 4—1936 , 324).
83The argument is described in verses 11-14 of Vasubandhu’s Vimsatika (Tola and
Dragonetti 2004, 127-129, 142-145). See also Kapstein (2001), Hopkins (1983, 373).
84Tillemans (1983, 308).
85Thurman (1984, 97).
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For the sake of simplicity consider the case of a supposed primary existent, 
say an earth-atom, and two of its properties (say ‘being solid’ and ‘being 
heavy’). Now obviously the earth atom cannot be identical with both these 
‘parts’, as one thing cannot be identical with two. So it must be distinct from 
them and should be conceived of as an individual which constitutes the bearer 
of the two properties. But this understanding of primary existents then leads 
us straight back to the problems we have encountered when discussing the 
property argument: we either end up with a bare particular (which is difficult 
to consider as existent in a mind-independent way) or with a trope (which 
cause problems with individuation). The view that primary existents exist 
without parts, stages or aspects should therefore be given up. The conclusion 
Nagarjuna wants to draw from this is that since everything either has parts 
or does not, and since neither option is possible for primary existents our 
difficulties stem from assuming such a notion in the first place. From a 
mereological point of view no consistent account of primary existents can be 
given. It is a notion we should do without.
The argument from change
Nagarjuna considers the existence of substance-svabhava to be incompatible 
with change:86
If svabhava existed the world would be without origination or
cessation, it would be static and devoid of its manifold states.
But given that we do perceive change in the world this provides us with an 
argument against substance-svabhava:
86ajdtam anivuddham ca kutastham ca bhavisyati /  vicitrabhir avasthabhih svabhave 
rahitam jagat. MMK 24:38. Other passages dealing with the permanence of svabhava 
include 13:4, 21:17, 23:24, and 24:22-26.
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By of the observation of change [we can infer] the lack of sva­
bhava. of things. [...] If svabhava was found, what would change? 
Neither the change of a thing itself nor of something different is 
suitable: as a young man does not become old, so an old man 
does not become old either.87
No thing which we perceive to be changing can exist by substance-svabha­
va. This is because an object existing by substance-svabhava, i.e. a primary 
existent, constitutes an independent, irreducible and unconstructed funda­
mental constituent of reality. If the young man had its age as an essential 
and intrinsic property (i.e. if he was young by svabhava) he could never grow 
old.
The obvious reply the advocate of substancersvabhava should make at 
this point is to say that both change and subst&nce-svabhava exist, though 
not at the same level. Things which we perceive as changing do not possess 
substance-svabhava, while those which do possess it do not change.
There are at least two different ways in which we could spell this out. 
According to the annihilationist view an rc-atom existing by svabhava can 
never change into a y-atom. W hat can happen, however, is that the re- 
atom ceases to exist and is replaced by a y-atom. W hat we perceive as 
macroscopic change in the nature of entities (hot water cooling down, green 
leaves turning brown) is in fact nothing else but the microscopic arising and 
ceasing of entities the natures of which do not change.88
According to the permutationist view no entities existing by svabhava 
ever pass out of existence. The change we observe is merely a difference in
87bhdvdnam nihsvabhdvatvam anyathabhavadarsanat / [ • • • ]  kasya syad anyathabhdvah 
svabhavo yadi vidyate / /  tasyaiva nanyathdbhavo napy anyasyaiva yujyate /  yuvd na
jvryate yasmad yasmdj jirno na jiryate. MMK 13:3a, 4b-5.
88See Siderits {2003, 124-125) for a description of this view.
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arrangement of the eternally existing objects. When hot water cools down 
this is not because the fire-atoms in the water pass out of existence, but rather 
because the set of permanently existent atoms changes its arrangement so 
that fewer fire-atoms are now mixed amongst the water-atoms.
There are two main difficulties for the annihilationist view. First of all 
it is not obvious to which extent the cessation of entities existing by sva­
bhava is theoretically less problematic than a change in their nature. The 
annihilationist view is based on the assumption that if some object passes 
out of existence its svabhava is not changed, since the object does not exist 
any more. It did not lose one nature and acquire another one, as there is 
nothing left which could possibly acquire such a nature. Whether this in 
fact works depends on the interaction of the conception of svabhava with 
that of momentarily existent objects. This is an intricate issue89 which we 
fortunately do not have to settle here. There remains a second problem, 
namely answering the question what is responsible for the cessation and 
production of entities existing by svabhava. If they are dependent on causes 
and conditions for their production and annihilation then they cannot be 
ultimately real entities after all, as the whole point of postulating entities 
existing by svabhava was to have some objects which are not existentially 
dependent on any others.90
The permutationist does not have this problem. He still has to assume 
that the ultimately real objects congregate in certain ways dependent on 
causes and conditions, but this only concerns the existential dependence of 
the objects they thus constitute, objects which were not supposed to exist by 
svabhava in the first place. While the permutationist view thus seems more
89See von Rospatt (1995).
90Siderits (2003, 125).
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attractive than the annihilationist one it has the curious consequence that 
the supposedly ultimately real objects existing by svabhava recede more and 
more.
The idea of fire-atoms as ultimately real objects is obviously only of his­
torical interest. It is far from clear, however, whether the conception of 
elementary particles of contemporary physics is much more attractive to the 
permutationist. While the mahabhutas had the advantage of being relatively 
close to objects of ordinary experience, such as fire, water, and so forth, var­
ious subatomic particles, quarks or strings are purely theoretical posits very 
different from anything we usually observe. Nobody has ever seen a string 
and nobody ever will, as these not accessible to sensory perceptions. More­
over, their assumed properties are very different from what we observe in the 
macroscopic world. As with all theoretical posits claims for their existence 
are based on the explanatory work this concept can do in a particular theory. 
It is therefore quite ironic that our best candidates for ultimately real enti­
ties existing independent of human conceptualization turn out to be objects 
which are so highly theory-dependent and the existence of which seems to be 
considerably less secure than that of the medium-sized dry goods with which 
we interact daily.
It appears tha t neither the annihilationist nor the permutationist view 
manage to give a satisfactory explanation of the existence of change in the 
presence of substance-svabhava. In the absence of any other explanations Na­
garjuna thus concludes that our experience of change constitutes an argument 
against the existence of substance-suafr/mua.
Considering the previous discussion it is evident that most of Nagarj una’s 
arguments, as well as those found in the work of his commentators such as 
CandrakTrti are concerned with the rejection of substancersvabhava^ while the
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examination of essence-svabhava appears to play at best a minor role. From 
certain passages in CandrakTrti’s works, however, we get the impression that 
a third conception of svabhava is in play in the Madhyamalca arguments as 
well. This third notion does not seem to share the marginal status of essence- 
svabhava and is also not the aim of attempted refutations. We will call this 
conception absolute svabhava.
2.1.3 Absolute svabhava
CandrakTrti describes absolute svabhava in the following way:91
Ultimate reality for the Buddhas is svabhava itself. That, more­
over, because it is itself nondeceptive is the tru th  of ultimate 
reality. It must be known by each one for himself.
While he stresses that substance-svabhava is a notion erroneously ascribed
to objects which in fact lack it92 he also asserts that svabhava does not
in any way appear to those having misknowledge.93 It therefore appears
that svabhava is both a mistaken ascription made by beings with deficient
cognitive capacities as well as something which does not appear to such
beings. To make sense of this we have to assume that there are two different
conceptions of svabhava in play here: substance-svabhava which the Madhya-
maka arguments attem pt to show to be non-existent on the one hand, and,
on the other hand, another kind of svabhava, which I call absolute svabhava,
91sangs rgyas m am s kyi don dam pa ni rang bzhin nyid yin zhing \ de yang bslu ba med
pa nyid kyis don dam pa ’i bden pa yin la | de ni de m am s kyi so sor rang gis rig par bya
ba yin no. MAB 108:16-19.
92PP 261:3-4.
93MAB 107: 15. See also 306.
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which constitutes the true and intrinsic nature of phenomena.94
CandrakTrti explicitly characterizes this as changeless (avikaritva), not 
originated (sarvadanutpada) and not dependent on something else (para- 
nirapeksa).95 Based on this the later Tibetan commentarial literature con­
ceives of svabhava as ‘triply characterized5.96 Tsong kha pa describes it as
1. not produced by causes and conditions97
2. unchangeable98
3. set forth without depending on another object99
The interesting problem arising at this point is that both CandrakTrti5s 
attributes as well as Tsong kha pa’s triple characterization are supposed to 
be applicable both to substance-svabhava as well as to emptiness, i.e. the 
absence of substance-svabhava.100 But taking into account that substance- 
svabhava is argued not to exist, while emptiness does exist this view faces an
94Some of the synonyms for absolute svabhava CandrakTrti gives include ‘objecthood 
of objects’ (dharmanam dharmata), ‘intrinsic nature’ (tatsvarupam), ‘original nature’ 
(prakrti), ‘emptiness’ (sunyata), ‘lack of svabhava’ (naihsvdbhdvyam), ‘thusness’ (tathata), 
‘complete non-origination’ (sarvadd anutpada), and ‘being thus, changelessness, ever-
abidingness’ ( iathdbhdvo ‘vikaritvam sadaiva sthayita) PP 264:11-265:1.
95PP 265:1-2.
9Gkhyad par gsum dang Idan pa (Tsong kha pa Bio bzang grags pa 1985, 643:12), (Tsong
kha pa Bio bzang grags pa 2000-2004, 3:194). This characterization follows Nagarjuna’s
discussion of svabhava in MMK 15:2 and 8. See also Magee (1999, 87-88).
97rgyu dang rkyen gyis ma bskyed pa. (Tsong kha pa Bio bzang grags pa 1985, 643:12-
13), (Tsong kha pa Bio bzang grags pa 2000-2004, 3:194). 
g8gnas skabs gzhan du mi ’gyur ba. (Tsong kha pa Bio bzang grags pa 1985, 643:13),
(Tsong kha pa Bio bzang grags pa 2000-2004, 3:194).
99rnam ‘jog gzhan la mi Itos pa. (Tsong kha pa Bio bzang grags pa 1985, 643:13), (Tsong
kha pa Bio bzang grags pa 2000-2004, 3:194).
100This is the reason why Tsong kha pa does not regard the three characteristics as
sufficient for identifying the object of negation (dgag bya). ’Jam dbyangs bshad pa asks
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obvious difficulty. The lack of svabhava seems to have exactly the properties 
of substance-svabhava, so the absence of svabhava should both exist (since 
svabhava does not) and not exist (since it has the same properties as the non­
existing svabhava). Emptiness (that is, the absence of svabhava) appears to 
be a contradictory concept.101
A m es’ solution
William Ames, in his analysis of CandrakTrti’s use of the concept svabhava 
tries to resolve this problem by arguing that substance-svabhava and lack of 
svabhava or emptiness do not collapse into one another since the latter differs 
from the former in two important ways:102
(1) Being purely negative, it does not satisfy the implicit condi­
tion that svabhava be a positive quality. (2) It is not a quality of 
things, but a fact about qualities of things, namely, that none of 
them are svabhava.
It appears to me tha t neither of these supposed differences can be made to
carry much weight. The difference between ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ qualities
seems to be purely an artefact of language. If our language did not contain
the word ‘blunt’ we might describe a blunt knife as ‘not sharp’ and conclude
tha t sharpness is a positive quality while bluntness is not. If we did not have
in the mChan bu bzhi: ’di stong nyid kyi khyad par yin pas dgag byar ga la rung ‘These
[three characteristics] being characteristics of emptiness how could they be the object of
negation?’ (Jam dbyangs bshad pa, Ba so chos kyi rgyal mthsan, sDe drug mkan chen
and Bra sti dge shes rin chen don grub 1972, 387.6).
101 Most philosophers would regard this as a problem with the notion of emptiness. An
exception is Graham Priest (2002, 249-270) who regards it as an indication of the funda­
mentally contradictory nature of reality.
102Ames (1982, 174).
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the word ‘sharp’, the reverse would be the case. But we would not have to 
assume that this indicates any difference between the properties we refer to.
Concerning the second point it does not seem to help much to observe that 
there is a fact about qualities of things which holds continuously, causelessly, 
and necessarily. All we have done is push up the location of svabhava to the 
level of second order properties: it is now not the property of heat (or any 
other first order property) which qualifies as the svabhava of fire, but one 
of its second order properties, i.e. the property that none of its first order 
properties is the object’s svabhava, But it is hardly satisfactory for the Ma­
dhyamika to avoid the above problem by saying that when he claims that no 
objects have svabhava what he really means is that none of an object’s first 
order properties are its svabhava.
Tsong kha pa’s solution
Another solution to this difficulty is suggested by Tsong kha pa Bio bzang 
grags pa (1357-1419). Though this Tibetan scholar is separated from Nagar­
juna by a considerable temporal, geographical and linguistic distance both 
the ingenuity of his solution as well as the considerable influence of his 
thought on the later interpretation of Madhyamaka justify its inclusion in 
this discussion. Tsong kha pa attempts to solve the above difficulty by argu­
ing that substance-svabhava (i.e. the Madhyamika’s ‘object of negation’) is 
to be distinguished from emptiness by its having additional characteristics. 
Apart from being triply characterized substance-svabhava is also
4. established from its own side103
103rang gi ngo bos grub pa. (Tsong kha pa Bio bzang grags pa 1985, 648:5), (Tsong kha 
pa Bio bzang grags pa 2000-2004, 3:199).
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5. a natural, not a learned notion.104
Concerning the first Tsong kha pa states that
Ultimate tru th  is established in this way as positing the nature of 
things (chos nyid) by svabhava (rang bzhin du), but what estab­
lishes it as svabhava is the fact that it is not fabricated and does 
not depend on other objects. It does not in the slightest exist by 
svabhava which is established from its own side.105
Here Tsong kha pa regards ‘establishment from its own side’ (rang gi ngo 
bos grub pa) as distinct from ‘independence from other objects’ (gzhan la mi 
Itos pa) in order to drive a wedge between the characterizations of substance- 
svabhava and emptiness or absolute svabhava. It should be noted, however, 
that this interpretation is not shared by all dGe lugs commentators, some 
of which read Candralurti’s nirapeksah as meaning ‘the establishment of an 
object from the perspective of its own entity’.106
Concerning the second point it should be noted that Tsong kha pa draws 
a distinction between conceptions of svabhava which are acquired misconcep­
tions (kun brtags) and those which are innate (lhan skyes). Given the funda­
mental cognitive change the understanding of emptiness is supposed to bring 
about he regards the removal of the latter as considerably more important
104fcnn brtags. (Tsong kha pa Bio bzang grags pa 1985, 644:20), (Tsong kha pa Bio bzang
grags pa 2000-2004, 3:196).
105 don dam p a ’i bden pa ni chos nyid la rang bzhin du bzhag pa der grub kyang rang
bzhin der ['jog byed bcos ma min pa dang | gzhan la mi Itos pa ni rang gi ngo bos grub pa ’i
rang bzhin der cung zad kyang med pa. (Tsong kha pa Bio bzang grags pa 1985, 648:3-5),
(Tsong kha pa Bio bzang grags pa 2000-2004, 3:199). An alternative translation of this
passage is in Magee (1999, 92-93).
10(5 rang gi ngo boH sgo nas yul gyi steng du grub pa. The relevant passage from Ngag
dbang dpal ldan is cited in Magee (1999, 94-95).
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than the former.107 Later commentaries108 classify the triply characterized 
svabhava as such an acquired misconception. The triply characterized sva­
bhava is too wide a notion to capture the object of negation, which is therefore 
further specified as an innate, rather than an acquired misconception.109
A bso lu te  svabhava as essence-svabhava
Let us conclude by considering one final way of distinguishing substance-sva­
bhava from absolute svabhava in order to solve the apparent contradiction 
inherent in this understanding of emptiness,110 The basic idea is that, whilst 
agreeing tha t both substance-svabhava and absolute svabhava are character­
ized as a) not fabricated (akrtrimah), b) immutable (na anyathabhavah), and 
c) not dependent (nirapeksah), we assume that b) and c) are understood 
in very different ways for the two different notions of svabhava. But let us 
consider these three characterizations in turn.
Absolute svabhava is described as not fabricated (akrtrimah) or as ‘com­
plete non-origination’ (sarvasa anutpada) to make clear that it is not in any 
way produced together with an empty object and does not cease once the 
object is destroyed. It is therefore unlike the hole in a cup or a vase, which 
is dependent on the cup or vase for its existence and is destroyed if the cup 
or vase are broken.
This point can be clarified by considering CandrakTrti’s assertion that
107(Tsong kha pa Bio bzang grags pa 1985, 644:18-645:1), (Tsong kha pa Bio bzang
grags pa 2000-2004, 3:196).
108See Magee (1999, 96).
109 The problem of the differentiation between substance- svabhava and absolute svabhava
was later further elaborated in the Tibetan tradition in the context of the debate over
self-emptiness (rang stong) and other-emptiness (gzhan stong). For further details see
Hookham (1991), Magee (1999, 103-115).
110I thank Mattia Salvini for helpful discussion of this point.
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svabhava ‘neither exists, nor does not exist, by intrinsic nature’.111 It is 
evident that since svabhava does not exist, it also does not exist by intrinsic 
nature. But why does it not fail to exist by intrinsic nature? In other words, 
why does emptiness not exist by substance-svabhava! After all for Nagarjuna 
phenomena do not just happen to lack svabhava, but could not have possibly 
had svabhava, no m atter what.
W hat CandrakTrti wants to say here is that the property of lacking sva­
bhava is dependent as well, since it depends on the erroneous ascription of sva­
bhava in the first place. It is not a property phenomena have independently 
of everything else. If someone hallucinates white mice running across his desk 
then part of what it means that this is a hallucination is that there are in 
fact no white mice on his desk. But even someone with a rather promiscuous 
attitude towards existence-claims concerning properties would hesitate to say 
that besides being brown, rectangular and more than two feet high the table 
also has the property of being free of white mice. If there is any distinction 
to be made between the properties an object has in itself and those which 
are merely ascribed to it by an observer, purely negative properties such as 
being not round or free of white mice seem to be the best candidates for 
being included in the latter category.
CandrakTrti stresses this point in a passage dealing with a person suffering 
from vitreous floaters112 which cause the illusory appearance of hair-like ob­
jects in the visual field.113 An ordinary observer would not generally ascribe 
the property ‘free of hairs’ to an empty pot, as this is one of the countless 
things the empty pot is empty of. But in order to correct the impression
111 na tadasti na capi nasti svarupatah PP 264:3. The terms svarupa and svabhava are
generally used interchangeably by CandrakTrti.
112 rab rib, timira.
U3MA 6:29, MAB 106:10-110:3.
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of the patient with the eye-disease the pot might indeed be described in 
this way. The property of hairlessness (like that of the absence of svabhava) 
is something ascribed to an object to correct a mistaken attribution of the 
property of being filled with hairs. It is not a property an object would have 
independently of such an attem pt to rectify a mistake.
Emptiness as a correction of a mistaken belief in svabhava is therefore 
not anything objects have from their own side, nor is it something which is 
causally produced together with the object, like the empty space in a cup. 
It is also not something which is a necessary part of conceptualizing objects, 
since its only purpose is to dispel a certain erroneous conception of objects. 
In the same way as it is not necessary to conceive of tables as free of white 
mice in order to conceive of them as all, in the same way a mind not prone 
to ascribing substance-s^ab/iava to objects does not need conceive of objects 
as empty in order to conceive of them correctly.
When absolute svabhava is interpreted as immutable (na anyathdbhavah), 
as changelessness (avikaritva) and ever-abidingness (sadaiva sthayitd) this 
does not mean the same as when for example the Sarvastivadin’s primary 
existents (dravya) are described in this way. Emptiness is not to be regarded 
as some unchanging, permanent, absolute reality. CandrakTrti does not mean 
that if some empty object like a pot or a flower is destroyed the po t’s or 
flower’s emptiness somehow stays behind, as it is changeless and ever-abiding. 
If the pot or flower are destroyed there is no use in referring to their emptiness. 
The point is rather that whatever phenomenon is conceptualized by ordinary 
beings will turn out to be empty, as they will ascribe substance-smfr/mwa to 
this phenomenon, and it is empty of such svabhava. In this sense emptiness is 
unchanging, since it is a property to be ascribed to all things ever considered, 
once they have been correctly analysed.
CHAPTER 2. INTERPRETATIO NS OF SVABHAVA 74
Finally, when we say that something is not dependent (nirapeksah) there 
are two different things we can mean. We might want to say that it does not 
depend on any object whatsoever or that it does not depend on some specific 
object. For example when saying that a mathematical theorem is independent 
we might make the claim that it does not depend on anything (human beings, 
minds, the world,...) for its existence, or me might mean something much 
weaker, namely that it does not depend on some particular thing (the person 
who proved the theorem, its inscription on a blackboard,...), i.e. tha t it would 
exist if someone else had proved it, or if some inscription or other existed on 
some blackboard or other.
These two meanings can also be employed when speaking about svabhava. 
We could say that if something exists by svabhava, it does not depend on 
anything whatsoever. This is the meaning of svabhava usually identified with 
substance-svabhava and corresponds to the Sarvastivadin’s primary existent. 
But we could also say some property exists by svabhava if as long as any 
objects are around they have that property. This, I would want to argue, is 
the best way to understand the assertion of emptiness being not dependent. 
It does not mean tha t emptiness is some sort of primordial reality ante rem 
but rather that as long as objects exist, and are conceived of by beings with 
deluded minds more or less like ours these objects will be empty.
The bottom line of this way of resolving the difficulty is the claim that 
for Nagarjuna there are not three different senses of svabhava, but only two. 
Absolute svabhava is equated with the essence-svabhava of all objects. In the 
same way as the property of heat constitutes the essence-svabhava of fire, 
emptiness, i.e. the absence of substance-svabhava constitutes the essence- 
svabhdva of all things. There are therefore only two different senses of sva­
bhava to be distinguished, namely essence-svabhava and substance-svabhava\
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what I have called ‘absolute svabhava’ turns out to be an instance of the for­
mer. Apart from resolving the above contradiction is also allows us to make 
sense of such characterizations of emptiness as the ‘objecthood of objects’
(dharmdnam dharmata), ‘thusness’ (tathata) ‘intrinsic nature’ (tatsvarupam), 
or ‘original nature’ (prakrti). These epithets do not equate emptiness with 
some objectively existent noumenal reality but simply indicate that empti­
ness is a property all objects could not lose without ceasing to be those very 
objects.
2.2 The cognitive dim ension
If we conceive of the Madhyamika. arguments about svabhava solely in on­
tological and semantic terms we are likely to miss one important dimension 
of the concept which occupies a central place in the Buddhist understanding 
of emptiness. This is the idea that the purpose of determining the existence 
or non-existence of substance-svabhava is not just to arrive at a theoretically 
satisfactory understanding of the fundamental objects which make up the 
world, or of the relation between words and their referents, but is supposed 
to have far more comprehensive implications for how we interact with the 
world. Nagarjuna notes in the final verses of chapter 26 of the MMK th a t114
with the cessation of ignorance, formations will not arise. More­
over, the cessation of ignorance occurs through right understand­
ing (jnana). Through the cessation of this and that [link of depen­
dent origination] this and that [other link] will not come about.
114 avidyayam niruddhayam samskarandm asambhavah /  avidyaya nirodhas tu 
jnanasyasyaiva bhavanat / /  tasya tasya nirodhena tat tan nabhipravartate /  
duhkhaskandhah kevalo ’yam evam samyag nirudhyate. MMK 26: 11-12.
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The entire mass of suffering thereby completely ceases.
Nagarjuna claims here that with the realization of the non-existence of sub- 
stance-svabhava the first link (ignorance) of the twelve links of dependent 
origination, which constitutes the fundamental Buddhist theory of the gen­
eration of the cognitive constitution of the human mind,115 will cease to exist. 
The first link being cut off, all consecutive links, beginning with formations, 
will no longer arise. W ith the cessation of the entire chain, Nagarjuna argues, 
suffering, which is the distinguishing mark of human existence, will cease as 
well.
How exactly the twelve links of origination are to be interpreted, and 
how the cessation of ignorance brings them to a halt is a complex and much 
debated question within Buddhist philosophy. It is not one I want to focus 
on in this context, however. The main idea I want to highlight here is that 
the cessation of suffering is supposed to be brought about by a cognitive 
shift, which is constituted by the realization of the absence of svabhava.
Candraklrti remarks in his commentary on the above passage tha t ‘the 
one who sees dependent origination correctly does not perceive a substance 
(svarupa) even in subtle things’.110 Note that svabhava is here not regarded 
as a theoretical posit, as something an ontologist or semanticist might pos­
tulate when investigating the world or its representation in language. The 
underlying idea here is rather that seeing objects in terms of svabhava is 
a kind of cognitive default which is criticized by Madhyamaka arguments 
against svabhava, such as ones described above. It is important to realize 
that svabhava is seen here as playing a fundamental cognitive role insofar as
115See Wiliams and Tribe (2000, 62-72) for an overview.
116 yo hi pratiLyasamutpadam sam.yak pasyatUi sa suksmasyapi bhdvasya na svarupam 
upalabhate. PP 559:3-4.
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objects are usually conceptualized in terms of svabhava. This conceptualiza­
tion (which the Madhyamika tries to argue is also theoretically deficient) is 
taken to be the ultimate cause of suffering.
According to this cognitive understanding svabhava is here regarded as a 
super imposition (samaropa) which the mind naturally projects onto objects 
when attempting to conceptualize the world. The term samaropa is only 
mentioned once by Nagarjuna in the MMK,117 but acquires a more prominent 
role in CandrakTrti’s commentary. I think that agreeing with CandrakTrti 
about the presence of a notion of svabhava as superimposition in Nagarju­
na1 s arguments allows us to give a theoretically coherent account of his view 
of svabhava,118 while it also helps us to understand why the establishment of 
the absence of substance- svabhava occupies such a central place in Madhya- 
maka thinking.
CandrakTrti argues that the understanding of svabhava in terms of a super­
imposition is of central importance for understanding the entire intellectual 
enterprise of the MMK:
Thus, when it is said tha t entities do not arise in this way first of 
all the initial chapter was written to counter the mistaken attribu­
tion (adhyaropa) of false intrinsic natures; the remaining chapters 
were written to eliminate whatever distinctions are superimposed 
anywhere.119
117MMIC 16:10. See Tanji (2000, 352, 355).
118This does deny that establishing what is ‘really meant’ by Nagarjuna’s arguments is 
in many cases more difficult to establish than for other philosophers (Tillemans 2001, 17), 
(Griffiths 2000, 24). Internal coherence of the arguments presented and external coherence 
with the context of Nagarjuna’s thoughts is all I think can be reasonably expected from a
presentation such as this.
119 tasmad anuppand bhdvd ity evam tavad vipanta-svarupa-adhyaropa-pratipaksena
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It is important to note that CandrakTrti is not merely concerned with the 
refutation of a theory he assumes to be mistaken, but with something more 
fundamental:
For one on the road of cyclic existence who pursues an inverted 
[view] due to ignorance a mistaken object such as the superimpo­
sition (sam,dropa) on the aggregates appears as real, but it does 
not appear to one who is close the view of the real nature of 
things.120
Independent of one’s particular theoretical position concerning the existence 
or non-existence of svabhava, svabhava is something which is superimposed 
on ordinary objects in the process of conceptualization. The five aggregates, 
for example, are seen as a single, permanent, independent self, due to the 
superimposition of svabhava on such a basis. The same happens when ordi­
nary partite and causally produced material objects, linguistic items, and so 
forth are apprehended.
It is because this cognitive default of the superimposition of svabhava is 
seen as the primary cause of suffering that the Madhyamika draws a distinc­
tion between the understanding of arguments establishing emptiness and its 
realization. Being convinced by some Madhyamaka argument that an object 
does not exist with svabhava does usually not entail that the object will not 
still appear to us as having svabhava. The elimination of this appearance 
is only achieved by the realization of emptiness. The ultimate aim of the
prathamaprakarandrambhah \ idanim kvacid yah kascid viseso ’dhyaropitas tad
visesdpakarandrtham sesaprakarandrabhyah. PP 58:10-11.
120samsarddhvani vartamandndm avidya-aviparydsa-anugamdn mrsdrlha eva skand-
hasamaropah satyatah pratibhasamdnah paddrbha-tattva-darsana-samvpasthdnam na prat-
ibhdsate. PP 347:1-3.
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Madhyamika project is therefore not just the establishment of a particular 
ontological or semantic theory, but the achievement of a cognitive change. 
The elimination of svabhava as a theoretical posit by means of arguments 
such as those presented above have to be followed by its elimination as an 
automatic cognitive superimposition by means of specific practices.
But what kind of evidence is there that svabhava constitutes an automatic 
cognitive superimposition? I agree with Tillemans that for anyone trying 
to establish this ‘the Indian Madhyamika literature would offer very little 
evidence, apart from a number of quotations from scriptures and a lot of 
doctrinal talk about people being ignorant, under the influence of karma, 
etc.’.121
However, it might be possible to adduce some evidence from other sources 
which make this assumption at least plausible. Buddhist philosophy generally 
assumes that the superimposition of svabhava applies to two things: to the 
self and to other phenomena we encounter. This superimposition at least 
entails conceiving of the self as unitary and permanent, and also viewing 
objects as external or observer-independent, as well as permanent We will 
have more to say 011 the former when considering Nagarjuna’s analysis of the 
self later on, so let us at the moment just consider our perception of objects. I 
would like to suggest that there is a cognitive default which a) determines that 
other things being equal we conceive of a sequence of stimuli as corresponding 
to a single enduring (though changing) object, rather than to a sequence of 
different, momentary ones and b) makes it more likely tha t we assume an 
external rather than internal objects as the source of the stimulus. Let me 
call these the principle of permanence and the principle of externality.
121Tillemans (2001, 18).
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The principle of permanence ensures that we generally conceive of objects 
as enduring phenomena which may change over time, but still remain fun­
damentally the same object, rather than as unrelated momentarily arising 
and ceasing phenomena, each of which lasts only for an instant. It should be 
noted that this latter way of interpreting the information we get through the 
senses is not in any way logically deficient, it is just not the way we see the 
world. There are good reasons why we do not do so, primarily that such a 
representation is vastly too complex to use in practice. Any mind who lived 
in such a world of kaleidoscopically flashing phenomena would presumably 
be at an evolutionary disadvantage when compared to one which represented 
a world of stable, enduring objects.
The principle of externality makes us assume that the causes of sensory 
stimuli are objects lying outside of us, rather than the product of our own 
perceptive mechanism. We generally assume that our perception is evidence 
for things lying outside of ourselves and that we do not live in a hallucinatory 
world of our own devising. Again, such a principle makes evolutionary sense: 
running away from an imaginary tiger is not as detrimental to our chances 
of passing on our genes as is declaring a real tiger rushing towards us to be 
a figment of our imagination.
Whether the principles of permanence and externality really determine 
our conceptualization of the world is of course an empirical question which 
can hardly be decided in a philosophical discussion such as this. W hat we 
can do, however, is to acquaint the reader with two simple empirical results 
which could serve as evidence that something like these two principles might 
play an important role in our cognitive access to the world.
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The first is the so-called beta phenomenon which has been known to 
experimental psychologists for a long time.122 The subject of the experiment 
is shown two slides, the first of which contains a dot in the top left-hand 
comer, the other a dot in the in the bottom right-hand corner. W hat the 
subject perceives if these slides are shown in quick succession is not two 
stationary dots, but a single dot moving diagonally from the top left to the 
bottom right across the slides. W hat has happened here is that our brain 
has interpreted the sequence of two stationary dots as a single moving object 
which is first seen on the left and then on the right. Rather than interpreting 
this particular stimulus as one object appearing at one spot and immediately 
disappearing, which is followed by another object appearing at a different 
spot the principle of permanence causes us to see the two dots as indications 
of a single object changing its position in space. When offered the choice 
of either regarding some sequence of stimuli as corresponding to a series of 
momentarily arising and ceasing objects, or as an enduring object changing 
its attributes our brain seems to opt automatically for the latter.123
Some evidence for the principle of externality can be drawn from the psy­
chological investigation of dreaming, in particular of the phenomenon of lucid 
dreaming.124 A lucid dream is a dream in which the dreamer is conscious of 
dreaming without waking up. Although lucid dreams happen spontaneously
122Tlie earliest description of the beta phenomenon is in Wertheimer (1912); further 
results and interpretations are given by Dennett (1991) (who erroneously refers to it as
the phi phenomenon) and Hoffman (1998).
123The problem of ‘object permanence’, i.e. of the question when two distinct perceptions
of an object are regarded as being caused by a single thing has been investigated extensively 
in developmental psychology. See Piaget (1937) and Spelke (1990) for two now classical
discussions. An interesting related experiment is described in Subbotskii (1991).
124LaBerge, Levitan and Dement (1986).
CHAPTER 2. INTERPRETATIO NS OF SVABHAVA 82
to some people there are also a variety of techniques for inducing them.125 
But the fact tha t some special effort is required to have a lucid dream points 
to the fact that our natural reaction to perceptions in dreams is to regard 
them as caused by external objects, rather than by our own mind. So it 
seems that our view of sensory information both in the waking state and in 
the dream state is generally determined by the principle of externality: in 
both cases we regard the source of the information to be something which 
is both external to us and existing independently of us. It requires a partic­
ular cognitive effort to question in a dream whether the things one sees are 
indeed caused by external sources, an effort which appears to be essential in 
inducing lucid dreaming.
If it is plausible to understand the Madhyamika’s notion of superimposi­
tion (samaropa) of substance-svabhava in terms of certain cognitive defaults 
(such as the principles of permanence and externality)126 which govern our 
representation of the world then it becomes clear why the Madhyamika draws 
a sharp line between intellectual understanding and realization. As familiar­
ity with any optical illusion attests, neither merely understanding that it 
is an illusion, nor even understanding how it works, will make the illusion 
go away. Now if there was a way of training oneself out of perceiving a 
particular illusion we would have an apt example of the relation between un­
derstanding and insight as seen by the Madhyamika. First of all we have to 
gain an understanding of how the illusion (in this case the superimposition 
of substanc e-svabhava) works, and in a second step we have to follow some 
training which eventually makes even the appearance of the illusion go away.
125LaBerge and Rheingold (n.d.).
126 Further investigation of our perceptions of the self, of causality, or of mereological 
relations might provide other aspects which cohere with the view of svabhava as a super­
imposition.
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But now this point also indicates the limitations of appealing to results 
from cognitive science for gaining a better understanding of svabhava. Even 
though such references are useful in giving us an idea of why the Madhyami­
ka’s view of superimposition could be plausible they give us very little insight 
into how the removal of such superimpositions could be possible and what 
it would entail. The reason for this is obvious: according to the traditional 
Buddhist view those who have realized (as opposed to merely understood) 
the absence of svabhava and thereby emptiness are few and far between. 
Empirical research into the way such persons perceive the world is there­
fore naturally difficult. Fortunately this is not a task the present discussion 
has to achieve. For our purposes it is sufficient to point out that a mere 
understanding of svabhava as a theoretical posit (arrived at within an on­
tological or semantic theory) is not sufficient for understanding the central 
role it occupies in Buddhist thought. The notion of svabhava must also be 
something which plays a much larger part in the mental life of the majority 
of people who are after all neither ontologists nor semanticists. The cognitive 
understanding of svabhava provides us with an interpretation which achieves 
this.
Chapter 3 
The role of negation in 
Nagarjuna’s arguments
The preceding chapter has acquainted the reader with the main objective 
of Madhyamaka thought, that is the rejection of svabhava. Before we can 
discuss the further ramifications of this idea in Nagarj una’s philosophy it is 
necessary to discuss some formal aspects of his arguments which the reader 
primarily acquainted with Western philosophical literature might find puz­
zling. They arise mainly from specific logical and methodological consid­
erations connected with the concept of negation which were widespread in 
Indian philosophy but are not always shared by the Western notion of nega­
tion derived primarily from formal logic. W hat makes the issue particularly 
intricate is the fact that there exists a tension between some presuppositions 
of the traditional Indian account of negation and the contents of Nagarjuna’s 
philosophical views, so tha t Nagarjuna sometimes sees himself challenged to 
adapt these presuppositions in order to formulate his philosophical position.
In the present chapter I will discuss Nagarjuna’s view of the standard 
view of negation as presented in the Nyaya system. The following chapter
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will discuss a specific form of argument, the catuskotz or tetralemma, which 
is frequently employed in Nagarjuna’s writings and essentially involves single 
and iterated negations.
Nagarjuna’s central argumentative aim is to develop a philosophical the­
ory which does not have recourse to the notion of substance or svabhava. His 
main strategy is to examine all the possible ways in which a particular phe­
nomenon (such as physical objects, causation, the self, language etc.) could 
be thought to exist with svabhava, and conclude that on close inspection none 
of these is satisfactory. It then remains to conclude that the phenomenon in 
question does not exist with svabhava. Since many of Nagarjuna’s conclu­
sions are therefore negative ones it is essential to gain a clear understanding 
of the role of negation in his philosophical system.
This is more difficult than it may sound initially, especially as Nagarjuna’s 
discussion of these matters, the greatest part of which is to be found in the 
VV and, to a lesser extent, in the VP is formulated against the background 
of the Nyaya theory of negation. This differs significantly from accounts of 
negation with which the reader primarily acquainted with Western philo­
sophical discussions is likely to be familiar.
3.1 N yaya theory of negation
The philosophical system known under the name ‘Nyaya’ incorporates a com­
prehensive theory of logic and epistemology which proved to be extremely 
important in Indian intellectual history, influencing not only different kinds of 
philosophical inquiry, but also such disciplines as linguistics, poetics, rhetoric,
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and law.1 The system is based on the Nyayasutra attributed to Gautama 
(also known as Aksapada). There is little agreement on when the sutra was 
composed; the dates proposed range from the 6th century B.C. up to the 
2nd century A.D.2 It is, however, relatively clear that they achieved the form 
in which they have been transmitted to us around the time of Nagarjuna 
and might even have in parts been composed as a reply to Nagarjuna’s argu­
ments.3 We must therefore keep in mind that when we refer to the relations 
between Nagarjuna’s Madhyamaka and Nyaya we are dealing with a very 
early phase of the latter. At Nagarjuna’s time none of the long sequence of 
works on Nyaya,4 including Vatsyayana’s Bhasya, had been written yet.5
In order to understand the Nyaya theory of negation we have to note that 
in the underlying ontological system properties are seen as separate entities 
over and above the substrata in which they inhere.6 Now the Naiyayika 
regards the absence (abhava) of a property as a category in its own right
1Matilal (1968, 21), Potter (1970-2003, II, 1-3), Guha (1979, 1-2). A concise summary
of the assumptions underlying the Nyaya system is given in Matilal (1986, 5-6).
2Potter (1970-2003, II, 4). Jha (1939, viii) even suggests a date of composition as late
as the 6th century A.D. A comprehensive account of the history of the composition of the
NS is given in Meuthrath (1996).
3Bronkhorst (1985) argues the greatest part of the NS existed before Nagarjuna and
was known to him, and that some parts were added later in response to Madhyamaka
objections. Bronkhorst’s conclusions have been severely criticized by Oetke in his (1991)
and (1997). For a reply see Bronkhorst (1993).
4Potter (1970-2003, II, 9-12)
5For more details on the relation between the VY and the NS see Meuthrath (1999).
6MatiIal (1968, 16). The Nyaya system of logic and epistemology usually relies on the
Vaisesilca ontology. The association between the two systems is so close that one often
refers to them jointly as Nyaya-Vaisesika. Opinions differ on how the two systems came
to be associated, and even if we are to speak of two systems rather than one. See Potter
(1970-2003, II, 12-13), Bronkhorst (1985, 123-124).
CHAPTER 3. NEGATION 87
(padartha)7, as something which can equally be possessed by a substratum.8 
The referent of a negative statement like ‘there is no pot in the house’ is 
therefore regarded as the qualification of the house by an absence, namely 
the absence of a pot.9 Judgements, whether they are affirmative (‘There is a 
pot in the house5) or negative (‘There is no pot in the house5) involve a qual­
ification or an attribution, which can be either an attribution of a presence 
or an attribution of an absence. As such the attribution can be construed as 
either affirmative or negative. Whether it is expressed by an affirmative or a 
negative statement is then a question about how the judgement of that attri­
bution is formulated in ordinary language, not a fact about the attribution 
itself.10
According to the Naiyayika account a judgement is correct if it combines 
some parts of reality in the way in which they are indeed combined (such as 
the house and the absence of the pot, if there is no pot in the house), and it 
is erroneous if it combines elements from reality in a way in which they are 
not combined (such as the house and the absence of the pot if there is a pot 
in the house).11 Error will therefore always arise from the way elements are
7Chatterjee (1939, 166-168), Sharma (1970, 11-12).
8We will not go into the reasons offered in defence of this assumption. Sharma (1970, 
3-11) argues that the conception of liberation (moksa or apavarga) espoused by the Nyaya- 
Vaisesiltas made it ‘imperative for this system to posit Absence as an ultimately real entity
(padarthay (6), so that this ontological point also acquired soteriological significance.
9Matilal (1968, 3).
10Matilal (1968, 92-93).
11Matilal (1970, 95). As such there is a close similarity between this view and the 
familiar correspondence account of truth we find for example in a semantics based on 
states of affairs. There the sentence ‘there is a pot in the house’ is regarded as true iff the 
referents of the constituents of the sentence (the pot, the house, the ‘inside of’ relation) 
are arranged in structurally the same way in the state of affairs in which the constituents 
are arranged in the sentence. The main difference is of course that this view does not
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combined in judgements, never from simple perceptions. For the Naiyayika 
‘a simple, non-complex property can never be empty’.12
3.2 N egation  and non-denoting term s
This leaves us with a substantial difficulty if we want to deny the existence 
of certain entities, for the Naiyayika faces the very problem Quine observes 
at the beginning of ‘On what there is’:13
When I try to formulate our difference of opinion, I seem to be in 
a predicament. I cannot admit that there are some things which 
[my opponent] McX countenances and I do not, for in admit­
ting that there are such things I should be contradicting my own 
rejection of them.
Suppose we want to say that Pegasus does not exist (or that every place is 
characterized by an absence of Pegasus). Such a judgement would intuitively 
be regarded as true, but for the Naiyayika a true judgement has to combine 
elements of reality in the right way. But Pegasus is not an element of reality, 
since he does not exist, Matilal observes th a t14
the property of Pegasus-ness thus arrived at would be, according
to Nyaya, unexampled or fictitious because it has no locus to
occur in, tha t is, no locus possesses this property. In such cases,
Nyaya asserts that we cannot even say that such a property is
absent or does not occur somewhere. [...] Thus, if a sentence is
accord any ontological status to absences, as tlie Nyaya theory does.
12Matilal (1970, 96).
13Quine (1953, 1).
14Matilal (1968, 154-155).
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said to express an absence of such an unexampled property, it 
becomes nonsensical.
Now of course this does not mean that adopting the Nyaya semantics we 
have no way of saying that a possible entity (like Pegasus) or an impossible 
one (like the round square) does not exist. If this was indeed the case it 
would not be a very satisfactory theory to begin with. W hat we have to do 
is to rephrase the statement to make evident that the source of the vacuity 
of such properties is the combination of more basic properties each of which 
exists in reality, but which are not thus combined in the world. So the 
Naiyayika can make the meaningful assertion that wingedness and horseness 
are never combined in the same animal, and tha t roundness and squareness 
are never combined in the same figure.15 All the properties referred to now 
have referents in reality, so the Naiyayika1 s semantics is taken care of.16 There 
is an obvious similarity between this approach and the Russellian procedure 
of replacing a non-denoting term by a definite description.17
This view of non-denoting terms is just a reflection of the fact that for 
the Naiyayika language must hook up with the world at some fundamental 
level via a denotation relation. Even if there are non-denoting terms in our 
language they can only exist parasitic on denoting terms. Simple designators 
are therefore guaranteed to refer, whilst complex designators may or may not 
do so. This of course means that according to Nyaya theory negative state­
ments involving simple designators (statements of absence of some entity) 
can only ever be statements of a local absence and will always entail the
15See Uddyotakara’s commentary on the Nyayasutrabhasya 3.1.1 (Chakravarti 1982,
232-233).
16Matilal (1968, 9, 23).
17Matilal (1970, 85), Chakravarti (1982, 211-212),
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presence of that entity somewhere else.18 In his Varttika on Vatsyayana’s 
Bhasya on 2.1.12 of the NS Uddyotakara notes th a t19
when the word ‘ja r’ is coordinated with the term ‘does not exist’ 
it does not convey the non-existence of the jar; all that it does is 
to deny, either the [spatial] connection of the jar with the house 
or its specification [as located at] a particular point in time.
Since the statement ‘There is no pot in the house’ or ‘There is an absence 
of a pot in the house’ is only meaningful if the pot referred to does indeed 
exist it must be present somewhere else. It would be nonsensical if there were 
no pots at all, at least if ‘po t’ is regarded as a simple designator. Vatsyayana 
raises this objection in his commentary on the passage from the NS 2.1.11, 
where he argues against the opponent’s attempt to deny the existence of 
means of knowledge:20
If you want to deny the existence [of the means of knowledge, 
this denial] implies their existence, and the refutation of [means 
of knowledge like] perception and so forth is not accomplished.
Phanibhusana’s subcommentary elucidates this point by adding tha t21
18Phanibhusana (Chattopadhyaya and Gangopadhyaya 1968,11:28) remarks that ‘there 
is not sense in denying the absolutely non-existent like a flower imagined to blossom in the 
sky. The denial of something can have sense only when its existence is admitted somewhere
else, e.g. to say that there is no jar in the room means that it exists elsewhere.’
19 na hy ayam ndsti nasamdnadhikarano ghatadisabdo ghatdbhavam pratipadayati api tu
gehaghatasamyogam vd kalavisesam va [...] pratisedhati (Gautama 1887, 192: 20-22), 
(Jha 1984, II: 623).
20 tod yadi sambhavo nivartyate sati sambhave pratyaksadinam pratisedhanupapatih.
(Nyaya-Tarkatirtha and Tarkatirtha 1985, 425: 2-3).
21 Chattopadhyaya and Gangopadhyaya (1968, 2: 26).
CHAPTER 3. NEGATION 91
the very attem pt to deny their existence presupposes the admis­
sion of their existence inasmuch as there is no sense in demolishing 
the possible existence of something which has no existence at all, 
just as it is impossible to smash with a stick the jar which does 
not exist.
The idea that simple designators have to have a denotation seems to 
possess some intuitive plausibility. Suppose I present you with some simple, 
non-denoting name such as ‘Hopzik’. You could not be taught the meaning of 
TIopzik’ by ostension (since there are none), nor could I give you an analysis 
in terms of other properties (since it is a simple designator). But then the 
problem occurs of how you could make sense of any sentence containing the 
term ‘Hopzik’, including statements such as ‘Hopzik does not exist’. We 
do not have any idea what this negation means, since we do not have any 
positive notion of the entity being denied.
Having taken account of this background it is understandable that the 
issue of non-denoting terms is raised by the Naiyayika opponent against the 
central philosophical thesis of Madhyamaka that there is no svabhava. He 
argues tha t if the Madhyamaka claim was true and if there was indeed no 
svabhava, then the claim would be nonsensical. For if a negative statement 
about svabhava was interpreted along the same lines as a negative statement 
about a pot in the house,22 we would have to hold that the existent svabhava 
stood in an absence relation to the world, in the same way as the pot stood in 
an absence relation to the house. But if we understand the statement in this 
way svabhava exists after all and so the Madhyamaka thesis must be false. 
The statement ‘there is no svabhava1 has to be either false or nonsensical,
22 VV 11.
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since ‘there is no name without referent’.23
A later manifestation of the same difficulty can be found in certain prob­
lems connected with formal reasoning.24 According to the Nyaya theory a 
formally set out ‘inference for oneself’ (svaHhanumana) establishing that the 
subject (paksa) has the qualifying property (sadhya) must provide both an 
agreeing and a disagreeing example (udaharana) ,25 Thus, in order to estab­
lish the thesis that all white things are coloured we need both an ‘agreeing’ 
example of a subject having the qualifying property (such as a conch shell, 
which is both white and coloured), as well as a ‘disagreeing’ example of the 
contraposed version (‘whatever is not coloured is not white’, space, which is 
neither, being a case in point).
But we realize tha t this leads to a problem if we assert a universal thesis 
like ‘all things lack svabhava’ or ‘all things are momentary’. In this case 
the disagreeing example would have to be an instance of some object which 
has svabhava or is not momentary. Since we want to establish that there 
are no such things, the term has to be empty. But if the occurrence of 
an empty term renders a statement meaningless, as the Naiyayika asserts, 
it immediately follows that the two theses cannot be established. If, on 
the other hand, the two theses are meaningful (as they appear to be) then 
they must assert absences of existent things, and svabhava or the property 
of permanence must exist. So once again we are faced with the unenviable 
choice between falsity and nonsense.
2Znarna hi nirvastukam nasti. VV 9.
24This is discussed in Matilal’s analysis of part of the Atmatattvaviveka by Udayana
(10-11th century AD) in (1970).
25For a concise summary of the Nyaya theory of inference see (Potter 1970-2003, II,
179-208).
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Nagarjuna suggests a variety of possible replies to the Nyaya difficulty of 
non-denoting terms. First of all he remarks tha t26
To one who says that the name is sadbhuta you would have to 
reply: ‘There is svabhava?. [ .. .] [However,] since things have no 
svabhava, that name also lacks svabhava. Because of this it is 
empty, and, being empty, it is not sadbhuta.
Bhattacharya27 here translates sadbhuta as ‘existent’. This does not strike 
me as a very fortunate rendering, primarily because Nagarjuna does not want 
to claim that emptiness entails a lack of existence. It is evident tha t what 
Nagarjuna wants to say in the first sentence is that if the Nyaya account was 
indeed correct (and each simple term in a negative statement had to denote 
an existent object) svabhava would exist. It therefore seems plausible that 
saying that a name is sadbhuta is not supposed to mean that the name exists 
(something which neither Nagarjuna nor his opponent denies) but that it 
functions in accordance with Nyaya theory: that each non-complex term is 
hooked up with a designated object in the real world.
But this is exactly what the proponent of emptiness denies. For the Ma­
dhyamika a satisfactory semantics cannot consist of an objectively existent 
reference relation which links the terms of our language to an objectively 
existent world. He will argue that both the question how the world is sliced 
up into individual entities and the question of how these entities link up 
with the parts of language are to be settled by convention. There is no 
‘ready-made world1 of simples out there which could provide the semantic
26 yo namatra sadbhutam bruydt sasvabhava iti evam bhavatd prativaktavyah syat | [...] 
tad api hi bhdvasvabhavasya abhdvan ndma nihsvabhavam tasmdc chhunyam sunyatvad
asadbhutam. VV(S) 76:16-77:2.
27Bhattacharya, Johnston and Kunst (1978, 128).
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foundation for the simple terms of our language.28
Nagarjuna therefore argues in this passage that the Naiyayika criticism 
is justified only if one is antecedently convinced of the Nyaya picture of 
semantics. This, however, is something which the Madhyamika does not 
want to share.
We might wonder at this point why a relatively obvious reply to the 
Naiyayika worries about statements like ‘there are no objects existing with 
svabhava1 is not made by the Madhyamika. This reply consists in arguing that 
svabhava is not a simple designator. As we saw above it is possible to assert 
that there are no unicorns even on Nyaya terms. This is done by rephrasing 
the statement as an assertion about real entities (such as wingedness and 
horseness) which do not occur together. We could now similarly break up 
the property ‘existing with svabhava’ into its simpler components (such as 
not depending causally on other phenomena, not depending notionally on 
other phenomena and so forth) and argue that since all these dependence 
relations exist, all we are asserting by a statement denying svabhava is that 
there is no object which is qualified by the absence of all these dependence 
relations at the same time.
This reply is certainly adequate for answering the Naiyayika worry, but 
it is hardly a position a Madhyamika would want to adopt without further 
qualification. For, according to the Naiyayika’s interpretation of this answer, 
there is still a world of objectively existent simple properties which the sim­
ple terms in our language refer to in a way which is independent of linguistic 
conventions. While the statement ‘there is no svabhava1 is thus at least ren­
dered comprehensible to the Naiyayika, this comes at the price of accepting 
a view of semantics fundamentally at odds with the one the Madhyamika is
28See chapter 9 for further discussion of this point.
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arguing for. For this reason trying to establish that svabhava is a complex 
designator is not a very satisfactory response by Madhyamaka standards.
Within the context of discussing the problem of negating a non-denoting 
term Nagarjuna also discusses a somewhat curious objection raised in W  12. 
The opponent asks about the point of negating a non-existent object since 
'the negation of a non-existent, such as the coolness of fire or the burning 
of water is established without words’.29 This passage entails tha t there are 
two kinds of negation for the opponent: those established without words, 
and those established with words. Looking at the choice of examples used 
it seems that members of the former group include negations of an essential 
property of an object, such as the heat of fire. W hat kinds of negation are 
included in the latter group is not quite clear. A reasonable assumption is 
to include negative contingent statements in here (such as 'There is no pot 
in the house’). Now the opponent does not want to say tha t the absence of 
the pot in the house is brought about by the assertion 'there is no pot in the 
house’: just saying it is so does not make it so.
There are two different ways of understanding what the opponent could 
mean here. Firstly, note that the Naiyayika does not draw any fundamental 
distinction between the judgements expressed by affirmative and negative 
statements. As Matilal observes30
all determinate cognitions or judgemental cognitions (savikalpa 
jnana), which can be very well regarded as the counterpart of 
statements, involve a qualification or attribution, and such an 
attribution cannot be construed as either affirmative or negative.
23asato hi vacanadvina siddhah pratisedhah tadyathagneh saityasya apamausnyasya.
W (S ) 51:6-7.
30Matilal (1968, 92).
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The affirmative-negative distinction is not one the Naiyayika regards as 
ontologically fundamental. Whether a particular statement is affirmative or 
negative just mirrors the way the particular qualification or attribution is 
expressed in ordinary language. W hat is meant therefore by saying that a 
negation like ‘There is no pot in the house’ is established with words is that 
it is only by the force of language that a negative meaning is expressed. The 
world itself contains no negations, only presences and absences of different 
kinds. It is only the words which bring negations into existence.
The absence of a non-existent entity (such as the absence of the opposite 
of an essential quality, like the absence of coolness in fire) can be regarded 
as a ‘negation established without words’ (vacanad vina siddhah pratisedhah) 
since it cannot rely on language for its expression as a negation, as the Nyaya 
restrictions on non-denoting terms render the phrase ‘absence of coolness of 
fire’ meaningless. It is of course the case that there is no coolness in fire, 
but, for the sake of argument assuming that ‘coolness of fire’ is a simple 
designator, this is not something which can be expressed in language, nor it 
is something which indeed need to be expressed. We might, after all think 
there is a pot in the house when there is none, but who would think there is 
coolness to be found in fire?
Secondly we can understand the claim that some negations are estab­
lished with words, while some are established without not as referring to 
the negation itself, but rather to the corresponding cognition of the negation 
created in our mind.31 To establish a cognition like the one that there is no 
pot in the house we generally need language (as we are not able to inspect 
all the parts of a house at once). Other cognitions, however, like those that
31 As argued below on page 100 this is also the most satisfactory way to understand the 
opponent’s worry about the temporal relations between negation and negated object.
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fire is not cool and water is not burning are established without linguistic 
mediation. Our acquaintance with fire or water directly acquaints us with 
these essential properties of them. There is therefore no need to assert the 
absence of properties opposed to the essential nature of things in language. 
As the claim concerning the absence of svabhava is of the very same nature it 
is therefore not obvious what the point of asserting this negation is supposed 
to be.
Nagarjuna replies by saying that the purpose of a statement like ‘there 
is no svabhava5 is to point out the absence of svabhava, not to create the 
absence of something which is in fact there.32 He uses the example of saying 
‘Devadatta is not in the house5 when he is in fact not there — this statement 
obviously just reports the absence of Devadatta and does not cause him 
not to be in the house.33 We noted above that it is quite unlikely that 
the opponent should hold such a peculiar position; unless what is created is 
supposed to be the cognition of the absence, rather than the absence itself. 
In this case Nagarjuna could be interpreted as saying that both kinds of 
negation, those involving essential and non-essential properties have to be 
linguistically mediated to be cognized by us.
W hat would be replied to our first interpretation of the opponent’s worry,
1.e. the position that the absence of something necessarily non-existent (such 
as the coolness of fire, or the svabhava of things) cannot and need not be
32VV 64.
33A similar point is made by Uddyotakara in his Varttika on Vatsyayana’s Bhasya on NS
2, 1, 11: ‘negation does not have the power to make an existing thing otherwise [i.e. non­
existent]. Because it makes something known it does not cause the existence of something 
to cease; [therefore] this negation [too] makes something known and does not cause the 
existence of something to cease.’ na ca pratisedhasyaitat samarthyam yad vidyamanam  
padartham anyathd kuryat jndpakalvdc ca na sambhavanivrttih jndpako ’yam pratisedho 
na sambhavanivarlaka iti. (Gautama 1887, 191: 13-15), (Jha 1984, II: 619).
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expressed? We have already seen above that the impossibility of expressing 
such negations depends on the peculiar nature of the Nyaya semantics which 
the Madhyamaka will not want to accept. And concerning the need to express 
this negation, the Madhyamaka will argue that whilst nobody in his right 
mind will think fire to be cool (and could therefore benefit from having 
this pointed out to him) the belief in the svabhava of things is extremely 
widespread, and realizing its falsity is one of the essential preconditions of 
liberation. Thinking that there is svabhava in things is like thinking there to 
be real water in a mirage. Deceived people who are likely to run towards the 
mirage to quench their thirst will benefit from getting to know tha t there is 
no real water there, as ordinary people will benefit from learning that things 
exist without svabhava.34
Nevertheless we might think that when we negate water perceived in a 
mirage there is still the person perceiving the mirage, its perception, and the 
perceived object (i.e. the mirage), as well as the person doing the negating 
(us), the negation, and the object negated (namely real water in the mi­
rage).35 But if this is the case, the Naiyayika will argue we are facing the 
familiar problem again: if the thing we negate (the mirage, svabhava) does 
exist after all the statement asserting its negation is obviously a falsity. If, on 
the other hand none of them exist, if there is no perceiver, perception, and 
perceived object, no negator, negation and object to be negated36 then the 
Madhyamaka argument vanishes altogether and the existence of svabhava is 
established by default.37
34 VV 13.
35VV 14.
360 f  course what the opponent must mean here is that the object of negation (i.e. sva­
bhava) does not exist as an object of negation (because there is no negation), not that it
does not exist at all.
37VV 15-16.
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W hat we have to say here (and what Nagarjuna in fact does say)38 is that 
all these things can exist without existing in quite the way the Naiyayika 
supposes. As we have seen above for the Naiyayika the different entities 
referred to by the simple designators in a negative statement (a statement 
of absence) each have to be real for the statement to be meaningful. The 
Madhyamika, however, thinks that an unreal entity, such as the water in 
a mirage, or the appearance of svabhava can be very well be the object 
of an (erroneous) cognitive state and also able to be referred to in a true 
sentence. Prom the fact tha t ‘something has become the ‘object5 (visaya) of 
a cognitive state it does not follow that it must have been causally related to 
the production of that cognitive state.539 This is due to the fact that for the 
Madhyamika the source of error is not exclusively located in the erroneous 
combination of individually existing properties, as the Naiyayika assumes.40 
The example of the mirage presents us with the case of a simple yet erroneous 
perception. As long as we assume that the object of perception and the object 
of negation are all dependently arisen objects, rather than entities existing 
in their own right we can deny their existence without antecedently having 
to regard them as real.41
38VV 65-G7.
39Matilal (1970, 94).
40Matilal (1970, 96).
41VP 16. This point is also underlined by CandrakTrti in commenting on MMK 15:11: 
‘A healthy person does not perceive any of the hairs which appear to one afflicted by 
vitreous floaters. When he says ‘these [hairs] are not’ he does not say that they are an 
existing entity the existence of which was denied because the object of negation is not real. 
In the same sense we say that ‘all things are not’ in order to remove clinging to an error 
in those who see things in the wrong way like those afflicted by vitreous floaters.’ yas tu 
tairnirikopalabdha kesesviva vitaimiriko na kimcid upalabhate sa nasti iti bruvan kimcin 
nasti iti bruydt pratisedhyabhdvdt \ viparyastanam tu mithyd-abhinivesa-nivrtty-artham  
ataimirika iva vayam brurno na santi sarvbhdva iti. PP 273:14-274:3.
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Even though the term ‘the water in the mirage’ is non-denoting, since 
there is no water in the mirage, there is still something created by the in­
terplay of our senses, light, and heat on which the presence of water is su­
perimposed, which we can subsequently deny. Similarly our language and 
general cognitive habits can, the Madhyamaka argues, create the unreal su­
perimposition (samaropa) of svabhava which Nagarjuna’s arguments set out 
to refute.
3.3 N egation  and tem poral relations
Apart from worries about negative statements involving non-denoting terms 
the second main difficulty to do with negation raised by Nagarjuna’s op­
ponent concerns the possible temporal relation between a negation and the 
object negated.42 This is a form of argument which we encounter frequently 
in Nagarjuna’s works, the most prominent examples being in the discussion 
of the relation between means of knowledge and object known, and between 
cause and effect.
The worry of the opponent is that there is a general difficulty with nega­
tive statements (including the Madliyamika’s assertion that there is no object 
with svabhava). He argues that the negation can neither exist before, after, 
or at the same time as the object of negation, and therefore cannot possibly 
exist. Now this might strike us as a strange position to maintain. As we 
usually regard negation as a logical relation temporal considerations seem to 
be wholly irrelevant, in the same way as there is no point in asking which 
numbers in a mathematical equation are there first.
In order to see the point at issue here we have to note tha t for the
42VP 20, VP 13-15. The same problem is raised in NS 2.1.12 (NS 425-426).
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Naiyayika the negation is the instrument making known a particular absence 
of a quality in some substratum. This making known is obviously a causal 
process,43 so tha t it is clear that the Naiyayika worries here just stem from 
an application of Nagarjuna’s criticism of causation44 to epistemology. The 
Naiyayika will argue that if causes and effects cannot exist standing in any 
of the three temporal relations (as the Madhyamika sets out to show) then 
this must also apply to epistemic causes and effects,45 and thus also to nega­
tions, which constitute one particular kind of epistemic cause. Therefore, if 
we take the Madhyamaka view of causation seriously we have a problem with 
establishing the negative thesis that there are no objects with svabhava.
The argument itself proceeds in the expected manner. The opponent 
argues that the negation cannot exist before the object to be negated, because 
then there would be a negation without anything negated. More worryingly, 
if the negated object does not (yet) exist, what is the point of negating it? 
Nor could the negation exist after the object of negation, for what is the 
point of negating something existing? We also have to note tha t it is only 
the causal interpretation of negation in this context which allows us to make 
sense of the opponent’s criticism of the simultaneous existence of the negation 
and its object. We might think that this was indeed a satisfactory way of 
thinking of the two (in the same way in which we might think that all the 
numbers in a mathematical equation exist at the same time). But considering 
negation in causal terms we face the problem that ‘the negation is not the 
cause of the object known by negation, nor is the object known by negation 
the cause of the negation’.46 As illustrated by the familiar analogy of the two
43See Jha (1984, 621).
44 See the discussion in chapter 5.
45VP 12.
4Gna pratisedhah pratisedhasyarthasya karanam pratisedhyo na pratisedhasya ca. VV(S).
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horns of a cow47 which do not cause each other, in the case of simultaneously
existing cause and effect we would have a problem in establishing which is
which, since the conceptual distinction between cause and effect is drawn in
terms of temporal priority.
There are various ways in which one can respond to this problem. In VV
69 Nagarjuna tries to turn the tables on his opponent.48 As we saw above
for the Naiyayika the existence of a negation is equivalent to the existence of
an object of negation, i.e. of an object the absence of which in a particular
substratum could be asserted. But if there is no negation, as the Naiyayika
has just been trying to argue, there is also no object the absence of which
can be asserted and therefore it follows on the Naiyayika’s own terms that
there is no svabhava.49
A more general way of replying is to point out that in the same way
as we can still talk about causal relations, even if the realist’s picture of
causality turns out to be unsatisfactory, in the same way the fact tha t some
epistemic process cannot be made sense of in Nyaya terms does not mean
54:13-14. This translation appears to me more satisfactory than Bhattacharya’s, who just
has ‘object of negation’ for pratisedhasya drtha (Bhattacharya et al. 1978, 106). It would
seem very peculiar to ascribe to Nagarjuna’s Naiyayika opponent the view that the object
of negation is causally brought about by the negation (or the other way round).
47See Bhattacharya et al. (1978, 106, note 1) for a list of references to this example.
48‘By virtue of your statement a negation is not possible in the three times, and,
like the negation, the thing to be negated also [does not exist].’ tatha hi tvadvacanena
pratisedhastraikalye ’nupapanna pratisedhavat sa pratisedhyo ‘pi. VV(S) 83:17-18.
49In VP 14-15 we find a different reply. Here the opponent argues that once the existence
of the means and objects of knowledge is denied in the three times this then also infects
the possibility of negation of the means and objects of knowledge, which also has to exist in
the three times. Nagarjuna then replies that it is not feasible to first accept the negation
of some object and then use this very acceptance to argue for its existence. See the
commentary in Tola and Dragonetti (1995a, 108-110).
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it could not be made sense of at all. After all what Nagarjuna criticizes 
in his analysis of causation is the conception of causes and effects as mu­
tually independent, objectively existing entities. Similarly, in his treatment 
of epistemology, he sets out to refute the conception that being a means of 
knowledge is an essential property of some cognitive processes. If we do not 
make this presupposition, however, there is nothing intrinsically problematic 
with the existence of causes and effects in general, and also not with causes 
and effects in epistemic processes.
Chapter 4
The catuskoti or tetralem m a  
• »
The second major formal aspects of Nagarjuna’s arguments we have to dis­
cuss is the catuskoti or tetralemma. Even though Nagarjuna employs this 
argumentative figure frequently and at important points in his arguments it 
is by no means restricted to his writings. In fact the tetralemma is likely 
to be familiar to any reader of Buddhist philosophical literature. Roughly 
speaking it consists of the enumeration of four alternatives: tha t some propo­
sitions holds, tha t it fails to hold, that it both holds and fails to hold, that 
it neither holds nor fails to hold. The tetralemma also constitutes one of the 
more puzzling features of Buddhist philosophy as the use to which it is put in 
arguments is not immediately obvious and certainly not uniform: sometimes 
one of the four possibilities is selected as ‘the right one’, sometimes all four 
are rejected, sometimes all four are affirmed. It seems that this confusion is 
only exacerbated by the plethora of treatments we find in the modern com- 
mentarial literature, many of which try  to analyse the tetralemma by recourse 
to notions of modern logic. There is no agreement about whether the four al­
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ternatives are to be understood as quantified1 or unquantified propositions,2 
whether any quantification is to be understood substitutionally or referen- 
tially,3 whether the Law of the Excluded Middle holds for them,4 or whether 
they should be formalized in classical,5 intuitionist6 or paraconsistent logic.7
Despite some important work done during the last decades8 a compre­
hensive study of the origin and development of the catuskoti from its use in 
the earliest Buddhist literature up to its later employment in the Buddhist 
philosophical works of Tibet, China, and Japan remains yet to be written. 
The present chapter obviously does not intend to fill this gap, but has the 
more modest and more specific objective of giving an interpretation of Na­
garjuna’s employment of the tetralemma which makes both logical sense and 
sheds most light on Nagarjuna’s philosophical position.9
The discussion in this chapter will be divided into four main parts. Firstly 
I will discuss the Indian distinction between two kinds of negation which will 
be of central importance for understanding the interrelations of the nested 
negations found in the tetralemma. In the second section I consider what 
might be taken to be a simplified case of the catuskoti, namely Nagarjuna’s 
rejection of two alternatives, of a position and its negation. Once the re­
sources for understanding the argumentative role of this argument-schema
1 Robinson (1967, 57-58).
2Schayer (1933, 93).
3Tillemans (1990, 75).
4Murti (1955, 146), Staal (1975, 46-47), Napper (1989, 672-673, note 83).
5Robinson (1957).
6Chi (1969, 162-3).
7Priest and Garfield (2002).
8One of the most thorough treatments pertaining to its usage in the Madhyamika
context is given by Ruegg (1977).
9To this extent the present discussion differs importantly from treatments like Robin­
son’s (1975) who explicitly restricted his investigation to the formal aspects of Nagarjuna’s 
arguments (295).
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are in place we can move on to the third section, in which Nagarjuna’s use 
of the tetralemma proper as the negation of four alternatives is considered. 
In this section I concentrate on three main questions: whether the four al­
ternatives are logically independent, what the status of third, ‘contradictory’ 
alternative is, and how instances of the catuskoti applied to properties are 
to be related to those applied to relations. In the fourth and final section I 
conclude my discussion with an account of the positive tetralemma, in which 
all four alternatives are affirmed.
4.1 Two kinds of negation
The Indian philosophical tradition distinguishes two kinds of negation which 
are referred to as prasajya and paryudcisa, respectively. The origin of this dis­
tinction is grammatical; in prasajya-negation the negative particle connects 
with a verb (as in brahm,ana ndsti, ‘This is not a brahmin’), in paryuddsa- 
negation it connects with a noun (as in abrahmana asti, ‘This is a non­
brahmin’).10
This grammatical distinction corresponds to an important semantic dis­
tinction. If we refer to somebody as a non-brahmin we negate the term 
‘brahmin’ and simultaneously affirm that he is a member of one of the three 
other castes. If, however, we simply say ‘This is not a brahmin’ we negate 
a proposition (i.e. ‘This is a brahmin’), rather than a term (‘brahmin’) and 
do not imply that we speak about a person belonging to one of the three 
lower castes; in fact we do not have to speak about a person at all.11 In 
the Indian philosophical discussion (and particularly in the Madhyamaka 
context) it is this semantic distinction between implicational term-negation
10Oberhammer, Prets and Prandstetter (1991—, 11:163).
n Renou (1942, II: 11), Cardona (1967, 40), Kajiyama (1973, 167-174).
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and non-implicational propositional negation which the terms paryudasa and 
prasajya are supposed to mark. It is therefore not necessarily the case that 
e.g. non-implicational propositional prasafya-negation is expressed as ver­
bally bound.12
In fact this distinction is very familiar to contemporary philosophers. 
Not only can the grammatical distinction from Sanskrit be easily replicated 
in English, but the semantic distinction between the two types of negation 
also features prominently in the current discussion, particularly concerning 
the notion of a category mistake. Given that numbers are abstract objects 
it is clear that claiming ‘The number seven is green’ is a category mistake. 
But what about ‘The number seven is not green’ ? This depends on how we 
take negation to operate in this case.
It has been argued by a variety of authors13 that we have to distinguish 
two kinds of negation, called choice negation and exclusion negation. A choice 
negation presupposes tha t an object falls under a property or its opposite. 
Presupposing that the apple on the table has some colour or other it must 
either be red or non-red. If we negate one alternative we affirm the other. 
Exclusion negation, on the other hand, ‘is supposed to reject merely what 
is denied, without making any presuppositions as to the fulfillment of sortal 
specifications’.14 Thus if we deny that the apple on the table is divisible by 
three we do not presuppose that it is the kind of thing which could be divided 
by three, but still (correctly) assert that it does not fall under the property 
‘divisible by three’. It is then evident that ‘The number seven is not green’ 
is a category mistake only if the negation employed is taken to be a choice 
negation, not if it is an exclusion negation.
12Ruegg (1977, 5), (2002, 20-21).
13Mannoury (1947), Pap (1960), Routley (1969), Sommers (1965).
14Thomason (1972, 242).
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While the distinction between choice negation and exclusion negation 
gives us a good model for understanding the distinction between paryudasa 
and prasajya negations, it should certainly not be identified with it, as there 
is no textual evidence tha t Indian thinkers connected the distinction between 
the two kinds of negation specifically with categorial considerations. Rather, 
the difference between choice and exclusion negation should be considered as 
one example of the difference the pair paryudasa and prasajya indicates. This 
is the difference between negations carrying with them the presuppositions 
implied by the propositions they negate, and those which deny these presup­
positions. Thus reading the ‘not’ in ‘The number seven is not green’ as a 
choice negation carries with it a presupposition ‘The number seven is green’ 
makes, namely that seven is a thing which could be green. This assumption 
is denied if the ‘not’ is read as an exclusion negation.
Examples of these different kinds of negation which do not rely on sortal 
considerations are not hard to come by. There are two ways of negating the 
assertion that the present King of France is bald, one making the negation 
true, the other false or meaningless,15 similarly there are two ways of negating 
the accusation of continuing to be an alcoholic, one asserting tha t one has 
stopped drinking now, the other also denying the implication that one ever 
was a heavy drinker.16
15The first being ‘It is not the case that there is somebody who is both the King of Prance 
and bald’, the other ‘The present Kind of France is not bald (i.e. has a full head of hair)’. 
The difference between the two is drawn in terms of the scope of the negation operator,
that is, put formally, as the difference between ->(3\)(Kx A Bx) and (3!)(Ka; A ~>Bx).
16Shaw (1978, 63-64) notes the interesting idea of representing the proposition a sen­
tence expresses as an ordered set, the last member of which is the sentence itself, the 
preceding one expressing the presuppositions that sentence makes, the one preceding this 
its presuppositions in turn and so on. A paryudasa-negeAion can then be understood as 
negating the final member of the set only, whereas a prasajya-negation negates both it and
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As I will argue below the best way of interpreting Nagarjuna’s arguments 
is based on understanding the concepts paryudasa and prasajya in this par­
ticular manner. That is, pan/wdasa-negations will be regarded as negations 
which continue to endorse the presuppositions made by the proposition they 
negate, while the purpose of prasajya-negations is to be able to formulate 
negations which explicitly reject some of these presuppositions.
4.2 R ejection  of two alternatives
The distinction between the two kinds of negation helps to understand an 
important methodological tool which is used extensively throughout Nagar­
juna’s writings. Consider MMK 18:10 which sets out claiming that
whatever comes into being dependent on some object is not iden­
tical with tha t object, nor is it different from that object.17
If we ascribe to Nagarjuna anything like the standard conception of iden­
tity (i.e. tha t identity is the relation everything bears to itself, and nothing 
bears to any other object) it seems hard to make sense of it, at least if we want 
to stay within the domain of classical logic. Nagarjuna considers the prop­
erty ‘being identical with the object it depends on for coming about’ (which 
we will abbreviate to ‘being identical with a ’) and denies that it applies to 
any object, and also denies tha t it fails to apply to any object. Expressed 
semi-formally this gives
1. For all x which come into being depending on some particular object,
not (identical-with-a(x) or not identical-with-a(x)).
some (possibly all) of its predecessors.
17prattiya yad yad bhavati na hi tavat tad eva tat /  na canyad api [...].
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But applying the familiar laws of logic (in this case DeMorgan’s law and 
Double Negation Elimination), this can easily be seen to be equivalent to
2. For all x which come into being depending on some particular object 
(not identical-with-a(x) and identical-with-a(x)),
which is a contradiction.
How can this interpretation be avoided? The key lies in the distinction be­
tween the two kinds of negation. We have to assume that the two occurrences 
of ‘not1 in 1. do not in fact refer to the same concept of negation, but rather 
that the first is a prasajya-negation, a presupposition-cancelling negation,18 
the second a paujudasa-negsktion^ understood as a presupposition-preserving 
negation.
Taking the first negation as prasajya is also suggested by Matilal,19 who 
claims that on this interpretation ‘the apparent contradiction of the joint 
negation1 disappears.20 Staal claims that such attempts to avoid inconsis­
18 That the first instance of negation is supposed to be prasajya is stated both by 
CandrakTrti in PP 13:5 (see Ruegg (2002, 19) for a translation and commentary), as well 
as earlier by Bhaviveka in the Prajnapradipa (Walleser 1914a, 10:8). CandrakTrti does not 
explicitly say what kind of negation the second negation is. It is evident, however, that 
for him it cannot be prasajya-negation too. Considering the first two alternatives of the 
tetralemma CandrakTrti argues against the claim that the negation of the first alternative 
(j4) logically implies (prdpnoti) the second alternative (not A). If the ‘not’ in this ‘not A' 
was indeed taken to be prasajya it would be obviously entailed by the prasajya-negation 
of A. Since it is not so entailed, however, it cannot be a prasojya-negation as well. It 
is therefore plausible to regard the second kind of negation as paryudasa, an assumption
which, as we shall see, also makes a good deal of exegetical sense.
19Matilal (1971, 164).
20Matilal refers both to the negation of two and of four alternatives (the catuskoti). As 
we will see below the interpretation of the latter involves additional complications Matilal 
does not seem to be aware of.
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tency are unsuccessful, as ‘it is not true that contradictions do not arise 
between p ras ajy a-neg&tions’ .21 However, this disregards the fact tha t Mati- 
lal’s point was that only the outer negation of the two alternatives is to be 
regarded as prasajya, while the negations employed within the statement of 
the alternatives are supposed to be pan/udasa-negations. It is therefore the 
entire set of two mutually exclusive alternatives which is negated, and on 
this interpretation there is indeed nothing inconsistent about it.
In order to see the motivation for this employment of two kinds of negation 
we have to understand that one of Nagarjuna’s main aims in the MMK as 
well as elsewhere is to demonstrate the deficiency of some key concepts of 
our conceptual scheme (such as causation, motion, identity and so forth).22 
Their deficiency is taken to be due to a presupposition failure: in the same 
way tha t we spot a deficiency in calling the number seven yellow (because the 
presupposition tha t numbers are things which could possibly have a colour is 
not fulfilled), Nagarjuna regards commonsense concepts like causation to be 
deficient because they presuppose the existence of svabhava, the independent 
existence of objects, which, Nagarjuna argues, is a presupposition which is 
not fulfilled.23 It then becomes easy to see that 1. should be interpreted along 
the lines of
3. For all numbers x, not (yellow(x) or not yellow(x)).
21See Staal (1975, 46). He also claims that the principle of contradiction only holds for 
prasajya- and not for paryizdasa-negations, a claim which he backs up by reference to the 
MTmamsa concept of two kinds of paryudasa (Staal 1962, 60-61). But this can only serve 
to show that the Madhyamaka concept of paryudasa is quite different as it is manifestly 
taken to be subject to the principle of contradiction. Compare the characterization of
paryudasa by Avalokitavrata given in Kajiyama (1973, 169-172).
22Ganeri (2001, 45-47).
23Ruegg (1977, 51).
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If the outer negation is taken to be exclusion negation and the second to 
be choice negation we cannot just read this as implying the contradictory 
statement that all numbers are both yellow and not yellow. Rather we will 
read it as denying (in a prasajya-manner) that the property yellowness and its 
(paryudasa) opposite (which would imply that numbers were of some other 
colour) fail to be applicable to numbers.24 Interpreted in this way, since 
the outer negation is read as exclusion negation, 3. does also not presuppose 
that any other property is in fact applicable to numbers. In the context of
3. this neutrality is not particulary important, as we usually would want to 
claim that there are other (mathematical) properties which are applicable to 
numbers. It is, however, important for 1. since Nagarjuna wants to extend 
his arguments to all other st>a6/iat>a-presupposing concepts (which, according 
to him, are all the concepts we usually operate with).
If we therefore read the first ‘not’ in Nagarjuna’s statement as prasajya 
and the second as paryudasa, the following interpretation emerges:
4. It is denied tha t either the concept ‘identical-with-a’ or its choice nega­
tion ‘different-from-a’ can be ascribed to any object x  which comes 
into being depending on some particular object, without assuming that 
there is any pair of a concept and its choice negation one of which can 
be applied to such an object.
In order to demonstrate the deficiency of a concept Nagarjuna has then 
to examine both the concept and its paryudasa-negation and show that both 
are not applicable to the objects under discussion, in the same way in which 
we argue that the concept ‘yellow’ is not applicable to numbers because
24See Galloway (1989, note 13, 29-30).( x is yellow’ and (x is not yellow’ are contraries 
when the referent of x is sortally incorrect (since they are both false). If the referent is 
sortally correct they are contradictories. See Raju (1954, 710-711).
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numbers, not being material objects, cannot have a property like yellowness 
(which is exclusively had by material objects), nor can they have any other 
colour (the paryudasa-negation of the concept ‘yellow’).25
4.3 R ejection  of four alternatives
As will be obvious to any reader of Nagarjuna’s writings far more com­
mon than the case just discussed, where two alternatives (a concept and 
its pan/udasa-negation) are both rejected is the rejection of four alterna­
tives: the rejection of the application of a concept, of the application of its 
negation, of the application of both the concept and its negation, and finally 
of the application of neither the concept nor its negation. For example we 
read in MMK 22:11
‘Empty’ should not be asserted, ‘Non-empty’ should not be as­
serted, both or neither should not be asserted, as these are only 
said for the purpose of designation.26
The same argumentative pattern of the rejection of four alternatives is
also applied to ‘permanence’ and ‘finitude’ concerning the Buddha,27 to the
25Raju (1954, 701-702) employs this argumentative procedure to show that neither the
concept ‘positive’ nor its pan/udasa-negation ‘negative’ is applicable to the number zero
(sunya in Sanskrit) and claims that similarly for the Madhyamilta no concept is applicable
to emptiness (sunyata). We should note, however, that there is no evidence in the Ma-
dhyamaka literature of an explicit connection between the mathematical concept sunya
and the metaphysical concept sunyata having ever been made. See Ruegg (1977, 69, note
154), (1978), Galloway (1989, 27-28, note 7).
26sunyam iti na vaktavyam asunyam iti va bhavet /  ubhayam nobhayam ceti
prajnaptyartham tu kathyate.
27MMK 22:12.
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existence of nirvana,28 to the existence of persons in the past,29 to their 
permanence,30 and to the finitude of the world.31
The employment of the tetralemma can be traced back to the earliest 
Buddhist scriptures. In the Kandaraka Sutta the four alternatives are em­
ployed as a classificatory tool for distinguishing four classes of ascetics, those 
which torment themselves, which torment others, which torment both and 
which torment neither.32 In this case the fourth alternative is explicitly rec­
ommended by the Buddha as the ideal to be emulated.
A case of the rejection of the four alternatives by the Buddha concern­
ing the question whether the Tathagata exists after death33 can be found 
in the Aggivacchagotta Sutta34 and the Culamalunkya Sutta.35 Although the 
relationship between the use of the tetralemma in early Buddhism36 and its 
employment by later Madhyamaka authors is complex and will not be inves­
tigated here it is nevertheless important to note at least that two different 
motivations can be discerned in the Buddha’s rejection of the four alter­
natives. One motivation is pragmatic; deciding which of the four position 
holds regarding specific questions (such as whether the Tathagata exists after 
death, whether the world is finite etc.) is seen to be irrelevant for the attain­
ment of liberation. Buddha therefore wants to set these questions aside, a is 
illustrated in the well-know simile of the poisoned arrow.37 The other moti­
28MMK 25.
29MMK 27:13.
30MMK 27:15-18.
31MMK 27:25-28.
32Trencker (1888, 1:341), Bikkhu Nalamoli and Bikkhu Bodhi (2001, 445).
33Nagarjuna considers the same question in MMK 22:12,
34Trencker (1888, 1:484-485), Bikkhu Nalamoli and Bikkhu Bodhi (2001, 591).
35Trencker (1888, 1:431), Bikkhu Nalamoli and Bikkhu Bodhi (2001, 536).
36For some material on this see Gunaratne (1980).
37Trencker (1888, 429), Bikkhu Nalamoli and Bikkhu Bodhi (2001, 534-535).
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vation is systematic; Buddha argues that the predicates applied in the four 
alternatives under consideration are in fact not applicable to their respective 
subjects, in the same way as any specification of spatial co-ordinates is not 
applicable in reply to the question where the extinguished flame of a candle 
went.38 All members of an exhaustive set of applications of such predicates 
(which the four alternatives are taken to be) therefore have to be rejected.
4.3.1 Distinctness of the four alternatives
There are a variety of prima facie difficulties in interpreting the four state­
ments of the tetralemma. The first difficulty concerns the distinctness of 
the four alternatives. It is fairly common in the Western commentarial lit­
erature to express the tetralemma in propositional form, so tha t in MMK 
22:11 cited above (letting A  stand for the proposition “Em pty1 should be 
asserted1) Nagarjuna is taken to say that all of the following propositions are 
to be rejected:39
38Trencker (1888, 486-487), Bikkhu Nalamoli and Bikkhu Bodhi (2001, 593).
39See e.g. Schayer (1933, 93), Galloway (1989, 16), Ng (1993, 93), Tillemans (1999, 134).
In some cases the equivalent form (—«j4 A -i-A ) is given for the fourth alternative.
The reader might wonder why we expressed the fourth alternative as ‘not (A or not A )’ 
rather than ‘not (A and not A )’, i.e. as the negation of the third alternative, which would 
be equivalent to ‘A or not A ’. If we look at the way the fourth alternative is formulated 
in the MMK we realize that there is a considerable amount of variation which seems to 
allow both formalizations. We sometimes find it formulated as na ubhayam ‘not both [the 
first and second alternative]’ (22:11, 25:17, 25:23, 27:13) which supports the reading as 
‘not (A and not A )’ and sometimes as naiva . . .  naiva . . .  ‘not even . . . ,  not even . . . ’ 
(18:8, 25:15-16) or na . . .  na . . .  ca ‘not . . .  and not . . . ’ (25:22) which seems to support 
the reading as ‘not (A or not A). The reason for this variation is not that Nagarjuna had 
problems distinguishing ‘and’ and ‘or’ but rather that the context makes it clear that ‘not 
(A or not A )’ is intended. If we read the fourth alternative as ‘not (A and not A )’ this
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1. A
2 . - 1A
3. A A ~iA
4. -i(A V ->A)
It is, however, easy to  see that on this understanding the final two alter­
natives come out as logically equivalent.40 Given the prominent place which 
the tetralemma occupies in Madhyamaka literature we would have to charge 
both Nagarjuna as well as later Madhyamaka authors with remarkable logical 
naivety for not realizing that instead of considering four possibilities, they 
were in fact only dealing with three.
In order to see how to solve this difficulty it is important to realize that 
once the fourth alternative is rejected, we are dealing with a statement with 
three nested negations, namely -i-i(A V -<A).41 If we read the negation- 
symbols just as straight truth-functional negation both this as well as the 
negation of the third alternative turn out to be equivalent to A V —'A, and it
leaves us with three possible ways in which it could be true: either A obtains and not-A
does not, A does not obtain and not-A obtains, or A does not obtain and not-A does
not obtain either. Given that the first two possibilities would be inconsistent with the
rejections of the first two alternatives earlier in the argument we are left with the third
possibility, which just says the same as ‘not (A or not A )1.
40Applying DeMorgan’s law to the fourth alternative, - ‘(A V ->A), we get (-M A ->-iA),
which, by Double Negation Elimination, is equivalent to Af\->A, i.e. the third alternative.
Robinson (1967, 57) is one of the surprisingly few authors to have picked up on this very
problematic issue.
41 After rearranging the relevant parts of MMK 22:11 it is straightforward to see the 
three stacked occurrences of negation it contains (here highlighted in bold): n a vaktavyam 
na ubhayam sunyam asunyam. See also 27:13.
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is obvious that this is not the conclusion Nagarjuna wants to draw.42 I have 
now argued above that the two instances of negation in such statements as 
MMK 18:10 should be regarded as different kinds of negation, namely that 
the outer had to be taken as prasajf/a-negation and the inner as paryudasa- 
negation. Since it is evident that the negation involved in the rejection of 
the four alternatives is meant to be prasajya-negation43 the rejection of the 
fourth alternative would then have to be read as
prasajya--i prasajya-^AV paryudasa--'A).
42It is interesting to note that the Tibetan commentarial tradition tried to avoid this 
difficulty by plugging in various modifiers, such as ‘ultimately’ (don dam par) or ‘conven­
tionally’ (tha snyad du). Abbreviating these by U and C respectively the tetralemma is 
taken to assert that all of the following should be rejected:
1. U A
2. C-iA
3. UA A C~>A
4. -i UA A ->C->A
It it thereby denied that A obtains ultimately, that it conventionally fails to obtain, that 
it both ultimately obtains and conventionally fails to obtain, and finally that it neither 
ultimately obtains nor conventionally fails to obtain. Tillemans (1999, 134-137) gives an 
example (slightly more intricate than the above) of such an interpolation procedure from 
Se ra rje btsun chos kyi rgyal mthsan’s sKabs dang po’i spyi. It is evident that on this 
account the third and fourth alternative are not in turn equivalent to the Law of the 
Excluded Middle, without requiring us to assume that negation behaves non-classically. 
While the dGe lugs interpolation procedure here (as well as in other contexts) provides a 
very interesting interpretation of the Madhyamaka arguments there seems to be no textual 
evidence that Nagarjuna expected qualifications of the above kind to be supplied when
interpreting the tetralemma.
43As stressed in PP 13:5.
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If we now assumed that prasajya-negation obeyed Double Negation Elim­
ination, i.e. that an even number of such negations cancelled each other out 
this would mean the rejection of the fourth alternative entailed the assertion 
of either A  or its paryudasa-negation, which is clearly not what Nagarjuna 
wants to say. I therefore want to argue that this assumption is indeed not 
justified, i.e. that —<—>>4. =  A  does not hold when the negation is taken to be 
prasajya- negation.
It is sometimes remarked in contemporary commentarial literature that 
the notion of negation at work in Madhyamaka arguments should be under­
stood along the lines of intuitionist negation, which famously does not accept 
the equivalence -i-iA = A .44 It has to be kept in mind, however, that the 
intuitionist rejection of -<-A. =  A, which went hand in hand with a negation 
of the Law of the Excluded Middle was motivated by very specific mathe­
matical reasons. Since the negation symbol was interpreted as expressing 
our ability to give a reductio ad absurdum of the mathematical proposition 
to be negated, while the assertion of an unnegated proposition was taken 
to imply our ability to provide a proof of that proposition, — iA could not 
entail A, as a demonstration that we cannot disproof a proposition does not 
amount to a proof of that proposition.45 Moreover, given the existence of un­
decided mathematical sentences the intuitionist is unwilling to accept that 
we are able to provide either a proof or a refutation of each mathematical 
proposition, which is what A V ->A means for him.46 It is obvious that these 
problems in the ontology of mathematics were not problems Nagarjuna was
44For an exposition of intuitionist logic see Heyting (1971). The intuitionist reading was
considered by Chi (1969, 162-3) and Staal (1975, 47).
45See Heyting (1971, 17-18) for an example.
46Heyting (1971, 99-100).
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concerned with.47 W hat speaks furthermore against the intuitionist interpre­
tation of Madhyamaka negation is the fact that while it is sensible to argue 
that prasajya-negation does not obey - 1- 1A  = A  in order to make sense of 
the tetralemma, I do not think Nagarjuna also rejected the Law of the Ex­
cluded Middle for it.48 For even if some property (or indeed all properties) 
should turn out to be inapplicable to an object, this means that the prasajya- 
negation of the ascription of the property to the object should be affirmed. 
And given Nagarjuna does not express any doubts about our ability to check 
whether properties are in fact applicable to objects in general, it appears to 
be unproblematic to affirm that A  V ~>A holds for prasajya-ilegation, that 
is to assume for any property and any object, that either this property is 
applicable to the object or it is not.49
47In (1974, 297) Richard Chi agrees with this point, calling his earlier intuitionist anal­
ysis of the tetralemma a ‘mistake’: ‘Despite the superficial resemblance, it is incredible 
that Nagarjuna and Brouwer could possibly think in the same way. Dialectics and pure 
mathematics are, after all, two different disciplines. The agreement of the two systems is
a sheer coincidence; they reach the same result for different reasons’.
48Nor did Tsong kha pa. See Napper (1989, 61).
49That Nagarjuna accepts the Law of the Excluded Middle is also argued by Ruegg 
(1977, 48-49). His argument there is, however, based on the erroneous presupposition 
(also made by Staal (1975, 47)) that the intuitionist has to assume the existence of a third 
truth-value (see Dummett (1998, 178), (2000, 11)).
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There does not seem to be any direct textual evidence in Indian Madhya­
maka literature stating that prasajya-negation does not obey ->-■ A  ~  A 50 
If we consider one example of a presupposition-cancelling prasuji/a-negation 
discussed above, namely the case of exclusion negation it seems plausible 
that -i-A  =  A  does not hold for it. Remember that when we use choice 
negation to negate a statement like ‘The apple is red’ we are merely saying 
of the apple that it has some other colour. To use set-theoretic terminology 
we assert (within the domain of coloured things) that the apple belongs to 
the complement of the set of red things. Now if we use choice negation twice, 
saying ‘The apple is not not red’ we are just saying that the apple belongs 
to the complement of the complement of the set of red things, which is of 
course the set of red things itself. In brief, we just say that the apple is red.
Exclusion negation, on the other hand, would be used to negate a state­
ment like ‘The number seven is yellow’, thereby claiming that yellowness not 
just fails to be true of the number seven, but is indeed not applicable to it. 
If we then iterate this exclusion negation we say that it is not applicable to 
assert of the number seven that the property of yellowness is not applicable 
to it — and whatever this means, it seems quite distinct from saying that 
the number seven is yellow.
Be this as it may, I think there is a more elegant way to dissolve the 
above difficulty of iterated negations. This involves the notion of illocutionary
50 An interesting case of a Tibetan rejection of this principle is provided by the Sa skya 
pa scholar Go rams ba bsod nams seng ge. As Tillemans (1999, 137) has argued, according 
to the mainstream dGe lugs approach the Tibetan analogues of prasajya- and paryudasar 
negation, med dgag and ma yin dgag, were assumed to obey -i-iA — A. (See e.g. Tsong 
kha pa Bio bzang grags pa (1973, 43-44).) Go rams pa bSod nams seng ge (1988, 51-52), 
however, rejects this principle, precisely to make sense of the tetralemma without the dGe 
lugs-style interpolations.
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negation?1 The underlying idea is that propositions expressing a content 
can be prefixed by illocutionary operators forming assertions, commands, 
requests, promises and so on. Thus ascribing the property of being open to 
the window produces the assertion ‘The window is open’ when prefixed by the 
assertion operator, the command ‘Open the window!’ when prefixed by the 
command operator and so on. It is now important for our purposes to note 
that when one of these results is negated it makes a difference whether or not 
the negation operator is within the scope of the illocutionary force operator,
i.e. whether we say ‘I promise not to open the window’ or ‘I do not promise to 
open the window’. Similarly there is a distinction between ‘I assert that the 
window is not open’ and ‘I do not assert that the window is open’ — the first 
involves familiar propositional negation, the second illocutionary negation.
There are various reasons why someone may employ illocutionary nega­
tion. One example is obviously when the proposition to be negated carries 
an unwelcome presupposition which propositional negation would preserve. 
Thus we will be happy to say ‘I do not assert that the number seven is yellow’ 
(presumably together with ‘I do not assert that the number seven is not yel­
low’), but not ‘I assert that the number seven is not yellow’. In other words, 
one motivation for using illocutionary negation is the desire to employ a 
prasajya- rather than paryudasa-negation because we want to reject a partic­
ular presupposition made by the sentence to be negated. Note, however, that 
this is not the only reason why we might use illocutionary negation. Another 
obvious candidate is lack of evidence. We might say ‘I do not assert that 
the continuum hypothesis is true’ in order to indicate tha t we have no good
51Searle (1969, 31-33); the distinction of illocutionary force from content goes back to 
Frege. The relevance of illocutionary negation to this problem was suggested by Jayatilleke 
(1963, 346, 475), (1967, 81), Chakravarti (1980), Ruegg (1983, 238) and Matilal (1986, 
66-67, 88-90).
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evidence either way; in this case the presupposition-cancelling consideration 
involved when discussing the colour of the number seven does not come into 
play. We do not want to say that the continuum hypothesis is not the kind 
of thing which could be true or false. A third case in which we might want to 
apply illocutionary negation to a proposition A  is when A  is not part of our 
language and we have no way of translating it. In this case we would not want 
to assert A  because we do not know which situation would make it true, and 
which would make it false. It is therefore evident that illocutionary negation 
is a more general notion than presupposition-cancelling prasajy a-negation: it 
incorporates these, but it subsumes other considerations as well.
It is now tempting to interpret the tetralemma as asserting that illocu­
tionary negation52 should be applied to the following positions:
1. A
2 . ~ iA
3. A  and ->A
4. I do not assert (A or -A.)
52It is interesting to note that in the Pali sources we sometimes find the four alternatives 
denied by the phrase na h ’ idam, ‘it is not so’ (for example in the Ahguttara Nikaya, (Morris 
1888, 2:163)), and sometimes by the phrase ma h 7 evam, ‘do not say so’ (Samyutta Nikaya^ 
(Feer 1888, 2:19-20)). Some have argued that there is a semantic distinction between the 
two uses and that ‘it is not so’ is employed when the predicate in question is applicable 
to the situation discussed, but giving an affirmative answer to any one alternative would 
be misleading, while ‘do not say so’ is used where the predicate is not applicable to 
the situation (Jayatilleke (1963, 346), Gunaratne (1980, 231-231), Bharadwaja (1984, 
312-313)). This second use corresponds to the illocutionary negation just introduced; 
interestingly enough this is employed in the passage from the Samyutta Nikaya just cited 
to reject the four alternatives claiming that suffering is produced by oneself, others, both 
or neither.
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Here the negation-operator -i is to be read again as parywdasa-negation. 
The focus of our attention is of course the negation of the fourth alternative, 
which now features two illocutionary negations in a row, i.e.
I do not assert that I do not assert that (A or -u4).
The advantage of replacing the prasajya-negations in this way by illo­
cutionary negations is that it allows us to see straightaway tha t the two 
negations do not reduce to an unnegated proposition, that is that - 1- 1A  =  A  
does not hold. Declining to assert a proposition which in turn asserts that 
we decline to assert a third proposition does not amount to an assertion of 
this third proposition.
Tillemans has argued that the illocutionary reading of prasajya-negation 
in the context of the tetralemma has the ‘serious philosophical drawback’ 
tha t it gives the impression of the Madhyamika’s refusing to adopt either 
a positive or negative position on some subject-matter. This impression 
would be misleading, however, since it is apparent that Nagarjuna and his 
commentators wanted to assert ‘some form  of a negated proposition’53 when 
setting out the arguments for rejecting the different parts of the tetralemma.
Fortunately this problem can be easily dissolved. While the application 
of illocutionary negation to some proposition entails that we want to be 
‘uncommitted to the tru th  or falsity of i t ’54 it also means that we want to 
assert a negative proposition when speaking about the proposition concerned. 
For example we might want to deny that there is enough evidence available 
for deciding it, or that we can translate it into our language, or that it carries 
with it a presupposition we want to assert. It is of course this last justification 
for using illocutionary negation the Madhyamika wants to adopt, as he wants
53Tillemans (1990, 74).
54Tillemans (1990, 74).
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to deny the existence of svabhava presupposed by the four positions in the 
tetralemma. It is therefore unproblematic to assert that the Madhyamika 
declines to assert any of the four positions, while still ‘asserting some form  
of negated proposition’.
A further objection one might make at this point is that the interpretation 
in terms of illocutionary negation is not able to account for one important 
feature we would want to ascribe to the tetralemma, namely that the four 
alternatives are logically disjoint. It is evident that if I refuse to assert some 
proposition A  (that is, negate it illocutionarily) this will entail tha t I also 
refuse to assert its conjunction with some other proposition. It could not be 
the case that I refused to assert the continuum hypothesis but would be happy 
to assert both the continuum hypothesis and Riemann’s hypothesis. But in 
this case the illocutionary negation of the first alternative will imply that of 
the third, so that any distinct argument for rejecting the third possibility 
would be superfluous.
This argument of course depends on the assumption that the ‘and’ in the 
formulation of the third alternative behaves like the truth-functional operator 
of conjunction, so that the third alternative entails the first. We will argue 
shortly that this is not generally the case. To do this, however, we must first 
have a closer look at the status of the third alternative itself.
4.3.2 The status of the third alternative
An important problem in interpreting the tetralemma is connected with the 
rejection of the third alternative, which asserts the applicability of a property 
and its paryudasa-negation. Why, we might well ask, does Nagarjuna think 
we have to consider this contradictory option as well, as if this constituted a
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real possibility?55
Robinson suggests tha t a way of dealing with this problem is to interpret 
the four alternatives not in a propositional, but in a quantificational way.56 
If F  is the property under consideration the four alternatives to be rejected 
become:
1. Everything is F.
2. Everything is not F.
3. Something is F  and something is not F.
4. N ot: Something is F  or something is not F.
Here all negations are paryudasa, apart from the one in the fourth alter­
native set in boldface, which is a prasajya-negation.
It is evident that when formulated in this way the third alternative is am­
biguous, depending on whether we take the two occurrences of ‘something’ 
to refer to the same object. If we take them to refer to different objects, the 
third alternative is not any more problematic than saying that chesspieces 
are both white and not white, where this is to mean that some are white, and 
some are not white. This interpretation, however, does not fit well with the 
employment of the tetralemma by Nagarjuna. His aim is to investigate the 
applicability of various concepts (such as emptiness, permanence, finitude 
etc.) to objects. If the third alternative was taken to mean ‘the concept un­
der discussion is applicable to some objects, and not to others’ this would not
55There are clear cases of pan/udasa-negation in the MMK where Nagarjuna assumes the 
Law of Non-contradiction (e.g. 7:30 and 8:7). The third contradictory alternative should 
therefore not constitute a genuine possibility. See also Robinson (1967, 50-52), Ruegg
(1977, 48-49), Galloway (1989, 19-22).
56Robinson (1967, 57-58).
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be an argumentationally interesting option for Nagarjuna, as the application 
of the concept to some objects, and its non-application to the others would 
then have to be investigated individually in any case. On this interpreta­
tion the third alternative would merely present a complex statement of two 
argumentative options which Nagarjuna will want to investigate separately. 
Richard Robinson remarks:57
It is a striking feature of the Stanzas that all predicates seem to be 
asserted totally of the whole subject. Existential quantifications 
are denied because the discussion is concerned, not with the denial 
or affirmation of commonsense assertions such as ‘Some fuel is 
burning, and some is not1, but with the concepts of own-being 
and essence. W hat pertains to part of an essence must of course 
pertain to the whole essence.
Put briefly, given that Nagarjuna wants to inquire into the applicability 
of particular concepts to objects tout court we should also consider the four 
alternatives as giving alternative ways of the application of particular con­
cepts to objects tout court, rather than as implying their application to some 
objects, but not to others.
We therefore have to interpret the two occurrences of ‘something’ as per­
taining to the same object, i.e. the third alternative claims that ‘something is 
F  and the same something is not F \  Whether this is contradictory depends 
on how we understand the application of the properties F  and not F. For 
example, it is straightforward to assert that a chess board is black and not 
black, if we mean by this that some parts of it are black, and others not black. 
On this reading the contradiction is avoided by relativising the two proper­
ties involved to different mereological parts. The same result can be achieved
57Robinson (1967, 54). See also Gunaratne (1986, 225-226).
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by relativizing to different respects or perspectives under which the object is 
considered, for example if we assign different utilities to an alternative in a 
decision problem under different descriptions.58
To see that these kinds of relativizing interpretations are present in Na­
garjuna it is instructive to look at the reasons by which the third alternative 
is generally rejected. Here we can distinguish two varieties. In the first case 
Nagarjuna rejects it because its claim is as contradictory as asserting of a 
single object that it is wholly black and not black. For example we read in 
MMK 25:14:59
How could nirvana exist and not exist? Like light and darkness 
these two [i.e. existence and non-existence] cannot be at the same 
place.60
In the second case Nagarjuna rejects the third alternative since it would 
combine the difficulties facing the first and second alternative (which have 
already been rejected earlier in the argument). This point is clearly made by 
CandrakTrti:61
Things do not originate from both [themselves and from other 
things]. This is because the problems stated for both positions
58The Digha Nikdya (1:31) asserts that the world is both not existent and not non­
existent; the former because it ceases, the latter because it arises. See Jayatilleke (1967,
79), Robinson (1969, 75), Gunaratne (1980, 221).
59Further examples can be found in 7:30, 8:7 and 27:28.
^bhaved abhavo bhavas ca nii'vanam ubhayam katham /  tayor abhdvo hy ekatra 
prakasatamasor iva.
61 dvabhyamapi nopajiiayante bhdvdh ubhaya-paksa-abhihita-dosa-prasangdt pratyekam  
utpdddsamarthydc ca. PP 38:1-2, (Ruegg 2002, 73). CandrakTrti makes the same point 
when commenting on MMK 12:9. See Schayer (1931, 20).
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[i.e. the first and second alternative] will arise together one by 
one.
It is clear from this way of rejecting the third alternative that it is here 
not understood to be contradictory, but that CandrakTrti takes it to be per­
fectly possible that something could be caused partly by itself and partly by 
other things. (One straightforward account of this consists in conceiving of 
an effect as a potential in a cause which is only actualized given the right 
background conditions).62 This is rejected because the presence of these two 
ways of causing would imply the difficulties of both causation from itself, 
and of causation from other things, both of which Nagarjuna has rejected as 
unsatisfactory earlier.63
We therefore have to conclude that Nagarjuna applies the argumenta­
tive figure of the tetralemma both to cases where he takes a concept and its 
paryudasa-negation (i.e. the conjuncts of the third alternative) to be contra­
dictory, as in the first case just mentioned, as well as where he considers it
62Garfield (1995, 106-107).
63These two ways of rejecting the third alternative are also distinguished in Ghose (1987, 
296-297). He also mentions a third way where the third alternative is rejected because ‘it 
attributes to the conjunction some properties which are common to both the conjuncts’. 
As an example Ghose discusses verse 25:12 from the MMK where Nagarjuna claims that 
‘if nirvana was both existent and non-existent, it would not be non-dependent, as it would 
depend on both’. Nagarjuna here does not refute this alternative by saying that it is 
contradictory for something to be both existent and non-existent, but by arguing that since 
existence and non-existence both presuppose dependence, nirvana would be dependent, 
which it is not. However, it is evident that this is just an example of the second way of 
rejecting the third alternative too. Nagarjuna has already rejected (in verses 6 and 8) that 
nirvana is either existent or non-existent, because it would be dependent in each case. The 
third alternative is thus rejected because it implies the difficulties of both the first and 
second alternative, which happen to be the same difficulty in this particular case.
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to be possible that both can be applied to an object, as in the second case.
Obviously only in the second case recourse to the tetralemma would have 
been strictly necessary, as in the first case a consideration of two alterna­
tives (of the concept and its paryuddsa-negation) would have been sufficient, 
given that both of them together are regarded as contradictory anyway. We 
might perhaps explain the fact that Nagarjuna uses the four alternatives 
nevertheless on rhetorical, rather than on logical grounds. If it was assumed 
that all four alternatives of the tetralemma applied to a particular notion 
were positions actually propounded by some school of thought64 it would be 
heuristically useful, if not logically necessary, to go through all of them indi­
vidually, even if this included an alternative which the Madhyamika regarded 
as logically contradictory.
But if we thus regard the second case as the domain of the tetralemma 
proper (and the first only as a rhetorical expansion of the rejection of two 
alternatives) it is clear that in the tetralemma proper the third alternative 
does not entail the first. Consider the case of the tetralemma applied to 
causation. Here the first alternative claims that things are exclusively caused 
by themselves, the second that they are exclusively caused by others. The 
third alternative constitutes a compromise between the first and second: it 
says that things are partly self-caused, and partly caused by other objects. 
But this obviously does not imply the first alternative, 110 more than saying 
that a chess-board is partly black and partly white implies that it is black all 
over. For this reason the illocutionary negation of the first alternative also 
does not imply that of the third, since the third is not a truth-functional 
conjunction of the first alternative and something else.
We should also note tha t according to the quantificational reading given
64See note 77 to this chapter.
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above the third and fourth alternative are logically distinct, as 3. says that 
some objects instantiate both the property F  and its complement, whereas 4. 
says tha t neither is in fact instantiated. Finally, as we conceive of the initial 
two negations in the negated fourth alternative as illocutionary negations, so 
tha t they do not cancel each other out the rejection of the fourth alternative 
is not equivalent to ‘Something is F  or something is not F \
It therefore becomes evident that what Nagarjuna wants to say in MMK 
22:11 is that the following four alternatives should all be rejected:65
1. ‘Empty’ should be asserted of all objects.
2. ‘Empty’ should be denied (in a paryudasa fashion) of all objects.
3. ‘Empty’ should be asserted of some objects, and should be paryudasa- 
denied of the same objects.
4. N o t: ‘Empty’ should be asserted of some objects, or ‘Em pty’ should 
be paryudasa-denied the same objects.
Nagarjuna’s usual argumentative procedure (as we will see below) is to 
argue tha t each of the four alternatives leads to an absurd consequence, so 
tha t the whole set is to be rejected. In this case, however, he does not 
discuss the four alternatives individually but dispatches them with a single 
argument, namely by saying that all assertions listed in the four alternatives 
‘are only names’.66 Nagarjuna is therefore making a semantic point: while it
65The boldface ‘not’ indicates illocutionary negation.
66Since Nagarjuna does not give reasons for the rejection of the four alternatives in­
dividually we cannot say whether he would have wanted to reject the third alternative 
because he considers it to be contradictory (‘nothing can be empty and not empty at the 
same tim e’) or because it would combine the difficulties inherent in the first two alterna­
tives. It is certainly conceivable that someone might adopt the third alternative by arguing
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is of course true for the Madhyamika that every right-minded person should 
assert the emptiness of all objects, this should not be done by assuming that 
there are some objectively existent objects out there, referred to by a sim­
ilarly objective reference relation, and that these objects have the property 
of emptiness.67 Statements of emptiness should not be understood according 
to the standard semantic theory.68 With such a theory in mind it is neither 
correct to say that all things are empty, or tha t they all lack emptiness, or 
that some are both empty and not empty, or that the predicate ‘empty’ is 
not applicable to objects at all, in the same way as the predicate ‘yellow’ is 
not applicable to numbers.
Before leaving the subject of the quantificational interpretation of the 
tetralemma it might be useful to have a brief look at the analysis presented 
by Tillemans in an appendix to (1990). There the four alternatives are 
formalized as
1. -.(3x)(Fx)
2. -i(3a;)(-iF x )
3. -i(3x)(F x A->Fx)
4. —i(3x){—iFxA~'~>Fx).
that phenomena are empty in some respects but not in others, e.g. one might claim that 
they are empty insofar as they are causally produced, but not empty insofar as they exist 
independently of us.
67It should therefore be noted that the last three alternatives are in a way more deficient 
than the first one. For a Madhyamika the first assertion would be true if interpreted 
according to the right semantics, whereas the final three would still have to be rejected,
because even with the right semantics they would be false.
68Garfield (1995, 280).
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Tillemans argues that it is straightforward to make sense of the simulta­
neous rejection of all four positions if we assume that there is no x , i.e. if the 
domain of quantification is empty.69 While this reading makes the distinc­
tion between different kinds of negation in the tetralemma superfluous it also 
has a number of problems. On the one hand there is the familiar difficulty 
that the third and fourth possibility come out as logically equivalent. On 
the other hand (as rioted by Tillemans himself) this interpretation implies 
that the Madhyamika would also have to accept all the four positions of the 
tetralemma, since the corresponding universal statements are also true in the 
empty domain. But there is no textual evidence in Madhyamaka literature 
that the four positions of the tetralemma are simultaneously to be rejected 
and accepted.70
Tillemans continues to argue tha t quantified statements accepted by the 
Madhyamika are generally to be interpreted substitutionally, rather than 
referentially. Interpreted referentially the statement ‘All x  are F ’ means that 
there is some set of objects such that every single one of them is F. Interpreted 
substitutionally it means that for every name substituted for lx ’ in ‘Fa;’ we get 
a true statement. The Madhyamika can therefore ‘use the world’s language 
to communicate about whichever day-to-day affairs the world concerns itself 
with: his sunyavada, however, dictates that he never accepts a referential 
interpretation of such language’.71
The difficulty with this interpretation is that the difference between ref­
erential and substitutional quantification is simply that between quantify­
69Tillemans (1990, 75).
70 As we will see in the final section of this chapter there are cases in which all four 
positions are affirmed (the so-called positive tetralemma). This, however, serves a very
different purpose from the negative tetralemma.
71 Tillemans (1990, 75).
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ing over objects in the world and quantifying over pieces of language. The 
Madhyamika distinction between the two truths, however, which Tillemans 
wants to spell out in this way, is concerned with two different ways of inter­
preting the ontological status of objects, or, to put it differently, with two 
different accounts of what it means for a statement to be true. At the con­
ventional level a statement is true if what it says is indeed the case, i.e. if 
there are objects taken to exist with svabhdva which are related in the nec­
essary ways. At the absolute level, however, the notion of svabhdva is to be 
found to be deficient and svabhdva is seen to be non-existent. But both the 
referential and the substitutional interpretation of a statement can be read 
either way: the objects quantified over can be seen as either existing with 
svabhdva or being empty, similarly the tru th  of the sentences featuring in the 
substitutional interpretation can be regarded as being made true by situa­
tions regarded at the level of conventional truth, or by situations regarded 
at the level of absolute truth, which are then seen as empty. It seems to be 
tha t what is important from the Madhyamaka perspective is not so much 
whether a quantified statement is read referentially or substitutionally, but 
the way in which the notions of ‘object’ and ‘true statement’ contained in 
these readings are spelt out.
4.3.3 Rejection of four alternatives: the case of rela­
tions
All of the examples of the rejection of four alternatives discussed concerned 
the rejection of one-place properties, such as emptiness,72 permanence, or
72Garfield (1996, 6) is of course correct in pointing out that ‘empty of’ denotes a relation. 
But what Nagarjuna has in mind is clearly emptiness of inherent existence, which is a one- 
place property.
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finitude. Nevertheless, some of Nagarjuna’s most famous arguments in fact 
involve the rejection of four alternatives concerning relations.
A very clear example of the employment of the tetralemma in this way 
can be found in the twelfth chapter of the MMK. Nagarjuna starts out by 
listing the four possibilities available when applying the concept of causation 
to suffering:
Some say that suffering is caused by itself, or by something else, 
or from both, or that it arises in an uncaused way.73
Now we could interpret this along the lines of the tetralemma concerning 
properties by just regarding it as about the property of self-causation, rather 
than about the relation of causation. The above verse would then amount 
to a rejection of the following four alternatives:
1. Everything is self-caused.
2. Everything is not self-caused (i.e. caused by others).
3. Something is self-caused and (the same) something is not self-caused.
4. N ot: Something is self-caused or (the same) something is not self­
caused.
While this move allows us to treat the forms of the tetralemma dealing 
with properties and relations as exactly parallel, I think a more natural way 
of reading the above argument would run as follows.
The essential difference between a property and a relation is that a prop­
erty (such as yellowness) will divide the set of objects it is applicable to (ma­
terial objects) into two subsets, those which have the property (like lemons,
73 svayamkrtam parakrtam dvabhyam krtam ahetukam /  duhkham ity eka icchanti [...].
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bananas, curry powder and so on) and those which lack it (like strawberries, 
apples, chili powder and so on). A relation,74 however, divides the set of 
objects it is applicable to into pairs of objects from the set which are related 
by the relation. There are various ways in which this set of pairs can be 
made up; it can consist
1. exclusively of pairs containing the same object twice, or
2. exclusively of pairs containing two different objects, or
3. of both pairs of identical and distinct objects, or finally
4. it can consist of nothing at all, i.e. it can be completely empty.
Which of these possibilities obtains determines the way in which the ob­
jects in the set are related by the relation. If, for example, we consider the 
‘loves’ relation and a set of human beings then in the case of 1. we are dealing 
with a set of egoists, where people only ever love themselves, in 2. we deal 
with a set of altruists, where people only ever love other people, in 3. we 
have the (normal) situation of some people loving both themselves as well 
as others, and in 4. we have an emotional vacuum: nobody loves anybody, 
neither themselves nor others.75
If we thus wanted to argue for the deficiency of the concept of a particular 
relation along the lines of the above argument, we would consider the four 
possibilities of that relation relating an object to itself, relating an object to 
something which is not itself (where the notion of negation involved is again
74For the sake of simplicity we will confine ourselves here to two-place relations.
75 It is important not to confuse this fourth case with the inapplicability of a relation to
a set: in a set of people nobody may stand in the ‘loves’ relation, and nobody will stand 
in the ‘is the square root o f’ relation. But it is at least possible that people could stand 
in the former relation, whereas it is impossible that they stand in the latter.
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of the paryudasa-kind) relating an object both to itself and to other objects, 
and relating it neither to itself nor to other objects, that is, relating it to 
nothing at all. If we succeed in showing all four possibilities to be unsatisfac­
tory we can then deny all four alternatives by a prasajya-negation and thus 
apply illocutionary negation to them. In this way we demonstrate the inap­
plicability of the concept of the relation to the objects under consideration.
We can therefore read the first verse from the twelfth chapter of the MMK 
as arguing tha t if it makes sense to use the concept of causation when talking 
about suffering at all, it would either have to be the case tha t causation 
related suffering to itself (i.e. that it was self-caused) or to another thing, or 
both, or that suffering was not causally related to anything. As is hardly 
surprising, Nagarjuna sets out to argue that the concept of causation is not 
applicable in this context, and ends the verse by stating the conclusion to be 
established:
To consider [suffering] as produced is not appropriate.76
In the remainder of the chapter Nagarjuna then sets out to refute each 
of these possibilities. Verse 2 attempts to refute suffering’s self-production, 
verses 3 to 8 production from another, and verse 9 the final two possibilities.77
76 [...] tac ca karyam, na yujyate.
77It is sometimes argued (e.g. in Wayman (1977, 11-12)) that the four possibilities con­
cerning causation mentioned in MMK 12:1, and, more generally, in 1:1 represent the views 
of four different Indian schools of philosophy. Self-causation is ascribed to the Samkhyas 
(Murti 1955, 168-169), causation by others to the theory divine causation expounded in 
the Vedas and Brahinanas (see Kalupahana (1975, 5) for some other examples of what 
he calls ‘external causation’), causation by itself and by others to the Naiyayikas and 
Vaisesikas (Dasgupta 1942, 1:320), (King 1999, 208) and finally absence of causation to 
the Lokayatas (Kalupahana 1975, 25). This last identification is denied by Schayer (1931, 
note 16, 20-21) who argues that the view of the Carvakas only denies causality in the con­
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As this chapter is primarily concerned with the argumentational mechanics 
of the tetralemma we can disregard the precise contents of these arguments. 
It is, however, important to note the generalization stated in the final verse 
of the chapter:
Not only does suffering not exist in any of the four possible ways 
described, but no other external entity exists in these ways ei­
ther.78
Thus, apart from being a specific argument about the suitability of using 
the concept of causation to talk about suffering, Nagarjuna takes the contents 
of this chapter also the be an argument-schema, that is as a framework 
which can be employed to demonstrate the deficiency of other concepts when 
referring to external entities.79
4.4 Affirming four alternatives: the positive  
tetralem m a
As we saw above the tetralemma is usually employed in Madhyamaka argu­
mentation to provide an enumeration of four exclusive and exhaustive logical 
alternatives, all of which are then shown to be deficient and thus rejected. 
There is, however, one notorious exception in Nagarjuna1 s writings, in verse
text of karma, but not all causal determinations, as they assert that things are determined
by their intrinsic nature (svabhdva).
78 na kevalam hi duhkasya cdiuvvidhyarri na vidyatc /  bahydndm api bhavandm
caturvidhyam na vidyate.
79 As Robinson (1967, 50) points out, Nagarjuna frequently indicates that his arguments
function as patterns into which other terms can be substituted. For examples from the 
MMK see 3:8, 16:7, 19:4, and 10:15.
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18:8 of the MMK. There Nagarjuna seems to affirm all four alternatives by 
claiming that
All is so, or all is not so, both so and not so, neither so nor not 
so. This is the Buddha’s teaching.80
In the commentarial tradition following CandrakTrti this verse is gener­
ally understood as indicating the graded nature of Buddha’s teaching (anu- 
s as ana),81 The idea is that ‘all is so’ is taught to ordinary disciples, in order 
to convince them of Buddha’s insight into the nature of phenomena. ‘All 
is not so’ is taught subsequently to inform them about the impermanence 
and momentariness of all phenomena. ‘All is both so and not so’ is taught 
to show that what appears to be genuine and substantial from an ordinary 
perspective might not do so from the perspective of a Buddha’s disciple. Fi­
nally, ‘All is neither so nor not so’ is taught to show tha t neither of these 
terms is applicable to reality in ultimate terms, in the same way, CandrakTrti 
observes, as the adjectives ‘pale’ or ‘dark-skinned’ are not applicable to the 
son of a barren woman.82
Neither of the four alternatives is therefore to be rejected in this con­
text. They rather form an ascending series of views of increasing conceptual 
sophistication, each suitable for the purposes of a specific audience.83
80sarvam tathyam na va tathyam tathyam catathyam eva ca /  naivdtathyam naiva
tathyam etad buddhanusdsanam.
81See Ruegg (1977, 5-7). Further references to graded teaching by Nagarjuna are in RA
3:94-96, YS 30.
82PP 371:11-12.
83Robinson (1967, 56-57), Ng (1993, 94-99). Ruegg (1977, 6-7, 63-64, note 71) argues 
that since each alternative improves on the preceding one and even the fourth alternative 
is only intended for the ‘scarcely obscured’ all four alternatives should nevertheless be 
rejected. (This interpretation is criticized by Wood (1994, 140-146)). Even if we accept
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Garfield offers a different interpretation based on the dGe lugs interpola­
tion procedure already discussed above.84 Here the conflict between the four 
alternatives is dissolved not by relativizing them to different perspectives, as 
CandrakTrti does, but by adding the modifiers ‘ultimately’ and ‘convention­
ally’. The passage is thus interpreted as saying that
1. Everything is conventionally real.
2. Nothing is ultimately real.
3. Everything is both conventionally real and ultimately unreal.
4. Nothing is either conventionally unreal or ultimately real.
While Garfield does not deny that the conception of graded teaching 
is something ‘with which Nagarjuna would agree’, he argues tha t such a 
discussion seems ‘out of place’ in the argumentative context of chapter 18. 
The reason for this is not quite clear. After all the sixth verse asserts that 
Buddha taught the teachings of self, non-self, and neither self nor non-self, 
and Garfield himself asserts that these three were meant to counteract specific 
wrong conceptions of the self in the mind of the listeners,85 On the whole 
the reading of the positive tetralemma in terms of graded teaching seems to 
be more satisfactory, as it does not commit us to making any additions to 
the text itself.86
Ruegg’s position it is clear that the four alternatives as given in 18:8 are quite distinct from 
all the other uses in Nagarjuna’s writings, as in all other instances all four alternatives are
negated and are not even assigned a heuristic value.
84(1995, 250-251).
85(1995, 249).
86See Tillemans (1990, 73).
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I hope the above remarks have made it plausible that to understand 
the catuskoti it is essential to keep apart the different kinds of nested nega­
tions involved. In this way it is possible to see that the four alternatives of 
the tetralemma are logically independent, as well as to understand how the 
rejection of the four alternatives (as illocutionary negations based on a pre­
supposition failure) fits in with Nagarjuna’s general philosophical attem pt to 
demonstrate the non-existence of svabhdva.
Compared to some accounts in the contemporary commentarial literature 
the interpretation presented above is logically very conservative. It does not 
involve anything beyond the resources found in classical logic and in partic­
ular gets by without rejecting the Law of the Excluded Middle or adopting 
a paraconsistent logic. While I think there are some aspects of Nagarjuna’s 
works (for example the notoriously complex issue of the emptiness of empti­
ness) which can perhaps be fruitfully interpreted by reference to some variety 
of dialetheism, such as the one put forward by Priest and Garfield87 this does 
not apply to the methodological foundations of Nagarjuna’s arguments in the 
catuskoti These can be explained entirely within the framework of classical 
logic.
87(2002).
Chapter 5
Causation
Having dealt with some important formal aspects of Nagarjuna’s arguments 
chiefly connected with the notion of negation we are now equipped to explore 
further ramifications of the Madhyamika’s rejection of svabhdva outlined in 
chapter 2. Apart from Nagarjuna’s general arguments against the existence of 
svabhdva presented there we also find in his writings specific investigations of 
phenomena arguing that these in particular lack svabhdva. In fact a large part 
of Nagarjuna’s writings can be best understood as an examination of various 
classes of things with the aim of establishing their emptiness. The phenomena 
examined are those which constitute a particularly important part of our 
view of the world, and which are therefore the most likely places where the 
mistaken ascription of svabhdva could arise. In the following five chapters 
we will investigate Nagarjuna’s arguments concerning five such phenomena: 
causation, motion, the self, epistemology, and language. The fundamentality 
of causation for making sense of our experiences need hardly be stressed. 
The notions of cause and effect provide us with one of the most fundamental 
set of tools we use to gain cognitive access to the world. Motion might strike 
us as a somewhat less central topic, but it is important to keep in mind
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its importance in the Indian mindset in which this discussion originates. 
Motion, not so much in the literal sense but in the sense of moving from 
one life to the next (of which the succession of one mental state by the 
following one provides a small-scale example), the traversing of samsara in 
an infinite succession of existences, is an essential feature of the Indian (and 
more specifically Buddhist) view of the world. The self appears to be the 
entity which does this traversing, and provides us with what seems to be the 
most important notion of them all. Viewing ourselves as a self, a subject, 
a responsible agent appears to be indispensable for our conception of what 
we are. It provides the focal point of our cognitive life, the place where the 
disconcertingly diverse array of different experiences comes together and is 
unified in a view of the world from a unique perspective. This self interacts 
with the world around it in a variety of ways. The description of its direct 
cognitive interaction with its surroundings is the province of epistemology. 
This analyses how parts of the world can become parts of our mind, in short, 
how knowledge is acquired. However, our interaction with the world is not 
completely solitary. We do not just read off information from the world, but 
also conceptualize it in a variety of ways in order to share it with others. Our 
primary tool for framing and sharing bits of information is language.
Arguing for the non-existence of svabhdva by examining different kinds 
of things one-by-one is of course beset with a fundamental problem. As 
there might be infinitely many or at least an indefinite number of things we 
are unlikely ever to conclude our investigation and to establish the thesis of 
universal emptiness. The Madhyamaka tradition does of course offer argu­
ments which are proposed to work as general arguments for emptiness (such 
as the five types of arguments discussed in chapter 2). However, we could 
equally argue that the absence of any master-argument for emptiness might
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constitute not a difficulty, but an inescapable consequence of Madhyamaka 
epistemology. Since the Madhyamika regards nothing as being intrinsically a 
means of knowledge, what establishes emptiness in one context might fail to 
do so in another.1 In any case there is hardly any doubt about the centrality 
of the five phenomena just introduced. Regardless of our view of its con­
sequences for establishing the general thesis of emptiness, a demonstration 
of the absence of svabhdva in each of them would have fundamental conse­
quences for our view of the world, of ourselves, and the relation between the 
two.
5.1 Causation: prelim inary remarks
Nagarjuna’s treatment of causation is an examination of different attempts 
to analyse the relation between cause and effect which employ a variety of 
familiar and (and least prima facie unproblematic) conceptual frameworks. 
Causation being a two-place relation we will want to investigate the identity 
relation between its relata: are cause and effect the same or different, or 
some identical and some different? Are cause and effect related as part and 
whole? Or are there perhaps no items instantiating the causal relation at 
all? Causation taking place in time, we will want to investigate the temporal 
relation between cause and effect: are they successive events, or simultaneous, 
or overlapping, or are cause and effect just two aspects of a single unified 
event?
The interesting fact about Nagarjuna’s discussion of these analyses is that 
he sets out to show that they are all equally unsatisfactory:2 cause and effect
1Siderits (2003, 147), see also the discussion in chapter 8 below.
2The reader familiar with Greek philosophy will realize that many of Nagarjuna’s ar­
guments concerning causation bear strong similarities to classical sceptical arguments as
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are argued to be neither identical nor different nor related as part and whole, 
they are neither successive, nor simultaneous, nor overlapping and so forth. 
In itself such a discussion would show little more than that the philosopher 
in question had failed to come up with a satisfactory theory of causation. It 
would at best be interesting for the criticism levelled against other positions, 
but would hardly constitute a unified philosophical outlook on its own.
In order to see the point of Nagarjuna’s arguments, however, it is essential 
to understand tha t he takes the possible analyses of causation examined to be 
exhaustive: any view one could possibly hold concerning the identity relation 
or the temporal relation between cause and effect can be subsumed under 
one of the alternatives considered. If Nagarjuna is successful in showing that 
all the alternatives are deficient there is only one conclusion to be drawn 
from this. The conceptual frameworks which these different analyses employ 
must be based on a mistaken presupposition.
Suppose there was some peculiar theory which tried to find out what
shape the colour red was. This could proceed by listing all the possible
shapes the colour red could be, and then examining them one by one, until
the right one was found. Unsurprisingly we would find that the colour red is
neither circular, nor triangular, nor rectangular, nor any other shape, since
while there are doubtlessly examples of such shapes which are coloured red,
the colour itself, being a property, does not have any of these shapes. The
explanation for our inability of coming up with a satisfactory answer to the
e.g. presented in the third book of Sextus Empiricus’ Outlines of Scepticism . Since the 
present discussion is not an attempt at comparative philosophy I will not discuss these 
resemblances in the following material. The interested reader is referred to McEvilley 
(1982), who even addresses the question whether Nagarjuna’s arguments might be derived 
from Greek works (28). For a broader discussion of possible Greco-Indian philosophical 
interactions see McEvilley (2002).
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question ‘W hat is the shape of the colour red?’ is that it is built on the mis­
taken presupposition that the colour red has a shape at all. In the same way 
Nagarjuna wants to argue that our inability to come up with a satisfactory 
answer to the question whether cause and effect are identical or different is 
due to another faulty presupposition.3 This is the presupposition tha t cause 
and effect exist with their own svabhdva, i.e. that they are independent and 
self-sufficient entities.4
Cause and effect existing with their own simbhava first of all means that 
cause and effect are qualitatively and therefore also quantitatively distinct 
objects. They do not require one another: first the seed exists without any 
need for the tree it will later produce; later, after the seed has produced the 
tree the seed has stopped to exist, and the tree will exist without any need 
for the seed to be still around.
Secondly, the existence of cause and effect as ‘independent objects’ or 
as ‘existing from their own side’ does not just refer to their mutually in­
dependent existence, but also to their independence of a cognizing subject. 
According to such an objectivist understanding of causation the interlocking 
chain of causes and effects is something which exists in the world indepen­
dent of any observers.5 It might be a transfer of energy from cause to effect, 
the cause’s raising the objective chance of the effect happening, or perhaps 
an unanalyzable, primitive causal relation, but in each case it is something
3See Ronkin (2005, 198).
4See Garfield (1994, 220), (2001, 509)
5Such an objectivist understanding of causation is entailed by the Abhidharmika’s claim 
that primary existents (dravya) can be dependent on causes and conditions. For if the 
existence of these primary existents is mind-independent the existence of one such object, 
a conditioned object (samskrta dharma) which is an effect cannot depend on another one 
by a relation which is itself mind-dependent. This point is elaborated in Siderits (2004, 
410-413).
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which remains independent of human expectations and conceptualizations.
Nagarjuna argues that this commonsensical view of cause and effect con­
stitutes the basis of the conceptual framework we employ in order to analyse 
causation. Should it now turn out, as Nagarjuna sets out to demonstrate, 
that there is something problematic with all the analyses usually encoun­
tered this would provide an argument for questioning the commonsensical 
view of cause and effect underlying all of them.
Before investigating different accounts of causation, however, we have to 
consider further what Nagarjuna means by the lack of independence and 
therefore the interdependence of cause and effect.
5.2 Interdependence of cause and effect
In order to get a clear conception of Nagarjuna’s view of the interdependence 
of cause and effect it is necessary to understand that his analysis of causation 
does not just distinguish two notions, cause and effect, but three. This is 
due to the fact that a cause does not bring about an effect on its own, but 
only against a background of supporting condition. A spark does not cause 
an explosion on its own, but only in the presence of oxygen, fuel, a suitable 
temperature, and so on. The Madhyamaka analysis of causation therefore in­
cludes reference to a collection of background conditions. Nagarjuna refers to 
the cause together with the background conditions as a ‘complete collection’ 
(.samagrt); we shall employ the term causal field for this.6 Nagarjuna asserts
6I<alupahana (1991, 61). It is interesting to note that the distinction between cause 
(hetu) and supporting conditions (pratyaya) is not found in early Buddhist texts (Ronkin 
2005, 222) where the two terms are often used interchangeably. Kalupahana (1975, 59) 
notes that ‘while recognizing several factors that are necessary to produce an effect, it 
[i.e. early Buddhism] does not select one from a set of jointly sufficient conditions and
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in a variety of places that cause and effect are interdependent, and can only 
be conceived of in such an interdependent fashion.7 It is apparent, however, 
that the dependence of an effect on a cause must be very different from the 
dependence of a cause on an effect. An effect depends for its existence on its 
cause: had the cause not existed, the effect would not have existed either.8 
A cause, on the other hand, can exist without causing any effect, it would 
just not be described as a cause in this case. The fact that some particular 
acorn does not produce an oak tree does not mean the acorn does not exist, 
only that we do not refer to it as ‘the cause of an oak tree’. This label is 
attached to it not because of some internal property, but simply because it 
stands in a particular relation to another object, namely the oak tree. In the 
absence of the oak tree there would be 110 relation to that oak tree, so that 
the label would be inapplicable.9
presents it as the cause of the effect. [...] Thus, although there are several factors, all of 
them constitute one system or event and therefore are referred to in the singular.’ See 
also Ronkin (2005, 206). The distinction between cause and condition as two different 
elements involved in the causal relation is due to the Sarvastivadins (Frauwallner (1995, 
199-201), Ronkin (2005, 221-232)) and coheres well with their distinction between primary 
existents or substances (dravya) and secondary existents (prajnapti) (Williams 1981, 237). 
The cause of a particular secondary existent would be regarded as the primary existents 
it is based on, while its conditions could be seen as whatever causes its properties as a 
secondary existent. See Kalupahana (1975, 60-66).
7MMK 8:12, 10:8, 20:22, 24; see also SS 13ab, BCA 9:13-15.
8Nagarjuna makes the additional claim that everything is existentially dependent on 
its cause, since ‘no object whatsoever exists without being caused’ (na casty arthah kascid
aketukah kvacit MMK 4:2).
9In MMK 1:5 Nagarjuna states that ‘something is called “condition” because in depen­
dence on it something else arises. But as long as the second something does not arise, why 
do we not refer to the first something as a ‘non-condition’?’ utpadyate pratityeman itime 
pratyaydh kila /  yavan notpadyata ime tdvan ndpratyayah katharn. In 10:9 he argues that 
if the dependence of cause and effect only held in one way, i.e. if fire (the effect) depended
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Taking into account the distinction between existential and notional de­
pendence described in chapter 2 it is clear that some of the dependence rela­
tions Nagarjuna asserts to hold between cause and effect are quite straightfor­
ward. Cause and effect are notionally dependent on one another. If anything 
falls under the concept ‘cause’ something will fall under the concept ‘effect’, 
and vice versa. The effect also depends existentially on its cause, since in 
the absence of the cause, the effect would not exist.
The main problem for understanding the supposed symmetric dependence 
between cause and effect lies in the assumption of the existential dependence 
of the cause on the effect. After all, as we have just seen in the case of the 
acorn (the cause) and oak tree (the effect), the latter failing to exist does not 
obliterate the former, so that we can at best speak of notional dependence 
in this context.
There are three distinct ways in which we can make sense of the existential 
dependence of the cause on the effect. Firstly we can argue that if Nagarjuna 
is arguing against an opponent who holds that a cause has its property of 
being a cause essentially its notional dependence on the effect will entail its 
existential dependence. For something being a cause essentially means that 
this is a property it could not lose without ceasing to be that very object. 
But since the presence of this property depends on existence of the effect, 
the existence of the cause as that very object also depends on the existence 
of the effect.
A second interpretation which does not have to assume tha t causes are 
essentially causes argues that Nagarjuna does not intend to refer to the ex­
on fuel (the cause) but not vice versa this would imply the absurd consequence that the 
cause could exist as a cause without the effect existing, yad mdhanam apeksyagnir [...] 
evarn satindhanam capi bhavisyati niragnikam.
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istentia.1 dependence of some particular cause on its effect but rather to the 
existential dependence of the property of being a cause on the property of 
being an effect.
If an object a falling under property F  notionally depends on something 
falling under G this means that the property F  existentially depends on 
the property G, as F  can only exist if some object falls under the property 
‘identical with the property G’, i.e. if the property G exists.
The property ‘Northern England’ depends existentially on the property 
‘Southern England’, even though the objects falling under each do not exis­
tentially depend on one another. This is due to the fact tha t one property 
could not exist without the other one, but the objects falling under them 
could. Nagarjuna refers to this existential dependence of properties on one 
another in RA 1:49:10
When there is no ‘short’ there is no ‘long’, they are without sub­
stance. When there is no lamp, there is no light.
The existential dependence of the effect (the light) on the cause (the lamp) 
is here equated with the way the properties ‘long’ and ‘short’ depend on one 
another — in each case the latter could not exist if the former did not exist.
According to this interpretation we would therefore conclude tha t Nagar­
juna means to say that the properties ‘being a cause’ and ‘being an effect’
w hrasve ’sati punar dirgham na bhavaty asvabhavatah /  pradipasyapi anutpddat 
prabhayd apy asambhavah, Kalupahana (1975, 97) interprets this statement of Nagar­
juna as ca rare interpretation of the causal principle’. This seems to be getting the order 
of concepts in the development of Nagarjuna’s thought the wrong way round. For him 
the notion of a dependence relation between objects is the more general concept, which 
can take a number of specific forms (such as mereological, causal, and cognitive depen­
dence). Dependence is not a specific interpretation of causality, but causality a specific 
interpretation of dependence.
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depend existentially on one another, even though the existential dependence 
of objects falling under them is not symmetric: the effect depends existen­
tially on the cause, but the cause does not need the effect for its existence.
The third, stronger reading claims that while Nagarjuna undoubtedly also 
wanted to assert the existential dependence of the properties ‘being a cause’ 
and ‘being an effect’ he moreover made the claim that not only the particular 
object which is the effect needs the cause for its existence, but the cause also 
needs the effect.
Such a reading can be supported by considering an entire causal field 
rather than just particular causes. A causal field is a cognitive artefact, a 
collection of objects assembled with the sole purpose of explaining why a 
particular effect came about. Divorced from this explanatory role there is no 
reason for introducing the concept at all.11 We might therefore want to argue 
that the causal field also depends for its existence on the effect it produces. 
This is of course not to say that every member of the causal field existentially 
depended on the effect they jointly bring about: the spark, petrol, and so 
forth would still exist, even if they for some reason did not manage to bring 
about an explosion. But the collection only exists if there is some effect 
it causes. Whether we want to argue that a causal field depends for its 
existence on the effect it brings about is intimately connected with our view 
of the existence of collections. We might either think that whenever the are 
some objects there is the collection of those objects. Or we might deny that 
every arbitrary assembly of objects constitutes a collection. We would then 
argue that for some objects to form a collection there must be something 
which makes them hold together as a collection, for example that they all
11‘Because the effect is absent, where would conditions or non-conditions come from?’ 
phalabhavat pratyayapratyayah kutah. MMK 1:14b.
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exemplify a property, or that they were put together for a specific purpose. 
If we adopt the first view of collections then clearly a causal field will only 
depend nominally on its effect, since ‘being a causal field bringing about that 
effect’ is only one way in which we can refer to the pre-existent collection 
which contains all the elements of the causal field, but not anything which 
brings it about. Adopting the second conception, however, it may be the case 
that the only thing which binds all the members of the causal field together 
is that they are considered to be the things which jointly bring about a 
particular effect. In the absence of this effect the collection disintegrates and 
ceases to exist. Nagarjuna seems to favour the second interpretation when 
he asserts that a cause could not exist without an effect.12 It is significant 
that what is denied here is not just the ascription of the label ‘cause’ to 
some object because it is related to some other object, the effect,13 but the 
existence of the cause in the absence of the effect. Nagarjuna endorses not 
just the uncontroversial notional dependence of the cause on its effect, but 
its existential dependence as well. Applied to the discussion of causal fields 
this implies that a causal field can only exist if the effect it brings about does, 
and for this reason cannot be taken to exist whenever all of its members do.
If we adopt this third, stronger reading then we have to conclude that for 
Nagarjuna causes and effects are both notionally and existentially dependent 
011 one another. They therefore cannot exist from their own side, irrespective 
of the existence of one another. Moreover, they also depend for their existence 
on us, because it is our cognitive act of cutting up the world of phenomena 
in the first place which creates the particular assembly of objects which 
constitutes a causal field, which then in turn gives rise to the notions of cause
12 nasty akaryam ca kdranam. MMK4:3. ‘How indeed can there be a causal field in the
absence of an effect?’ asti pratyayasamagri kuta eva phalam vina. 20:24b.
13This is discussed in MMK 1:5.
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and effect. This entails that the causal field, cause and effect are empty of 
svabhava.
It is evident that unlike the Abhidharmikas, Nagarjuna regards an ob­
ject’s not being empty, i.e. having svabhava as incompatible with the causal 
production of tha t object.14 A causally produced object depends on its cause 
for its existence and could therefore not stand outside of any dependence re­
lation with other objects. Furthermore, if an object either existed or failed 
to exist by svabhava, it would always do so, since such substantial proper­
ties cannot change. But then an existent object cannot be caused, since it 
will always have existed, a non-existent object cannot be caused either, as 
it will never become existent. Therefore, in the presence of svabhava (and 
thus the absence of emptiness) there can be neither causation nor change.15 
ft is equally clear that an object cannot depend notionally on some other 
object for having some property and yet have this property by svabhava. For 
this property is then obviously not had by the object from its own side, but 
only via its relation to some other object. Neither the existential nor the no­
tional interdependence of cause and effect is thus compatible with ascribing 
svabhava to them.
It has also to be noted that Nagarjuna asserts, somewhat puzzlingly, that 
the absence of svabhava, i.e. emptiness is not compatible with causation ei­
ther.16 Causation in this context has to be understood as an objectively 
obtaining relation which links objects and events independent of human con­
14MMK 15:2ab, YS 19. See also Siderits (2004, 399).
15SS 5: ‘What was born will not be born, what was not born will also not be born. 
The being born will not be born either, because it was both born and not born.’ skyes 
ba bskyed par bya ba min /  ma skyes pa yang bskyed bya min /  skye ba’i tshe yang bskyed
bya min /  skyes dang ma skyes pa yi phyir. See also MMI< 20:17, 21a.
16MMK 20:18, 21b.
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ceptualizations. As the objects our theory relates do not exist ‘from their 
own side’ the same has to hold for any relation of causation linking them. If 
the objects in our everyday world owe their existence to a partly habitual, 
partly deliberate process of cutting up the complex flow of phenomena into 
cognitively manageable bits the causal relations linking them cannot exist 
independently of us, since their relata do not do so either.17
5.3 The four ways of causal production
Having investigated what Nagarjuna means by claiming that cause and effect 
are interdependent we can now discuss his analysis of the different manners 
in which causal production could come about. Applying the four alterna­
tives of the catuskoti or tetralemma to the relation of causation Nagarjuna 
distinguishes four ways in which a thing could be causally produced:18
• it could be caused by itself
• it could be caused by something else
• it could be caused by both
17CandrakIrti’s commentary on 20:18 in the PP which makes this point is peculiar. In
explaining Nagarjuna’s assertion that empty objects cannot arise or cease (’How can the 
empty arise, how can be empty be removed? It follows that the empty is not ceased 
and not arisen.’ katham utpatsyate sunyam katham sunyam nirotsyate/  sunyam apy 
aniruddham tad anutpannam prasajyate) he refers to the example of space (akaso), ac­
cording to Abhidharma metaphysics an unconditioned phenomenon which neither arises 
nor ceases (Dhammajoti 2004, 383-384). But this ignores the fact that Nagarjuna here 
(as in the preceding verse) attempts to make a universal statement. As it is obviously 
not assumed that all empty phenomena are like space in lacking arising and ceasing this
reading of the verse appears to be rather misleading.
1SMMK 1:1; 12:1.
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• it could be caused by nothing at all
5.3.1 Self-causation
The Buddhist discussion of self-causation subsumes two very different views 
of causal production which have to be separated clearly. The first is the view 
that cause and effect are the very same object, so that at least in some cases 
the causal relation can relate an object to itself. The second does not assert 
tha t cause and effect are identical, but that the effect is contained in, and 
forms part of, the cause. In the context of the present discussion this should 
be taken to mean that the effect is already contained in the causal field.
Identity of cause and effect
It is evident that most instances of causation we encounter in everyday life
are not cases of self-causation in the first sense. The spark which causes
the explosion is not identical with the explosion. The causal field (the seed
together with water, light, warmth etc.) is what is supposed to bring about
the effect (the tree), but is not yet the effect itself — the collection of the
seed, water, light and so on is not the same thing as a tree but something
on which the existence of the tree depends.19 If we talk about one billiard-
ball colliding with another billiard-ball which it thereby causes to move we
talk about two balls, not just one.20 Nagarjuna’s rejection of causation as a
reflexive relation21 does therefore not appear to be particularly controversial.
We might think, however, that self-causation is what explains the persistence
of objects through time. ‘W hat causes the existence of the present billiard-
l9MMI( 12:2.
20MMK 20:20a.
21MMK 4:6a; 20:19.
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ball? Its existence at the preceding moment. Therefore the billiard-ball is 
the cause of its own persistence’. But this would be mistaken. If we assume 
that the billiard-ball has temporal parts (that is, if we are endurantists) the 
present temporal part of the billiard-ball being caused by a past temporal 
part is not an instance of self-causation, but an instance of one part of an 
object causing another, distinct part.
Being perdurantists and assuming that an object is wholly present during 
each moment of its existence seems to be a more satisfactory option. Here 
the object is not split up into temporal stages and being a cause turns out 
to be part of the svabhava of every perduring object. As long as the object 
exists it must be its own cause, moreover, its causal role is independent of 
any cognizing subject. We do not have to conceive of an object as its own 
cause for it to continue to exists as its own cause.
The problem with this view is that is conflicts with our deeply ingrained 
assumption that the cause temporally precedes the effect. No object, how­
ever, can temporally precede itself.
A more successful example to which the notion of self-causation could 
be applied would be that of a creator god. Since most theists would not 
want to hold that the existence of such a god is contingent on something else 
they might want to argue that the creator god exists as causa sui, thereby 
only causally depending on himself.22 Such a theist would obviously not 
be very impressed by Buddhapalita’s argument against self-causation which 
Candrakirti mentions in his commentary on MMK 1:1, namely tha t a self­
22This idea goes back at least to Plotinus (Hadot 1971), (Narbonne 1993). Everything 
which exists as causa sui obviously has its causal power as part of its svabhava. Another 
way of dealing with this issue consists in asserting the creator god’s aseity, i.e. his causal 
independence of everything, including himself.
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caused entity would continue causing itself and would therefore be eternal.23 
Eternal existence is one of the welcome consequences of regarding the creator 
god as his own cause. A more substantial difficulty with the notion of self­
causation appears to lie in the justification of using the term ‘causation’ at all. 
An object which causes itself cannot exist in time, at least if we assume that 
a cause must temporally precede its effect. Given that temporal priority is an 
irreflexive relation, a potential self-causer could not be a temporal object.24 
This is not problematic if the god is taken to exist outside time. But then it 
is not clear why such a non-temporal object would have to produce itself all 
over again, given that it already fully exists when it exists as a cause. As such 
a renewed production cannot be required for its continued existence in the 
next moment in time, its production would be both without meaning (artha) 
and without purpose (prayoja).25 If the causal relation has any essential 
properties its role as a transmitter of change is surely one of them. Causation 
relates a state of affairs which is a cause, that is a state of affairs in which the 
effect is not yet present to one in which it is present, and which has thereby 
changed.26 But a self-caused object could not change. Since its entire cause
23‘If the existent were to be born it would never not be born.’ atha sannapi jayeta na
kada cinna jayeta  PP 14:2-3. See MMK 10:1-4.
24See Hart (1987, 183).
25‘Things are not produced from themselves because of the pointlessness of that pro­
duction. [...] There is no purpose in the repeated production of existent things from 
themselves.’ na svata utpadyante bhdvdh tadutpadavaiyarthyat [...] no hi svatmana
vidyamandndm paddrtkanam punarutpade prayojanam asti PP 14:1-2. See also MA 6:8cd.
26Nagarjuna relies on this fact in his argument against suffering being self-caused (MMK
12:4, 8). If some person created his own suffering this means that the effect (the person 
with suffering) was preceded by a cause which is different from the effect (the person with­
out suffering), so that the transition from cause to effect could bring about the necessary 
change. But given the Buddhist identification of the notion of a person (pudgala), its 
constituents (skandha), and suffering (duhkha) (see Schayer (1931, 12-19 )) such a person
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lies within the very object which is both cause and effect there is no room 
for variation: such an object remains eternally the same. It thus appears 
that when the theist speaks of self-causation he chooses a rather misleading 
way of talking about an object he considers to be atemporal, acausal, and 
changeless. Of course Nagarjuna and his commentators do not think that 
such an object exists, but this is not the point at issue here. Nagarjuna does 
not attem pt to argue that there just happen to be no self-causing objects, but 
that the very notion of something causing itself is problematic.27 Even if the 
theist’s creator god existed we would not want to refer to him as self-caused.
Cause and effect related as part and whole
The second view of self-causation generally discussed asserts tha t the effect 
is in some way already part of the cause or, more specifically, part of the 
causal field.
A predecessor of this view can be found already in the Purusa Sukta of 
the Rg Veda which describes the creation of the world as the dismembering 
of the cosmic giant. The different parts of the world to be created (the four 
castes, earth, sky, sun, and moon) are already present in the body of the 
cosmic giant as parts, and only have to be separated from one another in 
order to be brought into existence.28
Nagarjuna gives two reasons for rejecting this mereological view of self­
causation. First of all this would mean that the effect would not have to be 
produced, since it is already present within the causal field. The causal field, 
however, is supposed to be that which brings the effect about in the first
could not exist; the self-causation of suffering is thereby ruled out. See also Garfield (1995,
203-204).
27Ganeri (2001, 52).
2810.90. For a translation see O’Flalrerty (1981, 28-32).
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place.29 Secondly, the effect would have to be something which we should be 
able to conceive of (grhyeta) within the causal field.30 Acquaintance with all 
the elements of the causal field (the spark, the fuel, the oxygen present etc.) 
does not acquaint us with the effect (the explosion). Of course this does not 
mean that given a complete scientific description of all the elements of the 
causal field we might not be able (at least in some cases) to infer the effect. 
But this is not what Nagarjuna has in mind here, he is concerned with the 
literal presence of the effect within the causal field, not with its relation to 
the field via an inferential relation, which could perfectly well obtain without 
the effect being part of the causal field.
It is evident that according to this view of self-causation cause and effect 
do not exist independently of one another. Since an object depends on its 
parts for its existence, if the effect is one of these the object will existentially 
depend on its effect, However, cause and effect can be considered to exist 
independently of a cognizing subject, at least as long as we assume tha t which 
parts an object has does not in any way depend on us but is an independent 
fact about the constitution of that object. If the mereological constituents 
of objects exist from their own side and causes and effects are special kinds 
of mereological constituents, causes and effects will also exist from their own 
side.
The historical precedent of the view of causation in terms of part and 
whole is the satkaryavada theory of causation defended by the Samkhyas.31
29MMK 20:1, 16b; SS 4a; VP 24.
30MMK 20:3.
31Prauwallner (1973, 1:303-306), Sharma (1960, 151-152). Parallels have been drawn 
between the satkaryavada theory and the Sarvastivadin assumption that not only present, 
but also past and future phenomena exist. The idea of a future effect being already real, 
though not yet present is very close to the notion of an effect existing in a latent but 
unmanifested form in the cause. See Stcherbatsky (1962, 1:111), Kalupahana (1975, 150-
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This account is somewhat more sophisticated than the postulation of the 
mereological containment of the effect in the cause. The Samkhya theory 
assumes that the effect (karya) is already existent (sat) within the cause, 
although only in a yet unmanifested form. Everything we need for the pro­
duction of a pot is already there in the causal field containing the lump of 
clay, the potter, and so on. Bringing about a cause is a transformation of 
the causal field, an unveiling of the previously hidden.32 For the Samkhya 
theorists the world is nothing but a sequence of transformations of primor­
dial m atter (prakrti). In a similar manner we might want to conceive of the 
universe as an arrangement of atomic particles, and of each future stage of 
the universe as a re-arrangement of these particles in some new way. On 
this conception causation would indeed never bring anything new into the 
universe, since all the combinatorial resources for the causal production of 
future stages are already there. All changes concern the way the individual 
particles are related to one another, but not what kinds of particles there 
are.
The Samkhya doctrine has the advantage of being able to account for the
fact that specific causes are related to specific effects.33 Curd can be made
from milk but not from oil because only the milk-, not the oil-particles allow
for a curd-re-arrangement, in the same way as ‘sator’ anagrams into ‘rotas’
but not into ‘horas’. However, even if the underlying idea of a fixed stock
of primordial m atter should prove to be correct we should be as reluctant
152), von Rospatt (1995, 39, note 72). Samghabhadra in the *Abhidharmanyayanusara, 
Taisho 1562, 635a argues against this identification. See Dhammajoti (2004, 100). Murti 
(1955, 172) and Siderits (2004, 404) subsume the Sarvastivadin position under asatkarya-
vada theories of causation.
32Shaw (2002, 215).
33Siderits (2004, 404).
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to accept the Samkhya conception of the presence of the effect in the cause 
as we would be to purchase a single volume at the price of an entire library, 
on the grounds that all the other books are ‘already present’ in this one, 
and just have to be brought from the unmanifested state to their manifested 
one by a transformation of the arrangement of letters.34 The presence of the 
m atter of the effect in the causal field is not sufficient to convince us that 
the effect is also present there, in the same way in which the presence of the 
letters making up a particular text is not the same as having the text in front 
of us.
5.3.2 Causation by another object
The idea that cause and effect are distinct phenomena and that therefore an 
effect is caused by something distinct from it certainly constitutes the most 
natural way of understanding causation. The spark is an event distinct from 
the explosion it causes, the movement of the first billiard-ball distinct from 
the motion of the second one it brings about. The naturalness of this view of 
causation is underlined by the fact that in the Madhyamaka discussion and 
rejection of the four alternative accounts of causation the greatest part of the 
argument is usually devoted to the examination of the second alternative, i.e. 
to the claim that objects are caused by something different from them. The 
initial plausibility of causation by other objects means that its refutation has 
to be worked out particularly well.
There existed a number of contemporary theories which Buddhist thinkers 
were likely to subsume under the label ‘causation by another’. An obvious ex­
ample is the theory of divine causation present in the Vedas and Brahmanas
34Compare Brunnholzl (2004, 768).
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which the Buddhists argued against.35 The view of the Carvakas, who re­
garded change as a rearrangement of material particles according to fixed 
laws of nature was also classified in the Nikayas as paramkatam presumably 
because it leaves no room for a human agent.36 Determinist theories like those 
of the AjTvikas37 which denied free will were included amongst accounts of 
‘causation by another’ as well.38
We can identify two main arguments put forward by Nagarjuna to refute 
causation from other objects. The first claims that causation from other 
objects entails an infinite regress.39 There are different ways in which we
35See Kalupahana (1975, 5) for some other examples of what he calls ‘external causation’. 
We also find interpretations which regard causation by Brahman as a mere transformation 
of the cause into the effect, which would subsume them under the theories of self-causation 
already discussed (Dasgupta 1942, 1:52-53).
dPa’ bo rin po che’s commentary on the BCA specifically considers causation by the 
creator god Isvara (dbang phyug) as an example of causation from another (Brunnholzl 
2004, 758-762).
36Ronkin (2005, 196-197). In the Tibetan tradition we find this position ascribed to 
the MTmamsakas (dpyod pa pa) (Brunnholzl 2004, 762). For more details on the Carvakas’
philosophical position see also Frauwallner (2003, II: 196-200), Steinlcellner (1986, 8-12).
37Frauwallner (1973, 1:213).
38The justification for this classification becomes more transparent when considering 
that in the Nikayas the Buddha specifically considers causality by discussing the causal 
production of suffering (Ronkin 2005, 195). A view which denies the existence of human 
free will is one which has to explain the existence of suffering by reference to some cause 
other than the agent experiencing the suffering. The Buddha’s ethical discussion of causa­
tion concerning the origin of suffering was later generalized to incorporate a metaphysical
discussion as well (see Ronkin (2005, 198)).
39MMK 7.19. A third, distinct argument is given in verses 5-8 of chapter 12, dealing
with the existence of suffering. Nagarjuna examines the possibility that the suffering of a 
human being is caused by another, namely by an earlier stage of that person, for example 
by that person in an earlier life. Since on the Buddhist conception suffering (duhkha) and 
the person experiencing the suffering (pudgala) are taken to be necessarily coextensive,
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could spell out the argument Nagarjuna has in mind here. Assume that
some object x was caused by some distinct object x — 1. Now the cause of
x — 1, which we will call x — 2 cannot be the same as x — 1, for then x — 1
would be self-caused, an alternative which has already been refuted. But
it can also not be identical to x , since this would result in a causal loop,
where first x  causes x  — 1 which then in turn causes x. Apart from the fact
that this leads to problems with the temporal ordering of causation (if the
cause must precede the effect x will precede itself) causal loops also entail
self-causation, even though an object will here not cause itself directly, but
only via an intermediate chain of other objects.40 It therefore follows that
x % x  —  1, and x —  2 are three distinct objects. Given that the choice of these
three was arbitrary, causation by another object thus entails the existence
of infinitely many objects. Ganeri41 argues that this result is sufficient to
rule out causation from another thing because fit cannot [...] be a matter
of logical necessity that the world of objects is infinite’.42 Furthermore such
a view of causation creates problems for the notion of causal explanation
because ‘one never reaches the explanans\ A3
The problem with this interpretation is tha t while we would agree tha t e.g.
a logicist like Russell found it difficult to establish the existence of infinitely
this move does not help a lot. After all the earlier stage of a person must have been 
experiencing suffering too, so that we now have to explain where this suffering came from, 
and so forth. But it is evident that this argument does not generalize to show the non­
existence of causation from other objects tout court since the cause does not always share 
the property it is supposed to bring about, as in the case of the various stages of the
person: the firewood, which is the cause of the fire, is not already blazing.
40For an argument that causal loops are logically possible see Lewis (1986a, 75).
41 Ganeri (2001, 52-55),
42Ganeri (2001, 52).
43Ganeri (2001, 55).
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many objects as a tru th  of logic44 it does not seem at all problematic that 
our concept of causation might logically entail that the world was infinite 
(whether the world is in fact infinite is of course a distinct question). In 
particular I do not see why this should be a problem for Nagarjuna, as I 
am not aware of any claim of his to the effect that the infinity of the world 
cannot established by conceptual analysis alone, or indeed that the world is 
finite. Nor does it seem much more plausible to assume that a chain of causes 
stretching infinitely far backwards vitiates the concept of causal explanation. 
After all this only means that for every causal explanation we can come 
up with another one to explain the fact referred to in the explanation in 
turn. But this is a property of explanations more generally: we can always 
demand (and in most cases also provide) an explanation of an explanation 
given. In fact it is hard to come up with an example of an explanation where 
the explanans itself is unexplainable. Even if there are some, explanantia in 
general are not like this.
In fact the only piece of textual evidence we have in connection with 
this refutation of causation from another does not claim that there is any 
problem with a world of infinitely many objects, but speaks specifically of the 
infinite regress produced by the assumption that objects are caused by objects 
distinct from them.45 It is therefore more satisfactory to understand Nagar­
juna here as addressing a criticism of the following form: ‘Of course it is not 
possible to assume that an object both has svabhava, i.e. exists independently, 
and is causally produced, due to its dependence on the cause which brings 
it about. However, we can circumvent this difficulty by incorporating the 
causes of an object into our conception of the object. Instead of speaking of
44Potter (2000, 151-152).
i5 anya utpadayaty enam yady utpado ’navasthitih. MMK 7:19.
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the object which is a sprout we refer to the whole causal complex of which 
the sprout is the final result: the seed together with water, moisture and so 
on. It is such causal complexes (rather than individual objects) we want to 
ascribe independent existence to .’
As Nagarjuna points out, this procedure is only viable if you can justify 
drawing the line at the inclusion of the sprout, water, moisture etc., but 
without including anything else in the complex. This would be possible if the 
things included were indeed self-caused, an argument which is unfortunately 
not available to us.46 Thus enlarging the conception of an object by including 
its distinct causes will always allow us to include more things, obliterating the 
distinction between objects altogether and thereby defeating the point of the 
exercise. For in order to arrive at a plausible candidate for the ascription of 
svabhava we have to identify some things which could act as starting-points 
of the chain of causes. But these things would either have to be their own 
causes or arisen without a cause. Each of these possibilities is rejected by 
Nagarjuna, as our discussion in sections 5.3.1 and 5.3.4 shows.47
46This point is stressed in MMK 12:7-8: ‘If we cannot show that it has been caused by 
itself, how could suffering have been created by another? If another one made the suffering, 
this one would have to have caused his own suffering. Suffering is not self-caused insofar 
as nothing is self-caused. If the other is not self-caused, how can suffering be caused 
by another?’svayamkrtasyaprasiddher duhkham parakrtam kutah /  paro hi duhkham yat 
kurydt tat tasya sydt svayamkrtam /  na tavat svakrtam duhkham na hi tenaiva tat krtam 
/  paro natmakrtas cet sydd duhkham parakrtam, katham. The point made here is that we 
can only speak of causal complexes as independent existents if we stop going back in the 
chain of causes at some point. The only systematic reason for stopping at a particular 
cause would be the fact that tracing down its cause would bring us back to the object 
itself, i.e. the object was self-caused. But the possibility of self-causation has already been 
ruled out earlier.
47It should be noted that some of the modern commentarial literature also ascribes a 
different argument from an infinite regress to Nagarjuna’ attempts of refuting causation by
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The second Madhyamaka argument against the distinctness of cause and 
effect is not based on any difficulties with an infinite series but tries to show 
that if cause and effect were different objects, the complete absence of cau­
sation would be entailed, so tha t we could not draw any distinction between 
those objects which are causally related and those which are not.48
This might strike us as a particularly strange argument. W hat is wrong 
with assuming that the spark causes the explosion, though the spark is not 
the explosion, nor the explosion the spark? The important point to realize 
is tha t two distinct objects which are causally related could not exist inde­
pendently, i.e. each having its own svabhava. This is due to the fact one 
will existentially depend on the other, which is its cause, while the other will
other objects (Garfield 1995, 113-114), (Siderits 2004, 405-406). The defender of causation 
by other objects must explain why only particular pairs of objects, but not others, are 
related to one another as causes and effects. The obvious answer in this case it to say that 
only some, but not all objects are linked by the causal relation. Now the obtaining of the 
causal relation itself either does or does not rely on conditions in turn. If it does not it 
is unclear how much explanatory gain results from the postulation of a causal relation. 
If all we can say to explain that joghurt comes from milk but not from oil is that milk 
and joghurt stand in a particular primitive relation it seems as if we have not explained 
much. After all what we want to know is why certain pairs of things but not others stand 
in this relation. If, on the other hand, the obtaining of the causal relation in turn depends 
on conditions, we now have to explain what links the relation and its relata. And for 
whatever provides that linkage we can ask what finks it in turn to the things it links and 
so on, following the familiar Bradleyan regress. Of course we can just reply to this that a 
relation no more needs another relation to link it to its relata than glue needs superglue 
to make the glue stick to the things it is supposed to glue — the glue sticks all by itself, 
and relations are self-linking in the same way. (This is in fact the Naiyayika reply to 
Bradley’s problem. See Siderits (2004, 417, note 27)). There thus do not appear to be 
great problems for the defender of causation by other objects to seize the second horn of
the dilemma, so that the ‘infinite regress’ argument fails on this particular interpretation.
48prthaktve phalahetvoh syat tulyo hetur ahctuna. MMK 20:20. See also 10:1a.
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depend at least notionally on the one, because that is what makes it possible 
to describe it as a cause. When the Madhyamika speaks of causation by 
distinct objects it is this kind of distinctness he has in mind: cause and effect 
are supposed to exist independently, it is not sufficient to assume that they 
merely differ by having some different properties. But if we have a collection 
of objects such that each exists independently of each other it is very hard to 
see how we could make a principled distinction between those objects in the 
collection which are causes and those which are effects. Any division of the 
collection into causes and effects seems to be as justifiable as any other, so 
that there is no distinction between the relation of causation and any other 
arbitrarily chosen relation defined on the set.
Moreover, if we observe a collection of objects which all exist indepen­
dently of one another over a period of time we realize that nothing happens 
in this collection at all. The different objects will just sit there, without 
influencing or changing each other. If we conceive of causation as bringing 
something about which was not there at an earlier moment, no causation will 
be found in such a world.49
It is important to realize tha t this argument is not based on any assump­
tion claiming that ‘the effect must resemble or pre-exist in its cause5, so that 
two distinct objects (which ex hypothesi did not resemble one another in such 
a way) could not be causally related.50 As we have seen above the idea of the 
pre-existence of the effect in the cause is explicitly denied by Nagarjuna.51
49‘[Fuel] which is different [from fire] is not reached; unreached it does not burn, more­
over, not burning it will not be blown out. Not blown out it will continue to blaze, like 
something having a property essentially.’ anyo na prdpsyate ’prapto na dhaksyaty adahan
punah /  na nirvasyaty anirvdnah sthdsyate vd svaliiigavdn. MMK 10:5.
50This interpretation is given by Ganeri (2001, 54).
51See also MMK 20:1-3.
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The point is rather that independently existent objects (whether resembling 
one another or not) could not be the relata of a causal relation. Given that 
one exists whether or not the other exists, how could one be the cause bring­
ing the other one about as an effect? If, however, we still want to talk about 
such objects in causal terms we have to ask ourselves what the point of this 
is supposed to be. After all, there is no more justification for claiming that 
one object is the cause, the other the effect, rather than the other way round, 
or that the members of some specific pair of objects, rather than those of 
another one, stand in the relation of cause and effect. This, however, would 
only mean that whatever relation we are talking about here is not the causal 
relation, since the causal relation is not subject to this kind of arbitrariness.
Assuming causation from another is a straightforward way of arguing for 
cause and effect existing by svabhava. As they exist independently they do 
not require one another. But trying to establish causal relations (which are 
dependence relations) between such independent objects then leads to all 
sorts of problems. First of all, to escape the obvious contradiction of an 
independent (causally) dependent object we can try to revise our conception 
of ‘object’, including everything an object causally depends on in this new 
conception of object and regarding this collection as the bearer of svabhava. 
As we have seen above this implies the difficulty that the things included 
bring with them what they causally depend on, which in turn bring other 
objects along and so forth. There is no mind-independent criterion for de­
ciding where to draw the line between which objects to include and which to 
leave out.
Secondly, a set of independently existent objects does not give us any 
indication of how the causal relations between them should be established. 
Since the existence of any object does not influence the existence of any other
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object it appears to be completely arbitrary which way round we consider 
the causal relations between the objects to hold. For these reasons the as­
sumption of distinct, independently existent objects does not support the 
view that cause and effect exist with their own svabhava.
5.3.3 Causation by itself and another object
The third alternative to consider is that an object is caused both by itself 
and other objects. This possibility is usually dismissed very briefly in the 
Madhyamaka literature by claiming that since self-causation and causation 
by other objects have already been refuted individually, there is no need to 
refute both of them together.52 To illustrate this point Candraldrti gives 
the rather unfortunate example of two conditions, neither of which is fatal, 
arguing that this demonstrates tha t both together could not be fatal either.53 
That this implication does not hold can be seen from the example of binary 
poisons which consist of two chemicals which are non-toxic individually, but 
poisonous when combined.
I do not think that Nagarjuna here argues by relying on the (faulty)54 
principle that if neither of two entities has a property, both of them put 
together will not have the property either. W hat he wants to show in this 
context is that if we have disproved each of a set of two propositions we do not 
need a further argument to disprove their conjunction as this is entailed by
52MMK 12:9a states the contrapositive: ‘If suffering was caused by both [itself and 
others] it could be caused by each individually.’ syad ubhdbhydrn krtam duhkham syad 
ekaikakrtarn yadi.
S3,It is not the case that who is not killed by each individually is killed by both [together]
na caikaikena prandtipate ’krte dvabhyam krta. PP 233:6.
54 As even limited exposure to mixing paint or cooking demonstrates.
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the individual refutations.55 It should be noted, however, that it is possible 
to interpret the third possibility in such a way that the simple refutation of 
self-causation and of causation by another object will not be sufficient. This 
is the case if we take the third possibility to be the position tha t the cause 
already contains the effect as a potentiality which is only brought out in the 
presence of particular supporting circumstances.56 In this way the effect, such 
as an explosion, is neither wholly caused by objects different from it (since 
it was already present as a potentiality in the spark which caused it) nor is 
it just produced from itself as the potentiality present in the cause (because 
without the auxiliary conditions, such as the temperature required or the 
presence of oxygen the explosion would not have happened). Therefore57
the happy compromise doctrine that emerges is the doctrine of 
causation-by-both: Effects are the result of the joint operation 
of the effect itself in potentia and the external conditions neces­
sary to raise the effect’s mode of existence from potentiality to 
actuality.
It is apparent that on this understanding of the third possibility it is not 
enough just to point at the refutations of the first and second possibility. For 
in this scenario there is neither a perpetually self-reproducing object due to 
the necessity of auxiliary conditions, nor do we have to suppose tha t there is a 
causal relation holding between existentially independent objects, given that 
cause and effect are connected by the latter being present as a potentiality
55See Ganeri (2001, 52).
56This view of causation has been ascribed to the Jains (Perrett (1998, 2:267- 
257), Ronkin (2005, 197-198)). It coheres well with their multiperspectivalist outlook 
(anekantavada) to argue that the effect is already present in the cause qua its potentiality
(sakti) but not qua its fully developed form.
57Garfield (1995, 107)
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in the former. It seems as if the ‘happy compromise5 manages to avoid 
the difficulties Nagarjuna attributes to both self-causation and causation 
from other objects. A slightly different compromise solution which gets by 
without the potential existence of the effect in the cause can be found in the 
theories of the Naiyayikas and Vaisesikas.58 Here causation is understood 
to proceed by means of two internal causes and one external cause. The 
two internal causes are the inherent cause (samavayikcirana) and the non- 
inherent cause (asamavayikarana), the external one is the instrumental cause 
(nimittakdrana). If we consider the way a marble statue is produced we can 
identify at least three different components: the marble out of which the 
statue is made, the various properties of the marble (such as colour, hardness, 
density etc.) and the actions of the sculptor. The marble constitutes the 
inherent cause, the material basis out of which the effect is made and can be
compared to the Aristotelian causa materialis. The non-inherent causes (the
marble's properties) do not cause the statue, but rather cause properties of 
the statue. Unlike the inherent cause, changes in the non-inherent cause do 
not change the kind of effect produced. Whether the marble is white or red, 
we still end up with a marble statue. Had the marble been clay, however, we 
would not have done so. These two internal causes are then combined with 
the instrumental cause (comparable to the causa efficiens) to bring forth 
the effect. The sculptor chipping off pieces from the block frees the statue 
locked within. On this account the marble statue is obviously not completely 
self-produced: the block of marble and its properties will just continue to sit 
there until the sculptor comes along. On the other hand it is not produced 
from objects which are completely different either, as any part of the statue 
is also part of the block of marble which is its cause.
58Dasgupta (1942, 1:320), King (1999, 208).
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The reason why this account of causation is not particularly attractive 
for Nagarjuna’s opponent is that the ascription of being an inherent, non- 
inherent or instrumental cause as a property something has by virtue of its 
svabhava is hardly satisfactory. Nothing can be a causa materialis in itself; 
it depends on the existence of a causa efficiens to turn it into an effect. The 
causa efficiens (the sculptor working on the marble) could not exist without 
the inherent or material cause (the block of marble). The non-inherent cause 
(the properties of the marble) needs the inherent cause as something to inhere 
in.
It is apparent tha t the three kinds of cause distinguished here both no- 
tionally and existentially depend on one another, as well as on the effect they 
jointly bring about. Their various causal properties are therefore nothing the 
respective objects have from their own side, independently of other objects. 
For this reason this account of causation is unable to defend the claim that 
the causality of the cause and the effect-ness of the effect are properties cause 
and effect have in virtue of their svabhava,
5.3.4 Absence of causation
The final possibility to discuss is causation which is neither self-causation 
nor causation by another object.59 This is generally regarded as the absence 
of causation altogether, given that the first three possibilities are taken to 
exhaust the ways in which the relata of causation can be related. If these are 
ruled out, the only remaining option is that objects do not exist as causal 
relata since there is no causal relation.60 We might think tha t there are some
59 MMK 12:9b.
60It is not quite clear who the original proponents of this view of fortuitous origination 
(adhiccasamuppada, see Ronkin (2005, 198)) actually were. Murti (1955, 135, note 3, 
167) identifies it as the view of the svabhavavadin, which is usually identified with that of
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entities which may plausibly be taken to exist outside the causal nexus, such
as mathematical objects and other abstract entities. Nagarjuna does not
talk about the metaphysical status of mathematical entities, so any account
of what he would have said about these is by necessity highly speculative.61
Moreover, he is interested in analyzing general accounts of how causation
works. As we would hardly want to describe all phenomena as abstract there
still remains the question of how to understand the working of causality for
phenomena unlike numbers and so forth.62
Two distinct problems with the absence of causation are distinguished in
the commentarial literature. First of all it is not clear how any facts about
the world could be grasped (grhyate)> given that our main route of epistemic
the Carvakas (see also Kalupahana (1975, 25)). Namai (1996, 561) agrees and mentions
svabhavavada, i.e. the view that ‘phenomena are spontaneously diverse, there being no
intervention of destiny or divine will* (Tillemans 2000, 58, note 210) as one of the positions
held by the Carvakas. Schayer, on the other hand, denies the ascription of this view,
since the Carvakas, he argues, only denied causality in the context of karma, but did
not deny all causal determinations, as they specifically assert that things are determined
by their intrinsic nature (svabhava) (1931, note 16, 20-21). Given the limited amount
of information about the Carvaka system we presently possess, whether their view of
causation should be regarded as one implying the complete absence of causation, causation
by another object (as claimed on page 161) or even self-causation remains a moot point.
61 One might want to argue Nagarjuna’s assertions that there is no effect without a cause
(na casty arihah kascid ahetukah kvacit. MMK 4:2) and nothing which is not dependently
originated (apratUyasamutpanno dharmah kascin na vidyate. 24:19) rule out the existence
of abstract objects altogether. Nevertheless one might read the first statement as saying
that something not causally produced could not be referred to as an effect and remark
concerning the second that dependent origination does not just mean causal origination.
The existence of some mathematical structure might, for example, be logically entailed by
certain concepts we have and therefore be dependent on these concepts for its existence.
This, however, does not mean that it is causally produced.
62Ganeri (2001, 52-53).
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access to the world is causal. Assuming that we are not causally connected 
to phenomena in the everyday world would make their epistemology as prob­
lematic as those of objects outside of the causal nexus.63
Secondly, and more importantly, a world without causation would be 
phenomenologically very much unlike the world we experience. That we 
experience the world as regular largely means that we experience it as causally 
ordered. Certain effects proceed from certain causes, but not from others: 
blood will flow if we strike a man, not if we strike a stone. A world with 
no causation is a world in which more or less anything can follow anything 
else.64 W ithout claiming tha t the assumption of the absence of causation 
‘falls to the ground through sheer inanity’65 it is sufficient to note that such 
a world is not the world we experience, and therefore the fourth alternative 
is no satisfactory explication of our concept of causality.
5.3.5 Identity, difference, and svabhava
If we imagine a set of points on a plane connected to one another by lines we
can imagine various connective possibilities for a particular point. It can be
connected to itself via a looping line, or to another point, or both to another
point and itself, or not connected to any point at all, or it can be connected
not to itself, but to a proper part of itself. The conclusion Nagarjuna wants
63‘If the world was empty of a cause it could not be grasped, like the hue and scent of
an [imaginary] lotus in the sky’, grhyate naiva ca jagad yadi hetusunyam syad yadvad eva
gagana-utpala-varna-gandhau. PP 38:7-8. This is a quotation from MA 6:100.
64As pointed out by Buddhapalita as quoted in PP 38:10-11: ’It is not the case that
things arise without cause because of the difficulty of everything arising always and ev­
erywhere.’ ahetuto notpadyante bhavdh sada ca sarvatas ca sarvasambhavaprasangat. For
the Tibetan see Walleser (1913—1914b, 11-12). The same point is made in MA 6:99.
65Murti (1955, 135).
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to draw from the preceding arguments is that if we apply this conceptual 
structure to causation, by letting the points stand for objects or events, and 
the lines for the causal relation, none of the possibilities could obtain. Given 
that the set of connective possibilities is exhaustive the reason for this must 
lie in the fact tha t we make a basic assumption about points connected by 
lines which is not justified when speaking about events connected by causal 
relations.
This assumption is that the points exist with svabhava, tha t is tha t they 
are distinct objects existing from their own side, independently of one another 
as well as of the cognizing subject which attempts to connect them by lines. 
Nagarjuna argues, however, that cause and effect do not exist in this way. 
They are both notionally as well as existentially dependent on each other, as 
well as dependent on us as a cognitive subject which orders a chaotic mass 
of diverse experiences into causal fields and the effects they bring about. 
If cause and effect were identical it could obviously not be the case that 
the effect was dependent on the cause for its existence at a later time. Their 
mutual dependence would also not be compatible with cause and effect being 
two distinct objects in the same way as two points are distinct objects, where 
none brings the other into existence, nor would such dependence allow that 
an effect depended causally both on itself as well as on another objects. If the 
effect was part of the cause, the existential dependence of the effect on the 
cause at a later time would also not be possible. Finally, if no lines connected 
the points, the points would still be points, but cause and effect could not 
exist in the absence of causal relations.
The conclusion of Nagarjuna’s examination of cause and effect in terms 
of identity, difference and parthood is therefore that such a conceptualization 
fails because it makes presuppositions about the existence of the objects thus
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related (about their notional and existential independence and existence with 
svabhava) which are not applicable to cause and effect.66 Cause and effect 
have to be conceived of as both mutually dependent, as well as dependent 
on the cognizing subject, and therefore as empty of svabhava.
5.4 Tem poral relations betw een cause and ef­
fect
Causes and effects are events which occur against the background of a partic­
ular causal field. One metal sphere moving (the causal event) brings about 
the moving of another one (the event which is the effect) by colliding with 
it 011 a plane surface, in the presence of the laws of gravity, in the absence 
of strong currents of air, magnetic fields, and so on (the background condi­
tions), If we consider two arbitrary events, such as Peter reading the paper, 
and Paul drinking tea it is clear tha t there are three ways in which they can 
be temporally related. They can be successive (Paul drinks his tea one hour 
after Peter reads the paper), they can overlap (Paul starts drinking his tea 
after Peter is halfway trough the paper), or they can be simultaneous (they 
start and finish at exactly the same times). Assuming that causes and effects 
are events like any others it should be straightforward to classify their tem­
poral relations in the same way. Interestingly enough, this is more difficult 
than expected.
One fairly clear point is that if two events are related as cause and effect 
there is a restriction on their temporal ordering: the effect cannot precede 
the cause. After all, the cause is what is supposed to bring the effect about, 
something it obviously cannot do if it only arrives on the scene after the
66Napper (1989, 63-64).
CHAPTER  5. CAUSATION 176
effect. Unless we assume that there is another event before the cause which 
also begins before the effect comes into existence, the effect would come about 
without any cause at all.
In SS 6ab Nagarjuna stresses this point: ‘If the effect existed [before the 
cause then what about] the cause which has this effect? [Ex hypothesi it does 
not exist yet.] If that [cause] does not exist, [however, the effect] would be 
similar [to something with] no cause’.67
Nagarjuna lists nine different ways in which cause and effect can be tem­
porally related: the cause can be either past, present, or future, and for each 
of these the effect produced can also be past, present, or future.68 Assuming 
that an effect cannot precede its cause we can immediately rule out three 
possibilities. A past effect could not have been brought about by a cause 
that is either present or future, nor could a present effect be brought about 
by a future cause. The remaining six possibilities fall into two large groups, 
those in which cause and effect exist (wholly or partly) at different times, 
and those in which they exist at the same time.
5.4.1 Cause and effect as successive
While the effect cannot begin before the cause, could we assume that the 
effect succeeds the cause? The idea is that some causal event (my pressing 
the switch) begins, endures and then stops. After this the effect (the light 
going on) begins. Unless we postulate another event which stretches right
67 ’bras yod ’bras dang Idan pa ’i rgyu /  de med na ni rgyu min mtshungs. As is evident 
from the interpolations in my translation the interpretation of this verse is not entirely 
clear, to say the least. This unclarity is further exacerbated by the existence of a number 
of variant readings. For some different translations see Tola and Dragonetti (1987, 25),
Komito (1987, 107-108), Erb (1997, 75).
68MMK 20:12-14.
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up to the time when the light goes on (thus raising the whole question of 
temporal relations anew, now for the effect and this event) the cause will 
have stopped to exist before the effect begins.
Nagarjuna considers it to be problematic that something which has al­
ready ceased could be regarded as a causal condition.69 This problem arises 
specifically for the Abhidharma view of phenomena as minimally extended 
space-time points.70 Within this theory of moments (ksanavada) it is diffi­
cult to see how the existence of a phenomenon limited to an atomic temporal 
point could be compatible with its causal efficacy, as when the cause exists, 
the effect is still inexistent, and when the effect arises the cause will already 
have ceased to be.71 It thus appears that being brought about by a cause 
which is past is no better than having no cause at all.72
The difficulty Nagarjuna raises with his criticism is the problem presentist 
theories of time face when accounting for causal relation. For the presentist 
only the present, but not the past or the future qualify as real. He therefore 
faces a problem when trying to explain that the present is the way it is due to 
causal influences from the past, as he will have to postulate that of the two 
relata of the causal relation only one (namely the present) is part of reality.73
69 [...] niruddhe pratyayas ca hah. MMK 1:9. See also 20:10a.
70Stcherbatsky (1923, 37-38), Kalupahana (1975, 67—73).
71 Since a two-place relation needs two arguments the Madhyainika will therefore argue 
that one of the two is a mere conceptual construction (or, as a Humean would put it, a 
reification of our expectations). Causation therefore does not connect things existing from
their own side. See Siderits (2004, 408-409).
72‘If the cause ceased without having passed on its causal power to the effect, that effect
which is born when the cause has ceased would be without cause.1 heturn phalasyadattva 
ca yadi hetur nirudhyate /  hetau niruddhe jatam  tat phalam dhetukam bhavet. MMK 20:6.
The same difficulty was also pointed out by Sankara in his bhasya on Brahmasutra 
2 . 2 . 2 0 .
73See be Poidevin (2003, 139).
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Amongst the Abidharmikas this presentist difficulty is faced by the Thera- 
vada account according to which only the present moment, consisting of the 
origination, endurance, and dissolution of a phenomenon exist and has sva­
bhava, while past and future moments are devoid of svabhava74 This theory 
will then have to explain how something which is past and therefore non­
existent can nevertheless assert its causal influence on the present.
It should be noted, however, that this problem does not arise for the 
Sarvastivadins, whose metaphysical theories generally constitute the main 
target of Nagarjuna’s philosophical criticism. For the Sarvastivadin past, 
present, and future all exist, they all have svabhava.75 Such a theory obvi­
ously needs some way of accounting for the privileged status of the present. 
Different Sarvastivada thinkers have proposed different ways of doing this.76 
The most popular account, due to Vasumitra,77 argues that the special na­
ture of the present is due to the fact that only present phenomena manifest 
causal activity (karitra).78 A phenomenon is past if it has already discharged 
its activity, it is future if it has yet to discharge it. Despite being devoid 
of causal activity a past phenomenon nevertheless continues to exist and 
remains able to cause presently existing phenomena.79
The obvious way of avoiding this problem of a succession of cause and 
effect within a theory of the momentary existence of phenomena in which
74Ronkin (2005, 66, 119-120).
75Dhammajoti (2004, 35, 39).
76*Abhidharmamahavibhasasastra) Taisho 1545, 396a-b, Dhammajoti (2004, 82-83).
See also Pradhan (1975, 296-297), Frauwallner (1995, 185-208).
77Dhammajoti (2004, 82-83). Samghabhadra’s account of the nature of karitra is given
in his *Abhidharvianyayanusara, Taisho 1562, 631c-633b. A summary of the discussion
can be found in Dhammajoti (2004, 89-92).
78Williams (1981, 241-242), von Rospatt (1995, 39), Siderits (2003,136, note m), Ronkin
(2005, 110, 227).
79Cox (1995, 93), Dhammajoti (2004, 94).
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only the present is regarded as real is to assume that cause and effect are 
temporally contiguous. This conception of a contiguous cause (samanatara- 
pratyaija) was adopted by a variety of different schools of the Abhidharma, 
by the Sarvastivadins as well as by the Sautrantikas and the Theravadins.80 
According to this theory whenever one phenomenon follows another one with­
out a pause the latter may be regarded as the cause of the former. In fact 
Nagarjuna raises the above problem specifically with regard to the notion 
of immediately preceding conditions (anantara), which is one of the four 
types of conditions distinguished by the Abhidharmikas81 discussed by him 
in the second verse of this chapter. Immediately preceding conditions are 
‘the countless intermediary phenomena that emerge upon the analysis of a 
causal chain’82 and which happen between a particular causal event and its 
effect.
The main advantage of the theory of temporal contiguity of cause and 
effect is that it eliminates the existence of a temporal gap between the two, a 
gap during which the cause does no longer exist, because it has just ceased, 
and during which the effect does not yet exist because it is just about to 
begin. Such a gap would make it hard to explain how any causal efficacy can 
be passed on from cause to effect, as they are divided by the insulation of 
a causal vacuum, a gap in which no causation takes place. If the temporal 
moments of cause and effect are regarded as ‘directly touching’, however, this 
difficulty is avoided, even if only the present moment is regarded as existent. 
The past moment does not have to exist in the present in order to be causally 
efficacious; all tha t is required is that it passes 011 its causal power when the 
moment of the cause and the directly successive moment of the effect meet.
80Kalupahana (1975, 72-73, 166-167).
81 Dhammajoti (2004, 131-132).
82Gavfield (1995, 109).
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Whether this account is able to provide us with a satisfactory theory of 
causation, however, in turn depends on the conception of time the view of 
causal contiguity is based on.
If we combine the notion of the contiguity of cause and effect with a view 
of time which does not view moments as atomic but as divisible in turn (as 
the Theravadins did) 83 this does not seem to help us much in addressing the 
problem of the temporal relation between cause and effect. For in this case 
no matter how close we regard the last moment of the cause and the first, 
moment of the effect to be in time, there will always be a moment between 
them which is different from either, thereby perpetuating the problem of the 
temporal gap.
If, like the Sarvastivadins84 and Sautrantikas85 we regard time as discrete 
and composed of atomic, indivisible moments,86 however, the situation we 
consider looks like the one depicted in figure 1. Here there is obviously
83von Rospatt (1995, 60), Ronkin (2005, 62-63).
84Ronkin (2005, 61-62), Dhammajoti (2004, 153).
85von Rospatt (1995, 60-63).
86There is an obvious tension between an atomic conception of time and the assumption 
that each moment is characterized by the three distinct characteristics of conditioned 
objects (samskrtalaksana) of origination, endurance, and dissolution, which can hardly be 
regarded as simultaneous. For a discussion of how the Sarvastivadins dealt with this issue 
see von Rospatt (1995, 49-59), for the Sautrantika account see 60-63.
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no temporal gap between the end of the cause and the beginning of the 
effect, as there is no further moment of time between these two moments. 
Nevertheless it does not seem to be the case that this is really a view of the 
temporal relation between cause and effect the opponent of Nagarjuna would 
want to defend. Obviously, the causal event does not become a cause until 
the first moment of the effect is present, for if the effect had never existed, 
the cause would not have been a cause (and, if we adopt the Nagarjunian line 
of the existential dependence of the cause on the effect, in this case the cause 
would not have existed at all). When the first moment of the effect is present, 
however, the cause is already past, so that during no moment when the causal 
event was present it was actually a cause — the term ‘cause5 is only applied 
to it post festum. The cause or, more precisely, the causal field, only comes 
into existence as such (as opposed to a random collection of objects) after 
the effect has been produced. Only after the sprout has been produced I can 
identify all the various elements which led to its production as its cause. But 
this then implies tha t being a cause cannot be an essential property of the 
underlying event, since the event can have the property at one time (after the 
effect has been produced) and lack it at another time (before the effect was 
produced). The above conception will therefore not support the idea that 
the cause exists as a cause from its own side, and that being a cause is part 
of its svabhava, a position which Nagarjuna’s opponent will want to defend. 
For the Sarvastivadin a phenomenon’s causal efficacy, like its svabhava, does 
not undergo any change through time, it is only the phenomenon’s activity 
(karitra) which becomes existent in the present moment and then ceases as 
the phenomenon vanishes into the past. But, as Nagarjuna argues, we do not 
call anything a cause unless it actually produces an effect; its being a cause 
depends on something’s being the effect it produces. In the presence of such
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a dependence, however, being a cause cannot be part of the phenomenon’s 
svabhava, since this very notion demands its being able to exist as a cause 
from its own side, independent of any other object.
5.4.2 Cause and effect as overlapping
Suppose there are two events related in the way depicted in figure 2. The 
causal event (my pressing the lightswitch) begins at time to and continues 
until t2. The effect, (the light going on) begins at t\ (while the cause still 
continues) and goes on until t3, after the cause has ceased. On the face of it 
this seems to be a reasonable understanding of the temporal relation of the 
cause and effect involved in this case. I press the switch (£0), after some time 
the light goes on (ti), then I stop pressing (£2); the light continues to be on 
until some future time £3 .
There are two main difficulties with this picture. The first, and most 
general problem is that seeing cause and effect as overlapping -  in contrast 
with all other accounts of their temporal relation -  implies that cause and 
effect are temporally extended. But given that temporally extended things 
have temporal parts, and that partite things cannot be ultimately real this 
seems to defeat the point of the argument. Nagarjuna’s opponent is inter­
CHAPTER 5. CAUSATION 183
ested in establishing causal relations between ultimate existents, i.e. between 
objects which are (unlike temporally extended objects) not conceptually con­
structed. But conceiving of cause and effect as overlapping (whether we think 
that there is a clear cut-off line between cause and effect as indicated in figure 
2 , or whether we take this to be a gradual process) entails tha t we do just 
that, since we have to conceive of them as spread out across time .87
The second problem is that according to the situation depicted in figure 
2  the cause would be taken to cease at t2, ke. when the lightswitch-pressing 
event comes to an end. This, however, means that we have to regard the 
period between ti (when the light went on) and t 2 (when I stopped pressing) 
as part of the cause. But my pressing after the light went on was of no 
consequence for the effect in any way, so it appears to be rather strange that 
we take a causally inert part of the event to be part of the cause. Nagar­
juna argues that in this case what we take to be the cause would have a 
double nature (atmadvaya): its causal power which is employed in bringing 
about the effect and its causal inertness, after the causing has been done.88 
While having two incompatible properties at different times is of course not 
a problem in itself (an apple can be green now and red later), assuming that 
part of the nature of a cause is causally inert seems distinctly odd — if a 
cause has any nature at all it seems to consist in being able to bring about an 
effect. It is therefore undesirable for anyone who wants to argue that being 
a cause is part of some object’s svabhava to assume that this object has a 
causally inert temporal part.
87See Siderits (2004, 406-408).
88‘If the cause ceased to exist after having passed on the causal power of [bringing about] 
the fruit, the cause would have a double nature: the given [causal power] and the ceased 
[nature after having passed on the causal power].’ heturn phalasya dattva, ca yadi hetur 
nirudhyate /  yad dattarn yan niruddham ca hetor atmadvayam bhavet. MMK 20:5.
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If we now try to avoid this problem by ‘cutting off’ the causally inert part 
of the cause ranging from ti to t2 and only regard the event ranging from tQ 
to ti as the cause we end up with a scenario in which cause and effect are 
temporally contiguous, the difficulties of which have been discussed above.
5.4.3 Cause and effect as simultaneous
The third possibility to discuss is that of cause and effect being simultane­
ous, i.e. their coming into existence and ceasing at the same moment. The 
concept of simultaneous causation (sahabhuhetu) is of central importance in 
the Sarvastivada theory of causality. 89 The principal Sarvastivada example 
of simultaneous causation is a thought (citta) and its specific concomitants 
(caitasika) 90 which mutually depend on one another ‘like the poles of a tri­
pod ’ .91 A thought cannot arise earlier than its concomitant factors, nor can 
such factors be earlier than the specific thought they accompany. The con­
cept of simultaneous causation is essential of for the Sarvastivada theory 
of the existence of past and future, as well as present objects. The main 
argument for this thesis of universal existence (sarvastitva) is that since con­
sciousness needs an existent object, and since there is consciousness of past 
and present phenomena, these phenomena must be existent objects. But of 
course this only establishes the existence of past, present, and future objects
89Dhammajoti (2004, 116-117) gives a selection of passages from the Sarvastivada Ab- 
hidharma literature dealing with simultaneous causation. See also Tanaka (1985), Burton 
(1999, 193), Dhammajoti (2003), Ronldn (2005, 217). The idea of a sahabhuhetu also 
becomes important in Yogacara literature where the dlayavijhana and bija are regarded
as standing in a simultaneous causal relationship (Dhammajoti 2004, 121—123).
"Dhammajoti (2004, 162).
91Hopkins (1983, 339). Another example used is the simultaneous existence of a lamp 
and its light (Dhammajoti 2004, 120).
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if the object of consciousness (the cause) and the consciousness of tha t ob­
ject (the effect) exist simultaneously. If a past object was able to cause a 
consciousness of it which is present, the past objects could be non-existent, 
even though the present consciousness of such objects does exist.92
Nagarjuna is primarily interested in the possibility of cause and effect 
coming into existence at the same time .93 An immediate problem with this 
idea is tha t the cause is generally taken to be what brings the previously 
nonexistent effect about, and so as something which exists while the effect 
does not yet exist. We distinguish the effect from the causal field by observing 
that the causal field (the wires, the bulb, pressing the switch) is there first, 
without the effect (the light going on) which appears subsequently.
A second difficulty is evident from a problem Nagarjuna discusses in a 
slightly different context.94 Speaking of cause and effect as simultaneous, 
we intend this to mean tha t there are two distinct events beginning at the 
same time as one another, rather than one event referred to by two different 
names.95 Being distinct, we should be able to imagine one without the other; 
it should be logically possible that one of the two distinct entities exists while 
the other does not. At least this is the sense of distinctness the opponent of 
Nagarjuna will have in mind, who will attempt to base the distinctness on 
the svabhava of the respective events. Considering the interdependence of 
cause and effect discussed above, however, such distinctness does not obtain, 
so tha t a claim for simultaneity cannot be made.
The reader of Candrakrrti’s commentary on the above passages will notice 
that he attem pts to elucidates Nagarjuna’s assertion that cause and effect
92Dhammajoti (2004, 38, 125).
93MMK 20:7.
94MMI< 6:3-9.
95Garfield (1995, 156).
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cannot exist together observing that simultaneously existing objects like the 
left and right hand ,96 or the left and right horn of an ox97 are never seen to 
stand in a causal relationship. This seems to be incorrect, as there are in fact 
a multitude of prima facie examples where cause and effect come into being 
at the same time: the cause of the effect of the left-hand-side of a pair of 
scales going up (namely its right-hand-side going down) begins at the same 
moment in time as the effect,98 as does the cause of the cart’s moving (namely 
the motion of the horse). If we place a ball of lead on a soft cushion, the 
cause (putting down the ball) and the effect (the indentation in the cushion) 
equally arise at the same time .99 Nevertheless, we have to note that these 
are hardly the examples the critic of Nagarjuna who wants to establish cause 
and effect as independent, self-sufficient entities could be looking for. The 
motion of the horse and the motion of the cart are simultaneous, but clearly 
not distinct in the strong sense defined above: it is certainly physically (and 
presumably also logically) impossible that the cart moves forward, and the 
horse stays where it is. This example is therefore not able to establish the 
simultaneity of two independently existing events, 100
96PP 395: 9-10.
97PP 139:14, see also 224:4.
98This example is discussed in MA 6:18-19. See also Shaw (2002, 230), Siderits (2004, 
408).
"For the origin of the last example see Kant (1993, A 203, B 248); some commentary
is in Rosenberg (1998) and Le Poidevin (1988). See also Bugault (2001, 252).
100 A different interesting argument against the simultaneity of cause and effect, attempt­
ing to show that it would undermine the existence of any succession of causes is given in 
Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature (Hume 1896, I, III, II: 76). See also Munsat (1971).) 
Suppose a cause and its effect existed at the same time, t \ .  Suppose further that there was 
another cause of the effect which existed at t_i ,  a short instance of time before this. Given 
that the simultaneous cause produces the effect immediately, but the earlier cause only 
after some delay (i.e. the time which passed between t_ i and t\)  we would only want to
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5.4.4 Cause and effect as one event
A final possibility Nagarjuna raises in MMK 20:20 is the suggestion that when 
speaking of causes and effects we are not dealing with two events at all but in 
fact only with one single event which in the course of its history transforms 
itself from a causal event into an effect-event. Now the question to consider is 
whether the cause retains its causal nature after the transformation. If it does 
not, it will not be the same any longer since for Nagarjuna’s opponent being 
cause and effect are not just intrinsic features of events, but also essential 
ones, i.e. features an object cannot lose without ceasing to be that very object. 
As Candraklrti points out, for the defender of the ‘transformation’ theory the 
difference between cause and effect cannot just be one in terms of description 
(samjhamatrabheda) , but must be one in terms of essence (dravyabheda) . 101
If the event retains its causal nature, however, then, after the cause has 
ceased an event with the very same svabhava will arise once more. This 
is problematic for the same reasons tha t the presence of the effect in the 
causal field is problematic, as was discussed in 2 0 :1 : if the cause already 
existed, there would be no need to produce it once more. A further problem 
arises from the fact tha t it is hard to see how this kind of self-causation
regard the simultaneous cause as the true cause (the earlier cause is at best an earlier part 
of the effect’s causal history), Therefore, given the possibility of a simultaneous cause, no 
earlier event will be a plausible candidate for being a cause. Given that there are always 
events simultaneous with a another event, we will always prefer to regard these as causes, 
rather than some preceding event. But if we thus assume that for any effect its cause is 
simultaneous we are faced with the problem that simultaneity is transitive. If cause c is 
simultaneous with effect ei, and e\ is in turn simultaneous with whatever effect it may 
have (call this e2 ) then c and e2  are also simultaneous. Therefore all causes and effects 
would happen at the same time, and thereby there would be no such thing as a causal
succession in time.
101PP 397:7.
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should ever stop. Since there were no factors present apart from the causal 
event which triggered its transformation into the effect (which is the very- 
same event as the cause and is both cause and effect essentially) there is no 
absence of factors which could stop such a transformation. The cause would 
be self-perpetuating and exist for ever.
5.4.5 Temporal relations and svabhava
Considering any two events it is evident that they either appear in succession 
(being contiguous or separated by a temporal gap), that they are temporally 
overlapping, that they happen at the same time, or that they are successive 
stages of one single event. As we have seen, Nagarjuna denies that any of 
these possible temporal relations holds of two events which are related to 
one another as cause and effect. The reason for this is the same we observed 
in the case of the relation between cause and effect in terms of identity, 
difference, and parthood. The above set of temporal relations only presents 
us with an exhaustive classification of all possibilities if we are dealing with 
distinct and mutually independent events which exist from their own side 
independent of a cognizing subject, that is with events which exist by their 
own svabhava, Cause and effect, however, do not exist in such a way, as 
one brings about the other. Given this dependence relation cause and effect 
cannot be separated by a temporal gap, as in this case the effect would have 
to depend on a non-existent object, as the cause does not exist any more. 
Assuming them to be overlapping entails that the cause has a causally active 
and a causally inert part, which conflicts with the assumption tha t being a 
cause is part of its own nature. If cause and effect come about at the same 
time, it is hard to see how the effect could rely existentially on the previously 
existing cause, while taking them to be stages of one event again means that
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the cause cannot be a cause as part of its own nature, as this is a property 
the cause loses when turning into the effect.
The consideration of the temporal relations between cause and effect 
therefore demonstrates once more the inapplicability of conceptual schemes 
suitable for discussing mutually independent and observer-independent ob­
jects to causes and effects. Being empty of svabhava they cannot be conceived 
of using the conceptual resources intended for discussing phenomena which 
exist both independently of one another and independently of a cognizing 
subject.
Having investigated a variety of commonsensical theories of the identity 
relations between cause and effect, as well as theories of their temporal rela­
tions Nagarjuna concludes that the commonsensical view of objects under­
lying these theories is unsatisfactory, since it conflicts with each of the ways 
in which the relation between cause and effect can possibly be conceived of.
According to the view Nagarjuna wants to establish instead of the com­
monsensical one cause and effect do not exist independently of one another: 
they require each other both notionally and existentially. There is no point 
in using the concept of a cause without that of an effect, or vice versa. More 
importantly, while an effect cannot exist without being brought about by a 
cause (or, more precisely, by a causal field) the effect brings about the causal 
field as well. This is because without the effect there would be no indication 
of which phenomena are to be included in some causal field, and which are 
to be left out. The causal field is not something found ready-made out there 
in the world, waiting to be discovered by the inquiring mind. It is a cognitive 
artefact brought about whenever the mind organizes its experiences. To this 
extent the causal field does not just depend on the effect which provided the 
justification for certain objects rather than others to be included in it, but
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also on the mind which does the including. Cause and effect are therefore 
not just mutually interdependent, but also mind-dependent. This is what 
Nagarjuna means by saying that causes and effects do not exist from their 
own side, that is tha t they are empty of svabhava.
A general worry we might want to raise about Nagarjuna’s attem pt to 
establish emptiness on the basis of causation is the following. It is clear that 
showing that some object causally depends on another one shows tha t it is 
empty in some way. For example, if we define an object to be non-empty iff 
it is mereologically, causally and conceptually independent, demonstrating 
that some object is causally produced is obviously enough to show that it is 
empty. But this might not be good enough.102 After all it is the notion of 
emptiness in terms of conceptual dependence or imputation which is generally 
regarded as the most subtle understanding of emptiness. But it is clear that 
establishing some object is causally produced does not entail tha t this object 
is also conceptually constructed .103
Siderits argues that this difficulty can be solved by attributing to the 
Madhyamika the principle that if some object essentially involves a property 
which is conceptually constructed, the object is conceptually constructed 
too . 104 If we replace ‘conceptually constructed’ by ‘fictional’ the tru th  of the 
principle is immediately evident. Consider a violin performance by Sherlock 
Holmes as a simple example. This object essentially involves the relation 
‘being performed by Sherlock Holmes’, which is a fictional property. For this 
reason the performance, which incorporates this property as an essential part
102It is useful to remember in this context that for the Abhidharmikas conditioned objects 
(samskrta dharma) were both regarded as having svabhava and as being dependently
originated.
103See Burton (1999, 115).
104Siderits (2004, 411).
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is fictional too.
In the same way, the Madhyamika will argue, each material object es­
sentially involves reference to causality, since all these objects are causally 
produced. But if it is now demonstrated, as Nagarjuna set out to do above, 
that the causal relation does not exist from is own side, is conceptually 
constructed and thus empty it follows that each material object must be 
conceptually constructed and therefore empty in the most subtle sense as 
well. In this way the discussion of causality is not just able to establish the 
comparatively crude emptiness in terms of causal interdependence, but also 
the more subtle one in terms of conceptual construction.
5.5 A nalysis o f tim e
The analysis of causation is intricately bound up with that of time as it refers 
to temporal relations at various crucial places in the argument. Nagarjuna 
discussed time in the shortest chapter of the MMK which consists just of six 
verses. He notes that first of all tha t the past, present, and future existentially 
depend on one another. 105 Not only could there be no present if there was no 
past or future, there could also be no present if it was not related to past and 
future in exactly the way it is, that is sandwiched between them. Time is a 
fundamentally relational phenomenon with an intrinsic ordering. Assuming 
such an interdependence between the three times Nagarjuna claims that if 
the present and the future depended on the past then the present and future 
would exist in the past . 106 On the face of it this seems to be the now familiar
105<In turn the past is not found established independent of the two [present and future].5
anapeksya punah siddhir ndtitam vidyate tayoh. MMK 19:3a.
106 pratyutpanno ’nagatas ca yady atttam apeksya hi /  pratyutpanno ’nagatas ca kale ’tile
bhavisyatah. MMK 19:1.
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point that when a dependence relation holds between two entities, both of 
them must exist. If, for example, we claim a pot to exist in dependence on 
its parts both the pot and its part must exist. But on the (not implausible) 
ascription of a presentist view of time to Nagarjuna according to which only 
the present is real, neither the present nor the future can depend on the past 
since the past does not exist any more. We would thus have a case of a 
dependence relation with only one term, as one of the relata failed to exist.
We can identify a different problem here if we assume that dependence 
relations only exist between objects located in time . 107 For then past, present, 
and future would have to be located in another time, which would in turn give 
rise to temporal relations located in a yet another time and so one. In the 
end we would need an infinitely extended hierarchy of times to make sense of 
the dependence between the three times. Given these difficulties of analysing 
time in terms of dependently related phenomena Nagarjuna concludes that 
none of the three times can be found .108
The difficulty with this reading, however, is that Nagarjuna immediately 
goes on to assert that ‘by precisely the same method’ concepts such as high­
est, lowest, and middle should be elucidated .109 The problem is that, pace 
Garfield, 110 the above argument cannot be generalized to cover spatial rela­
tions as well. The higher, middle, and lower part of a building can perfectly 
well be described as depending on one another. The second floor notionally 
(and architecturally) depends on the first floor, since it is only in relation 
to the first floor tha t in can be called ‘second floor’, and it is also the first
107As done by Garfield (1995, 255). A similar point, is made in rGyal tshab’s commentary
on RA 3:56 (Hopkins 1998, 141).
108pratyutpanno ’nagatas ca tasmdt kdlo na vidyate. MMK 19:3b. Verse 4 makes clear
that this assertion is also meant to apply to the past.
109 etenaiva [...] kramena [...] uttama-adhama-madhyadin [...] laksayet. MMK 19:4.
110Garfield (1995, 256).
CH APTERS. CAUSATION 193
floor which keeps the second floor up. But as all these parts of a building 
exist simultaneously all the relata of the dependence relation do. Therefore 
neither the argument from the non-existent relatum nor indeed the regress 
argument111 get off the ground in the spatial case.
We could assume that what Nagarjuna means here is just the general 
fact that distinctions like high, middle, and low are essentially relational, 112 
so tha t no object could for example be regarded as essentially ‘middle’ since 
this property depended on it spatial relation to objects other than itself. But 
this seems at odds with Nagarjuna’s earlier attempt to find fault with the 
very idea of establishing the three times as dependent entities.
Alternatively we could understand the argument as claiming tha t if any 
present or future entity depended on a past entity, this entity would have to 
have existed in the past. W hat the argument rejects on this interpretation is 
that each object has a ‘hard core’ persisting through the three times. That 
today’s cup is the same at yesterday’s cup would be taken to mean tha t there 
is one thing (perhaps the substance of the cup) which was here yesterday and 
is here today, and is characterized by different accidental properties at the 
different times. This notion of a substantial core has been criticized by Na­
garjuna in a variety of ways in earlier parts of the MMK.
On this interpretation we could then read the statement in MMK 19:4 
as claiming that in the same way in which it makes no sense to speak of
m It makes much more sense to interpret MMK 19:5a as noting the difficulty of a temporal 
regress. Here Nagarjuna argues that one could conceive of neither a static nor of a non­
static time. (ndstito grhyate kalah sthitah kdlo na vidyate) The reason for this is that in 
order to conceptualize time as static or non-static we have to locate it in another time
relative to which it changes or does not change.
112This is the interpretation given by Tsong kha pa (2006, 397). See also Weber-Brosamer
and Back (1997, 70-71).
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a persisting substance across time there is no spatially persisting substance 
either. In a house which has an upper, middle, and lower part there is not one 
piece of matter which runs through the entire house and is characterized by 
the attributes upper, middle, and lower. It is rather that different parts of the 
house are designated in this way in relation to one another, and that they are 
regarded as parts of the same house by their spatial contiguity, not because 
of some sort of material backbone running through all of them. Similarly 
the different temporal parts of the cup can be conceptualized as belonging 
to one individual by their temporal closeness and the sharing of a significant 
number of properties without the need for a persistent cross-temporal unifier.
In fact this interpretation of time which does not refer to the persistence 
of an underlying substance is the only way for the Madhyamika to affirm 
the existence of time . 113 As Nagarjuna described in detail the reasons for 
the rejection of such a substance he would then also be forced to deny the 
existence of time. The Madhyamika therefore has to explain how we can 
account for an object changing and persisting through time without having 
to assume that there is some unchanging aspect of the object which underlies 
all change. Nagarjuna claims that this can indeed be done. Understanding 
how this can be the case becomes particularly important in the context of the 
Buddhist conception of the self when the temporal continuity of persons has 
to be explained without reference to the concept of a persisting subjective 
core (atman).
113‘If time existed dependent on an object from where should it come without this object? 
As there is not any object, from where does time come?’ bhavarn pratUya kalas cet halo 
bhavad rte kutah /  na ca kascana bhavo ’sti kutah kdlo bhavisyati MMK 19:6. Note that 
‘object’ (bhava) in this context is to be understood as ‘object with svabhava\
Chapter 6
M otion
At a prominent place at the beginning of the MMK Nagarjuna analyses the 
concept of motion. This discussion, which takes up the whole of the second 
chapter is primarily concerned with the investigation of two questions: firstly 
‘Where is the locus of motion?’, i.e. where is motion taking place,1 and 
secondly ‘W hat is the object of motionV, i.e. what is it that has the property 
of moving? 2
Imagine a car driving down a road, turning right at an intersection, then 
driving on. Where is it moving? We obviously do not want to locate motion 
anywhere where the car has just been, say twenty seconds ago, as this is not 
where motion is presently happening. Nor is a place where it has not been at 
all (say, turning left at the intersection) any better — not only is 110 motion 
presently taking place there, it has also not taken place there in the past. 
Neither the places the car has driven through in the past, nor those it has 
not are plausible candidates for locating its motion in the present moment.3
XMMK 2:1.
2MMK 2:8.
3‘As far as the place moved over does not move the place not moved over does not 
move either.’ gatam na gamyate tavad agatarn naiva gamyate. MMK 2:1a.
195
CHAPTER 6. MOTION 196
The car is obviously moving in the space which it presently traverses, which 
constantly changes as what is present changes: for each moment the car 
is presently moving where it is moving when that moment is the present 
moment. The locus of motion must be the space which is presently being 
traversed .4
Secondly, what moves? Not the car which is parked nearby and is sta­
tionary (agantr) but the one being presently driven. It is only the mover 
that moves.5
Now it appears that one of the main aims of Nagarjuna in this chapter is to 
analyse both these commonsensical answers, that present motion happens in 
the presently traversed space, and that it is the mover which moves, in order 
to demonstrate that they are more problematic than they might initially 
seem. While this impression is largely correct, as we shall see m atters are in 
fact a bit more complicated.
The second chapter of the MMK has attracted considerable attention in 
the contemporary commentarial literature, not least amongst scholars inter­
ested in a certain kind of cross-cultural comparison, setting out to compare 
Nagarjuna’s arguments with Zeno’s paradoxes. The ways in which the chap­
ter has been understood are very diverse and it does not seem as if an in­
terpretative consensus has yet been reached. This is hardly surprising, given 
that this chapter in particular brings out the difficulty of doing two things 
at the same time: understanding the internal structure of Nagarjuna’s ar­
guments and placing them in the argumentative context of his philosophical 
enterprise. After all these arguments were not intended as particularized di­
alectical curiosities but occupy a central point in the structure of the MMK.
4gamyamane gatis. MMK 2:2b.
bganta gacchati. MMK 2:10.
CHAPTER 6. MOTION 197
6.1 A rgum ents concerning m otion
The arguments presented in the second chapter of the MMK can be best 
understood if we divide its 25 verses into three groups. The first group (verses 
1-6, 8-11, 15-16, 22-25) investigates the locus and the object of motion by 
two arguments which I call the property-absence argument and the property- 
reduplication argument.6 As I will argue later on these arguments are not 
specifically about motion. Nagarjuna rather uses the example of motion to 
give an example of a form  of argument which can be applied to a variety of 
subject-matters and is indeed referred to again and again in different contexts 
within the MMK.
The second group of verses (12-14, 17) discusses the interdependence of 
the concepts ‘beginning of motion’ and ‘end of motion’ and the division of 
the triple division of the space and time where motion takes place. This is a
6There is also a further argument supposed to show that there can be no motion in the 
space presently traversed. This is the so-called ‘foot argument’ given by Candraklrti in his 
commentary on verse 1. Candraklrti presents this as a refutation of the opponent’s claim 
(supposedly implicit in verse 1} that motion takes place in the space presently traversed. 
This is slightly peculiar, as the opponent will explicitly make this claim in the following 
verse.
The argument attempts to show that the foot cannot be at the place presently traversed, 
since the foot is made up of atoms. But a place behind some atom at the front of the foot 
is already moved over, while some atom in front of some atom at the back is not yet moved 
over. There is some debate about how to interpret this argument (see for example Siderits 
and O’Brien (1976, 289) and Galloway (1987, 81-85) for diverging accounts). Fortunately 
we do not have to settle this issue here, as this specific argument belongs more properly 
to the thought of Candraklrti than to that of Nagarjuna. I share Bhattacharya’s concern 
(1985, 8) about the mathematical gloss CandrakTrti’s commentary imposes on the reading 
of the first four verses of chapter two (see also Mabbett (1984, 409-410)). For more 
discussion of the ‘mathematical’ and the ‘conceptual’ interpretation see section 6.1.1.
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division of space into a space not yet traversed, a space presently traversed 
and a space to be traversed, and a division of time into the times of past, 
present and future motion. Nagarjuna’s aim in these verses is to establish 
tha t the concepts of beginning and end of motion and the triple division 
cannot exist independently of one another.
The third group (7, 18-21) considers the relation between mover and 
motion and sets out to establish that these two mutually depend on one 
another.
6.1.1 The property-absence argument
In the property-absence argument Nagarjuna seems to assert that some in­
dividual can only be said to have a property if it is at least conceivable that 
it lacks that property. An apple can have the property ‘red’ because it is 
conceivable that it lacks redness and has some other property instead, such 
as being green. However,
how suitable is it to attribute motion to the space presently tra­
versed, as far as attributing non-motion to it is not suitable? For 
whom motion is attributed to the space presently traversed, there 
should be such a space without motion — but ‘presently traversed 
space1 means ‘movement takes place there’ .7
7 gamyamanasya gamanam katham namopapatsyate /  gamyamanam vigamanarn 
yada naivopapadyate /  gamyamanasya gamanam yasya tasya prasajyate /  rte gater 
gamyamanam gamyamanam hi gamyate. MMK 2:3-4. The reading vigamanarn (non- 
motion) in verse 3 follows May (1959, 55, note 19). PP 94:7 has dvigamanam (double 
motion), Inada (1970, 44) has hy agamanam. See also de Jong (1978, 36). For some dis­
cussion of the varying philosophical interpretations suggested by these different readings 
see Siderits and O’Brien (1976, 290-291).
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How suitable is it to say ‘a mover moves*, as far as a mover with­
out motion is certainly not suitable? For the one who holds the 
position that a mover moves, and who is looking for the motion 
of the mover there is a mover without motion .8
Nagarjuna’s claim seems to imply that there is a problem with analytic 
statements9 and the ascription of essential properties. In an analytic state­
ment the property attributed could not be conceived of as failing to be in­
stantiated by the object under consideration. Because there are no married 
bachelors, it would be ‘unsuitable’ to say of a bachelor that he is unmarried. 
Essential properties are such that an object cannot lose them without ceasing 
to be that very object, it is therefore not feasible to speak of the object in 
question as lacking an essential property. Because a block of ice would stop 
being ice if warmed up to more than 30°C, by the above principle it would 
also be problematic to assert of a block of ice that its temperature is not 
above 30°C.
8ganta tavad gacchattti katham evopapatsyate /  gamanena vind ganta yada naivopa- 
padyate /  pakso ganta gacchatUi yasya tasya prasajyate /  gamanena vind ganta gantur 
gamanam icchatah. MMK 2:9-10. In order to understand the structure of the argument it 
is important to realize that 2:9-10 spell out the assertion made in 2:8, namely that neither 
the mover nor the non-mover moves. In fact Nagarjuna only considers the first alternative, 
he does not specify why the non-mover does not move. But we can infer what he would 
say from 2:16, which elucidates 2:15, being just the mirror-image of 2:8. 2:15 claims that 
neither the mover nor the non-mover is not moving. Here Nagarjuna only considers the 
alternative of the mover not moving, a presupposition which is contradictory and therefore 
to be discarded.
9Both the statement ‘present motion happens in the presently traversed space’ and ‘the 
mover moves’ can plausibly be regarded as analytic as their negations can be reduced to 
logical contradictions. The problem Nagarjuna discusses here, however, is not restricted 
to analytic statements.
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We might wonder at this point what precisely is ‘unsuitable’ about saying 
that a bachelor is unmarried. After all it is not only true but necessarily true. 
As long as expressions ‘bachelor’ and ‘married’ mean what they mean this 
assertion could not possibly be false. The difficulty Nagarjuna has in mind 
here is that of analysing the referents of statements like the above in terms of 
an ontology of mutually independent objects. If we consider the referent of 
a statement like ‘the apple is red’ it makes sense to regard the constituents 
of the state of affairs this refers to (namely the individual apple and the 
property red) as distinct objects. After all there are apples which are not 
red, and red things which are not apples. We rely here on the Humean 
principle that for things to be distinct we must be able to conceive of them 
independently of one another . 10
For statements like ‘the mover moves’ or ‘bachelors are unmarried’, how­
ever, this does not hold: there are no movers which are stationary, nor mov­
ing objects which are at rest; there are no married bachelors, nor unmarried 
non-bachelors. In each case the individual depends11 on the property it in­
10‘We have observed, that whatever objects are different are distinguishable, and that 
whatever objects are distinguishable are separable by the thought and imagination. And 
we may here add, that these propositions are equally true in the inverse, and that whatever 
objects are separable are also distinguishable, and that whatever objects are distinguish­
able, are also different. [...] [A] 11 ideas, which are different, are separable. For it follows 
from thence, that if the figure be different from the body, their ideas must be separable as 
well as distinguishable: if they be not different, their ideas can neither be separable nor
distinguishable.’ (Hume 1896, I, I, VII: 18, 24-25).
11 The dependence of the individual on the property it instantiates may be notional or
existential, depending on whether the individual has the property in question essentially. 
As nobody is essentially a bachelor a bachelor who marries would still continue to exist, 
but would no longer be described as a bachelor. But since ice is essentially frozen, when 
we heat up a block of ice to more than 30°C it is not just that we would not describe the 
result as a block of ice any more, the block of ice will have ceased to exist.
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stantiates. We therefore cannot analyse the referent of propositions like ‘the 
mover moves’ in the same way as that of ‘the apple is red’. Such an anal­
ysis would assume the existence of two distinct entities, a property and an 
individual, existing independently of one another (and therefore, as Nagar- 
juna’s opponent would put it, each existing by its own svabhava) which come 
together in a state of affairs where one instantiates the other.
The ‘m athem atical’ interpretation
We should note tha t there is a different interpretation of the two passages un­
der discussion which, unlike the interpretation just presented, regards them 
as an argument specifically concerned with motion, rather than more gener­
ally with the instantiation of properties . 12 This interpretation sees Nagarju- 
na as concerned with refuting a particular conception of space and time by 
demonstrating that motion would not possible under such presuppositions. 
These presuppositions are that space is infinitely divisible, but that time is 
not, and that it consists of a succession of temporal atoms of minimal dura­
tion. The argument then runs as follows. Let there be a moving object and 
consider the portion of space traversed by this object during one temporal 
atom. Even if this portion is very small, since space is infinitely divisible we 
can break it up into further portions of space. Now take some point within 
this portion of space. The moving object cannot have passed it during the 
course of its motion, since the time it would take to reach it would be a frac­
tion of the temporal atom, and since atoms are indivisible no duration that 
short exists. So motion cannot happen in the space presently traversed, since 
all tha t happens is that the moving object is at the beginning of the portion 
of space before the temporal atom, and is at its end afterwards, without
12Siderits and O’Brien (1976, 291).
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having moved through any of the points in between. We are thus dealing not 
with motion, but rather with a succession of rests. Because of this we (un­
suitably) have to attribute non-motion to the space presently traversed. The 
same interpretation can be given to verses 9 and 10 of this chapter: a mover 
moving in an infinitely divisible space during a temporal atom would be a 
mover without motion (gamanena vina ganta), because he does not traverse 
any of the infinitely many spatial points between the beginning and the end 
of the space traversed. Such a mover would be a mover at rest.
This reading allows us to give a consistent interpretation of the individ­
ual verses discussed, of course always presupposing that Nagarjuna really 
made these particular assumptions about the divisibility of space and time. 
Nevertheless I think that the ‘conceptual5 interpretation given above accords 
better with an understanding of the place of chapter two in the whole of 
the MMK than the ‘mathematical’ interpretation proposed by Siderits and 
O’Brien . 13 My main reason for thinking this is that the various references 
to the arguments in chapter two throughout the MMK14 are very hard to 
make sense of on the mathematical interpretation. For example Nagarjuna 
remarks in the discussion of fire and fuel in chapter 1 0  that the remaining 
points concerning these have been discussed in the treatment of the presently 
moving object, the moved and the non-moved. 15 If we follow Candraklrti’s 
interpretation tha t this means we can substitute ‘what has burnt’ (dagdha) 
for ‘what has moved’ (gata), ‘what has not burnt’ (adagdha) for ‘what has
13These terms are theirs (1976, 289). This criticism is also shared by Mabbett (1984, 
412).
14In the dedication, as well as in 3:3, 7:14, 10:13, and 16:7.
15‘In the place of ’fire’ all the other cases can be expressed by ‘what is presently moving’, 
‘what has moved’, ‘what has not moved’.’ atrendhane sesamuktam gamyamdna-gata- 
agataih. MMK 10:13b. Ye (2006b, 163-164) reads athendanam instead of atrendhane.
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not moved’ (agata), and ‘what is presently burning’ (dahyamdna) for ‘what is 
presently moving’ (gamyamana) throughout the second chapter16 it becomes 
evident that this makes much more sense if we adopt the conceptual rather 
than the mathematical interpretation. For example, by substituting in MMK 
2 :3  we get something like the following:
How suitable is it to attribute burning to the presently burning 
fire, as far as attributing non-burning to it is not suitable? For 
whom burning is attributed to the presently burning fire, there 
should be such a fire without burning — but ‘burning fire’ means 
‘burning takes place there’.
If we interpret this statement according to the conceptual interpretation 
we can see that Nagarjuna makes the point that the fire and its property 
(i.e. burning) cannot be conceived of as mutually independent objects, like 
an apple and its redness, which come together in a state of affairs. For 
whereas it is possible for the apple and the property of redness to exist one 
without the other (if the apple is green, and redness is instantiated elsewhere) 
there cannot be an individual which is a fire and also not burning, nor can 
the property of burning be instantiated by something which is not a fire.17
The widespread use of the discussion of the mover, the non-mover, and 
the presently moving object throughout the MMK suggests, I think, (and this 
will become more evident in the following discussion) that this section of the 
second chapter was not meant to be a specific investigation of the problem 
of motion and the various structural properties of time and space. Rather it 
uses the discussion of motion as an example to illustrate an argumentative
16PP 211:8-12.
17See also Cheng (1980, 233-234).
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template which can be used in a variety of different contexts. 18 I would want 
to argue that main issue addressed here is that of instantiation. The point 
Nagarjuna wants to establish by investigating the notion of a mover and its 
motion in MMK 2-3 and 9-10 is tha t the standard analysis of instantiation in 
terms of independently existent individuals and properties is not universally 
applicable since a variety of predications (such as ‘the mover moves’, ‘the fire 
burns’ and so forth) cannot be analysed by it.
The use of the example of motion for the illustration of this template is 
explained by its centrality in the Buddhist world view. After all the term 
‘mover’ (gati, ’gro ba) does not just denote moving objects in the everyday 
sense of the term, but more specifically beings in transmigratory existence. 
In analysing the mistaken presuppositions behind statements like ‘the mover 
moves’ Nagarjuna thereby attempts to clear away misconceptions likely to 
arise at the very core of the Buddhist view of human existence.
6.1.2 The property-duplication argument
The property-reduplication argument raises another difficulty with the state­
ments ‘present motion happens in the presently traversed space’ and ‘a mover 
moves’. If motion is ascribed to the presently traversed space or to the mover
18This is fact is also noticed by Schayer (1929-1930, 44, note 26): ‘It has to be stressed 
that the critique of the gati bears no direct relationship to the problem of motion. ‘Going’ 
is only used as an example to demonstrate the general impossibility of action (kriyu). ’, 
Walser (1998, 204): ‘Nagarjuna’s root text indicates that there is something about the 
form of the argument in chapter 2 which should serve as a model or pattern for any 
subsequent argument.’, and, interestingly enough, by Siderits and O’Brien themselves (at 
least concerning some verses of the second chapter): ‘The attack is not against motion per 
se but against a certain attitude towards language, and so its basic point will have effect 
wherever noncritical metaphysics is practiced.’ (1976, 294).
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we suddenly end up with two motions, rather than just one.
If there is motion in the presently traversed space this eventuates 
two motions, that by which it is a presently traversed space; and 
also the motion itself. 19
Also, if the mover moves, two motions would be implied: that in 
virtue of which it is manifested as a mover, and, it being a mover, 
that [motion] with respect to which it moves.20
To understand this argument it is essential to note that Nagarjuna regards 
both the presently moving object (gamyamana) and the mover (gantr) as thin 
individuals. For an example of what I mean by a thin individual, consider 
the case of some object which is green, cubical, and heavy. When referring 
to such an object in language we will generally form the nominalization of 
one of the predicates denoting its properties, which we then take to denote 
the object which instantiates the other two properties. Calling the object a 
‘green, heavy cube1 we have turned the predicate cubical into the common 
noun cube of which green and heavy are then predicated. According to the 
standard ontological interpretation of this expression we are thereby refer­
19gamyamdnasya gamane prasaktam gamanadvayam /  yena tad gamyamanam ca yac
catra gamanam punah. MMK 2:5.
20 gamane dve prasajyete ganta yady uta gacchati /  ganteti cdyate yena ganta san yac
ca gacchati MMK 2:11. La Vallee Poussin’s edition has the beginning of l ib  as ganteti 
cocyate, ‘in virtue of which it is called a mover’ (99:6). This is one of several places (such 
as 99:7, 105:15, 106:11) in the second chapter of this edition where the root vac (‘to say’) 
instead of ahj (‘to cause to appear’, ‘to manifest’) is used. The Tibetan translation as 
mngon pa supports the latter reading (see de Jong (1978, 37-38), May (1959, 62, note 
46)). The philosophical content of these passages is largely unaffected by this, apart 
from the fact that the reading with aiij places less emphasis on the role of language in 
conceptualizing the mover as a mover.
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ring to an individual with two distinct monadic properties. Let us call the 
property which we turned into an individual by nominalizing the predicate 
the constitutive property, since it brings about or constitutes the individual 
referred to (in our example this is being cubical), and the other two instanti­
ated properties, since they are instantiated by the individual thus constituted 
(being green, being heavy). Which properties we regard as constitutive and 
which as instantiated depends on our choice. With equal justification we 
could have chosen to speak of a ‘heavy, cubical green thing’ (so that being 
green is constitutive, being heavy and being cubical instantiated) or a ‘green, 
cubical heavy thing’ (so that being heavy is constitutive, being green and be­
ing cubical instantiated). In each case we would have referred to a different 
individual with different properties.
Nagarjuna distinguishes explicitly between constitutive and instantiated 
properties. The constitutive property of the presently moving object is that 
‘by which tha t is a presently moving object’ (yena tat gamyamanam)21; the 
constitutive property of a mover is that ‘in virtue of which it is manifested as a 
mover’ (ganta iti cacyate)22 or ‘the motion by which the mover is manifested’ 
(gatya yayajyate ganta)23 An instantiated property of a presently moving 
object is ‘motion itself’ (yat [...] gamanam)24; an instantiated property of 
the mover that ‘[motion] with respect to which it moves, it being a mover.’ 
(ganta san yac ca gacchati) 25
In the example of the green heavy cube we are dealing with a case where 
constitutive and instantiated properties are distinct; the cube is therefore a 
thick individual A thin individual, on the other hand, is an object whose only
21MMK 2:5b.
22MMK 2:11b.
23MMK 2:22a, 23a.
24MMK 2:5b.
25MMK 2:11b.
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instantiating properties are its constitutive property or properties entailed by 
its constitutive property .26
A good example of a thin individual is a clap of thunder. A clap of 
thunder is a particular sound-event caused by rapidly expanding air along 
an electric discharge know as lightning. The particular sound made is the 
constitutive property of the thunder-clap; it is what makes a thunder-clap a 
thunder-clap. Of course a clap of thunder does not just have the property of 
making the sound it makes, it also has a certain volume, goes on for a certain 
length of time, can only be heard in a particular area and so forth. But all 
of these properties are entailed by the thundering’s constitutive property of 
making the thundering sound. A clap of thunder does not have any other 
properties apart from these.
Nagarjuna argues that in the case of thin individuals the familiar analysis 
in terms of objects instantiating properties no longer works.27 This is evident 
when we compare a statement about a thin individual, such as ‘The thunder 
roars5 with one about a thick one, such as ‘Farinelli sings’. In the case of 
the latter it is clear that Farinelli existed before he started to sing, and at 
that time there was a silent Farinelli. But it would make little sense to apply 
this to the roaring thunder. There was no silent thunder present before it 
began to roar; it is the roaring as its constitutive property which brings the 
thunder about. We are therefore faced with essentially the same problem we 
already encountered when discussing the property-absence argument. As the 
thunder and the sound it makes are mutually dependent on one another for
26This concept of a thin individual should not be confused with the concept of a thin 
particular familiar from the contemporary metaphysical discussion. This concept denotes 
the object which is left when all the non-relational properties are abstracted away. See
Armstrong (1997, 109-110, 123-126).
27Compare Bhaviveka’s commentary on MMK 2:22 (Ames 1995, 330).
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their existence we cannot analyse states of affairs in which they feature in 
the same way in which we analyse those involving a thick individual, namely 
as being constructed of various independently existing entities, like the cube, 
the property of being green and the property of being heavy.
If, however, we insist on conceiving of a thin object in the way in which 
we usually conceive of thick objects we will end up with a duplication of 
properties.28 A thick individual has some properties which are logically in­
dependent of one another (in the case of Farinelli, for example, being a singer 
and having dark hair), and one of this can be used to constitute an object 
of which the other is then predicated as an instantiated property. But in the 
case of a thin object there is only the constitutive property and the properties 
this entails. If we think that every object is to be analysed like a thick object, 
that is by regarding it as a collection of at least two distinct properties, one 
of which is regarded an individual to provide the metaphysical condensation 
nucleus which can instantiate the other property, we end up with having to 
split up the single property into two: one of which does the work of a consti­
tutive property, the other that of an instantiated property .29 Such a split is 
ontologically hard to make sense of, as we seem to be only dealing with one 
property seen in two different ways, and not with two distinct properties.
The fundamental problem is that the conceptualization of some situa­
tion in terms of an individual instantiating a property is purely a result of 
cognitive convenience. We conceptualize something which is green, heavy, 
and cubical as a green heavy cube if cubes are what most interests us in 
the present context. But it is mistaken to rest an ontological distinction 
on such an intrinsically pragmatic fact by assuming that our conceptualiza­
28MMK 2:5, 6, 23.
29Compare Siderits and O’Brien (1976, 292-294).
CHAPTER 6. MOTION 209
tion corresponds to the way reality itself if carved up, namely as consisting 
of an individual (the cube) instantiating some properties (greenness, heavi­
ness). The examples of thin individuals and the resulting multiplication of 
properties show us where the problem lies. But it is important to realize that 
Nagarjuna’s arguments are not just directed against specific problems arising 
only for thin individuals. It is rather that these present a particularly ex­
treme case indicating difficulties with the assumption of a ready-made world 
sliced up into individuals and properties in general.
The same problem of property duplication also arises when we consider 
this argument against the background of the classical Indian theory of gram­
mar going back to Panini. As Nagarjuna makes clear a duplication of the 
action of movement requires a duplication of its agent, and therefore two 
movers.30 Candraklrti’s commentary on this presupposes Panini’s theory of 
karakas, a theory of the semantic relations between noun and verb .31 The 
underlying idea is tha t the various participants of an event described in a 
sentence occupy various participatory roles relative to the action denoted by 
the verb, roles which are generally marked by different grammatical cases.
Consider the following sample sentence:
In the palace the prince brings presents from the king to the queen 
on an elephant.
The event described here is one of bringing, as indicated by the verb, in 
which various entities participate: The prince is the agent (kartr, generally 
marked by the nominative case in Sanskrit), the presents are the object 
(karman, in the accusative), the queen is the recipient (sampradanam, in the 
dative), the king is the point of departure (apadana, in the ablative), the
30dvau gantarau prasajyete prasakte gamanadvaye. MMK 2:6a.
31 Astadhydyi 1,4.24-54; see Ganeri (1999, 51-63).
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elephant is an instrument (karanam, in the instrumental) and the palace is 
the location or ‘support’ (adhikaranam, in the locative case). The theory 
of karakas provides us with a general account of how the different thematic 
roles the participants in an action might occupy can be expressed in Sanskrit 
by the various vibhaktis or cases.
CandrakTrti observes in his commentary on MMK 2:6 that the karaka 
required by the verb gamy ate ‘is moved’ is an agent (kartr) which is the 
mover (gantr).32 If the property of moving thus requires a mover, given the 
reduplication of motion discussed above we are faced with two distinct agents 
(one for each motion) rather than just one.
We might argue at this place that on the face of it there seems to be 
no problem for a single agent being the means of bringing about two actions 
simultaneously, as for example in the case of someone simultaneously smoking 
and typing. This does not mean that there are in fact two persons sitting at 
the desk, a smoker and a typer, rather than a single one, a smoking typer. 
Multiplicity of actions does not always entail multiplicity of agents.33
To see where the problem lies here we have to have closer look at the 
various conceptions of the nature of the karakas or participants of an event 
in Indian grammatical theory.34 In his commentary CandrakTrti refers to 
Bhartrhari’s account when he claims that a karaka is not to be understood
32‘Since an action (kriya) necessarily depends on a means of accomplishing it 
(svasadhana) [which is] either the object (karman) or the subject (kartr) [of the action], 
the action of motion also involves an agent and therefore depends on an agent of motion.1 
yasmad avasyam kriya svasadhanam apeksate karma kartdram vd | garnikriyd caivam kar- 
tary avasthitd ‘to gantaram apeksate. PP 96:8-9 Here sddhana is taken to be synonymous
with karaka.
33Ganeri (1999, 58, note 12).
34Bhattacharya (1977, 269-270), ?. See also Renou (1942) s. vv. karaka, sakti, sadhaka, 
sddhana; Chalcravarti (1930, 225).
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as a substance (dravya) but as a power or capacity (sakti) . 35 The reason 
for this is that if the karaka denoted a substance, the same object could not 
function in different ways in different contexts, as an agent in one, an object 
in the next, or as an instrument in the th ird .36 The karaka therefore refers 
to the powers of an object to fill specific roles in different contexts. The 
number of powers is diversified by the actions; the actions are not seen as 
properties of a single agent. For each action, such as smoking and typing we 
therefore assume a separate power which serves as its agent. The problem 
now arises if we assume tha t the different powers are differentiated due to the 
different natures of the actions performed, such as typing and smoking. The 
two motions, however, are actions of the same nature, and should therefore 
be regarded as being brought about by the same power as an agent.37 Since 
the splitting of a single motion into two thus commits us to the unsuitable 
assumption of two different powers as agents of motions the splitting must 
be seen to rest on a deficient analysis of the situation at hand.
We therefore have to conclude that thin individuals cannot be analysed in 
the same way as thick individuals if we want to escape the methodologically 
distasteful consequences of splitting up a single property and a single agent 
into two, thereby multiplying entities beyond necessity.
35Bhattacharya (1980, 89). See also Bhattacharya (1977, 269-270, note 21). That 
karaka is a dravya is also denied by Patahjali in his Mahabhasya (Kielhorn 1880-1885, I, 
442:23-26). Note that Bhaviveka in the Prajnapradfpa, commenting on MMK 2:6 has the 
opponent assert that according to the grammarians (sgra pa dag, sabdika) the agent (byed 
pa po, kartr) of the action of going is the goer. The opponent must conceive of the goer 
as some sort of substance, as Bhavavivelca objects to this by pointing out that the goer is
a mere collection of conditioned factors ( ’du byed, samskara). See Ames (1995, 308).
36Bhattacharya (1980, 89).
37Bhattacharya (1980-1981, 38).
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6.2 The beginning of m otion
In verses 12-14 of the second chapter Nagarjuna is concerned with the loca­
tion of the point where motion begins (gamanasya arambha). His argument 
can be best illustrated by considering the diagram in figure 1 .
For the sake of simplicity we consider both space and time to be discrete. 
There is a box which occupies different spatial points in succession: it starts 
off at point s<2 at times ti and 12 until it reaches point S4 at t\. The diagram 
thus depicts the motion of a box from the left to the right. If we ask where 
the motion of the box begins, the answer is obvious: the box commences its 
move to the right at point S2 ■ To begin a motion at some point an object 
must first be stationary at this point (so that there are at least two successive 
moments of time in which the box remains at the same point of space), and
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at the immediately following moment it must be located at an adjacent point 
of space. At t 2 the box is located at point s2> at £3 at point S3 . So point s2 
satisfies the condition for being the place where motion begins.
Given that there seems to be nothing inherently problematic about this, 
why does Nagarjuna claim that the place where motion begins ‘is nowhere 
perceived’ (adrsyamana sarvatha;)? Nagarjuna divides the space where mo­
tion takes place into three jointly exhaustive and mutually exclusive parts: 
the part already moved over (gata), the part presently traversed (gam.yamana), 
and the part to be moved over in the future (agata). To make things a bit 
more precise we can say that a place i is presently traversed by some moving 
object if the object is at a spatially adjacent place i — 1 at the preceding 
moment t — 1 , is at place i at t  (which is the present moment), and at i +  1 
at £ +  1. Similarly i is a place already moved over if £ is some moment in the 
past, and a place to be moved over if £ is in the future.
Now assume tha t the place where motion begins (let us call this b) is one 
of the places already moved over. In this case the moving object would have 
to have come from some adjacent place b — 1 at a moment before t (where t is 
in the past), reached 6 at £ and moved to bT 1 at t  T 1. But it is obvious that 
this cannot be the case, since if b is the place where motion begins the moving 
object cannot have got there from another place at the immediately preceding 
moment, because then b would just be one of the places moved over. Since 
a place already moved over must have been occupied by an object coming 
from the immediate vicinity at the immediately preceding moment, b cannot 
be one of these places.
If b was a place already moved over the moving object would have come 
from the immediately preceding point of space. So there would have to be 
motion from b — 1 to b, i.e. motion before the beginning of motion. But
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b — 1 can neither be taken to be a place already moved over, nor a presently 
traversed space, nor one yet to be moved over,38 since all of these are to be 
found after the beginning of motion. Therefore b cannot be a place already 
moved over. Analogous arguments show that b also cannot be a presently 
traversed place or a place to be moved over in the future. It is evident that 
the same argument can be run concerning the place where motion stops; for 
the reason just given it cannot be located in any of the three parts of the 
space where motion takes place.39
A simple numerical model illustrates this point: if we define a set of 
numbers such that for every number in it that number’s direct predecessor 
and direct successor must also be in the set it is clear that this set cannot 
have a smallest (or largest) element. For suppose x was this smallest element, 
then a;’s predecessor would also have to be in the set, but this is smaller than 
a;, so £ cannot be the smallest.
A different interpretation of Nagarjuna’s argument for the unfindability 
of the beginning of motion is given by Siderits and O’Brien .40 Their inter­
pretation is based on the presupposition that Nagarjuna assumes the infinite 
divisibility of time as a background to this argument in verses 12 to 13. Sup­
pose some temporal interval consisted of some object first at rest, then later 
starting to move. Now take the moment of time t dividing the rest from mo­
tion. Now m atter how short t is, it can always be divided further, subsuming
38<Neither the presently traversed [space] nor [the space] already moved over are before 
the beginning of movement. Where would motion begin? How could movement [begin] in 
the [space] yet to be moved over?’ prdg asti gamanarambhad gamyamdnam na vd gatarn
/  yatrdrabhyeta gamanam agate gamanam kutah. MMK 2:13.
39‘0n e does not stop after the presently traversed [space], after the [space] moved over,
also not after the [space] to be traversed.’ na tisthati gamyamdnan na gatdn nagatad api.
MMK 2:17a.
40(1976, 295-296).
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its initial sub-moments under ‘rest’, its later sub-moments under ‘motion’. 
Adding together ‘rest’ and ‘motion’ will then cover the entire duration of 
the temporal interval, without any place for t. On this ‘knife-edge’ view of t 
there is no moment where motion can begin, since t is just the dividing-line 
between rest and motion. It is not a temporal duration where anything can 
happen.
We might want to note that matters don’t improve if we assume that time 
consists of discrete indivisible atoms. If we regarded t  as an atomic moment 
between the last moment of rest t — 1 and the first moment of motion t +  1 
we are again faced with the problem of where to locate t in the exhaustive 
division of the temporal duration into past, present, and future motion. Since 
the beginning of motion cannot be in the past or future, our best bet is the 
present motion. But then since t is atomic it cannot be the moment of 
present motion, as nothing moves during t: there can be no changes during 
an atomic moment of time .41
A third argument for the impossibility of locating the beginning of motion 
in the present motion is suggested by Candraklrti’s commentary on verse 1 2 . 
CandrakTrti claims that the beginning of motion ‘is also not in the present 
motion, since that does not exist and because it [absurdly] eventuates two 
actions and two agents’.42 This obviously is a reference to the property- 
duplication argument mentioned in verses 5-6 and 11. In analogy with our 
interpretation of this argument given above we could here read CandrakTrti as 
trying to establish the impossibility of conceiving of the beginning of motion 
and its property of spatial location as independently existent objects. This 
point can then be generalized to apply to different examples of change and
41 Compare Galloway (1987, 81-82) who regards this argument as implicit in Can-
drakTrti's commentary on verse 1.
A2napi gamyamane tadabhavat kriyddvayaprasangdt kartrdvayaprasaiigac ca. PP 100:8.
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their respective locations.43
Unfortunately Nagarjuna’s verses do not allow us to decide which (if 
any) of the three arguments he had in mind. The enterprise of rational re­
construction can here only suggest plausible alternative arguments which the 
Madhyamika might want to put forward. We cannot tell what the argumen- 
tum ipsissimum of Nagarjuna might have been.
We shall therefore continue the discussion by assuming tha t it has been 
established by one of these arguments tha t the beginning of motion is not 
to be found anywhere within the three parts of the space where motion 
takes place. Nagarjuna now points out tha t this entails a problem for the 
discrimination of these three parts of space.44 That portion of the way which 
has been moved over in the past is just the collection of all the spatial points 
each of which is gata, that is for each of these points the moving object must 
have been located at this point at some past time t, and it must have been 
at a preceding point at t — 1 and at a succeeding point at t +  1. But in 
order to know how many points to include in the collection we have to know 
where the motion begins. Otherwise we would not be able to distinguish 
those spatial points which have not been moved over from those which have. 
The same problem arises when ascertaining which collection of points forms 
the part of space yet to be moved over. Here we have to determine which 
point is the end of motion in order to distinguish the part which is yet to be 
moved over from that which is not.
It is now clear tha t in verses 12-14 Nagarjuna is arguing for two con-
43See Mabbett (1984, 414-415) for a defence of this interpretation.
44‘How are the [space] moved over, the presently traversed and the one yet to be moved
over differentiated when the beginning of motion is indeed nowhere perceived?’ gatam kim 
gamyamdnam kim agatam kirn vikalpyate /  adrsyamdna drarnbha gamanasyaiva sarvathd. 
MMK 2; 14.
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elusions. Firstly, given the conceptual resources of the triple division of the 
space where motion takes place into the space which has been moved over 
(i.e. a collection of spatial points each of which is gata), the presently tra­
versed space (the point which is gamyamana) and the space yet to be moved 
over (the points which are agata) it is not possible to define the spatial point 
where motion begins. This is due to the fact that to be in one of the three 
divisions a point must have had the moving object move to it at the preced­
ing moment, whereas to be the beginning of motion a point cannot be such 
that something has just moved there, since it would then just be one of the 
many points across which motion takes place.
But this passage is not just about the definition of concepts. Since the 
triple division of the space where motion takes place is seen to be exhaustive, 
and since the above argument shows that none of the points in the triple 
division can be the beginning of motion this implies that the beginning of 
motion cannot be anywhere within the space where motion takes place.45 
But this seems peculiar, since the beginning of motion is where motion takes 
place, not where it does not.
Secondly it is not possible to define two of the three divisions, namely 
the space which has been moved over and that which is yet to be moved 
over without reference to the point where motion begins and its dual, the 
point where motion stops. These two are essential cognitive resources for our
45It is not the case that Nagarjuna just ‘falsely assumes that what is characteristic of 
individuals must be characteristic of the group containing those individuals’, as argued 
by Cheng (1980, 237). The argument should rather be understood as a proof by cases: 
if the place where motion begins is to be found anywhere then it should either be in the 
portion of space traversed in the past, in the one presently traversed or in the one not yet 
traversed. As each of these can be eliminated, the place where motion begins is nowhere 
to be found.
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understanding of motion. They must provide the dividing line between the 
space which has already been moved over and that which has not, as well as 
that between tha t which is yet to be moved over and that where no motion 
is going to take place in the future.
We are therefore faced with a paradox. The triple division of space where 
motion takes place presupposes the beginning of motion. The beginning of 
motion in turn presupposes the triple division of space in which this beginning 
is located. But the beginning is nowhere to be found within the space triply 
divided, nor would it make sense to say that it exists outside of tha t space. 
The beginning of motion therefore must both exist (since it is conceptually 
necessary given the triple division of space) and cannot exist (since we can 
demonstrate that it cannot exist at any location within this division) . 46
The paradox can be resolved by rejecting the assumption that the begin­
ning of motion is findable. We thereby deny that it can be picked out by a 
set of properties it has independent of us, who conceive of the space where 
movement takes place, for example by saying that some point b qualifies as 
the beginning of motion if the moving object occupies it at time t but did 
not occupy the directly preceding spatial point at the immediately preceding 
moment, or by trying to squeeze b into the infinitesimal temporal moment 
between rest and motion. Since on such an understanding b turns out to be 
unfindable we must come up with another conception of b. The idea here is 
to deny that any point qualifies as the beginning of motion independently 
of us, but that it is rather our decision to regard it as such a point which 
makes it the beginning of motion. This does not mean that we could pick 
absolutely any point and take it to be the beginning of motion, but as long as 
certain boundary conditions are observed (e.g. that the beginning of motion
46Compare Siderits and O’Brien (1976, 295-296).
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must be temporally and spatially before the place presently traversed) we 
can pick an arbitrary point and declare it to be the beginning of motion. 
W hat this means is that we regard that part of an event which begins with 
the presence of the moving object at a given point and stretches up to its 
being located at the space presently traversed as a single event, regardless of 
whether the moving object occupied an adjacent point at the immediately 
preceding moment. By deciding to regard some moment as the beginning of 
motion we split up the flow of events according to our cognitive needs and 
regard everything between this and the similarly imposed end of motion as 
part of a single event of motion.
In this way the paradox disappears. We can still have the triple division 
of the space where motion takes place and have the beginning (and end) as 
boundaries of this. These two points are no longer unfindable since according 
to the present interpretation they are just where we draw the line between 
one event and another; they do not have to fulfill any additional conditions 
like the ones given above. As Nagarjuna argued earlier on the triple division 
of space is conceptually dependent on the notion of the beginning of motion. 
This, however, does not mean that the beginning of motion has to have 
any existence apart from the cognizing subject; in fact it is precisely this 
assumption which leads to the problems described by Nagarjuna in verses 12 
to 14, The beginning of motion (as well as the beginning of events in general) 
is not something found out there in a ready-made world, but a boundary 
drawn by the mind in accordance with one’s particular interests and needs. 
On the basis of such an imposed boundary we can then establish the triple 
division of space and time into where and when an event had already taken 
place, where and when it is presently taking place and where and when it 
will take place.
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6.3 The interdependence of mover and mo­
tion
Nagarjuna observes that the concepts mover (gantr) and movement (ga­
manam, gati) are existentially dependent on one another. The concept of 
a moving object requires that of a movement this object carries out, the 
concept of movement must be the movement of something, i.e. of the mov­
ing object.47 This mutual dependence implies for Nagarjuna that mover and 
movement can neither be regarded as identical nor as distinct objects.48 To 
regard mover and motion as identical would imply that agent and action are 
considered to be one object (ekibhava). This would mean that no agent could 
ever perform two distinct actions, since for this he would have to be identical 
with two distinct things. The agent must therefore vary with the action, 
for example by not being regarded as a substance (dravya) but as a power 
(sakti) to carry out a certain action, as done by CandrakTrti in his commen­
tary on verse 6 . As these powers come into and go out of existence this entails 
the problem tha t there would be no continuous existence of a single agent 
performing a sequence of actions over time. Since this point generalizes to 
individuals and their properties as a whole a theory which regarded these 
two as identical would have difficulties in explaining how we could ever re­
gard such a sequence of distinct individuals and properties as a single unified 
temporally extended object 49 A more specifically Buddhist difficulty would 
arise in connection with the concept of karma. If for every action there is a
47MMK 2:7.
48MMK 2:18-21.
49This is a familiar problem for theories which equate objects with sets of properties. 
As two sets are identical iff they have the same members an object could never lose a 
property and yet remain the same object. Compare Armstrong (1978, 37-38).
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distinct agent, what reason is there for the karmic consequence of an action 
to apply to one agent rather than another? As ex hypothesi none of the later 
agents are identical with the original one there seems to be no justification 
for the karmic result to be reaped by one rather than another.50
Mover and motion also cannot be regarded as distinct. It is important to 
note that here, as well as in other contexts, Nagarjuna uses the word ‘distinct’ 
to mean ‘independently existent’. If mover and motion exist independently, 
like a piece of cloth and a pot, as CandrakTrti puts it ,51 it would be possible 
for a stationary mover to exist, or for a movement to exist which was not the 
movement of any object. But since the two are existentially dependent on 
one another, neither of these is in fact possible.
While the identification of mover and motion led to problems with the 
continuity of an individual over time, as we have just seen, regarding them 
as existentially independent generates a different problem. Even if we adopt 
the more sensible position of interpreting independence here as meaning that 
motion could be instantiated in a different object from the one it is in fact 
instantiated in, and that the moving object could instantiate a different mo­
tion from the one it in fact instantiates we end up with having to postulate 
a thin particular, a substratum which remains once all the properties have 
been abstracted away. For if any property could just leave the individual and 
go instantiating somewhere else how are we to characterize the individual? 
Since any property can exist in principle without it it must be something
50Kalupahana (1991, 128) interprets the identity of agent and action as the position of 
the Sarvastivadins, who assume ‘identity (sa eva) on the basis on an eternal substance 
(svabhava), thereby rendering the attribute (laksana) an ephimeral (sic) or impermanent
come-and-go entity’.
51PP 105:5.
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which could in principle exist without any of its properties .52
The difficulty resulting from treating mover and motion as independently 
existent objects is also what is behind Nagarj una’s assertion in the final verses 
of chapter 2 , saying that neither an existent, nor a non-existent, nor a both 
existent and non-existent mover can carry out a triple movement.53 It is eas­
iest to fit this verse into the argumentative context of chapter 2  by regarding 
the Triple movement’ as not referring to movement in the past, present, and 
future54, but by following CandrakTrti1 s commentary.55 According to this in­
terpretation ‘existent mover1 here means one in which the activity of moving 
(gamikriya) inheres, a non-existent mover is one in which it does not inhere, 
while a mover which is both is an entity in which it both inheres and does 
not inhere. Saying that the movement, which is to be understood as the 
space gone over (gamyata) 56 is ‘triple’ equally means that either the activity 
of motion inheres in it, fails to inhere in it, or both.
On this interpretation we are left with nine distinct possibilities: that a 
mover in which the activity of motion inheres moves at a place in which this 
activity inheres also, that a mover in which the activity of motion inheres 
moves at a place in which this activity does not inhere; and so forth for the 
remaining possibilities. The philosophical idea behind this is straightforward.
52See Armstrong (1997, 123-126).
5Zsadbhuto gamanam ganta triprakaram na gacchati /  nasadbuto ’pi gamanam  
triprakaram sa gacchati /  gamanam sadasadbhutah, triprakaram na gacchati. MMK 2:24- 
25a.
54Garfield (1995, 133). He also translates the Tibetan of MMK 25a (yin dang ma yin 
gyur pa yang /  ’gro m am  gsum du ’gro mi byed) by ‘Neither an entity nor an nonentity 
moves in any of the three ways1, rather than as ‘An object which both exists and does not
exist does not carry out a movement in any of the three ways1.
55PP 107:9-14. CandrakTrti explicitly refers to MMK 8 for the interpretation of 2:24-25,
which indeed gives a more detailed version of the argument Nagarjuna has in mind here.
56tatra gamyata iti gamanamihocyate. PP 107:9.
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We should not assert that a mover in which the activity of motion inheres 
moves at a place in which this activity inheres also, if this is supposed to 
mean that the activity of motion inhering in the mover is independent of 
its inhering in the mover. This is due to the fact that one depends on the 
other: motion can only inhere in a mover if it moves at some place, a place 
can only be the locus of motion if something moves at it. Furthermore, it 
cannot be the case that a mover in which the activity of motion inheres 
moves at a place in which this activity does not inhere, since it would then 
not be a space gone over. It is obvious that the remaining examples are to 
be treated in a similar way. The ‘contradictory’ third alternative of both 
inherence and non-inherence seems to be given by Nagarjuna merely for the 
sake of completeness, as supposing that some property both inheres and fails 
to inhere in some object is inconsistent.57
The bottom line58 of the above arguments concerning the interdependence 
of mover and motion is that while the concepts of mover and motion (and, 
more generally, agent and action and individual and property) have to be 
regarded as non-identical, neither of them can be regarded as self-sufficient 
or existing from its own side, since the existence of each requires that of the 
other. It is therefore somewhat misleading to take Nagarjuna as arguing that 
mover and motion are not real.59 While it is certainly correct to say that 
Nagarjuna thinks that mover and motion are illusory to the extent to which 
the way they appear (namely as independently existent entities) is not the
57As Nagarjuna asserts in MMK 8:7. See page 129.
58MMK 2:21.
59As claimed by Murti (1955, 183), see also pages 137 and 307. Note that Jacques May 
translates CandrakTrti concluding his commentary of MMK 2:21 in PP 105:11 with the 
words nasti gantrgamanayoh siddhir ity abhiprayah rather misleadingly as ‘L’idee est que 
le mouvement et son agent sont depourvus de realite’ (1959, 71).
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way they really are, their lack of reality is quite different from that of other 
non-existent objects, such as hare’s horns and present kings of Prance, which 
do not exist even at the level of conventional reality (samvrtisat).
6.4 The second chapter of the M M K  in its 
argum entative context
The second chapter of the MMK must be understood as playing a double 
role in Nagarjuna’s philosophical enterprise. On the one hand it is part of 
the discussion of a variety of different entities (such as agent and action, 
suffering, time, nirvana and so forth) attempting to show that none of them 
exists substantially, tha t is, by svabhava. In this context the examination of 
motion deserves a particularly prominent place because of its centrality in 
the Buddhist world view. Cyclic existence or samsara is after all nothing but 
the moving about (samsr) in the various realms of rebirth. When Nagarju­
na argues tha t mover, motion and so forth are empty of svabhava he uses 
the terms both in their everyday and in their soteriological sense, where the 
mover (gati) is the subject to be reborn and motion is the move from one life 
to the next.
It is in the context of this discussion that Nagarjuna’s arguments about 
the beginning of motion and the identity and difference of mover and motion 
have to be understood. If we accept Nagarjuna’s conclusion tha t the begin­
ning (and end) of motion are nothing to be found ‘out there’ in the world, 
but rather a boundary established by the mind this also entails tha t the be­
ginning and end of a particular motion in samsara, that is a particular birth 
and a particular death have no objective existence either, but are merely 
conventional ways of cutting up the flow of cyclic existence into conceptually
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convenient bits. Seen the other way round the concepts of past, present, and 
future lives only arise once we have decided to mark particular places in the 
continuity of consciousness as ‘birth’ and ‘death’. Read in this soteriological 
way Nagarjuna’s arguments in this section of chapter 2 of the MMK aim 
to establish that such central concepts like birth and death, past, present, 
and future lives are no objective features of reality but merely conventionally 
real boundaries drawn by the human mind. This is made more explicit by 
Nagarjuna in chapter 11 of the MMK where he notes that
Where the earlier, the later, and the simultaneous do not appear, 
how [is there] a proliferation [of the concepts] ‘birth’, ‘ageing’ and 
‘death ’ ? 60
Given the cyclical nature of samsara what is earlier and what is later is 
very much dependent on where we identify the starting-point. The hands of 
a clock will reach ‘3’ before ‘5’ if we start at ‘2’, but they will reach ‘5’ before 
‘3’ if we start at ‘4’. As Nagarjuna has argued that the starting-point is not 
something ‘out there’, but a boundary drawn by us in order to accord with 
our specific cognitive concerns, it becomes evident that we cannot ascribe any 
objectively existing referents to such concepts as ‘earlier’ or ‘later’, ‘birth’ or 
’death’, and ‘past life’ and ‘future life’.61
60 yaira na prabhavanty tie  purua-apara-saha-kramah /  prapancayanti tam jatim  taj
jaramaranam ca him. MMK 11:G.
61 Jay Garfield observes that ‘to see particular entities as having determinate, noncon-
ventional beginnings of existence and determinate, nonconventional termini and, hence, 
that there are distinct times at which there is a clear fact of the matter about whether 
or not they exist, independent of conventions for their individuation, is to see those enti­
ties as having necessary and sufficient characteristics for their identity, that is, as having 
essences [i.e. svabhava ]. [...] Once we see the world from the standpoint of emptiness of 
inherent existence, the history of any conventionally designated entity is but an arbitrary
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The discussion of the identity and difference of mover and motion ad­
dresses another crucial issue which will be taken up again by Nagarjuna ,62 
namely the question of the status of the subject transmigrating through a 
succession of rebirths. Clearly the mover (the person in cyclic existence) can­
not be identical with each different rebirth, since it would then be identical 
with a number of things which are taken to be distinct at the conventional 
level. But it can also not be distinct from them as anything resembling an 
a£mrm-like transmigrating substance is ruled out in the Buddhist view of 
persons. There is therefore something fundamentally mistaken with the view 
which sees the transmigrating person and his rebirths as two entities which 
could be related by identity and difference.
While it thus appears that the arguments in the second (12-14, 17) and 
third (7, 18-21) group of verses of the second chapter are concerned with the 
investigation of the existence of svabhava in various entities connected with 
motion in both the everyday as well as in the soteriological sense, the first 
group (1-6, 8-11, 15-16, 22-25) is intended to play a more general role. It 
is not just that the concepts of mover and motion have to be understood in 
more than one sense, but rather that they serve as placeholders for which a 
variety of other concepts denoting an individual and a property could be sub­
stituted. Nagarjuna’s aim in these verses is therefore primarily to establish 
an ontological conclusion about the relation between individuals and their 
properties. By considering predications involving thin individuals (such as 
‘the mover moves’ or ‘the fire burns’) Nagarjuna establishes tha t the stan­
dard analysis of predication into individuals and properties, which conceives 
of them as mutually independent entities combined in a state of affairs is not
stage carved out of a vast continuum of interdependent phenomena.1 (1995, 199).
02In chapter 27 of the MMK.
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satisfactory as a general analysis. Statements referring to thin individuals 
cannot be analysed in this way. Furthermore, Nagarjuna wants to argue that 
this problem generalizes to analyses involving thick individuals as well. Once 
we have accepted that talk of individuals and properties in the case of such 
statements as ‘the mover moves’ is nothing more than the projection of forms 
of language which are mistakenly given ontological weight we will be much 
more reluctant to take this analysis ontologically seriously in other contexts. 
We should rather conceive of this analysis as a reflection of what is cogni­
tively convenient for us, rather than as a structure of the world mirrored in 
our language.
Chapter 7
The self
After considering Nagarj una’s arguments for the selflessness of external phe­
nomena such as causation and motion we can now turn towards an assessment 
of the most important example of a subjective phenomenon, namely the self. 
Of all the discussions of the emptiness of various entities which Nagarjuna 
examines in his works that of the emptiness of the self occupies a special 
position. He notes th a t1
Where something prior to, simultaneous with or after seeing and 
so forth [which could be regarded as a self] is not evident, there 
conceptions ‘it exists’, ‘it does not exist’ [with svabhava ], have 
ceased.
Nagarjuna claims here that once the emptiness or lack of svabhava in the self 
has been realized it will be comparatively easy to understand the emptiness 
of other phenomena. This is because the view of a substantial self is partic­
ularly natural and tends to assert itself in an especially convincing manner.2
1prdk ca yo darsanadibhyah sdmpratam cordhvam eva ca /  na vidyate ’sti ndstiti
nivrttas tatra kalpand. MMK 9:12.
2Garfield (1995, 188).
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Having seen through this fundamental illusion, Nagarjuna wants of argue, 
all other mistaken ascriptions of svabhava can be unmasked in a relatively 
straightforward manner.
In order to appreciate Nagarj una’s arguments for the emptiness of the 
self it is essential to have a clear idea of what he argues against, that is what 
a self with svabhava would amount to. Such a self can be characterized by 
four core properties .3 It is an entity distinct from both our body and our 
psychological states. The self is not the same as the body, but is what has 
the body, similarly the self is what has sensations, thoughts, beliefs, desires 
and so forth. It is essentially unchanging. Whether or not we think that our 
selves survive the death of the bodies they have we still want to claim that it 
is the same self present in the elderly general now and in the schoolboy he was 
sixty years ago. This permanence of the self also serves as the foundation 
for the ascription of moral responsibility, as we are dealing with a single 
entity unified over time. Thirdly the self is a unifier:4 it integrates diverse 
sensory information, beliefs and desires in such a way as to allow us to make 
decisions and to act on the basis of them. Fourthly, the self is an agent, 
it is the permanent core which makes the decisions which shape our lives. 
The results of these decisions may then in turn influence the self, but there is 
little doubt that it is the self, not the decisions which occupy the driving-seat. 
This substantialist conception of the self appears to be a relatively accurate 
description of our intuitive, everyday belief of what we are .5
3Compare Gowans (2003, 70).
4Gautama makes this point in NS 3, 1, 1. See Chakravarti (1982, 222-223), Siderits 
(2003, 22-23).
5The extent to which the notion of a self denied by Nagarjuna (and the early Buddhists 
for that matter) was influenced by the Samkhya and Vaisesika concept of atman is difficult 
to determine. See Conze (1967, 38), Bliattacharya (1973), Harvey (1995, 33-34).
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As is to be expected the aim of Nagarjuna’s examination of the self is to 
show that this intuitively plausible view of the self is fundamentally mistaken. 
The substantialist view of the self has to be replaced by a different one. We 
can divide Nagarjuna’s discussion into two main parts. The first deals with 
the relation of the self to its synchronic parts at a single time and to its 
diachronic parts across time. The second investigates the relation between 
the self and its properties.
7.1 The self and its parts
The Buddhist tradition divides the person into five main constituents (skan- 
dha): matter or the physical body (rEpa), sensation (vedana), perception 
(samjnd), intellect (samskara), and consciousness (vijnana) . 6 W hat is im­
portant from a philosophical perspective is not so much the precise nature of 
these constituents and the merits and demerits of the resulting psychological 
theory for explanatory purposes, but primarily the fact that the human per­
son or self are conceptualized as composite.7 In addition it is essential to keep 
in mind that the analysis of the self into different components is meant to be 
exhaustive. It is not just supposed to illustrate various aspects or properties 
of a person, but to list all the aspects it consists of. Bearing this in mind 
will keep us from interpreting a denial of any of the five constituents being 
the self as an assertion that something else is.8
Once an exhaustive analysis of the self into a fixed number of constituents
6These can in turn be subdivided further (RA 1:81). See Nyanatiloka (1950, s.v. khanda, 
73-76) for an overview of the standard Abhidharma analysis. A detailed exposition is in
chapter 14 of the Visuddhimagga (Buddhaghosa 1991).
7Garfield (1995, 142, 245).
8Collins (1982, 7-10, 98)
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is in place the question concerning the relation between these constituents 
and the self they comprise naturally arises. Nagarjuna mentions four different 
ways in which the self and the constituents could be related .9 The self could 
be identical with the constituents (either with a subset or with all of them 
together), it could exist as a separate entity distinct from them, the self 
could contain the constituents as a part or finally it could itself be part of 
the constituents.
Nagarjuna observes tha t identifying the self with a particular constituent, 
such as the body, or consciousness entails the difficulty that the individual 
constituents are constantly changing. 10 Neither the body, nor consciousness, 
nor any of the other constituents remains as it is over time. Such an iden­
tification would therefore not do justice to the view of the self as essentially 
unchanging. This is a familiar argument for the absence of a substantial self 
and is frequently encountered in the Pali Suttas . 11 The Anattalakkhana Sutta, 
for example, describes the Buddha as investigating each of the constituents 
by asking: ‘Is what is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change fit to 
be regarded thus: ‘This is mine, this I am, this is my self’ ? ’12
If we cannot identify the self with a single constituent we might consider 
equating it with some or all of the constituents across a stretch of time. We 
would then for example regard as our self not just our body as it is now, 
but a sequence of bodies which incorporate the past as well as the future
9MMK 22:1, See also RA 1:82. A detailed discussion of these possibilities can also 
be found in MA 6: 126-165. The Buddhist commentarial literature often illustrates the 
possible relations between the self and its constituents by a series of similes, like the 
relation between a flower and its scent, a tree and its shadow etc. See Conze (1967, 38),
Collins (1982) for references.
10MMK 18:1a, 27:3.
11 Collins (1982, 98).
12Samyutta Nikdya 22.59 (Bikkhu Bodhi 2000, I: 901-903).
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stages of our body. This solves the problem of the self disappearing from 
one moment to the next (as each single constituent is only in existence for a 
short duration) but entails other problems. First of all, if we have to include 
constituents at future times (such as our body tomorrow) into the entity we 
regard as our self in order to explain our concern for our future self we face 
the difficulty that these future constituents do not yet exist. We then could 
not claim that our self as it existed today was in fact the entire self. We (that 
is, our selves) could never be wholly present at the present time . 13 Secondly 
our candidate for a self is now no unified whole any more, but rather a series 
of ever-changing parts. In this series there will not be any one thing which 
remains constant and only changes its accidental properties. Such an account 
would therefore be hardly satisfactory for an advocate of a substantial self.
Given that the identification of the self with constituents at one time or 
across a stretch of time does not appear to be satisfactory the other alterna­
tive for the defender of a substantial self is to assume that the self is an entity 
distinct from the various constituents of a person . 14 The self would then be 
regarded as the owner of the body, the experience!' of the sensations, the 
perceiving subject and so forth. However, as Nagarjuna points out, such a 
self could not bear the marks of the constituents (bhaved askandhalaksanah) , 
that is it could not be characterized as the owner of the body, the experi- 
encer of the sensations, the one undergoing change etc .15 This is because 
such a self would be completely unknown to us. Once we have abstracted 
from all the constituents of the person there seems to be nothing left which 
could qualify as a self. 16 The familiar Humean observation that introspection
13See Garfield (1995, 345).
14MMK 18:1b.
1SMMK 13:5.
10RA 2:1.
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shows us all sorts of inner psychological events, but never acquaints us with 
any object which has the characteristics of the substantial self17 means that 
a self existing apart from the five constituents of a person (or any other set 
of constituents we might come up with) could not be one we are directly 
acquainted with. But it would then be distinctly odd to assume tha t such a 
self would be the one we cared about. For all that we know it might be an 
entity we have never even come across.
Another difficulty with this position is that the assumption of the self 
as an entity distinct from the constituents also implies that it would be 
possible for the self to exist without any of them, since it does not existentially 
depend on them . 18 There could be something which we would be justified 
in regarding as our self, even though it was not connected with our body, 
shared none of our memories, desires or preferences and would not even have 
to stand in any specific temporal or causal relation to these. Even if such a 
thing could exist it would be questionable with what motivation we could call 
it a self, given that it is devoid of all the connections which we usual regard as 
crucially important for our selves. More worryingly its independence makes 
it difficult to conceive of this self as an agent shaping our lives with its 
decisions. If there is no essential causal connection between the self and our 
various cognitive faculties, how does it enter into the formation of beliefs, the 
making of decisions, and the bringing about of actions? Such a self would be 
devoid of action (akarmakah) 19 and for this reason could not be regarded as
17‘For my part, if I enter most intimately into what I call viyself I always stumble on 
some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, of love or hatred, pain 
or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can 
observe any thing but the perceptions.’ (Hume 1896,1, IY, VI: 252). See also Parfit (1984,
223).
18MMK 10:1b.
19MMK 10:2.
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an agent.
The final two possibilities considered by Nagarjuna, that the self contains 
the constituents as a part or is itself part of the constituents can be seen 
to be equally unsatisfactory in the light of the arguments presented above. 
The former would lead once again to the problem of the unity of the self, the 
latter would entail the difficulty of how constantly changing entities like the 
five constituents of a person could have any permanent parts at all.
The picture of the self thus emerging might strike us as very close to 
Hume’s bundle theory. While this parallel is illuminating to some extent it is 
important to be aware that for Hume his view of the self is the corollary of an 
epistemological theory which is not seen as having any practical implications. 
For Nagarjuna, however, as for Buddhist thinkers in general the emptiness of 
the self constitutes a central philosophical position with major practical and 
soteriological implications.20 Its realization, tha t is not just the intellectual 
understanding of the absence of svabhava in the self but the cognitive shift 
accompanying the ability to stop conceiving of oneself as a substantial self21 
is taken to be an essential step on the road to liberation .22
The inability to come up with a satisfactory account of the relation be­
tween the self and its parts might now lead us to thinking that there is no 
temporally extended self at all. Thus what be take to be our self existing now 
would not be in any way the same as what we regarded as our self yesterday, 
since there is no continuity between them .23 There would just be mutually 
independent entities each of which would be regarded as a self at a time,
20MMK 18:4-5, Siderits (2003, 29-31).
21 Collins (1982, 94).
22Further cautionary remarks about drawing parallels with Hume’s bundle theory can
be found in Conze (1963, 113-115).
23MMIC 27:9a.
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but there would be nothing which could be interpreted as an overarching, 
essentially unchanging self.
A minor difficulty with this view is that if the various selves were indeed 
independent and each existed by svabhava the existence of one would not 
depend on the non-existence of another. But then it would be conceivable 
that yesterday’s self just continued existing while today’s self came into being, 
so we would end up with two mutually independent selves at the same time, 
and thereby fail to account for the self’s unity .24
The main difficulty with this view of episodic selves is tha t it transforms 
most of the relations we regard as intrapersonal into interpersonal ones. An 
obvious example is memory. Given that the self which had an experience 
and the one which later remembers it are independently existent objects the 
transmission of memory turns out to be on the same level as the transmission 
of information between two persons; perhaps even more problematic. Since 
any causal influence of the former on the later self would imply a dependence 
relation between the two it is hard to see how anything could be transmitted 
between them at all.25 In any case it would be impossible to distinguish 
between true and false recollections, since a criterion of the former is exactly 
the connection between selves which the episodic theory denies. An even 
greater difficulty is presented by the issue of moral responsibility.26 For 
apportioning praise and blame, but also for making sense of the Buddhist 
concept of karma we need to be able to postulate some sort of dependence 
relation between different stages of a self, because only in this way we could 
explain why today’s self should be responsible for yesterday’s actions, and
24MMK 27:10.
25 This then also entails the problem how the different stages of the self could arise at
all, given that they are not causally produced. See MMK 27:12.
“ MMK 27:11.
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how a being reborn in the form of a god at the present time could have been 
a human being in a previous life.27
7.2 The self and its properties
Most of the above arguments for the emptiness of the self based on an in­
vestigation of its relation to its synchronic and diachronic parts are familiar 
to us from pre-Madhyamaka Buddhist literature. However, the MMK also 
presents us with a set of arguments against the substantial conception of the 
self which has a distinctly Nagarjunian slant.
Nagarjuna’s opponent wonders ‘if there was no self, where would the 
self’s properties come from? ’28 Similarly we might want to ask ‘how can 
seeing and so forth belong to something which is not found? Therefore there 
is an independently existing thing (bhavo vyavasthita) which is earlier than 
those [sensory faculties] . ’29
The worry behind these questions is that the undeniable fact that there 
are properties of the self — since the Madhyamaka does not want to deny that 
seeing, feeling, tasting and so forth takes place — implies that there must be 
a bearer of such properties, i.e. a self. Since properties depend existentially on 
something that instantiates them a self must be postulated as the instantiator 
of all the mental properties we observe. Vatsyayana argues tha t30
desires are qualities, and qualities inhere in a substance, so that
27See MMK 27:15-17.
28atmany asati cdtmvyam kuta eva bhavisyati. MMK 18:2a.
2Qkaiham hy avidyamanasya darsanadi bhavisyati /  bhdvasya tasmat prag ebhyah so ’sti
bhavo vyavasthitah. MMK 9:2.
30In the Bhasya to NS 1, 1, 5 (Nyaya-Tarkatirtha and Tarkatirtha 1985, 156:3-157:2):
icchddayo gunah, gunasca dravyasamslhandh tadyadesam. sthanam sa atmeti.
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which they inhere in is the self.
Summarizing the Nyaya criticism voiced by Udayana in the 11th century 
Matilal observes th a t31
A sort of robust realism dictates that the substance or the sub­
stratum  must be distinguished from the features, properties or 
qualities it holds. This would require a substratum for the so 
called mental episodes and dispositions, awareness, desires, pref­
erences, etc., and the body, because of its continuously changing 
nature, cannot be regarded as adequate for such a substratum- 
hood.
However, if we take into account Nagarjuna’s distinction between consti­
tutive and instantiating properties described on page 206 it seems possible to 
dissolve this worry. Nagarjuna differentiates between the property we see as 
constituting an individual (such as roundness in the case of a circle, treeness 
in the case of a tree etc.) and those properties which the individual is then 
taken to instantiate (such as redness in the case of the circle, and greenness 
in the case of the tree). As became evident in the discussion of motion where 
Nagarjuna introduces this distinction the difference between constitutive and 
instantiating properties is not regarded as bearing any ontological weight. It 
is rather a reflection of our epistemic priorities and practical concerns that 
we describe an object as a tree which is green, rather that as a green object 
which has the property of treeness.32 There is therefore no fundamental on­
tological difference between a substratum (dravya) and the qualities (guna)
31Matilal (1989, 76). See also Chakravarti (1982, 214-217, 227), Siderits (2003, 32, note 
b).
32Compare Siderits (2003, 26).
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which inhere in it, contrary to what is assumed by the Naiyayika. When 
we speak of an individual having a property we nominalize the predicate 
expressing the property we take to be constitutive and ascribe the instanti­
ating properties to the individual thus created. There would, however, be 
no deep ontological reason why we could not change our view of what the 
constitutive and what the instantiating properties are, and thereby describe 
the very same situation in terms of different individuals and properties.
But if we accept this picture of ontology it is evident that we are not 
obliged to infer the existence of a substratum or underlying individual from 
the existence of a quality. Of course the Madhyamika does not deny tha t there 
are a variety of sensory and mental events which happen in close temporal and 
causal connection. But our ascription of these to a single self does not commit 
us to the existence of such a self at the ontological level, any more than the 
ascription of redness to a circle commits us to the existence of an individual 
— the circle — and the redness it instantiates. In the same way in which 
we select one property, such as circularity, as constitutive and then group all 
the other properties around this new-found ‘individual’, in the same way we 
select certain properties of a causal nexus of sensory and mental events, some 
‘shifting coalition of psychophysical elements’33 and group the remainder of 
the properties around this new-found ‘self’ .34 To speak of the self and its 
properties in terms of substratum and quality is perfectly acceptable, as 
long as we do not assume that such talk is based on a distinction with an 
ontological grounding.
33Siderits (2003, 27).
34Dennett (1991, 228). For details of how this construction of a self might be carried 
out see the discussion in Siderits (2003, 43-51).
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In MMK 9:3 Nagarjuna raises the question of the origin of our knowledge of 
the self. He asks35
The independent thing which is earlier than seeing, hearing and 
so forth, and [also earlier than] feeling and so forth [i.e. the self], 
by which means is it known?
This investigation of the epistemology of the self might strike us as curious. 
After all there seem to be few things which are more epistemically obvious 
than our own self, which seems to accompany us all the time. While there 
might be all sorts of problematic issues connected with the parts and proper­
ties of the self, surely the way in which we get to know it is unproblematic?
The difficulty arises once we note that in its role as a unifier of our 
cognitive life a substantial self is the subject of all experiences, but at the 
same time given the distinctness of such a self from our body and all parts 
of our mental life it must also be distinct from all experiences. So in order 
to have epistemic access to our self it must be able to function as a cognitive 
object. Since we assume, however, that it is not only a cognitive subject but 
also essentially a cognitive subject it cannot ever occupy this role — at least 
if we make the plausible assumption that being an object and being a subject 
are mutually incompatible properties.36 Now given that we do not seem to 
be able to acquire knowledge of the self by directing the self’s attention at 
it (i.e. by introspection) nor by empirical observation (due to the private
35 darsanasravanadibhyo vedanadibhya eva ca /  yah prdg vyavasthito bhavah, ken a 
prajhapyate 'tha sah.
36Nagarjuna observes that the same epistemic difficulty of self-perception holds for vi­
sion: svam atmanam darsanam hi tat tam eva na pasyati MMK 3:2a.
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nature of mental states) it appears that the only cognitive route left open to 
us is inference. We have to establish by a (hopefully sound) argument that 
the self exists. This is by no means an absurd position to hold (in fact it is 
just what the Naiyayika sets out to do) but it might still strike us as slightly 
curious that what seems to be the most intimate object of our acquaintance 
has to be known by a most indirect route. We might also consider it as 
somewhat epistemically implausible to assume that everybody’s belief in a 
self is arrived at by a process of drawing inferences from a set of clues.37
One Nyaya argument for the existence of the self based on the supposed 
existential dependence of qualities (guna) on a substratum (dravya) has al­
ready been discussed above.38 The Madhyamika will be reluctant to accept 
it since he does not agree with the Nyaya ontology of individuals and prop­
erties it presupposes. Other arguments would obviously have to be dealt 
with on a case-by-case basis. But the Madhyamika will argue here that in 
fact no such argument is needed, since it is perfectly possible to account 
for our self-awareness, as long as we give up the conception of a substantial 
self. If we conceive of the self as a temporally stretched-out compound of 
psychophysical events then there is no fundamental difficulty that the same 
type of event turns up on the cognizing subject side on one occasion, and 
on the cognized object side on another. Given that there is no unified sub­
stratum  constituting the self there is also no necessity for something to be 
essentially a subject of experience. As different parts can play different roles 
at different times our self-knowledge can be just explained by a momentary 
identification with a mental event which presently functions as a cognizing
37Siderits (2003, 20).
38Weil-known Western arguments to this effect are the Cartesian cogito and the Kantian 
demand for a self to unify mental events spread out in time as belonging to a single subject. 
For a Madhyamaka response to these two see Siderits (2003, 21-31).
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subject.
7.4 T he M adhyamaka view  of the self
Given that Nagarjuna rejects the picture of a substantial self described above 
we have to consider which alternative picture we are presented with instead. 
The self is obviously seen as depending on the five constituents, which rules 
out the assumption that any independently existent substance could be re­
garded as a self.39
The emerging view of the self is characterized by two main properties. 
Firstly it is to be regarded as a sequence of events which stand in close 
temporal and causal relations. Physical processes cause sensory events, which 
are then framed by concepts, used as the basis of decisions, which give rise 
to actions, which in turn set physical processes in motion which cause new 
sensory events and so forth. The self is not seen as a cognitive nucleus which 
stays constant amidst the stream of changing sensory impressions and mental 
deliberations, but rather as the entire set of such sensory and mental events 
which are interconnected in complicated ways.
In order to stress this point Nagarjuna compares the collection of con­
stituents of the self to a lamp.40 The light of the lamp is not a persisting 
thing, but a process, a sequence of events one following the next which arise 
on the basis of the interaction of a complex set of causes, such as fuel, a 
wick, the presence of oxygen and so forth.41 It is for this reason tha t Na-
39MMK 22:2.
40MMK 27:22.
41 In the Samyutta Nikaya 4.196-198 (Bikkhu Bodhi 2000, II: 1254) the same point is 
illustrated by the example of the sound of a lute, which is a process based on the parts of 
the lute and the skill of the player but no part to be found anywhere amongst them. See 
Collins (1982, 101).
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garjuna claims that his analysis of fire and fuel given in chapter 10 of the 
MMK also explains the relation between the self and its constituents.42 This 
example adds the additional complexity of the mutual dependence of the self 
and its constituents.43 Not only does the self depend for its existence on 
the constituents, but the constituents only acquire their existence as distinct 
parts of the stream of mental and physical events by being associated with a 
single self, which, regarded as a constitutive property produces the basis for 
postulating the individual in which the various properties of the self inhere. 
It is precisely this reason which keeps the Madhyamika from regarding the 
constituents as ultimate existents (dravya) and the self as merely imputed 
(prajnapti), For the Madhyamika not only is there no substantial self, there 
is also no substantial basis on which a non-substantial self could be built.
Secondly, the self is characterized by a mistaken self-awareness. This 
means that the self which is essentially a sequence of events does not re­
gard itself in this way, but considers itself to be a substantial self, that is 
an essentially unchanging unified agent distinct from its physical and mental 
properties.44 To this extent it is deluded about its real nature. Nagarjuna 
therefore compares the agent to an illusion (nirmita) created in a magical 
performance which in turn brings about another illusion.45 This construc­
42’With [the investigation] of fire and fuel the way [for the solution of the problem of] the 
self and of grasping is completely described.1 Agnindhanabhyam vyakhydtd dtmopadanayoh 
kramah /  sarvo niravasesena sardham. MMK 10:15. The example of the lamp is well- 
known in the Buddhist philosophical tradition. It can already be found in the earliest 
Buddhist literature ((Trencher 1888, 486-487), (Bikkhu Nalamoli and Bikkhu Bodhi 2001, 
593)) and lends itself to a further metaphorical explanation of transmigration (lighting one 
flame by another) and the notion of nirvana in terms of its literal meaning as the ‘blowing
out of a flame1. See Collins (1982, 186-187); also compare Siderits (2003, 25-26).
43[...] indhanam apeksyagnir apeksydgnim [...] indhanam. MMK 10:8a. See also 10:9b.
44Gowans (2003, 71).
45‘As a magician creates a magical illusion by the force of magic, and the illusion pro­
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tion allows Nagarjuna to reconcile his rejection of a substantial self as an 
essentially unchanging unifier of our mental live distinct from both its phys­
ical and mental attributes with the acceptance of the self as an agent who 
will experience the results of his actions, an assumption which could not 
be relinquished within the Buddhist world view. This is a very important 
point, since the identification of the self with a causally interlinked set of 
events might tempt us to throw out all prudential considerations for our fu­
ture selves, as well as those for other selves.46 Since none of these have any 
ultimate existence we might think that all actions referring to them in some 
way (that is all our conscious actions) are all equally insubstantial too, so 
that in the ultimate analysis it does not make any difference how we act.
Nagarjuna counters this view by distinguishing the view from the inside
of an illusion from tha t from the outside. When we are dreaming and are not
aware we are doing so we understandably prefer to leave a building by using
the stairs, rather than jumping out of the window. For somebody who is not
dreaming, however (and also for our later, waking selves) it does not make any
difference whether we jump or not since at the ultimate level (from the point
of view of the awakened one) there is no fundamental difference between the
two actions. This does not imply that whilst we are still under the thrall of
the illusion we should leave all prudential and moral considerations behind.
On the contrary, as long as we are under the influence of the illusion we have
duces another illusion, in the same way the agent is a magical illusion and the action done is 
the illusion created by another illusion.’ yathd nirmitakam sasta niunirmtarddhisarnpada /  
nirrnito nirrnimitdnyam sa ca nirmitakah punah / /  tatha nirmitakdkdrah kartd yat karma 
tat krtam /  tadyatha nirmitendnyo nirrnito nirmitas tatha. MMK 17:32. This metaphor 
is encountered frequently both in Nagarjuna’s works as well as in later Madhyamaka lit­
erature. See YS 16-17; SS 66, VV 23, 27; RA 1:52-56; CS 7:24, BCA 9:150.
46Garfield (1995, 243-244). For a detailed discussion see Siderits (2003, chapters 3, 5,
9).
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to act in accordance with its laws, even if we might suspect that it is an 
illusion. Unlike in the case of dreaming, where the mere wondering whether 
we are dreaming sometimes allows us to see through the nature of the dream 
the mere suspicion tha t there is no substantial self is (unfortunately) not yet 
a realization of the emptiness of the self.
Chapter 8 
Epistem ology
An account of the theory of knowledge is important for Nagarjuna’s investi­
gation for at least two reasons. First of all objects of knowledge and means of 
accessing them form an essential part of our conceptualization of the world 
and our place in it. The means of knowledge are instruments used by the self 
in order to apprehend objects of knowledge which connect our inner world 
with that of a world of outside objects. Given the centrality of these key 
notions of epistemology it is obviously important to investigate whether any 
of these could be regarded as existing with svabhava. Secondly Nagarju­
na’s account of epistemology also has to provide the foundations of his own 
project. Given that the knowledge of the theory of universal emptiness is 
what Nagarjuna wants to establish it is important for him to describe the 
epistemology on the basis of which such knowledge is to be gained.
The Indian philosophical tradition distinguishes a variety of means of 
knowledge (pramana) by which objects of knowledge (prameya) are epistem- 
ically accessed. Which means of knowledge were accepted and how their 
function is understood differs amongst different philosophical theories.1 In
ISee Potter (1970-2003, II, 154-178) for a summary; also Chatterjee (1939, 53-74).
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his discussion of epistemology Nagarjuna lists four such means of knowl­
edge: perception {pratyaksa) , inference (anumdna), recognition of likeness 
(upamana), and testimony (dgama).2
Nagarjuna’s primary concern is not a discussion of the nature and in­
terrelation of these different means of knowledge, but the question of how 
to establish any particular set of means of knowledge, whether it is the one 
just indicated or a different one. Once we have agreed tha t the existence of 
objects of knowledge is established by the means of knowledge (as for exam­
ple the existence of the desk in front of me is established by my perceptual 
abilities, in this case primarily non-defective vision) we then have to address 
the further question of how to establish the means of knowledge.3 How do 
we know that these means of knowledge are good guides to the objects out 
there in the world?
There are three different ways in which we could try to establish the 
means of knowledge. First of all we could regard them as established by 
mutual coherence: perception is an adequate means of knowledge of the desk 
because its accuracy is established by other means of knowledge indicating 
its presence as well. Having the receipt of the delivery of the desk allows me 
to infer tha t there must be a desk in my room (since if I have such a receipt 
the item in question must have been delivered), my perceptual recognition 
of the desk is in important ways like the perception of other medium-sized 
dry goods, such as tables and chairs, and finally I can rely on the testimony 
of other people who also see the desk in my room. In a similar way we could 
then argue for the establishment of inference by the fact that the conclusions 
inferred are supported by perception, likeness, and testimony, and so on for
2VV 5, VS(S) 46:15-16, 72:6-17.
3Matilal (1986, 49).
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all the other means of knowledge.
Secondly we conld assume tha t the means of knowledge justify themselves. 
We do not have to go beyond perception to realize that perception usually 
delivers an accurate picture of the world, but perception itself presents a 
faithful representation of the world and of its own validity. A popular exam­
ple illustrating this point is that of the lamp which illuminates other objects 
at the same time as illuminating itself. We do not need another lamp in 
order to illuminate the lamp.
Finally one could regard the means of knowledge and their objects as 
mutually establishing each other. The means of knowledge establish an object 
of knowledge by giving us epistemic access to it. But we could also argue 
that the object in turn establishes the means of knowledge. Given tha t we 
manage to interact with the objects of knowledge more or less successfully (as 
confirmed by the evolutionary success of our species) there must be something 
amongst our cognitive means which gives us a relatively accurate account of 
the way things are. In this way epistemic success allows us to establish the 
means of knowledge via the objects successfully cognized.
Nagarjuna does not devote a great deal of discussion of to the first alter­
native, the establishment of the means of knowledge by mutual coherence.4 
This seems sensible, for even if the argument succeeds the kind of establish­
ment of the means of knowledge which can be derived from it is not exactly 
what Nagarjuna’s Naiyayika opponent is looking for.5 He is trying to argue 
that the means of knowledge provide us with information about the nature 
of independently existing reals. But it is clear that the mutual establishment 
of means of knowledge can do no such thing. All it can do is establish the
4m  [,..] prasiddhih [...] parasparatah [...] bhavati [,..] pramandndm. VY 51.
5For the relationship between Nagarj ima’s Madhyamaka and Nyaya with a special focus
on epistemology see Oberhammer (1963), Bhattacharya (1977), Bronlchorst (1985).
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coherence of statements arrived at by different means of knowledge. But the 
mere coherence of some set of statements is not sufficient for showing that 
there is anything with an independent existential status which they describe. 
There are, after all, coherent fairy-tales.6
Let us therefore now consider the remaining two possible ways of estab­
lishing the means of knowledge.
8.1 M eans of knowledge as self-established
Regarding the means of knowledge as self-established7 has the immediate 
advantage of avoiding two difficulties. Firstly we get around the infinite 
regress of establishing the means of knowledge by other means of knowledge, 
which then in turn need yet other means of knowledge to establish them, 
and so forth.8 Unlike other forms of infinite regress which Nagarjuna accepts 
(such as an infinitely extended chain of causes and conditions) this regress is 
vicious, since the burden of proof is transferred in its entirety to the preceding 
stage, as a preceding means of knowledge would have to establish all the 
succeeding ones.9
Secondly the self-establishment of the means of knowledge allows the op­
6I do not think that the problem of an infinite regress (as argued by Matilal (1986, 56))
is the main difficulty with the establishment of means of knowledge by mutual coherence.
7na [...] svatah prasiddhih [...] bhavati [...] pramdndndm. VV 51. See Matilal (1986,
51-53).
8VV 32, 51, VP 5, Siderits (1980, 310-312), Matilal (1986, 50). Compare NS 2, 1, 17.
9To argue that the regress could just be stopped after a finite number of steps, af­
ter which the correctness of the means of knowledge is established as ‘highly probable’ 
(as is done by Burton (1999, 159), following the arguments presented in NS 2, 1, 8-20) 
confuses the pragmatic question of how our epistemic enterprise should proceed with the 
philosophical question of its justification. See also Siderits (1980, 331), Siderits (2003, 
141).
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ponent to hold on to the assumption that everything lmowable is established 
by the means of knowledge.10 It might be attractive to give up this assump­
tion in order to escape the vicious regress, but this then makes it necessary to 
give a special reason (visesahetu) explaining why ordinary objects are estab­
lished by means of knowledge, but not the means of knowledge themselves.11
8.1.1 Means of knowledge compared to fire
In support of the self-establishment of the means of knowledge we are pre­
sented with the following example:12
Fire illuminates itself as well as other objects. In the same way the 
means of knowledge establish themselves as well as other objects.
This argument is based on an recognition of likeness (upamana).13 Because 
the means of knowledge are like the fire, to the extent to which fire illuminates 
objects in the dark and thus brings them to our attention, in the same way 
the means of knowledge retrieve objects from the darkness of ignorance.14
10 don thams cad tshad mas bsgrub par bya ba yin no. VP(S) 23:15; see also VV(S)
63:6-7 31, 64:11-13.
11See NS 2, 1, 18.
12 dyotayati svdtmanam yatha hutdsas tatha pardtmdnam /  svapardtmanavevam
prasadhayanti pramanani VV(S) 64:18-19. See also VP 6, MMK 7:8-12, NS 2, 1, ID.
13Chatterjee (1939, 325-342), Potter (1970-2003,11:174-176), Matilal (1986, 57-58).
14Some references supporting the close connection between illumination and cognition
in Indian thought are given by Burton (1999, 163-164). He also offers a different reading of
this argument, claiming that like an illuminated object manifests the existence of light, the
existence of a known object manifests the existence of a means of knowledge (161). This,
however, appears to conflate this argument with the establishment of means of knowledge
by their objects discussed separately below. This reading is also not very satisfactory
from a hermeneutical perspective, given that it lets all of Nagarjuna’s arguments dealing
with self-illumination come out as very problematic (as Burton sets out to argue on pages
CHAPTER 8. EPISTEMOLOGY 250
Now it would be absurd to suggest that there is a vicious regress involved in 
the illumination of the fire, that is if someone argued as follows: ‘Because we 
can see the object, it must be illuminated by something. It is illuminated by 
the fire. But we can see the fire too. So something must illuminate it. So 
there must be a second fire, which is either invisible or visible. But how can 
it be invisible, since it illuminates a visible object (namely the fire)? So it 
must be visible. But then we need a third fire to illuminate the second fire, 
and so forth.’ It is clear tha t the error occurs by assuming that there must 
be a different fire illuminating the fire: a fire can illuminate both itself and 
other things.Therefore, given the similarity of fire and means of knowledge 
and thereby of the relations of illumination and establishment the means of 
knowledge can both establish themselves as well as other things.15
Nagarjuna tries to counter the use of the example of fire to demonstrate 
the means of knowledge as self-established by arguing for two claims:
• Fire does not illuminate other objects.
• Fire does not illuminate itself.
Note tha t the establishment of either of these theses is sufficient for re­
futing the opponent, as each one would demonstrate that an argument by
165-172).
15We might want to note the similarity of this argument with the ‘glue’ objection to 
Bradley’s regress. This regress occurs once we think that what unifies two constituents of 
a state of affairs (such as an individual and a property) is the instantiation relation holding 
between them, and that this instantiation relation has a distinct ontological status. For 
then we need a further relation to connect the instantiation relation with the individual and 
the property and so forth. To see what goes wrong here we can argue that when glueing 
two things together we do not require superglue to first glue the glue to the objects, and 
then super-superglue to glue the superglue to the glue and so forth. It is the glue itself 
which can connect to the objects, as well as connecting the objects themselves.
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the recognition of likeness between the means of knowledge and fire cannot 
be used. Nagarjuna sets out to establish both claims.
In order to argue for the first claim he observes that in order to illuminate 
an object, a fire has to illuminate the darkness concealing that object. In 
order to do so, fire and darkness must come into causal contact, so that one 
can remove the other. This, however is impossible:
A lamp cannot illuminate when it is connected with darkness 
since their connection does not exist. Why are the lamp and 
darkness not connected? Because they are opposed. Where the 
lamp is, darkness is not. How can the lamp remove or illuminate 
darkness?16
The point Nagarjuna wants to make here is that darkness and light cannot 
be understood as two independently existent objects one of which acts on 
the other when they come into contact.17 The illumination of darkness by 
light is not analogous to the dissolution of salt by water. This is because 
darkness is the mere absence of light,18 it is wherever light is not. For this 
reason the two can never come into spatial contact.
16re zhig mar me ni mun pa dang phrad nas gsal bar byed par mi ’gyur te phrad pa med 
p a ’i phyir ro \ gang gi phyir mar me dang mun pa ni phrad pa yod pa ma yin te \ ’gal ba'i 
phyir ro \ gang na mar me yod pa de na mun pa med na j i  Itar mar me ’di mun pa sel bar
byed pa ’am gsal bar byed par ’gyur. VP(S) 24:2-8. See also VV 38, MMK 7:10.
17Another example where Nagarjuna rejects this assumption (even though we are here
dealing with mutually dependent rather than with mutually exclusive entities) is the case 
of fire and fuel. Nagarjuna argues that we cannot conceive of these as two distinct entities 
which produce an effect (heat and illumination) when put together, in the same way in 
which the union of man and woman produces an effect, i.e. a child (MMK 10: 1, 6. See 
also Garfield (1995, 191—192)). This is because fire is existentially dependent on fuel, while
fuel is at least notionally dependent on fire.
18 ’od med pa ni mun pa ’o. VP(S) 25:10. See also Burton (1999, 71-72).
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Nagarjuna’s opponent argues in VV 38 that light and darkness might 
coexist during the process of origination (utpadyamana) of light. So light 
and darkness would be both present at the same time for a single moment, 
and then the light started to act on the darkness in order to remove it. But 
this leaves us then with the problem of explaining what causes light to remove 
the darkness in its second moment of existence but not in the first. If light 
does not have the causal power to remove darkness in the moment of its 
origination, how could it have this power later on?19
On the other hand it would be highly unsatisfactory to regard light and 
darkness as independently existing objects which interact without coming 
into contact. For if light could act on darkness at a distance without spatial 
contiguity (as the planets were seen to act on human beings in ancient India,20 
and as we now know such forces as gravity and magnetism to work) without 
influencing it causally it is difficult to explain why for example a certain 
lamp can only dispel a certain darkness (namely the one in this room) but 
not other ones (such as the darkness in the room next door).21
The refutation of the second claim (that fire illuminates itself) proceeds 
by analysis of the notion of illumination. For something to be illuminated 
it must first exist hidden in darkness and subsequently made visible by light 
shining on it.22 But it is obvious that this is not true of the fire: it does 
not first exist hidden away in darkness, like a pot in a dark room, and is 
then made visible by shining its own light onto itself.23 If we conceive of
19See Siderits (1980, 314).
20VP 8, compare the discussion in Burton (1999, 178-179, note 27). See also Aryadeva’s
Satasastra (Tucci 1929, 9).
21MMK 7:11, VP 8, VV 39, Tucci (1929, 9). See also Burton (1999, 169-171).
22VV(S)65:3-4. See also Burton (1999, 166).
23Siderits (1980, 313).
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illumination as the prevention of darkness (tamasah pratigatah)24 we would 
have to assume tha t darkness is somewhere in the fire or encapsulating it 
to hide it from view.25 But this would mean that we are again thinking 
of darkness as an independently existing substance preventing illumination, 
something like a thick lampshade which prevents the light from reaching 
our eyes. But as Nagarjuna has argued above this view of darkness as a 
substance is thoroughly unsatisfactory, since darkness is nothing but the 
absence of light.
Nagarjuna also adds a second argument against the self-illumination of 
fire. He first claims tha t since the illumination by fire proceeds by the con­
sumption of fuel, self-illumination would entail self-consumption, that is, fire 
would burn itself as well as its fuel.26 Of course we cannot argue tha t if one 
quality of an objects acts on itself, any other of its qualities will do so as 
well.27 An oven may heat a piece of wax as well as itself, and melt the wax, 
but not melt itself. Nagarjuna must therefore regard the fire’s burning of fuel 
and its illumination of objects as the very same process. But we do not have 
to say that the fire burns down because there is less fuel (it being gradually 
consumed by the fire) and less fire (because it gradually consumes itself). 
Fire is just the burning of the fuel rather than some distinct entity acting 
both on the fuel and also on itself.28 Therefore, if there is no self-consumption 
of fire there should also be no self-illumination.29
24VV(S) 66:10.
25VP 10. See also BCA 9:18.
26VV 35.
27As pointed out by Burton (1999, 167).
28MMK 10:1.
29It is interesting to note that the Madhyamaka argument against the Yogacara view of 
the mind as self-illuminating (svaprakasa) given by Santideva in the BCA is another l'eason 
by recognition of likeness (upamana): that of a sword which cannot cut itself (9:17). The 
Yogacara view is also criticized by Sankara in the UpadesasahasrT 16:13, the Brahmasutra-
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Secondly, if fire illuminated itself, and perception was to be understood as 
structurally similar to illumination, the different modes of perception should 
also be able to perceive themselves: seeing should be able to see itself, hearing 
hear itself, and so on.30 Vision would be possible in the absence of any distinct 
object, as vision could act as its own object of sight. Visual perception 
would then not be regarded as an intrinsically relational phenomenon, but 
as solely based on some essentially perceptive quality of vision. As such a 
non-relational understanding of visual perception (and of any other kind of 
perception as well) is unsatisfactory Nagarjuna argues that if the parallel 
between perception and illumination is maintained, fire cannot be seen as 
self-illuminating.
Thirdly, since darkness is the opposite of light, if light illuminates itself,
darkness should conceal itself.31 But then we should not be able to perceive
darkness, as we are not able to perceive a pot concealed in darkness. Since
darkness can be perceived, however, it is not self-obscuring and therefore,
Nagarjuna argues, fire cannot be self-illuminating either.32
bhasya 2:2:28 and in his commentary on the Brhadaranyaka Upanisad 4:3:7. For further
references to this ‘anti-reflexivity principle’ see Siderits (2003, 32, note a).
It is important to note, however, that even though the example of the lamp or fire is
used in the discussion of both, the question of whether the mind is self-illuminating and
the question whether the means of knowledge are self-established are distinct. See Siderits
(1980, 334-335, note 4), Burton (1999, 155-156).
30Nagarjuna only mentions the case of seeing seeing itself (MMK 3:2). This reading of
the verse is supported by a variety of commentaries, such as PP 114:1-5, Tsong kha pa
Bio bzang grags pa (2006, 130), Garfield (1995, 137-138) and Weber-Brosamer and Back
(1997, 15). For a different reading see Kalupahana (1991, 133-134). See also the further
references given in May (1959, 79, note 135).
31MMK 7:12, VV 36, VP 11.
32Some more discussion of this argument is in Burton (1999, 167-168).
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8.1.2 The problem of the independence of means of 
knowledge from their objects
Apart from attempting to find fault with the opponent’s example based on 
the supposed self-illumination of fire Nagarjuna also presents us with positive 
arguments against the self-establishment of the means of knowledge. First of 
all, if a means of knowledge, such as visual perception, was self-established it 
should be able to exist independently of the existence of an object of vision.33 
But if we then assume that it is an essential property of visual perception to 
see34 visual perception must be able to function as its own object, as otherwise 
there might be no other object to be seen. This, Nagarjuna claims, then leads 
to the same problem encountered in the analysis of motion.35 As the mover 
and the place being moved over cannot exist simultaneously, since motion 
takes time, vision cannot see something which exists simultaneously with it 
(such as itself), since vision takes time too.36
Secondly, observing again that if the means of knowledge are self-established 
they will be established independently of the objects known37 Nagarjuna ar­
gues as follows. Assume that we wanted to chose those amongst all the differ­
ent means of cognitive access to the world which deliver accurate knowledge 
of the nature of the objects known, that is, which qualify as means of knowl­
edge. We would select all those which have a specific internal quality (such as 
the cognitive equivalent to self-illumination). The possession of this quality 
would then guarantee that its possessor delivered accurate information about 
the nature of the objects cognized. But how is the connection between the
33MMK 3:2.
34As stated e.g. in Vimalamitra’s Vibhdsa-prabhdvrtti (Kalupahana 1991, 133).
35MMK 3:3,
36See Garfield (1995, 138-139).
37VV 40. See Siderits (1980, 314-15).
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specific internal quality and the correct representation of the object justified? 
After all there are all sorts of properties our means of cognitive access to the 
world can have, so how do we know that a specific one is a guide to accurate 
representation?
Suppose we are presented with a set of fancy mechanical devices and are 
asked to select the five best tin openers from these. No detailed study of the 
internal properties of each will allow us to accomplish that task. We have 
to analyse each in relation to a tin and try to determine the way in which 
it might open it. Only then would we be able to conclude which particular 
properties of the mechanisms are correlated with good tin-opening abilities. 
In the same way we can only regard an internal quality of a way of accessing 
the world as a characteristic of a means of knowledge once we have assessed 
it in relation to the objects cognized. Only then can we conclude that this 
particular property really leads us to the knowledge of the nature of the 
object, rather than doing something else. But in this case the establishment 
of the means of knowledge can no longer be regarded as self-establishment 
since it incorporates reference to other objects (namely the objects known) 
at an essential place.
8.2 M eans of knowledge and their objects as 
m utually established
If the argument for the self-establishment of the means of knowledge is not 
successful, the remaining option is to argue that the means of knowledge and 
the objects of knowledge mutually establish one another.38 Assume tha t I see 
an apple on the table. The existence of the apple, the object of knowledge
38VV 42-51.
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is established by the means of knowledge which is perception. But we could 
equally argue the other way round: that the object known establishes the 
means of knowledge. This would invite the immediate objection tha t we 
then need prior cognitive access to the object known, and if we have this we 
must already have established the means of knowledge.39 We are therefore 
pointlessly establishing it twice.40 But if we somehow gain this access without 
relying on the means of knowledge the whole project of establishing these 
means seems futile, since it is precisely the justification of our means of 
gaining knowledge of the world which we have set out to scrutinize.41
We will therefore need a different argumentative strategy to argue for 
the mutual establishment of objects known and means of knowledge, and 
in particular for the establishment of the latter by the former. One way of 
going about this (which does not commit us to the viciously circular mu­
tual establishment criticized by Nagarjuna)42 is to argue that because the 
object of knowledge is perceived, there must be something bringing about 
such a perception, and this is the means of knowledge. In this case the 
apple establishes the existence of the means of knowledge by which it is 
known 43 An essential prerequisite for this latter direction of establishment 
is of course success. Because we successfully apprehend an apple our means of 
apprehension is regarded as a means of knowledge.44 If we were susceptible 
to frequent apple-hallucinations which disappeared once we tried to touch 
them we would not regard perception as a reliable apple-detector, that is, as
39Matilal (1986, 56-57), Burton (1999, 183).
40This is the fallacy of ‘proving the proven’ (siddhasya sadhanam). See VV 42,
41VV 44.
42VV 46-48.
43This way of establishing the means of knowledge is what Nagarjuna criticizes in VV
51 by saying prasiddhih [...] bhavati na ca prameyaih [...] pramdnandm,.
44VP 17. See the commentary in Tola and Dragonetti (1995a, 111-112).
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a means of knowledge. But since we are generally successful in our cognitive 
interactions with the world and normally only perceive the existence of ap­
ples which are indeed there the very fact that we successfully apprehend a 
world of outside objects serves as an argument for regarding the successful 
means of apprehension as means of knowledge.45
An immediate difficulty with this procedure is that we also need a means 
of knowledge for establishing the success of our cognitive actions,46 that is 
to ascertain whether we really are perceiving the apple or just an apple- 
hallucination. Nothing seems to rule out that some means of knowledge first 
deceives us about what we see, and later deceives us about the outcome 
of whatever procedure we use to establish whether the first cognition was 
successful.47 But this need not rule out any attempts of mutually establishing 
the means and the objects of knowledge if we do not use epistemically suspect 
procedures (which we know to have lead to unsuccessful cognitions in the 
past) to establish the success of our cognitive actions.48
A more worrying question is whether the mutual establishment of means 
and objects of knowledge ~~ if successful -  actually delivers the account of 
means of knowledge Nagarjuna’s opponent wants to defend. In order to see 
this we have to note first that the notion of ‘successful cognitive apprehension’ 
referred to above cannot just be an act of cognition which leads to a successful 
action, as many of our cognitions (and many of the beliefs subsequently 
acquired) are never acted upon. We therefore also have to include coherence 
with other cognitions or beliefs as a criterion for the success of some means
45 For more discussion of the Nyaya criterion of pragmatic success as an indication of 
valid knowledge see Chatterjee (1939, 81-89), D’Almeida (1973, 46-62), Bijalwan (1977,
53-60) Matilal (1986, 160-179).
46Siderits (2003, 140-141).
47Burton (1999, 184-185).
48Siderits (1980, 317).
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of knowledge as well. Our cognition of the apple on the table might therefore 
be deemed successful if it either leads to a successful action (we reach out, 
grasp the apple, and eat it) or if it coheres with other means of knowledge 
(for example with my memory of buying a bag of apples and putting them 
on the table). However, the difficulty with employing coherence in this way 
is that we have to select a certain set of cognitions or beliefs which we hold 
fixed, so that we can then evaluate the status of other cognitions relative 
to them. One problem now is of course how to assure the accuracy of this 
selected set: if they are not accurate themselves coherence with them has 
very little weight. But let us assume for the sake of argument tha t they 
are indeed accurate and constitute an epistemological fixed point relative to 
which other means of knowledge could be justified.
The remaining worry is that Nagarjuna’s Naiyayika opponent wants to 
establish the means of knowledge as something which gives us cognitive access 
to a world of independently existing reals. But as long as we do not know 
the initial set to be accurate (even though it may be) it is hard to see why 
coherence with the selected set should provide us with such access. Since we 
cannot establish the accuracy of the initial set without circularly assuming 
tha t we have already established some means of knowledge the possibility 
remains that a different selected set would have provided us with a different 
set of means of knowledge coherent with it. As Mark Siderits observes: 
‘since at no point in our proof is there appeal to any facts other than those 
concerning logical relations among cognitions, we cannot legitimately include 
in the resultant theory of the pramanas the claim that they yield direct 
knowledge of their objects’.49 There is no explanation why coherence with 
the selected set should assure us that the means of knowledge indeed ‘reach
49(1980, 318),
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out’ to provide us with knowledge of an independently existent world of 
objects as long as we do not have an independent way of establishing the 
accuracy of the selected set.50 But if this could be done the entire attem pt of 
mutually establishing means and objects of cognition would be superfluous.
The argument against the mutual establishment of means and objects of 
knowledge just presented is very much a rational extrapolation: it is what 
Nagarjuna (as well as a Madhyamika more generally) should say in response, 
even though we do not find such a detailed argument in Nagarj una’s texts. 
The argument in the VV fundamentally boils down to the observation that 
the mutual establishment of the means and objects of knowledge excludes 
the possibility of either existing by substance-svabhava, i.e. independently of 
any other object. If father and son were mutually established in the same 
way as means of knowledge and their objects, Nagarjuna argues, father and 
son would not be distinguished by any substantial difference.51
This is a familiar argumentative move we encounter repeatedly in Na- 
garjuna’s works. A different and more unusual response to the proposal of 
mutual establishment is given in the VP. Nagarjuna observes that:52
Potness is perceptible, but the pot is not. That which is the object 
of the sense-faculty (dbang po la rab tu phyogs pa’i don), that 
is perceived. If we apply the term (brda) ‘visual sense-faculty’ 
then the object [of that faculty] is perceptible and depends on
50See Siderits (1989, 237-238).
51VV 49-50. Compare BCA 9:12-14.
52bum pa nyid mngon sum yin gyi bum pa ni ma yin te dbang po la rab tu phyogs p a ’i 
don gang yin pa de ni mngon sum yin par byas nas [ mig gi dbang po la dbang po ’i brda 
by as la de la rab tu phyogs pa’i don gang yin pa de ni mngon sum yin zhing de yang snang 
ba la sogs pa ’i rkyen la Itos pa ste \ de phyir bum pa la sogs pa nyid mngon sum du yongs 
su grub pa yin. VP(S) 29:6-13.
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conditions like light and so forth. Thus pot and so forth are 
established as perceptible.
The idea behind this argument is to deny the establishment of the means 
of knowledge by the object known by denying that the object of knowledge 
(the prameya) is an external, independently existent real. The Naiyayika 
opponent wants to argue that since our cognitions are generally successful, 
and since this success serves as an indication of the existence of an exter­
nal, mind-independent reality the means of knowledge are just those things 
which allow us access to this reality. Nagarjuna replies that in fact the object 
perceived by our sense-faculties is not the external object, but a mental rep­
resentation of the object. Nagarjuna here embraces a representative theory 
of perception which does not assert (as a naive realist would) tha t we have 
direct and unmediated cognitive access to the objects of the external world.53 
W hat is directly perceived is the sense-datum (what Nagarjuna calls the ob­
ject of the sense-faculty (dbang po la rab tu phyogs pa’i don)), on the basis of 
which information about the external object is inferred. If, for example, we 
look at a white disc under red light at an angle, our sense-datum will be a red 
ellipse, though, knowing some basic facts about vision and about the peculiar
&3Burton (1999, 192) ‘suspects that Nagarjuna actually means that [...] the knowledge- 
episode itself is constitutive of the object known’. This is indeed the case. Burton is also 
correct in claiming that there is not much of an argument for this position in Nagarjuna’s 
texts. But given the generally elliptic nature of the VP this philological gap does not 
necessarily entail the existence of a gap in Nagarjuna’s philosophical argumentation as 
well.
Tola and Dragonetti (1995a, 12) suggest that the Yogacara flavour of VP 18 could be 
interpreted as evidence for locating the composition of the VP after the appearance of the 
Yogacara school about 350 A.D., which would speak against its attribution to Nagarjuna. 
Given the somewhat isolated nature of VP 18 in Nagarjuna’s argument this suggestion 
does not seem to me to be able to bear much weight.
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lighting conditions, we perceive a white disc. Nagarjuna stresses the contri­
bution of inference to knowledge gained by perception.54 He notes that in 
the same way in which the inferential process is based on some perception in 
order to arrive at some piece of non-perceptual knowledge, for example when 
we infer fire from smoke55 there is an inferential process at work in ordinary 
perception as well, which, on the basis of the object of direct acquaintance 
(the sense-datum) subsequently produces the object of perception.56 But it 
is evident that for the proponent of a representative theory of perception an 
object of knowledge cannot serve as establishing a means of knowledge in the 
way the Naiyayika requires. Since all we are directly acquainted with is the 
sense-datum we cannot use this acquaintance to support the view that there 
are epistemic processes which give us direct access to a world of external, 
independently existent reals.
8.3 Tem poral relations betw een m eans and 
objects of knowledge
Apart from the question of how the means of knowledge are established Na­
garjuna also investigates the question of how they are related to the objects 
of knowledge. The two stand in a causal relation. In the case of perception,
54See Matilal (1986, ch 8).
55‘In the same way [in the case of inferential knowledge] based on the connection between
fire and smoke there is an inference preceded by a perception.’ de bzhin du me dang du ba
la ‘brel pa las mngon sum snon du ’gro ba can rjes su dpag pa yin no. VP(S) 29:14-16.
56The role of inference (or, as contemporary cognitive science would prefer to put it: the
implicit reliance on biologically hard-wired rules in interpreting perceptual input) in the
formation of visual perception in particular is now well-supported by empirical research.
See Hoffman (1998) for an accessible summary.
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for example the contact between the sensory faculty and the object perceived 
bring about the object of knowledge which for Nagarjuna is not an external 
object, but a sense-datum.57 It is therefore hardly surprising that Nagarjuna 
sees the relation between means of knowledge and object of knowledge as fac­
ing the same difficulties as those of other causes and effects. He concentrates 
specifically on the problematic nature of their temporal relation.58
If the means of knowledge exists before its object, there is no justification 
for calling it a means of knowledge, as Nagarjuna argued earlier tha t being 
such a means cannot be a purely intrinsic feature of some cognitive way of 
accessing the world.59 A different interpretation of this difficulty is found in 
Vatsyayana’s Bhasya on the NS 2.1.9.60 Here the means of knowledge is not 
regarded as the perceptual faculty, but as a specific act of perception, and 
the object of knowledge as the object in the world which, when in contact 
with the sense-organ produces the perception.61 The prior existence of the 
means of knowledge would then be equivalent to the existence of the effect 
before the cause.62
57See VV(S) 70:17-18 where the means of knowledge is described as the cause (karana)
of the object of knowledge.
58VP 12. See also the discussion in Burton (1999, 191-199), Siderits (2003, 146).
59See also Burton (1999, 172-174).
60 NS 443-445. Bronlchorst (1985, 107-111) argues that the discussion of the arguments 
concerning the temporal relations between means and objects of knowledge in NS 2, 1, 
8-15 is evidence of Sarvastivadin influence rather than an anticipation of Madhyama- 
ka arguments, as claimed by Phanibhusana (Chattopadhyaya and Gangopadhyaya 1968, 
21- 22 ).
61In accordance with the definition of perception in NS 1, 1, 4,
62 While it is instructive to compare the explanation of the difficulties connected with the 
temporal relations between means of knowledge and their objects in the commentaries on 
NS 2, 1, 8-15 and Madhyamaka treatises it is important to be aware of the significance of 
their respective background assumptions. The Nyaya theory of means of knowledge, based 
on Vaisesika metaphysics, regards a particular lcnowledge-episode, such as an instance of
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If it existed after the knowable object there is no justification for calling 
the object of knowledge an object of knowledge, as there is not anything yet 
by which it is known.63 Nagarjuna also identifies another difficulty when he 
argues that an arisen and a non-arisen thing cannot abide together.64 If two 
things are such tha t one exists only now, the other only at a later moment it 
cannot be the case that the second has any effect on the first, such as making 
it known.
The final possibility is that the means of knowledge and its object exist 
simultaneously.65 The difficulty is here that for two simultaneously existing 
things (such as the two horns of a cow, which Nagarjuna gives as an exam­
ple, but also e.g. the two ends of a see-saw moving in opposite directions) it 
becomes problematic to establish which is the cause and which is the effect. 
For Nagarjuna the means of knowledge brings about the object of knowledge,
perception, as caused by the combination of an externally existing object of knowledge and 
the respective sense-faculty. For Nagarjuna, on the other hand, the object of knowledge 
(prameya) is no external but an internal object, a sense-datum. If we now regard the 
means of knowledge (pramana) as bringing about the internal representation which is 
the prameya we realize that the causal relation between pramana and prameya is seen in 
different ways by the Naiyayika and by Nagarjuna. For the former the prameya is causally
prior, for the latter the pramana.
63For the Naiyayika this dependence is purely notional (Jha 1984, 609, note *), whereas
for Nagarjuna it is both notional and existential, as argued in our discussion of causation 
on page 151.
64ma skyes pa dang skyes pa dag lhan cig mi gnas pa. VP(S) 28:24-25.
65In his commentary on NS 2, 1, 11 (NS 421—424)Vatsyayana argues that the problem is
that if means and object of knowledge existed at the same time there could be no sequence 
of cognitions. The point seems to be that if, for example, we hold a pot in our hand and 
thereby have both a visual and a tactile perception of it the optical and haptic properties 
of the pot exist at the same time — and so should the corresponding perceptions. In 
our consciousness, however, they occur as successive, and indeed this non-simultaneity 
occupies an important place in the Nyaya theory of mind (see NS 1, 1, 16).
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the sense-datum. As such the means of knowledge is a cause, the object of 
knowledge its effect. But in this case they would better not exist simultane­
ously, as it is the temporal ordering which characterizes one item as a cause, 
the other as an effect.66
One potential way of dealing with the difficulty of the temporal relation 
between means and object of knowledge is outlined by Vatsyayana in his 
commentary on NS 2, 1, l l . 67He claims that the term pramana is to be 
applied to something which has been the cause of apprehension of an object 
in the past, is so at present, or will be in the future. Similarly, the term 
prameya is to be used for an object that was apprehended in the past, is 
presently being apprehended or will be apprehended in the future. Only in 
this way can we make sense of somebody saying ‘bring the cook to do the 
cooking’, as he has not cooked yet — else the term cook would fail to refer. 
In this case we use ‘cook’ just as a synonym for ‘whoever will do the cooking’. 
The problem with this reply is that in this case it is obvious that being a 
cook is not regarded as an essential property of the person referred to. As 
statements about the future are contingent the expression ‘whoever will do 
the cooking’ must be able to refer even if it turns out that person designated 
does not cook in the end. But now it is evident that someone who takes 
‘cause’ and ‘effect’ to denote essential properties of things — as Nagarjuna’s 
Naiyayika opponent does — cannot help himself to this reply. As a statement 
referring to a cause or a means of knowledge might really be talking about 
what this thing is likely to do in the future it must be possible tha t the thing
66I disagree with Burton’s claim (1999, 193) that Nagarjuna ‘provides no justification 
[...] for his unusual and far from self-evident assertion’, as this matter is extensively 
discussed in those passages where Nagarjuna deals specifically with causation (rather than
with causal issues in epistemology). See chapter 5, section 5.4.3.
67NS 421-424.
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picked out does not cause anything, or does not give us access to an object 
of knowledge — else its intelligibility now would depend on what happens in 
the future. Since this is not the case (we know what ‘what is going to be a 
means of knowledge in the future’ etc. refers to, and we do not know what 
is going to happen in the future) being a cause, or a means of knowledge 
cannot be an essential property of the thing, as it could lose this property 
whilst remaining that very thing.
8.4 The aim  of N agarjuna’s argum ents
Nagarjuna’s aim in his discussion of epistemology is not to argue tha t means 
of knowledge and their objects do not exist at all.68 Such an argument 
immediately generates a paradox, for the non-existence of the means and 
objects of knowledge is itself an object of knowledge arrived at by some 
means. But then there must be at least one means and object of knowledge, 
which was previously denied.69
W hat Nagarjuna sets out to do is refuting the existence of either means 
or objects of knowledge with substance-st/ab/iaya.70 He thus wants to show 
tha t there are no procedures which are intrinsically and essentially means 
of knowledge, nor are there independently existent reals they give us knowl­
edge of. Means of knowledge and their objects are notionally interdependent: 
without its ability to give us epistemic access to some thing we would not 
label a cognitive procedure a means of knowledge. Similarly something can­
not be called an object of knowledge unless there exist a means which allows 
us to know it. We can also argue tha t the two are existentially dependent
68As claimed by Burton (1999, 194, 198).
69VP 13.
70MMK 3:5-6, VP 3-4.
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on one another. The existence of certain objects of knowledge allows us to 
divide off certain types of our cognitive procedures and label them as means 
of knowledge; it is not the case that this division proceeds along certain fis­
sures which had been there all along. Since our consciousness is a continuous 
flow without ready-made fissures the objects of knowledge can be regarded 
as bringing the means of knowledge into existence. Similarly if the object 
of knowledge is to be identified with a mental representation (as Nagarjuna 
argued above) it is evident that the means of knowledge brings this object 
about by unifying information received through the different sensory modal­
ities. Means of knowledge and their objects therefore cannot be regarded as 
distinct substances.
This point is also stressed by Nagarjuna’s argument that each can assume 
another’s role: a means of knowledge can be an object of knowledge and vice 
versa. There are two different ways to argue for this position.
First of all,71 building on the familiar Nyaya definition tha t a means of 
knowledge is what produces the knowledge of something72 we can argue that 
since the object of knowledge is what brings the means of knowledge about, 
it is an essential part of what produces the knowledge of something, and 
therefore an essential part of a means of knowledge. A similar argument can 
be applied to means of knowledge.73
Alternatively we could argue that a means of knowledge at one time can 
be an object of knowledge at another time, and vice versa. For example, 
when we establish a certain cognition as correct this means of knowledge is 
an object of knowledge. And what is thus known to be correct and is an 
object of knowledge can in turn be a means of knowledge for knowing other
71VP 2.
72See Vatsyayana’s Bhasya on NS 2, 1, 11 (NS 421-424).
73See Burton (1999, 177).
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objects of knowledge later on. Vatsyayana illustrates this with the example 
of a piece of gold which can be both the object tested (if we want to determine 
how heavy it is) or a testing object itself (if we want to check the accuracy 
of a pair of scales).74 In fact, as Nagarjuna points out,75 the Naiyayikas 
themselves count ideas (buddhi, bio) as both a means of knowledge and as 
and object of knowledge.76 In either way it becomes evident that means of 
knowledge and their objects cannot exist as essentially different entities.
It is important to realize that Nagarjuna’s rejection of the essentially 
existing means and objects of knowledge is presented within the discussion 
of the knowability of emptiness. His opponent argues that if all things are 
empty, means and objects of knowledge are empty too.77 But if ultimately 
there are no objects of knowledge, emptiness cannot be an object of knowl­
edge. And if there are ultimately no means of knowledge, if nothing has the 
intrinsic nature which is characteristic of a means of knowledge, emptiness, 
even if it obtained, could never be known. There appears thus to be a fun­
damental inconsistency in the Madhyamaka project of establishing the tru th  
of emptiness.78
Nagarjuna’s response to this difficulty is to investigate the realist’s way 
of accounting for means and objects of knowledge with characteristic natures 
as means and objects, in order to demonstrate that all possible ways of es­
tablishing them fail. This sequence of arguments, which has been discussed 
above is not so much to be seen as a tu quoque move on the side of Nagar­
juna79 but as an assessment of the realist’s epistemological position which
74In the commentary on NS 2, 1, 16 (NS 433-440). See also (Bhattacharya 1977, 268).
75VP 20.
76NS 1, 1, 9.
77VV 5-6.
78Siderits (2003, 140) refers to this as the ‘self-stultification objection’.
79Siderits (2003, 147).
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lets emptiness come out as unknowable. For the realist means and objects of 
knowledge have intrinsic characteristics, and there are invariant relations of 
epistemic priority, i.e. cognitive procedures which are means of knowledge in 
all possible contexts. On this account of epistemology it is indeed impossible 
to establish emptiness. But as we have seen earlier in this chapter Nagar­
juna tries to argue tha t this is not the right account of epistemology. Even 
though there are no means of knowledge which are intrinsically such, deliv­
ering knowledge in every context, there are still cognitive procedures which 
function as means of knowledge in the specific context in which they are em­
ployed, regimented by certain background constraints and other pragmatic 
features. By using these procedures (which, Nagarjuna argues are all the 
means of knowledge there are anyway) we can achieve knowledge of empti­
ness even though ultimately there are neither means of knowledge nor objects 
of knowledge. Certain procedures can still count conventionally as means of 
knowledge within the framework of certain aims and directions of inquiry. 
Nagarjuna’s arguments about epistemology have therefore to be seen as ful­
filling two purposes. Firstly they continue his general project of examining 
different types of objects one by one and arguing that none have substance- 
svabhava by considering means of knowledge and their objects. Secondly, 
and more specifically, they establish the necessary background epistemology 
needed for understanding how emptiness could in fact be known. It is this 
second aim which is particulary interesting, since it provides us with the 
outlines of a specific Madhyamaka theory of knowledge.80
S0For a good assessment of this and its relation to the debate about anti-realism see 
Siderits (2003, ch. 7).
Chapter 9
Language
As opposed to topics like causation, motion, the self, or the theory of knowl­
edge, language is not given much explicit discussion in Nagarjuna’s works. 
This does not mean that such matters were not important to Nagarjuna 
but merely that his extant writings do not contain an extended connected 
discussion of the impact of his theory of emptiness on our view of language. 
Nevertheless it is possible to extract some of Nagarjuna’s views on this philo­
sophically highly interesting issue from remarks found at different places in 
his works.
9.1 N agarjuna’s view  of language and th e ‘no­
th esis’ view
A good starting-point for the discussion of Nagarjuna’s conception of how 
the theory of emptiness affects our view of language is his so-called ‘no­
thesis’ view. This is without a doubt one of the most immediately puzzling 
philosophical features of Nagarjuna’s thought and also largely responsible for 
ascribing to him either sceptical or mystical leanings (or indeed both). The
270
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locus classicus for this view is found in verse 29 of the VV:
If I had some thesis the defect [just mentioned] would as a con­
sequence attach to me. But I have no thesis, so this defect is not 
applicable to me.1
That this absence of a thesis is to be regarded as a positive feature is stressed 
in YS 50, where Nagarjuna remarks about the Buddhas:
For these great beings there is no position, no dispute. How 
could there be another’s [opposing] position for those who have 
no position?2
Now it is important to observe that when considered in isolation it is very 
hard to make any coherent sense of these passages. For even if we assume 
tha t the Buddhas do not hold any philosophical position anymore (having 
perhaps passed beyond all conceptual thinking), how are we to make sense of 
the first quotation which, in the middle of a work full of philosophical theses 
claims that there is no such thesis asserted at all?
In fact this first statement is even more difficult to interpret than the 
famous last sentence of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, which is preceded by the 
equally famous ladder-metaphor.3 Although Wittgenstein here denies that
1yadi kdcana pratijna sydn me tata esa me bhaved dosah /  ndsti ca mama pratijna
tasman naivasti me dosah.
2che ba’i bdag nyid can de dag /  m am s la phyogs med rtsod pa med /  gang m am s la ni
phyogs med pa /  de la gzhan phyogs ga la yod.
36.54 My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who under­
stands me eventually realizes them as nonsensical, when he has used them — as steps — 
to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has 
climbed up it.)[...]
7. Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.
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his preceding statements are of anything but instrumental value, that they 
turn out to be nonsensical after they have fulfilled their instrumental role 
and that there is something outside of the grasp of these statements, at least 
he does not deny making any statements at all!
9.2 V V  29 in context
In order to get a clearer understanding of what these passages might mean, 
it is important to consider them in the argumentative context in which they 
occur. The VV, which contains the first passage given above is a work of 
seventy verses, accompanied by Nagarjuna’s autocommentary. As its title, 
which translates as ‘The Dispeller of Objections’ suggests its main aim is to 
answer objections which had been advanced concerning Nagarjuna’s theses. 
Being of a rather technical and specific nature makes it is plausible to assume 
that the VV was written later than his main work, the MMK, and was 
meant to deal with particular problems arising from the arguments set out 
in there.4 The first twenty verses and their commentaries contain criticisms 
of Nagarjuna’s position, which are answered in the remaining verses and their 
commentaries. Verse 29 given above specifically addresses the problem raised 
by the opponent in verse 4.
The principal point the opponent makes at the beginning of the VV con­
cerns the status of Nagarjuna’s claim of universal emptiness. The opponent 
argues that Nagarjuna faces a dilemma the horns of which are inconsistency 
and impotence. If he assumes his claim not to be empty he has contradicted 
his own thesis of universal emptiness (because there is now at least one thing 
which is not empty). If, on the other hand Nagarjuna takes his own claim
4Mabbett (1996, 306-307), Bhattacharya (1999, 124).
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to be empty too, the opponent argues, this claim is then unable to deny 
the existence of independently existing phenomena the opponent asserts. As 
becomes clear later in verse 22, Nagarjuna accepts the second horn of the 
dilemma: everything is empty, and his claim that everything is empty is 
empty too. As he stresses in the following verse this, however, does not en­
tail that the claim could not carry out its philosophical function. A key can 
open a door in a film even though it is only a key in the film, not a real key.5 
Verse 4 now considers a specific comeback Nagarjuna could make in reply to 
the difficulty arising from accepting this second alternative, i.e. the charge of 
the argumentational impotence of his claim of universal emptiness. Nagar­
juna could argue that if universal emptiness renders his own claim impotent, 
the opponent’s claims, being also subsumed under the universal statement 
of everything being empty are similarly impotent, and therefore cannot act 
as a refutation of Nagarjuna’s claim either. But as the opponent is quick to 
point out, this involves a blatant petitio principii: only if we already accept 
that everything is empty will the opponent’s arguments be rendered empty 
and impotent. But this is exactly the thesis the opponent denies. For him 
at least some things are not empty, and in particular his own statements are 
not subject to Nagarjuna’s claim of universal emptiness. The difficulty the 
opponent raised is a difficulty which arises because of the specific character 
(laksana) of Nagarjuna’s system, namely the claim that everything is empty. 
It does not apply to someone who does not make that assumption.
Verse 29 then is made in reply to this supposed counter-argument and its 
rejection as a petitio. There Nagarjuna claims that the particular defect (of
5As Nagarjuna points out in MMK 1:10 this is in fact a necessary condition for its 
being able to perform its function: only a cinematic key could open a cinematic door, a 
real key could not. See also the commentary on this verse in Garfield (1995, 119).
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his thesis of universal emptiness rendering his own philosophical assertions 
impotent) would indeed apply if he had any position. But given that he has 
no position, the difficulty therefore does not apply to him.
Now it will strike the reader that this is a rather curious reply to make. 
It is evident tha t the opponent’s criticisms formulated in verse 4 as well 
as in the preceding verses rest on a misunderstanding of the central term 
‘emptiness’. W hat exactly this misunderstanding amounts to is less clear. 
In fact the above set of arguments would make sense if we assumed that 
the opponent understood ‘empty’ to mean ‘false’, or ‘meaningless’, or even 
‘non-existent’.6 But as a reply to a criticism based on misunderstanding of 
this kind Nagarjuna’s reply in verse 29 seems a little extreme, given that 
it would have been perfectly sufficient and far less controversial for him to 
point out tha t emptiness entailed neither falsity, nor meaninglessness, nor 
non-existence and that he thereby could both assert that his claims are empty 
and simultaneously able to refute the opponent’s objections (in fact he makes 
exactly these points in verse 21 and 22). Even if we agree with M abbett that
it may be the case that the objection addressed by a given verse
has already been essentially refuted, but in turning to each new
6Indeed we might think that the argumentative context makes it most likely that the 
opponent misunderstands ‘empty’ as ‘non-existent’. In this case the problem that non­
existent statements cannot really refute anything seems to be most pressing. But in the 
case of the other two alternatives other problems become more serious. If Nagarjuna meant 
‘meaningless’ when he said ‘empty’ his claim that everything is empty would obviously 
just be false, given that we perfectly well understand the claim he makes (in the same way 
as somebody saying ‘all statements, including this one, are not grammatically well-formed’ 
would utter a falsehood). If, however, ‘empty’ meant ‘false’ Nagarjuna’s thesis of universal 
emptiness would reduce to the liar paradox and there is no good textual evidence that this 
is the problem the opponent had in mind. On this last point compare also the discussion 
in Mabbett (1996) and Sagal (1992).
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objection Nagarjuna seeks to make a fresh rebuttal in order to 
administer the coup de grace7
Nagarjuna here seems to use a sledgehammer to crack a nut. Why deny to 
hold any proposition whatsoever if it would have been perfectly sufficient to 
point out that since 'empty1 does not mean ‘non-existent’ it is completely 
unproblematic to claim that one’s own position is as empty as everything 
else?
We can distinguish at least three different ways in which Nagarj una’s 
crucial statement that he has no position can be interpreted. I will refer 
to these as the semantic, argumentational, and transcendent interpretations. 
According to the semantic interpretation Nagarjuna does not claim to hold no 
thesis whatsoever, but only claims to accept no statements which are taken to 
have a particular semantics. If we follow the argumentational interpretation 
Nagarjuna makes a claim about how one should proceed in debates, namely 
by always refuting opponents via reductio arguments, without ever adopting 
any thesis oneself. The transcendent interpretation finally reads Nagarj una’s 
statement as the assertion the existence of an inexpressible reality beyond 
concepts and language.
All of these three interpretations have historical predecessors in the com- 
mentarial tradition. The semantic and argumentational interpretation can 
be found in works of the dGe lugs tradition, in particular those of Tsong kha 
pa8 and mKhas grub rje,9 while a variety of views which can all be regarded 
as some kind of transcendental interpretation can be found in the writings
7(1996, 307).
sTsong kha pa Bio bzang grags pa (2000-2004,111:230, 236-249).
9Ruegg (2000, 173-187).
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of scholars like rNgog bio ldan sh.es rab,10 Go rams pa11 and dGe ’dun chos 
’phel.12
In the following I will restrict myself to an exposition of the semantic 
interpretation. This is primarily due to the fact that this appears to give 
us the clearest understanding of the role of verse 29 in the context of Na- 
garjuna’s arguments. The argumentational and transcendent interpretations 
tend to use Nagarj una’s denial of a thesis as a textual peg on which to hang 
an argument concerned with quite different matters from those dealt with 
in the VV. Tsong kha pa, for example, refers to this verse in the context of 
expounding the distinction between Svatantrikas and Prasangikas; Sa skya 
Pandita13 offers the transcendent interpretation in the context of a debating 
manual (advising the reader on how to debate with somebody who does 
not put forward a position); dGe ’dun chos ’phel’s work is, despite its title, 
not a study of Nagarj una’s thought in particular, but is mainly concerned 
with criticizing the then prevalent dGe lugs interpretation of Madhyamika 
philosophy more generally.
This is of course not to say that the argumentational and transcendent 
interpretations are for this reason deficient or lacking in interest within the 
context in which they are presented. However, it is important to be aware 
tha t these contexts were not Nagarj una’s context. There is certainly no 
reason for suspicion towards later Indian or indeed Non-Indian works as not 
giving a valid interpretation of Nagarjuna’s thoughts. Nevertheless, the most
10See Ruegg (2000, 32-33, note 59).
11 See Ruegg (2000, 194-195, note 135).
12See Lopez (1994). A translation of dGe ’dun chos ’phel’s Klu grub dgongs rgyan is in 
Lopez (2005).
13In his mKhas pa rnams ’jug pa’i sgo, III: 37-39. See Jackson (1987, volume 1, 271) 
for the Tibetan text, volume 2, 341-342 for an English translation. A summary with 
comments is in Ruegg (2000, 169-171).
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interesting of these for the present purpose of a philosophical analysis of Na- 
garjuna’s thoughts are those which allow us to understand passages from his 
works in their argumentative context, rather than using them as a starting 
points for presenting their own ideas on a particular topic,
9.3 The sem antic interpretation
If we consider the major dGe lugs pa commentaries on verse 29 it becomes 
evident tha t these usually regard Nagarj una’s statement as elliptical. W hat 
Nagarjuna really means when saying that he has no position, these commen­
taries claim is tha t he has no positions which are non-empty.14
The key to understanding the point made in these commentaries lies of 
course in a precise understanding of what it means for a position or statement 
to be empty. An object is empty if it does not exist from its own side and is 
therefore dependent on other objects, so that its existence is not grounded 
in its ‘own-nature’ (svabhava, rang bzhin). The Buddhist commentarial tra­
dition considers a variety of dependence relations in which objects stand and 
which prevent them from existing in a non-empty way. These dependence 
relations include causal dependence, dependence of a whole on its parts, as 
well as dependence on a cognizing subject.15 While in the case of certain 
objects their independent existence seems at least a prima facie plausibility 
which the Madhyamika then attempts to refute by appropriate arguments, 
the emptiness of statements appears to be entirely uncontroversial. Material 
objects might be considered to exist in causal and mereological dependence,
14,It is not being said that the Madhyamika has no theses; he mei'ely has not theses 
that inherently exist.’ Hopkins (1983, 471). The same point is made in mKhas grub rje’s
commentary on this passage; see Ruegg (2000, 179).
15See e.g. Gyatso (2005, 66-69).
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but independent of a cognizing subject; abstract objects, platonistically con­
ceived, will be assumed to be independent in all three ways. Statements, 
however, can hardly be taken to ‘exist from their own side’ in any of the 
three senses.
As even Nagarj una’s opponent affirms in VV 1 token16 utterances are 
events, which arise in dependence on causes and conditions like all other 
events. When considering utterances as types it is equally clear that, assum­
ing a compositional semantics, these are mereologically dependent on their 
parts, since the meaning of the sentence type is a function of the meanings 
of its constituents or parts. Finally, considering a constituent like the ex­
pression ‘red’, we realize that its referring to the colour red is no property 
the word ‘red’ has independently of everything else: the connection of this 
particular phonetic or typographic object with the property is a convention 
which holds for speakers of English; for speakers of French the same property 
is connected (by a different set of conventions) with ‘rouge’, for speakers of 
Tibetan with ‘dMar po’, and so forth. That ‘red’ refers to the colour red 
depends on a complex framework of conventions connecting a community of 
cognizing subjects which share a language. Unless we mistakenly consider 
‘empty’ to mean ‘false’ or ‘meaningless’ or ‘non-existent’ the claim that u t­
terances conceived of as either tokens or types are not empty seems to be a 
position it is hard to make sense of.
Despite the prima facie strangeness of their claims theories of the non­
emptiness of language have found their defenders. Perhaps the most extreme 
example is the view of language defended by the MTmamsakas.17 A primary
16A particular utterance of a sentence is a sentence-token, what is expressed by several
such utterances which say the same thing is a sentence-type.
17The basic text of this school is J aim ini’s Purva Mimams a Sutra. For the Mlmamsa
theory of language see especially the first adhyaya, first pada of this text (Jaimini 1916,
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motivation of the Mlmamsa theory of language was to provide a justification 
of the authoritative status of the Vedas. As opposed to the Naiyayikas, who 
justify the Vedas by their divine authorship the Mlmamsakas regard them 
as authorless (apauruseya). The elements of the Vedic language are assumed 
to exist eternally, without the necessity of a speaker. Any particular human 
utterance of course depends on a phonetic or typographical instantiation of 
a piece of language, but the types thus instantiated exist ante rem, without 
depending on the tokens instantiating them. The referents of expressions, 
which the Mlmamsakas take to be eternal and unchanging universals are 
related to these expressions via a set of objective and necessary relations.18
While the Mlmamsa view of language attracted plenty of criticism from 
the Buddhist side (centred around Dignagas apoha theory)19 there is no good 
evidence that this is the view Nagarj una’s opponent in the W  wants to 
defend.20
There is, however, some interesting evidence that at least some of Na- 
garjuna’s Indian commentators saw him as opposed to similar conceptions of 
language. When commenting on MMK 2:8 in his Prajnapradipa Bhaviveka 
raises the question why the verbal root gam, ‘to go’ is used in its atmanepada 
form ‘gacchate' rather than conjugated in the usual paraismapada manner as 
a ‘gacchatV21 Bhaviveka lists a varieties of quotations from Indian grammar­
1-22). See also D ’Sa (1980, 80-82, 113-140).
lsSharma (1960, 220-222).
19See Dreyfus (1997, 213-215).
20That Nagarjuna’s opponent was a Naiyayilca (as claimed by Bhattacharya (1977, 265) 
and Bhattacharya et al. (1978, 1)) is supported by the close connection between the VV
and the NS (Meuthrath 1999). See Bhattacharya (1999, 124) for further references.
21 Ames (1995, 309). This form is not found in any version of Candraklrti’s Prasannapada
from which the Sanskrit text of the MMK is usually extracted. Here we just read lgacchati, 
(PP 97:14, see also de Jong (1978)). Only recently some fragments of older manuscripts 
of the MMK independent of the Prasannapada have been discovered (see Ye (2006a),
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ians illustrating the perils of wrong grammar. When the god Tvastr created 
a serpent to destroy Indra he exclaimed indrasatrur vardhasva, intending to 
say ‘Go, destroyer of Indra!*. As he intended the compound to be a tatpurusa 
it should have been stressed on the ultimate syllable. Unfortunately Tvastr 
stressed it on the first syllable, turning it into a bahuvrihi meaning ‘having In­
dra as a destroyer*. The words did what they meant, rather than what Tvastr 
intended them to mean, and Indra destroyed the snake, not the other way 
round.22 Bhaviveka then continues to observe that Nagarjuna’s irregular use 
of lgacchat& was not only intentional, but served a philosophical purpose. By 
demonstrating tha t no disaster would strike from an irregular use of grammar 
Nagarjuna was aiming to convince his opponents to give up their attachment 
to mere words, together with the assumption that there was a substantial 
nature (svarupa) of words which determined that they could only appear in 
certain grammatical forms.23
Nevertheless, for the purposes of interpreting the VV it makes better sys­
tematic sense to ascribe a different (and less extreme) theory than that to 
Nagarjuna’s opponent. According to this theory wether a statement is empty 
or not does not depend on the mind-independent existence of language in 
some Platonic heaven but focuses on the semantics we employ when inter­
preting the statement. Even if we accept that the link between ‘red’ and 
the property of redness is conventional, this does not imply tha t we also 
think that the property of redness only has conventional existence as well, 
It can still be a property which exists in the world independent on human 
conventions and intentions. Moreover, even if the linkage of particular words
(2006b)). Unfortunately the verse in question is not amongst them.
22Ames (1995, 342, note 65). Notes 64-70 provide very useful information for identifying
some of the authors Bhaviveka quotes.
23Ames (1995, 310).
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to their referents should prove to be conventional, the linkage of entire sen­
tences to the world might not be. For example we might suppose that the 
statement ‘The apple is red’ is linked to the state of affairs it refers to by a 
relation of structural similarity, by their sharing of a common logical form, 
which is in turn is not a product of convention. Once we have linked up the 
simple signs of our language with the simple objects in the world we then 
do not need a further set of conventions to link up the complex signs (the 
sentences) with the complex objects (facts or states of affairs), in the same 
way as once we have settled by convention how the different chessmen are 
to  move we do not have to bring in further conventions to decide whether a 
particular distribution of chessmen on the board will allow white to mate in 
five moves. This can be decided just by reference to the initial conventions, 
and in the same way the truth-conditions of a sentence like ‘the apple is red’ 
can be worked out by considering the simple signs it is made up of and how 
these are put together in the sentence.
In fact both the assumptions behind this picture of the non-emptiness 
of statements, that there is a ‘ready-made world’, to borrow a phrase of 
Putnam ’s, and the assumption of a structural link between language and 
the world are extremely widespread, so widespread indeed that we might 
refer to them jointly as the ‘standard picture’. This standard picture pro­
vides us with good idea of what is meant by the notion of svabhava in the 
context of language, as opposed to an ontological understanding of svabha­
va in terms of substance, or a cognitive understanding in terms of a su­
perimposition (samaropa) which conceptualizes objects as permanent and 
observer-independent. The standard picture therefore represents the third, 
the semantic dimension of svabhava mentioned in chapter 2.
It is evident that the standard picture does not sit well with the thesis of
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universal emptiness. Neither the existence of a world sliced up ‘at the joints’ 
into particulars and properties nor the existence of an objective structural 
similarity between sentences and the world would be acceptable for the Ma­
dhyamika. A Madhyamika-compatible semantics would deny the existence 
of a world differentiated objectively into different logical parts, and would 
try to replace the structure-based picture of the language-world link by a 
different one, perhaps by a theory built on speaker conventions.
There is good historical evidence that the standard picture is indeed what 
Nagarjuna’s opponent presupposes if we take into account how closely many 
of the arguments in the VV engage with the NS. Garfield24 points out that
in the Nyaya-influenced logico-semantic context in which these 
debates [in the W ]  originate the dominant view of meaning­
ful assertion (the one that Nagarjuna calls into question) is one 
that from our vantagepoint can best be characterized as a ver­
sion of Fregean realism: meaningful assertions are meaningful be­
cause they denote or express independently existent properties.
A proposition is the pervasion of an individual entity or groups 
or entities by a real universal or sequence of universals.25
On this understanding of the emptiness of statements we can read the 
opponent as claiming in VV 1 that because of Nagarjuna’s thesis of universal 
emptiness the Madhyamika cannot accept the standard semantic interpreta­
tion for his utterances. For Nagarjuna both questions of ontology (how the 
world is sliced up) and of semantics (how language and the world are linked)
24Garfield (1996, 12).
25 On the relation between the VV and the Nyaya school see Oberhammer (1963) and 
Bhattacharya (1977). For some remarks on the realist background of the Navy a-Nyaya 
see Ingalls (1951, 1, 33-35).
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must be settled by appeal to conventions. The opponent, on the other hand, 
can assume tha t there is a ‘ready-made world’, as well as an objective, struc­
tural way of linking this to our language.26 Now the opponent argues that on 
this picture Nagarjuna never gets out of his system of conventions to connect 
his claims with the things — and that is the reason why his claims are unable 
to refute the opponent’s claims, which manage to connect with the things. 
Nagarjuna’s arguments can no more refute the opponent than the rain in 
a meteorological simulation can moisten real soil.27 Nagarjuna’s opponent 
thus considers the interesting case of a language where we have two kinds of 
statements: some are interpreted according to the standard semantics (refer­
ring via an objective reference relation to objects which exists independently 
of us), some are interpreted according to Nagarjuna’s semantics (which does 
not make these assumptions). The opponent argues that statements of the 
second kind could not possibly influence the first kind. To see this consider 
a similarly structured case. Assume we recognize two kinds of norms, norms 
which are real, objective, ‘out there’ and norms which are the product of 
human convention. (Moral realists take certain ethical norms to be of the 
first kind, rules for the regulation of traffic are generally considered to be of 
the second kind). Now it is clear that although the two kinds of norms could 
be in conflict, a norm of the second kind could never override one of the first
26 Another manifestation of the Naiyayika opponent’s conception of a harmonious word- 
world link is the view that the simple terms of our language cannot fail to refer (as discussed 
in chapter 3).
27In VV(S) 43:2-6 the opponent claims that ‘a fire that does not exist cannot burn, a 
weapon that does not exist cannot cut, water that does not exist cannot moisten; sim­
ilarly a statement that does not exist cannot deny the intrinsic nature of all things.’ 
na hy asatagnind sakyam dagdhum \ na hy asatd sastrena sakyam chettum j na hy 
asatibhir adbhih sakyam kledayitum \ evam asatd vacanena na sakyah sarva-bhava- 
svabhava-pratisedhah kartum.
CHAPTER 9. LANGUAGE 284
kind, since the former are part of the objective normative framework of the 
world, while the latter are only a supplement of human design.
Although he does not explicitly say so Nagarjuna’s arguments seem to 
imply that he agrees this situation would indeed be problematic. If there are 
two kinds of statements the latter would be as impotent compared to the 
former as a film would be to reality: we could not escape the burning cinema 
by entering the scene projected onto the wall. Nagarjuna counters the charge 
of impotence by denying that there are two kinds of statements, which differ 
like film and reality. All statements are to be interpreted in the same way, 
so that their interaction is not ontologically any more problematic than the 
interaction of different characters in a film.28
Understanding the emptiness of statements as their interpretation accord­
ing to a non-standard semantics we can also give a more interesting rendering 
of the argument in VV 4. Remember that there the opponent claims that 
Nagarjuna might want to say
According to this very method, a negation of negation is also im­
possible; so your negation of the statement negating the intrinsic 
nature of all things is impossible.29
The opponent has just claimed tha t because Nagarjuna’s theory entailed a 
non-standard semantics his assertions did not manage to connect with the 
world and were therefore meaningless. But if the opponent then sets out to 
refute the thesis of universal emptiness, this either means that he takes it 
to be meaningful after all (and therefore deserving refutation) or that the 
statement he wants to defend (which is the negation of Nagarjuna’s claim)
28See particularly VV 23, 27; MMK 17:31-33.
29 pratisedhapratisedho ’py anenaiva ka Ip en dnupap arm a h tatra yadbhavan sarva-bhava- 
svabhava-pratisedha-vacanam pratisedhayati tad anupapannam iti. VV(S) 45:16-18.
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is meaningless as well, since plugging in the word ‘not’ will not help to turn 
nonsense into sense.
The opponent could reply to this charge by pointing out the difference 
between internal and external negation. While it is plausible to assume 
that the internal negation of a nonsensical statement is nonsensical too (‘the 
number seven is not yellow (but rather some other colour)’ is as problematic 
as ‘the number seven is yellow’) this is not the case for an external negation 
(‘it is not the case that the number seven is yellow’ is not just meaningful but 
also generally taken to be necessarily true). Nagarjuna’s opponent could then 
claim that his negation of the claim of universal emptiness is external only 
and therefore not affected by the lack of meaning in the claim it negates.30
It is possible tha t the opponent had argued like this, as a distinction 
between the different scopes of negation, as well as the accompanying pre- 
suppositional and non-presuppositional readings was made in the philosoph­
ical literature of the time.31 It has to be noted, however, tha t the passage 
in question fails to make any direct reference to different kinds of negation 
being involved.32
A more abstract way of employing the distinction between the two kinds 
of negation in the opponent’s reply consists in rejecting Nagarjuna’s pe­
culiar semantics. Here the opponent points out that he does not have to 
accept Nagarjuna’s semantics as it is a particular characteristic (laksana) 
of Nagarjuna’s system, but nothing the opponent would be forced to take
30Garfield (1996, 12) reads the argument in this way and argues that the opponent just
wants to negate Nagarjuna’s position, without asserting the contrary.
31 For present purposes we can assume a (simplifying) identification of
paryudasapratisedha with internal negation and of prasajyapratisedha with external 
negation. For further differentiation see Ruegg (2002, note 6, 19-24) as well as the
discussion in chapter 4, section 4.1.
32Compare also the discussion in Ruegg (2000, 117).
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on board.33 The opponent does not just negate Nagarjuna’s claim of uni­
versal emptiness, but the entire non-standard semantics which comes with 
it. If prasajya-negation is seen as a presupposition-cancelling negation which 
negates not just a proposition but also that proposition’s presuppositions,34 
and if the semantics according to which a speaker wants the set of his utter­
ances interpreted is included amongst these presuppositions denying a claim 
together with the semantics it comes with can be regarded as an example of 
p ra s aj y a- n e gat i on.
9.4 The specific role of verse 29
It is interesting to note that verse 29, which is meant to be a reply to the 
opponent’s argument given in verse 4 does not attempt a comeback in try­
ing to argue that the opponent’s negation of Nagarjuna’s claim of universal 
emptiness is somehow impossible after all. Instead Nagarjuna addresses a 
difficulty (dosa) arising from the ‘specific character’ of his system which the 
opponent raises at the end of verse 4.
In mKhas grub rje’s sThong thun chen mo, an influential dGe lugs com­
mentary which deals with the interpretation of this passage35 this difficulty 
is taken to be inconsistency. If Nagarjuna assumed that his thesis of uni­
versal emptiness was non-empty itself (rang bzhin gyis yod pa) and, on our 
interpretation, would therefore have to be supplied with a semantics accord­
33‘The objection applies only to the specific character of your proposition, not to that 
of mine. It is you who say all things are void, not I. The initial thesis is not mine.’ tava hi 
pratijhalaksanapraptam na mama \ bhavan braviti sunyah sarvabhava iti naham \ purnakah
pakso na mama. VV(S) 45:19-66:2.
34As e.g. in Shaw (1978, 63-64).
35See Ruegg (2000, 173-187) for a summary and analysis of the relevant part of the 
commentary.
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ing to the standard picture his position would be inconsistent (at least until 
he proposed a special reason why this statement should be excepted, which 
Nagarjuna does not do). But, mKhas grub rje argues, since none of Nagar­
juna’s claims of universal emptiness are taken to be non-empty, the difficulty 
of inconsistency does not arise.36 The same point is made by Tsong kha pa:37
Therefore, the issue as to having or not having theses is not an 
argument about whether [Nagarjuna] has them in general It is 
an argument as to whether the words of the thesis ‘all things lack 
intrinsic nature’ have intrinsic nature. [Therefore the meaning of 
the lines from the VV is this:] If I accepted that the words of 
such a thesis had an intrinsic nature, then I could be faulted for 
contradicting the thesis that all things lack intrinsic nature, but 
because I do not accept that I cannot be faulted.
W hat is unsatisfactory about this interpretation is tha t Nagarjuna has 
already made the point ascribed to him here in verse 22. There he claims 
tha t his claim of universal emptiness is also empty, and gives reasons why 
he thinks it can still have argumentative force, thus avoiding the charge of 
impotence. Unless we assume Nagarjuna to be unnecessarily repetitive it is 
not clear why we should assume that he makes the very same point once 
again a couple of verses later, and also formulates it in a much more obscure 
manner than the first time.
36150al-3, Ruegg (2000, 179).
37des na dam bca’ yod med ni spyir yod med rtsod pa ma yin gyi \ dngos po thams cad 
la rang bzhin med do zhes dam bcas pa ’i tshig la rang bzhin yod med rtsod pa yin pas | de 
’dra ba’i dam bcas p a ’i tshig de la rang bzhin yod par khas blangs na dngos po thams cad 
rang bzhin med par dam bcas pa dang ’gal ba’i skyon nged la yod n a’ng \ nged de Itar mi 
’dod pas skyon de nga la med (1985, 687:13-17), (2000-2004, 111:241).
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It is important to note that verses 21-28, which deal with the objections 
raised in the first three verses of the W  are primarily concerned with solving 
the dilemma of inconsistency and impotence which is faced by Nagarjuna’s 
claim of universal emptiness, Verse 29, however, (pace mKhas grub and 
Tsong kha pa) is not again concerned with the thesis of universal emptiness, 
Nagarjuna realizes that the twin problem of inconsistency and impotence is 
not just a problem for his thesis of universal emptiness, but for any other 
claim he holds as well. Any other claim will either face the problem of being 
a counterexample to Nagarjuna’s assertion that all claims should be given a 
non-standard semantics, or it will fail to connect up with the world in the way 
sentences with the standard semantics do, and will therefore be meaningless. 
I want to argue tha t this is the difficulty arising from the ‘specific character’ 
of Nagarjuna’s system the opponent refers to in verse 4 and which Nagarjuna 
takes up again at the beginning of verse 29. He is not interested in defending 
the claim (attributed to him by the opponent in verse 4) that his thesis 
of universal emptiness could not possibly be negated. Instead he takes up 
the opponent’s more important point that apart from defending his claim of 
universal emptiness from the twin problems of inconsistency and impotence, 
he should better say something about the status of his other assertions as 
well. This is why he says in verse 29 that none of his other assertions should 
be regarded as propositions with standard semantics (pratijha) either.38
The plausibility of this interpretation rests on there being two mean­
ing of ‘thesis’ (pratijha) in play here, one referring to theses with standard 
semantics (which Nagarjuna rejects) and one which refers to theses with non­
380etke (2003, 468-471) reconstruction of Nagarjuna’s argument results in a different 
reading of verse 29; he argues that here Nagarjuna claims that for the Madhyamika there 
is no thesis to be made at the absolute level (paramartha) — a reading entirely consistent 
with Nagarjuna’s other statements (e.g. MMK 18:9).
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standard semantics (which Nagarjuna does not reject). In fact there appears 
to be good textual evidence tha t the notion of ‘thesis’ is indeed used in two 
different ways in Madhyamaka literature.
CandrakTrti’s commentary on Nagarjuna uses one sense of thesis (pratijha) 
to refer to statements with clearly unproblematic status, indeed some utter­
ances by Nagarjuna himself are regarded as theses in this way,39 while theses 
in another sense are firmly rejected. We might want to refer to the first kind 
of theses as propositions, and to the second as views. How are we to un­
derstand the distinction between them? It has been claimed that views are 
theses with philosophical or metaphysical commitments40 and, more specifi­
cally, that they postulate an independently existing entity (bhdva).41 Propo­
sitions, on the other hand, do not make such commitments and are therefore 
philosophically unproblematic. It is important to note at this point, how­
ever, tha t what distinguishes a view from a proposition is not just that the 
former asserts the existence of objects existing by svabhava while the latter 
does not. On this understanding the statement ‘Object x  does not depend 
in any way on any other object’ would be a view concerning x } while ‘Object 
x stands in a variety of dependence relations with other objects’ would not 
be. Ontological commitment only comes into play at the level of seman­
tics. Whether someone asserting that the average man has 2.4 children is 
committed to an object which acts as the reference of the expression ‘the 
average man’ depends on the semantics given. If we interpret the statement
39For example MMK 1:1 in PP 13:3. See Ruegg (1983, 213-214) for further examples. 
Oetke (2003, 458-459), however, argues that the distinction between two senses of pratijna 
only arises in the later Prasangika literature and should not be read back into Nagarjuna’s
works.
40Sagal (1992, 83).
41 Ruegg (1983, 213).
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in the way statements like ‘Paul has two children’ are usually interpreted, 
such commitment to a strange man with partial children ensues; if, on the 
other hand we read it (more plausibly) as a statement about ratios between 
the number of men and children in a certain set there is no such commitment.
It therefore seems to be plausible to take the distinction between views 
and propositions and between theses with standard and non-standard seman­
tics as coinciding. The views the Madhyamika rejects are theses which are 
interpreted by referring to a ready-made world and a structural link between 
this world and our language. The propositions he takes to be unproblematic, 
and some of which he holds himself, are theses which are given a semantics 
which makes neither of these two assumptions.
Some support for this semantic interpretation of the difference between 
the two senses of ‘thesis’ can be gained from MMK 13:8:
The Victorious Ones have announced that emptiness is the re­
linquishing of all views. Those who in turn hold emptiness as a 
view were said to be incurable.42
Although Nagarjuna does not use the word pratijna for ‘view’ but rather 
talks of drsti, it seems to be sensible to treat the two terms as synonymous in 
this context.43 If the difference between propositions and views just depended 
on what the statement asserted, statements asserting the emptiness of some 
phenomenon such as ‘each spatio-temporal object depends causally on some 
other object’ ex hypothesi could not be views, contrary to what Nagarju­
na says in the verse just cited. If, however, we treat ‘view’ as denoting
42sunyata sarvadrstmam proktd nihsaranam jinaih /  yesdrn tu sunyatadrstis tan 
asadhydn babhasire.
43As done by Ruegg (1986, 232-233) and Mabbett (1996, 301). For more details on the 
relation between the two terms pratijna and drsti see Ruegg (2000, 129-136).
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a statement together with the standard semantics, this is indeed possible. 
For if we read ‘each spatio-temporal object depends causally on some other 
object’ as asserting the existence of various objectively existing individuals 
in the world, linked by a relation of causation, about which we speak by 
exploiting an objectively obtaining structural similarity between language 
and the world it would indeed be turned into a view.
That the point at issue here is a specific (and, as Nagarjuna sees it, 
inappropriate) conception of semantics is supported by CandrakTrti’s com­
mentary on this verse. Candraklrti argues that one taking emptiness to be a 
view is like one who, when being told by a shopkeeper tha t he has nothing 
to sell, asks the shopkeeper to sell him that nothing, The customer (like the 
White King in Alice through the looking-glass) treats ‘nothing’ like a proper 
name and therefore expects it to denote a particular object, as proper names 
do. But though justified by the surface grammar of the sentence concerned, 
this does not lead to an understanding of what the merchant wants to say. 
Similarly, giving a standard semantical interpretation of statements assert­
ing emptiness does not lead to an understanding of what Nagarjuna wants 
to say.44
The semantic interpretation outlined above provides a good way of mak­
ing sense of verse 29 within the argumentative structure of the VV and also 
provides us with an idea of what a Madhyamaka theory of language would 
look like. W hat Nagarjuna means when he says that he ‘has no thesis’ is that 
none of his theoretical statements (including the claim of universal empti­
44This interpretation does of course not imply that one could hold ‘any position at all’ 
as long as one gives it the required non-standard semantics, as Galloway (1989, note 5, 27) 
asserts. A statement like ‘things arise from what is other that themselves’ will be regarded 
as false by Nagarjuna, independent of whether it is interpreted according to the standard 
or the non-standard semantics.
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ness) are to be interpreted according to a semantics based on the standard 
picture. For the Madhyamika no assertion is to be taken to refer to a ready­
made world of mind-independent objects, nor can he assume that there is a 
structural similarity linking word and world which is independent of human 
conceptual activity.
Chapter 10
Conclusion: Nagarjuna’s 
philosophical project
This chapter is to serve three purposes. First of all it will summarize the main 
philosophical conclusions Nagarjuna argues for. The arguments in support of 
these have been analysed in detail in the preceding chapters, I will therefore 
confine myself to a concise statement of the conclusions themselves. Secondly 
I set out to show that these are not just isolated philosophical statements 
but fit together as a unified philosophical theory which is Nagarjuna’s Ma- 
dhyamaka. Finally I want to assess some systematic aspects of the emerging 
theory, its theoretical appeal as well as some connections with contemporary 
philosophical debates.
10.1 M etaphysics
Nagarjuna’s central metaphysical thesis is the denial of any kind of substance 
whatsoever. Here substance, or, more precisely, svabhava when understood 
as substaiice-svabhava is taken to be any object which exist objectively, the
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existence and qualities of which are independent of other objects, human con­
cepts or interests, something which is, to use a later Tibetan turn of phrase 
‘established from its own side’.1 To appreciate how radical this thesis is we 
just have to remind ourselves to which extent many of the ways of investigat­
ing the world are concerned with identifying such substances. Whether it is 
the physicist searching for fundamental particles or the philosopher setting 
up a system of the most fundamental ontological categories, in each case we 
are looking for a firm foundation of the world of appearances, the end-points 
in the chain on existential dependencies, the objects on which all else depends 
but which do not themselves depend on anything. We might think that any 
such analysis which follows existential dependence relations all the way down 
must eventually hit rock-bottom. As Burton2 notes, ‘the wooden table may 
only exist in dependence upon the human mind (for tables only exist in the 
context of human conventions) but the wood at least (without its ‘tableness’) 
has a mind-independent existence.’ According to this view there is thus a 
single true description of the world in terms of its fundamental constituents, 
whether these are pieces of wood, property particulars, fundamental particles 
or something else entirely. In theory at least we can describe -  and hopefully 
also explain -  the make-up of the world by starting with these constituents 
and account for everything else in terms of complexes of them.
The core of Nagarjuna’s rejection of substance is an analysis which sets 
out to demonstrate a variety of problems with this notion. The three most im­
portant areas Nagarjuna focuses on are causal relations between substances, 
change, and the relation between substances and their properties.
1rang ngos nas grub pa.
2Burton (1999, 115). Compare Siderits (2004, 395).
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Causation
Supposing there were such things as substances Nagarjuna argues tha t they 
could not stand in the relation of cause and effect. The first, and simplest 
argument to this effect is of course to point out that if one substance caused 
another, the latter being an effect would be existentially dependent on the 
first and therefore could not be a substance, as it is an essential property of 
substances not to be dependent in such a way.
But Nagarjuna also employs a different argument which can be used 
against an opponent who does not want to rule out all dependence rela­
tions between substances. Like the Abhidhannilcas he might want to assert 
tha t substances can form a causal network, but still claim that they are in­
dependent in important other respects (for example not being dependent on 
their parts or on human interests or concerns).3 This argument proceeds as 
follows.
Nagarjuna agrees with the Abhidharma analysis that any substance, any 
object which exists by its own intrinsic nature has to be atomic. For if 
it consisted of parts it would be existentially dependent on them. But as 
the Abhidharrnika’s mereological argument aims to demonstrate a partite 
entity cannot be regarded as ultimately real. It is rather to be conceived 
of as a conceptual construction from (or as a superimposition 011) its parts, 
which may be ultimately real, presupposing that they do not depend for their 
existence on anything else. It is obvious that the demand for the atomicity 
of substance cannot just be restricted to mereological atomicity but must 
include temporal atomicity as well. For in the same way in which we can 
argue that a house is conceptually constructed from its proper mereological 
parts, such as bricks, beams, tiles and so on, in the same way we have to
3See Siderits (2004, 396), Burton (1999, 90), Walser (2005, 241-243).
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regard it as being constructed as a collection of temporal moments, namely 
from its temporal part which exists now, from that in the next second, from 
the one after tha t and so forth.
We now already see the problem for the causal relation between sub­
stances on the horizon, as causation is a relation which is necessarily located 
in time. We will recall that Nagarjuna considered the different possible tem­
poral relations between cause and effect and rejected them all as problematic 
when dealing with substances. Clearly it makes no sense to assume that 
the cause exists only after the effect, for once the effect exists there is no 
further necessity for the cause to bring it about. It might initially seem 
more plausible to assume that the cause exists first, and is succeeded by the 
effect. But after a moment’s thought it becomes apparent that within the 
present ist framework in which the argument is set up this means that only 
one relatum of the causal relation will exist at one time. For while the cause 
exists the effect, being future, does not yet exist, and after it has come about 
the cause, being past, exists no longer. In this case it should be apparent 
that we cannot deal with a relation between two substances or ultimately 
real things, for one of the relata is only provided by our expectation4 (or our 
memory in the retrospective case). On this understanding causation cannot 
be regarded as a relation between items ‘which are there anyway’ but has 
to be seen as essentially dependent on the mind which supplies it with the 
missing relatum. The final possibility, that cause and effect are simultaneous 
does not fare much better, as discussions of causation commonly accept that 
it makes not much sense to speak of two simultaneous events (such as the 
rising and falling of the opposite ends of a perfectly rigid see-saw) in terms
4As noted by Bhaviveka in his commentary on MMK 1:3 in the Prajn dp ? u dip a (Pandeya 
1988-1989, 26).
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of cause and effect, for each argument we could produce for one event being 
the cause can equally well be used to claim that it is the effect. Even if we 
could get around this difficulty somehow we would certainly not want to say 
that simultaneity of cause and effect is something to be found in all instances 
of causation.
At this place in the argument we might want to accuse Nagarjuna of hav­
ing neglected a crucial case: that of the cause and effect overlapping. After 
all this is the most straightforward model of causation we have. When we 
see a potter make a pot we see the pot during the process of its production, 
i.e. at a time at which both the cause (the pot-making potter) and the effect 
(the pot being produced) exist. So cause and effect appear to be able to exist 
as temporally overlapping events. But the problem is that this commonsense 
model of causal production cannot be used to account for the causation be­
tween substances. Because substances are temporally atomic they cannot 
undergo a temporally thick process of gradual emergence we observe in ob­
jects which are not part of the fundamental furniture of the world (such as 
pots). At any particular moment either there is such a substance or there is 
not. For this reason the three temporal relations examined by Nagarjuna are 
really all there is for substances to which the concept of gradual emergence 
does not apply.5 Assuming we accept Nagarjuna’s argument that causation is
5Siderits (2003, 131), (2004, 418, note 30) notes that during a process of gradual 
production such as that of a pot we find that there will always be a stage at which it is 
vague whether or not the pot has been produced yet. According to some views of pots 
the produced entity is already a pot, but not according to others. This is unproblematic, 
as we accept that there are different ways of conceptualizing pots. But we would not 
countenance a similar vagueness in the case of substances, for here it should precisely 
not depend on our conceptualizing whether a particular substance exists or not. This 
should be something settled by the world on its own. Arguing in this way provides us 
with another reason why we would not want to accept that the causal relation between
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conceptually constructed it is clear how this can be employed against the Ab- 
hidharmika’s view of primary existents. For even though the Abhidharmika 
can accept that primary existents possessing svabhava can be dependent on 
causes and conditions they should not be dependent on the human mind. 
But then the existence of one primary existent should not be dependent on 
another one by a relation which is mind-dependent. So assuming these ob­
jects are connected by causation they cannot be primary (dravya) but must 
be secondary existents (prajnapti).
Change
It is an obvious fact tha t the world around us is always changing. Now a 
substance, an object which has its properties intrinsically could not change 
with regard to these properties. For in this case the existence of the prop­
erties would rely on the causes and conditions which brought them about 
so these properties would turn out to be dependent after all. For the same 
reason substances could not come into existence or go out of existence; be­
sides being changeless they also have to be eternal.6 For the defender of 
substances it is therefore necessary to regard all the change we observe as 
a mere difference in rearrangement of the most fundamental constituents of 
the world. Successive states of the world are just permutations of what is 
there all the time, An immediate consequence of this is that the fundamental 
particles physics studies do not qualify as substances. For suppose such a 
particle is destroyed in a collision close to the speed of light. A the same time 
a burst of energy is detected in the close vicinity. Now we either say that
substances could be conceived of in terms of a temporal overlap,
°This presupposes that the annihilation of a substance does not imply any change
regarding its properties, since both the substance and its properties cease to exist.
CHAPTER 10. CONCLUSION 299
the particle went out of existence and the energy burst came into existence 
more or less at the same time, in which case neither can be a substance for 
the reasons just noted, or we say that the particle changed into the energy 
burst, in which case we have to explain this change in terms of some yet more 
fundamental elements the rearrangements of which could appear either as a 
fundamental particle or as a burst of energy. The fundamental constituents 
of the physical world thereby recede further and further.
We might want to argue that we are acquainted with some eternal, un­
changing entities, such as mathematical objects. Of course this depends 
heavily on our ontology of mathematics, and looking at the contemporary 
discussion Platonism does not seem to be a position attracting the most con­
vincing defences. But even if we assume Platonism is true, we would have 
to argue in addition that all the objects of our experience can be reduced 
to abstract objects if we follow the downwards chain of dependencies for a 
long enough time. How a complex arrangement of objects without spatio- 
temporal location could turn out to have such a location in itself would be 
only one of the startling questions such a theory would have to answer. It 
therefore appears that the permanent entities we are acquainted with are 
not quite the right kind of thing for playing the role of fundamental parts of 
reality, while those which seem to be the right kind of thing (like the fun­
damental particles of physics) cannot be regarded as fundamental as long as 
they are subject to change as well. Once more the notion of objects existing 
with svabhava seems to have slipped our conceptual grasp.
Substances and their properties
Another difficulty arising if we assume 'there are substances is the relationship 
between such substances and their properties. We cannot just conceive of
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some substance as an individual instantiating properties. For the sake of 
illustration (and using an Indian example) suppose that water-atoms are 
substances and that their only intrinsic property is wetness. Now what is 
the individual in which wetness inheres? As it is not characterized by any 
other properties it must be some kind of propertyless bare particular. W hat 
makes it a bare particular? Given that we are dealing with substances here 
it had better not depend on some other object. But if it is a bare particular 
by svabhava and being a bare particular is therefore its intrinsic nature we 
are in the same situation as we were with the water-atoms and their wetness. 
For now we can ask what the individual is in which being a bare particular 
inheres, and then we are well on our way into an infinite regress. Note that 
this problem does not got away if we feel uneasy about the property ‘being 
a bare particular’ and do not want to admit it. For we have to assume that 
the individual has some determinate nature due to which it is a bearer of its 
properties and the difficulty will just reappear with whatever we take such a 
nature to be.
It does not help much if we conceive of substances as particularized prop­
erties or tropes instead. For then it is unclear how we can individuate one 
wetness-trope from another. We cannot differentiate them according to the 
individuals in which they inhere because we have just rejected the existence of 
individuals at the level of substances. We cannot say that this wetness-trope 
is different from that because they turn up in different samples of water, since 
the samples of water are just collections of tropes. Of course we could try 
to tell apart the various trope-substances by the collections in which they 
occur (or, more precisely, by which other tropes they are related to via a 
higher-order compresence-trope). The difficulty for this is that it introduces 
dependence-relations via the back door, for every trope will existentially de­
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pend on being connected to just these other tropes via a compresence-trope 
— we cannot take a trope and ‘move’ it to another collection. As we want 
to conceive of substances as entities which are not existentially dependent 
on one another this approach inevitably introduces a certain tension into our 
system.
It thus becomes apparent that once more a conceptual scheme which can 
be more or less straightforwardly applied to non-substances breaks down once 
we attem pt to analyse the supposedly foundational objects of our world in 
terms of it. This happened in the case of causation and can be observed once 
again in the case of individuals and properties. While there is no difficulty 
in analyzing the relation between a potter and a pot in terms of cause and 
effect, various problems ensue if we try to transpose this to an analysis of 
the relation of substances. Similarly while the analysis of a red apple into 
an individual and the property it instantiates is at least on the face of it 
unproblematic, the same analysis cannot be carried out when dealing with 
ultimate existents.
After the criticism of the distinction between individuals and properties in 
N agarj una’s discussion of motion this should not be too much of a surprise. 
There he attempted to show that the distinction between individuals and 
properties is not one which exists independent of our conceptualizations. As 
the talk about the ‘property’ instantiated by a thin individual (such as a 
clap of thunder) had to be explained in terms of a single feature seen in two 
different ways -  as constitutive and as instantiating -  in the same way talk of 
the properties of ordinary thick individuals (such as Farinelli) could be seen 
to be equally a reflection of the division of their features into constitutive and 
instantiating properties, something which is just a reflection of our pragmatic 
concerns in conceptualizing the individual in question, but not a reflection
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of its intrinsic nature.
We could now imagine that somebody would argue as follows. Nagar- 
juna has shown that we run into difficulties if we attem pt to analyse the 
fundamental constituents of reality, objects which have an intrinsic nature in 
terms of such notions as cause and effect, change, or individual and property. 
Such objects cannot stand in causal relationships, they do not change, they 
cannot be thought of as bearers of properties. The most fundamental bits 
of reality therefore fail to be grasped by the familiar conceptual schemes we 
employ in our everyday lives in order to get around in the world. We therefore 
have to assume that substances are acausal, atemporal (since for them there 
is neither beginning, end, nor any change in between) entities which cannot 
be regarded as objects having properties. Given the fundamentality of the 
above conceptual schemes to our cognitive lives this seems to be nearly as 
good as saying that the nature of substances transcends conceptualization. 
Since the fundamental constituents of reality cannot be grasped by concepts 
which are our nearest and dearest they constitute an ineffable reality to which 
we can have no cognitive access.
This interpretation was favoured by some Indian commentators. A par­
ticularly well-known example can be found in Dharmapala’s debate with 
Bhaviveka.7
There the Yogacarin Dharmapala takes Bhaviveka to task for asserting 
that even though things exist at the conventional level, nothing exists at the 
ultimate level. Dharmapala argues that it would be mistaken to assume that
7See Hoornaert (2004), Tillemans (1990). For modern defenders of the ineffability 
thesis which do not presuppose a Yogacara background see e.g. Murti (1955), Inada (1970, 
24-26), Matilal (1990, 149), Mohanty (1992, 278). Interpreters who accept the ineffability 
thesis may or may not accept that there is a non-conceptual form of cognition through 
which substances can nevertheless be known.
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at the ultimate level there was no svabhava at all, leaving the knowledge of 
ultimate reality without an object, like knowledge of a non-existent flower in 
the sky.8 It should rather be understood in terms of the Yogacara theory of 
the ‘three natures’ (trisvabhava) by claiming that only the imagined nature 
(parakalpita svabhava), the mistaken projection of things as sustantial, was 
completely non-existent. Both the dependent nature (paratantra svabhava), 
the appearances, as well as the absolute nature (parinispanna svabhava), the 
fact that the dependent nature is empty of the imagined nature, do, however, 
exist.9 Moreover, the true nature of things is completely beyond concepts.10
The difficulty with this interpretation is that if we regard the true nature 
of things as ineffable we still assume that there are objects with a mind- 
independent11 intrinsic nature, namely that of ineffability. This position 
assumes tha t there is a way things are from their own side, by svabhava, 
which is not in any way affected by us. The key difference between this 
kind of realism and the more familiar kind of realism which provides the 
background to much contemporary philosophy (and much of our everyday 
life) is an epistemological one. Common-or-garden realism asserts there is 
a way the world is which is independent of all description, and tha t we can 
know at least a substantial part of it. Its less plain cousin agrees with the first
8Hoornaert (2004, 132-133).
9Hoornaert (2004, 139-140).
10ra£> tu phye ba tshig dang bral ba (Hoornaert 2004, 141, note 60).
n We might think that because ineffability contains a reference to the conceptual frame­
works we use it is in fact a mind-dependent quality. But its dependence is only notional, 
not existential. Compare it with the property ‘is so long that it cannot be measured by 
any measuring-rod on earth’. If any object had this property it would obviously not make 
sense to describe it in this way if our planet ceased to exist. But the annihilation of the 
earth would not affect its length. In the same way the ineffable nature of a substance 
remains the same whether or not there is anyone around trying to eff it.
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part of the statement, but holds that this state of things forever eludes our 
grasp. But it is clear that for Nagarjuna neither form of realism is acceptable. 
The doctrine of emptiness tries to establish that there are no objects with 
intrinsic natures, whether they are knowable or not. The view of substances 
as ineffable which introduces entities with svabhava through the back door 
is therefore to be firmly resisted.
A key element of the rejection of the view of ineffable substances is deny­
ing that it makes any sense to speak of objects lying beyond our conceptual 
frameworks, or, as Dharmapala put it, as ‘inaccessible to differentiating con­
sciousness and words’ and ‘suspending all speech’.12 These frameworks are 
all we have and if we can show that some notion is not to be subsumed under 
them we must not conclude that it therefore has some shadowy existence 
outside of the framework. To this extent our conceptual framework is to be 
thought of not so much as a map of a country, but as a set of rules for a game. 
If a traveler brings us news from a city in some far-off land which we cannot 
find on our map we conclude (if we regard the traveler to be truthful) tha t it 
must be located somewhere outside of the area covered by our map. But if 
somebody told us he had found a new opening gambit in chess, but tha t this 
could not be written down using the familiar notation be would be justified 
in being puzzled. After all the notation allows us to describe all the legal 
moves of chess (as well as some illegal ones), so how could something tha t is 
part of a game not be constructed in accordance with the rules of the game? 
In this case we would not conclude that because of the limited nature of the 
expressive resources of chess notation this gambit was beyond its grasp, but 
rather that there was no such gambit. It is not that there are some objects 
within the grasp of our cognitive capacities as well as some beyond them,
12Hoornaert (2004, 148-149).
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but rather that the very concept of an object is something established by 
these capacities. It is not that parts of the world might not correspond to 
our linguistic and conceptual frameworks but that the idea of a structure of 
reality independent of these practices is incoherent.13 Our ability to grasp 
the world by concepts is acquired by our knowledge of language (or, as some 
might argue, is the very same thing as that knowledge). Language is a public 
phenomenon, an ability we display in interaction with other speakers. We 
would therefore want to claim that we can only be taken to have understood 
the meaning of a word or to have mastered some concept if we can give a 
public display of its use or application. A concept for which we could not 
give the application conditions even in principle, where we could not even tell 
in the abstract what kinds of objects would fall under it is not a concept at 
all. But this seems to be exactly the situation with the concept of substance 
when seen as ineffable. Because what falls under this concept is understood 
to transcend all our conceptual resources we would be necessarily unable to 
apply this concept to anything. It is for this reason that the Madhyamika 
claims that the concept of an ineffable substance is necessarily empty. And 
once this concept is ruled out the only remaining conclusion to draw from 
Nagarjuna’s criticism of substance is that there is no such thing, not even an 
ineffable one.
The metaphysical anti-realism defended by Nagarjuna is not just of histor­
ical but also of considerable systematic interest. One reason is its wide scope. 
While most of the discussion of anti-realism we find in the contemporary lit­
erature is concerned with particular local phenomena (such as mathematical
13Candrakirti makes this point criticizing the Yogacara view of the mind as self- 
illuminating (svaprafcaso), See Siderits (1989, 243). This, however, does not imply that 
these frameworks would not be susceptible to criticism or change. See Tillemans (2003, 
123, note 47).
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objects or moral values), the Madhyamika’s anti-realism takes the form of a 
general anti-foundationalism which does not just deny the objective, intrin­
sic and mind-independent existence of some class of objects, but rejects such 
existence for any kinds of objects which we could regard as the most funda­
mental building-blocks of the world. A second interesting point is the fact 
that Nagarjuna does not regard his metaphysical theory to imply that any­
thing is up for grabs. That there are no substantially existent entities does 
not entail tha t there are no selves responsible for their actions, no distinction 
between the moral worth of different actions, no difference between true and 
false theories. The Madhyamika therefore has to come up with an account of 
convention which is both solid enough to ground our ethical, epistemic and 
semantic practices but not so rigid as to re-introduce some sort of realism 
regarding any of these.
10.2 Personal Identity
Nagarjuna’s rejection of entities existing by svabhava is not restricted to the 
study of the external world around us. At least as important as refuting 
the existence of fundamental substances which provide the basis for a world 
independent of human interests and concerns is the refutation of a substan­
tial self, which constitutes the fixed point around which our internal world 
revolves. Such a substantial self is an essentially unchanging entity, distinct 
from our physical body and psychological states which unifies our sensory in­
put and mental life and acts as a foundation of our agenthood in the world. 
Nagarjuna wants to replace this prima facie plausible and compelling view 
of a self which, however, he claims to be mistaken by a conception of the self 
as a set of causally interconnected physical and psychological events. He sets
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out to account for the fact that we normally do not see ourselves in this way 
by arguing that this set of events is usually under the misapprehension of its 
own properties, i.e. it sees itself as a substantial self, even though it is not.
It is interesting to note that this alternative view of the self presented here 
(which, to be sure, is not a Madhyamaka speciality but widely shared be­
tween different Buddhist traditions) despite its intuitive implausibility finds 
a surprising amount of support in recent research on cognitive science. Of 
particular interest in this context is the so-called narrative view of the self, 
a theory which has been explored in detail by Daniel Dennett,14 who also 
present supporting evidence from our current knowledge of how the brain 
works. One of Dennett’s central observations is that the processing of neu- 
rophysiologically encoded information is spread out across the entire brain. 
There is no place in the brain where ‘it all comes together’, no ‘Cartesian 
theatre5 where the stream of sensory information is unified into mental con­
tent and presented to consciousness. He argues that not only is there no 
neurophysiological analogue to the self anywhere in the spatial organization 
of the brain, the temporal sequence of events in the brain also cannot be used 
as a foundation of a continuous self. Dennett shows that in certain cases the 
order of events as they appear in our consciousness does not line up with 
the temporal order of their underlying neurophysiological bases.15 The view 
of our selves as continuous, temporally extended entities therefore cannot be 
seen as a mere reflection of a series of events in the brain, but requires a 
significant deal of conceptual construction. Our subjective feelings of spatial 
and temporal location cannot be grounded on the spatially and temporally 
spread out, discontinuous series of events in the brain in a straightforward
14Most famously in Dennett (1991).
10Dennett (1991, 134-138).
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manner. Onr view of the self as an essentially unchanging unifier and agent 
cannot be based on our biological makeup in the same way as our view of 
the nature of the centre of gravity (another conceptual construction) of some 
object cannot be based on the structure of the piece of m atter which occupies 
the space where we locate the centre of gravity.
Dennett argues instead that the self is a product of our linguistic capaci­
ties. The capacity to use language is hard-wired into our brain, and once we 
start using language we tell stories, including stories about ourselves which 
continuously create that very self. The self emerging on this theory is not the 
author, but the authored. Dennett notes that ‘our tales are spun, but for the 
most part we don’t spin them; they spin us. The human consciousness, and 
our narrative selfhood, is the product, not their source.’16 For this reason 
there is no fundamental difference between the self created by our own nar­
rative and the selves created in works of fiction.17 It is not the case tha t the 
former are intrinsically more real than the latter, in fact they belong funda­
mentally to the same class of things (even though the fictional selves, unlike 
our own narrative selves, are usually not open-ended). Both are conceptual 
constructs produced by regarding a narrative, our own or that in some text, 
as revolving around a single fixed point.
Assuming we accept the view of the self as a conceptual construction 
superimposed on a collection of physico-psychological events we might still 
ask ourselves what the point of all this constructing is. Why do we spin 
these narratives which in turn cause us to misapprehend the nature of the 
self, thinking that there is a substantial self where in fact there is only a set of 
intersecting narratives? Some cognitive scientists have proposed evolutionary
16Dennett (1991, 418).
17Dennett (1991, 410-411), Dennett (1992, 105-111).
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reasons for this phenomenon. Thomas Metzinger suggests that we should
look at the human self-model as a neurocomputational weapon, 
a certain data structure that the brain can activate from time 
to time such as when you have to wake up in the morning and 
integrate your sensory perceptions with your motor behaviour.
The ego machine just turns on its phenomenal self, and tha t is 
the moment when you come to be. To have a good self-model 
means to be successful in a certain environment. It starts with 
simple properties: you need to know how far you can jump, what 
your body can do, how big you are, what your boundaries are, 
so tha t you don't start to eat your own legs, as some primitive 
animals may actually do, or as some psychiatrically disturbed 
people do.18
According to this interpretation our intuitive view of ourselves as substance- 
selves is to be understood as a pragmatically successful self-deception. A 
self-model along the lines of a substance-self allows us to respond to many 
tasks more quickly than a more cumbersome one based on the notion of a 
process would. This is the reason why this sense of the self has spread so 
widely, as it provides the minds who hold it with an evolutionary advantage. 
It thus became the dominant and most natural way to see ourselves.19
Despite its popularity with cognitive scientists the reductionist view of 
the self as nothing but a causally connected chain of physical and psycho­
logical events faces some obvious philosophical problems. The first problem 
concerns the unity of a person. It is not clear whether reductionism can ac-
18Blackmore (2005, 153).
19An interesting account of the psychological consequences of the loss of such a self­
model from the first-person (!) perspective is given in Segal (1998).
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tually account for the boundaries between different persons in the right way. 
For suppose I decide to make a sound. This means that there is a casual 
sequence involving a psychological event (the decision) and a physical event 
(my making the sound). You hear tha t sound and later remember it. Given 
tha t all these events are causally connected to one another, how do we draw 
the line between the causally connected chain which constitutes ‘me’ and 
that which constitutes ‘you’ without already presupposing the concept of a 
person? If we think of causally connected chains of physical and psychologi­
cal events it seems as if there is only one big network of these, without any 
obvious ways of dividing them into persons. A second problem arises with 
the rationality of prudential concern for ourselves. We usually think that it 
is rational to show concern for future stages of our selves, so that e.g. we buy 
an umbrella today so that we don’t get wet tomorrow. Similarly arguments 
built around the notion of karma presuppose in the same way that we should 
care about what happens to us in the future. But if a person is nothing but 
a logical fiction built on a succession of momentary psycho-physical events, 
how could such a fiction exhibit prudential concern? After all the person 
is never present at any particular temporal stage to function as a potential 
subject of such concern.
Addressing these difficulties would obviously require a long and careful 
discussion of the implications of a reductionist theory of persons. This will 
not be attempted here, for two main reasons. First of all there exists now a 
philosophical literature of considerable depth and sophistication dealing with 
issues arising from a reductionist view of persons. In Western philosophy this 
developed as a reaction to Derek Parfit’s influential monograph Reasons and 
Persons. This describes a reductionist view of persons which the author
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regards as fundamentally the same as the one found in Buddhist texts.20 
It would neither be possible nor desirable to repeat the resulting discussion 
here. Secondly, the theory of persons described above is no position specific 
to Madhyamikas, but something shared by all main Buddhist schools. A 
prolonged discussion of these matters would therefore take us away from the 
main Madhyamaka focus of this study.
At this place I would just like to sketch briefly two key concepts one could 
use to address the problems of unity and prudential concern, based on the 
discussion in Siderits (2003). In dealing with the first problem it is useful 
to establish the concept of a maximally causally connected set of psycho­
physical events.21 This is a set which we make as large as possible whilst 
maximizing the causal connectedness of the set. For example we will only 
include events connected with specific body-parts (such as the vocal chords 
and the ear) if they stand in continuous causal connection over time. While 
your ear-event might be causally connected to my vocal-chord event (because 
you hear me) and could therefore be included in the set doing so would reduce 
the overall causal connectivity of the set, since over time there will be fewer 
causal connections between my voice and your ear than between my voice 
and my ear. Such sets could then be made more and more comprehensive 
and could be regarded as reductionist substitutes for the notion of a person.
One avenue to explore for the establishment of prudential concern is the 
idea that the concept of a person as a trans-temporal, non-momentary entity 
is a convention accepted because of its consequences. Given that there are 
several conventions which we could have adopted (such as the convention 
of momentary beings without temporal extension, or the convention of one
20Parfit (1984, 273, 280). More recent discussions of the issues involved here can be
found in Siderits (2003), particularly in chapters 2 and 3, as well as in Albahari (2006).
21Siderits (2003, 45-46).
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overarching mind of which everything else forms a part) the one we chose in 
the end must have something to recommend it. This something might either 
be cashed out in evolutionary terms, arguing that this person-convention just 
provided its bearers with the greatest survival value,22 or it could be given 
a normative justification. Here the idea is that conceptualizing a causal se­
quence of psycho-physical events using the concept of a person rather than 
some other one maximizes utility. For example, under such a conceptualiza­
tion it is much less likely that minor immediate pleasures will be traded in for 
major future pains. Moreover, the idea of future pain could be used as a de­
terrent, whereas under the conception of a person as a momentary entity this 
idea of punishment would not have much force.23 This utilitarian defence of 
the concept of a person of course presupposes that the concept of pain (which 
is what is to be minimized) does not bring in persons again through the back 
door. But assuming this could be done this seems to leave us with a sensible 
way of accounting for prudential concern against a reductionist background.
10.3 E thics
Very little has been said in the previous pages on Nagarjuna’s ethical theory.
Apart from the RA and some verses in the MMK most of his remarks on
ethics are found in such works as the Suhrllekha2i and the Shes rab sdong
22Siderits (2003, 43).
23Siderits (2003, 39).
24Nagarjuna (2002), Nagarjuna (1979), Lindtner (1982, 218-224).
CHAPTER 10. CONCLUSION 313
bu.25 The former text, which enjoyed considerable popularity in Tibet,26 
presents the reader with concrete ethical advice for the layman; it stresses 
the importance of compassion and describes karmic consequences of various 
kinds of behaviour. The Shes rab dong bu or ‘Tree of Wisdom’ is a collection 
of aphorisms dealing with maxims for ethical behaviour, drawn from the 
Mahabharata, the Pancatantra and the Puranas,27 reminiscent of Sa skya 
Pandita’s Legs bshad rin po che’i gter28 who may have borrowed from it.29
While these works contain a considerable amount of discussion of ethical 
topics I have chosen not to analyse them in detail, but to confine my discus­
sion to the remarks in this section. To see why we have to note tha t we can 
distinguish three different kinds of ethical statements in Madhyamaka texts. 
First of all there are the ethical pronouncements made by a Madhyamika such 
as Nagarjuna as part of an exposition of the Buddhist doctrine which he, as a 
Buddhist, incorporates into his teachings. These will include remarks about 
the relative consequences of meritorious and non-meritorious actions, attach­
ment as the primary cause of suffering, the importance of compassion and 
so on. Secondly we find an ethical discussion in connection with the concept 
of emptiness, in particular with the emptiness of persons. If there is no sub­
stantial self we might wonder who the agent of an action or the experiencer 
of a result, or the subject and object of compassion really are. The Bud­
dhist propounder of a non-self has to give a re-interpretation of these notions
25Nagarjuna (1919). Lindtner (1982, note 29, page 15) regards this text as ‘dubious’ 
but ‘perhaps authentic’. Pathak (1974, 38) disagrees and ascribes this, as well as some 
other niti texts not to Nagarjuna the Madhyamika but to a pre-8th century compiler of
the same name. See also Ruegg (1981, 27).
26Nagarjuna (2002, 1-2).
27Pathak (1974, 38).
28Pathak (1974, 78).
29Nagarjuna (1919, iv).
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without the tacit presupposition of a substantial self underlying all of them. 
We should note tha t this is not a challenge which applies specifically to the 
Madhyamika, but to any theorist holding a non-self view in conjunction with 
the common Buddhist ethical view. It is thus equally a task for a Vaibhasika, 
Theravadin or Sautrantika to give a theoretical account of this issue. The 
third kind of statements deal with the specific ethical consequences of Ma- 
dhyamaka views. For example, the particularly Nagarjunian view tha t there 
is no ultimate difference between samsara and nirvana demands an expla­
nation of why we should engage in meritorious rather than non-meritorious 
actions, or Buddhist practices in general: if there is no difference between 
the liberated and the non-liberated state in any case, why bother?
Most of Nagarjuna’s ethical remarks fall into the first, and some also into 
the second class. Those in the first class, though interesting in the context of 
Nagarjuna’s Buddhist worldview shed relatively little light on philosophical 
problems, especially concerning Nagarjuna’s most original thoughts, i.e. the 
metaphysical and epistemological considerations which form the heart of Ma- 
dhyamaka philosophy.
In the context of remarks in the second class, dealing with the relationship 
between ethical issues and the concept of emptiness Nagarjuna extends his 
analysis of phenomena also to such key ethical notions as pleasure and pain 
and notes that these too do not exist by substance~svabhava. In the RA he 
observes tha t30
Physical feelings of pleasure are only a lessening of pain. Percep­
tions [and the pleasures they produce] are made of thought, they 
are created only by conceptuality.
30 duhkapratikriyamatram sarvram vedanasukham /  samjnam ayam manasam tu kevalam 
kalpanakrtam. RA 3:47.
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Pleasure and pain therefore cannot be treated as basic reals on which 
our system of ethics could be based (for example in the form of some sort 
of utilitarian calculus aimed at maximizing pleasure), since they exist in- 
terdependently. There could be no pleasure in the absence of pain, or vice 
versa. But this then implies that neither could exist by substance-svabha­
va. Furthermore, if the extent to which a certain situation is regarded as 
painful or pleasurable depends on the way it is conceptualized, being painful 
or pleasurable is shown to be no intrinsic property of a part of the world out 
there, but something arising from the interaction between a conceptualizing 
subject and a conceptualized object.31
The question of the compatibility of the emptiness of the self and the 
notion of karma is raised in the MMK. Nagarjuna notes th a t32
If an action were uncreated fear would arise of encountering some­
thing not done. [...] It would be impossible to draw a distinction 
between merit and demerit.
The worry here is that if there was no substantial self creating actions there 
would be no way of ascribing individual actions to individual selves, since 
there are no such selves, but only complexes of psychophysical events. But 
then it may happen that one experiences the consequences of a deed which 
one did not do, i.e. which arises from a different such complex. This would 
then not give us any way of differentiating actions into wholesome actions as 
those which have pleasant consequences, and unwholesome ones, which have 
unpleasant consequences. Moreover, on the analysis in terms of psychophys­
ical complexes the entire set of distinctions into action, agent, consequence
31 See also RA 3:50.
32 akrta-abhyagama-bhayam sydt karakrtakam yadi / [ . . . ]  /  punyapapakrtor naiva prav- 
ibhagas ca yujyate. MMK 17:23a, 24b.
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and experiencer of the consequence,33 which are of central importance for 
the entire system of Buddhist ethics disappears.
As already noted in chapter 7 this worry may be answered by the ex­
ample of the illusion created within an illusion. The fundamental mistake 
of an insubstantial self to regard itself as substantial creates the concepts 
of agent, action, consequent and experiencer which then in turn bring with 
them the whole system of karmic interrelations. Unfortunately this belief 
is so fundamental that mere intellectual understanding of the non-existence 
of substantial selves does not stop such selves from appearing to us. In the 
same way the understanding that some phenomenon is an optical illusion 
generally does not alter the way it appears to us, but at best how seriously 
we take this appearance. W hat is needed for the disappearance of such con­
cepts as agent, action, consequence and experience is the realization of the 
non-substantiality of the self, that is the attainment of a cognitive shift which 
keeps the mistaken notion of the substantial self from arising.
Remarks dealing with the ethical repercussions of emptiness like those just 
discussed are relatively rare in the works of Nagarjuna, Analyses belonging to 
the third class, i.e. those dealing with the specific ethical consequences of Ma- 
dhyamaka thought are virtually absent. A major issue presenting itself at this 
point is the question to which extent there is fundamental relation between 
the Madhyamaka theory of emptiness and the ethical theory of compassion 
centred on the ideal of the bodhisattva. After all it seems that a case for such 
an ethical theory can already be made from the perspective of the ‘lower 
schools’. If there are no substantial selves and therefore no psychological 
states — such as pains — essentially attached to selves all these unpersonal 
pains can be regarded as equally bad, irrespective of their location. But in
33 MMK 17:29-30.
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this case my reason for removing my own pain is not more pressing than 
that of removing the pain of other beings, in fact it is considerably less 
pressing, since the pains of other beings outnumber my own. We thus seem 
to be able to get relatively close to Mahayana ethics on the basis of Hlnayana 
metaphysics. So what is the distinctive advantage of the Madhyamaka theory 
of emptiness for establishing the ethical ideal of a bodhisattval
There is much to be said about this question as well as others arising in 
the same context34, but the basis of such answers in Nagarjuna’s writings on 
Madhyamaka is at best implicit. The examination of these issues becomes 
considerably more interesting when we take into account later Madhyama­
ka texts which address questions dealing with the distinctive Madhyamaka 
consequences for ethics explicitly and in greater detail.35 We can imagine a 
variety of possible reasons why we find so little discussion of these matters 
in Nagarjuna’s works. One obvious possibility is that the respective text or 
texts were lost relatively early in the tradition. Alternatively it might have 
been the case that Nagarjuna’s focus of interest when developing the Ma­
dhyamaka approach was a set of metaphysical and epistemological questions, 
and that its ethical dimensions were only explored in detail by later writers. 
A final possibility is that discussions of the point where the perfections of 
wisdom and compassion join were regarded as too advanced to be put down 
in writing and were only transmitted orally. Whatever the explanation may 
be, the fact remains that the investigation of Madhyamaka ethics will find 
a more extensive set of data in later writers than in what is preserved in 
Nagarjuna’s Madhyamaka.
34For example Siderits (2003, chapter 9).
35An obvious source in this context is the BCA. See Williams (1998).
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Nagarjuna’s account of epistemology is supposed to fulfill a purpose both 
at the object- as well as at the meta-level. At the object-level means of 
knowledge and their objects are just another set of central concepts which 
have to be investigated as entities potentially existing with svabhava. At 
the meta-level Nagarjuna’s theory of epistemology is supposed to present the 
theoretical background of his own account of emptiness. As the theory of 
emptiness is something we are supposed acquire knowledge of it is essential 
to get clear about the means by which we are supposed to do so, and indeed 
about what our object of knowledge consists of in this case.
These two projects are inherently interconnected. For according to the 
standard Nyaya theory of epistemology Nagarjuna encountered knowledge 
is acquired by using a set of procedures (such as perception or inference) 
the nature of which it is to produce knowledge and which convey informa­
tion about a set of objective, mind-independent set of individuals which are 
the bearers of specific qualities. But a theory which thus presupposed the 
existence of objects of knowledge with distinct natures which the means of 
knowledge could adequately represent could hardly be used as a basis for 
knowing emptiness, for it presupposes exactly what the theory of emptiness 
denies.
A substantial part of Nagarjuna’s epistemological discussion is therefore 
dedicated to a criticism of the standard Nyaya theory of knowledge, Na­
garjuna sets out to establish tha t nothing can be regarded as intrinsically a 
means or object of knowledge. Means of knowledge and their objects have 
to be mutually established: the means of knowledge establishes the object 
by giving us cognitive access to it, our successful interaction with the object 
establishes the means of knowledge as a trustworthy route to the object.
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Something will therefore be classified as a means or object of knowledge not 
because this is a reflection of its intrinsic nature, but because it is regarded 
as such once a reflective equilibrium has been reached. We use beliefs about 
the nature of the object in order to test our hypotheses concerning the means 
of acquiring such beliefs, these hypotheses are then in turn used to assess our 
view of the nature of the object.
The reason why this could not lead to an establishment of the means of 
knowledge in the way the Naiyayika wants is that a different initial set of 
beliefs could have led to a different reflective equilibrium as a result. But 
given that each would have led to a different view of reliable means of cog­
nition and of the objects known we would not be able to determine which of 
the two faithfully reflects the nature of the means and objects of cognition. 
Assuming that establishing a reflective equilibrium is the only way of arriving 
at an account of the means and objects of cognition it is therefore impossible 
to establish the true nature of either.
This criticism of the Nyaya position has been considered to be unsatisfac­
tory by Mark Siderits in recent work.36 Siderits* main point is tha t it relies 
on an internalist conception of knowledge according to which the justification 
for a knowledge-claim also has to be known to the subject. For the internal­
ist it is not just sufficient to respond to a sceptical threat by demonstrating 
that the subject is justified, it also has to know to be justified. It is thus 
not sufficient that the method of the reflective equilibrium might as a matter 
of fact supply us with the right account of means of knowledge and their 
objects, but we also have to know that it is the right account. But given 
the fact that there can be several such equilibria the internalist fails to be 
justified. Siderits argues that the Nyaya view of veridical cognition as the
36(20 00 , 227).
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product of a reliable causal process cannot be subsumed under such inter- 
nalism,37 indeed it is a typical externalist position where the justification for 
knowing something is located outside of the body of the subject’s knowledge. 
But if this is the case then the Madhyamika’s criticism loses its force, for it 
is now based on an assumption -  namely epistemic internalism -  which its 
opponent does not share.
The force of this criticism is undermined to a certain extent by the fact 
that the identification of the opponent Nagarjuna criticizes in individual ar­
guments is notoriously difficult to establish by any but systematic reasons. 
While the heavy influence of Nyaya thought on the epistemological discus­
sion in the VV is obvious this does not necessarily entail tha t the opponent 
addressed in the passages dealing with the mutual establishment of means 
and objects of knowledge38 is a Naiyayika as well. We might equally use 
Siderits’ argument to claim tha t the implicit internalist position entails that 
he cannot have been one, as the criticism would not have applied to him 
otherwise.
While such questions are impossible to decide on the basis of the textual 
evidence available to us it is interesting to consider what kind of argument 
Nagarjuna could have used in his criticism of an externalist position. Sider­
its39 makes the interesting suggestion of employing Nagarjuna’s analysis of 
causation, which does not feature much in the VV and is not put to any 
epistemological use in the MMK. As the reader will recall Nagarjuna argues 
tha t causation, far from being a mind-independent relation which establishes 
objective connections between phenomena is itself intricately bound up with 
conceptualization. As was argued above we cannot conceive of a causal re­
37(2000, 223).
38VV 46-48.
39(2000, 229).
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lation between two entities without a substantial mental contribution. If we 
plausibly assume tha t the cause precedes the effect then, at the time of the 
existence of the cause, when the effect does not yet exist, our mind will have 
to supply the missing relatum in our expectation. Moreover, it is not just 
the causal relation which cannot be regarded as mind-independent, as it also 
plays an essential part in the construction of objects. This is because the very 
establishment of miscellaneous collections of entities as unified items called 
‘cause’ (or ‘causal field’) and ‘effect’ could not proceed without the notion 
of causation in the first place. Causation cannot be regarded as a relation 
connecting items which are ‘there anyway’ in a mind-independent way.
But now it is clear that if this criticism goes through then causation 
cannot be made to bear the epistemological weight the Naiyayika wants it 
to bear. For the externalist regards causation as a guarantor transmitting 
features of the object to perception in a reliable way because the nature of the 
causing object will determine the nature of the perception which is the effect. 
As the Madhyamika has argued, however, causation is itself conceptually 
constructed. A reliable means of cognition which incorporates causation as 
a central element therefore has to be conceptually constructed in the same 
way. There is therefore no way in which we can regard it as providing us with 
accurate knowledge of an objectively existent world independent of human 
conceptual practices.
Nagarjuna therefore argues for an epistemology in which nothing is in­
trinsically a means or an object of knowledge. And if nothing is intrinsically 
a means of knowledge there is also nothing which could function as such a 
means in any context; it is only against a specific background tha t it could 
fulfill such a role. Such an epistemology is able to provide a background for 
the knowledge of emptiness as means and objects of knowledge are no longer
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regarded as being means and objects of knowledge intrinsically. Means of 
knowledge are such means only in specific contexts, and they are not sup­
posed to adequately reflect the properties objects have from their own side, 
but provide the basis of successful interaction with them. The theory of 
emptiness therefore no longer contradicts the epistemology on the basis of 
which it is to be known.
10.5 Language and Truth
As was mentioned earlier there exists no fully-formed Madhyamaka theory 
of language or tru th  in Nagarjuna’s extant writings. This does not mean, 
however, tha t his works do not give us a fairly good indication of what his 
views on some of the key questions within this area were.
First of all it is apparent that the Madhyamaka theory of emptiness is not 
compatible with a the idea of a ‘ready-made world’, that is of a world which 
exists independently of human interests and concerns and already shows a 
particular kind of structuring which our structured language could then set 
out to reflect. If nothing exists with substance-svabhava nothing in the world 
could exist from its own side and nothing could bear a structure which is 
intrinsic to it, rather than something ascribed to it from the outside.
Moreover, the Madhyamika will reject the classic correspondence account 
of truth, according to which the tru th  of a statement is grounded in a sim­
ilarity of structure between a statement and the bit of the world it refers 
to. This also entails a rejection of the corresponding view of how language 
works, namely that our sentences manage to connect up with the world via 
a set of objectively existent structural similarities. The main reason for this 
rejection is that the Madhyamika cannot find any sufficiently substantial re­
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lation which would allow us to bind together world and word at the most 
fundamental level. The most plausible candidate for linking words and their 
referents is the causal relation, for example by using it to construct a causal 
chain from an ‘initial baptism5 to our present use of the term. But as Nagar­
juna has argued in detail the causal relation itself is conceptually constructed. 
But if causation cannot be regarded as a relation which functions objectively, 
independent of the concepts we employ then it can hardly be regarded as a 
mind-independent way of founding the relationship between language and 
the world.40
An alternative account which the Madhyamika might want to adopt is one 
which does not conceive of truth in terms of correspondence with an exterior 
reality but rather in terms of assertability conditions. In this case a state­
ment is regarded as true if conditions obtain which warrant our asserting the 
statement. W hat makes the statement that water is wet true is not a struc­
tural correspondence between it and a fact about water, but tha t we have 
something which justifies us in making this statement. W hat this justifica­
tion consists in depends on the further details of our theory of truth; it might 
be based on facts about empirical observation, about coherence with other 
beliefs, about pragmatic success and so forth. This view of course implies 
that there could not be any truths which are in principle beyond our ability 
to verify them. This is because we could never have a warrant for asserting 
such statements, and the existence of such a warrant is precisely what we con­
sider the tru th  of the statements to consist in. Such statements would have 
to be regarded as lacking a truth-value. This kind of denial of verification- 
transcendent truths in turn agrees very well with Nagarjuna’s contextualist 
epistemology. For if nothing is intrinsically a means of knowledge nothing
40See Siderits (2003, 166).
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can be intrinsically beyond the grasp of such means of knowledge either. As 
what constitutes a means of knowledge is context-dependent, tha t a certain 
tru th  cannot be accessed by some means of knowledge is context-dependent 
too. There is no context-independent concept of knowledge we could use to 
form the idea of a tru th  which lies beyond all epistemic contexts.
According to the Madhyamaka view of truth there can be no such thing 
as ultimate truth, a theory describing how things really are, independent of 
our interests and conceptual resources employed in describing it. All one is 
left with is conventional truth, tru th  with consists in agreement with com­
monly accepted practices and conventions. These are the truths which are 
arrived at when viewing the world through our linguistically formed concep­
tual framework. But we should be wary of denigrating these conventions as 
a distorting device which incorporates our specific interests and concerns. 
The very notion of ‘distortion’ presupposes that there is a world untainted 
by conceptuality out there (even if our minds can never reach it) which is 
crooked and bent to fit our cognitive grasp. But the very notion of such a 
‘way things really are’ is argued by the Madhyamika to be incoherent. There 
is no way of investigating the world apart from our linguistic and conceptual 
practices, if only because these practices generate the notion of the ‘world’ 
and of the ‘objects’ in it in the first place. To speak of conventional reality as 
distorted is therefore highly misleading, unless all we want to say is that our 
way of investigating the world is inextricably bound up with the linguistic 
and conceptual framework we happen to employ.
There are two worries one might have with the rejection of the notion 
of an ultimate truth. First of all one might think that progress in human 
inquiry requires that we question what we now believe to be truths and 
perhaps replace them by other beliefs. Even a cursory acquaintance with the
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history of science will show that we are where we are now only through a 
persistent process of replacing beliefs we once held to be true, but no longer 
think so. But it seems hard to explain what our justification for this is if it 
is not trying to bring our beliefs into greater accordance with the way things 
are. All we are ever seem to dealing with according to the Madhyamaka view 
is a purely immanent notion of tru th  where the only kind of tru th  we have 
access to is a reflection of conventional human practices and agreements.
In response to this the Madhyamika might want to make the point that 
it is at least sometimes advantageous to treat truths as if they had a more 
than conventional grounding, that is as if they were not just the product 
of agreement with commonly accepted practices and conventions. This is 
precisely because such practices need improvement from time to time, and 
since a spirit of inquiry is facilitated more by the idea that there is a mind- 
independent tru th  waiting to be discovered.41 The Madhyamika could thus 
argue tha t for pragmatic reasons we should conceive of truths as reflections 
of an objective, external reality even though we do not think tha t there are 
any such truths in fact. We might object at this point that if the notion of the 
existence of at least some verification-transcendent truths is pragmatically 
useful, whoever believes in tru th  as warranted assertability then has to believe 
tha t some truths are not conventional, since asserting this is now supported 
by a warrant. But this will not just turn the anti-realist into a realist against 
his will, since his embracing of non-conventional truths is dictated by purely 
practical concerns: we are considerably better off if we build our inquiries 011 
the convenient fiction of non-conventional truths. But they remain just that, 
namely conventional fictions; the anti-realist does not think, as the realist 
does, that the existence of such truths is in any way grounded by the way
41Siderits (2003, 183-184).
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the world is independent of our interests and concerns.
Another worry with the Madhyamika’s rejection of an ultimate tru th  is 
that emptiness cannot then be regarded as the ultimate tru th  either. But 
surely, one will argue, for the Madhyamika emptiness is the end-product of 
the correct analysis of phenomena, and thereby indicative of the way things 
really are? As was argued in section 2.1.3 of chapter 2 the theory of emptiness 
is not to be seen as a description of reality as it is independent of human 
conceptual conventions, as its main purpose it to combat the wrong ascription 
of svabhava to things. The absence of svabhava is nothing phenomena have 
within themselves, but only something which is projected onto them from the 
outside in an attem pt to rectify a mistaken cognition. Therefore the theory 
of emptiness is not to be regarded as an ultimately true theory either. Such 
a theory would describe things as they are independent of human interests 
and concerns. But the theory of emptiness is intricately bound up with such 
interests and concerns: if there were no human minds who mistakenly read 
the existence of svabhava into phenomena which lack it there would be no 
point in having a theory to correct this. It is only due to our erroneous view 
of things that the theory of emptiness is required as a corrective.
A final problem with the Madhyamaka focus on conventional tru th  might 
be the fact that it entails a form of relativism we find unacceptable.42 If we
42This is a problem which despite its considerable complexity has not been explicitly 
discussed in Indian sources. It is tempting to speculate why relativism does not seem 
to have been a prominent problem for Indian Madhyamaka authors. Siderits (1989, 240) 
suggest that ‘the hegemonistic strategy which Brahmanic culture used to subsume the 
other cultures of the Indian subcontinent’ might have been responsible for this. It is true 
that if diverging perspectives are incorporated into one’s own view (perhaps as displaying 
a restricted understanding of some aspect of this view) rather than seen as independent 
and incommensurable views of the same subject-matter the problem of relativism loses 
much of its force.
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regard tru th  as being a matter of warranted assertibility and not at something 
settled by ‘what the facts are’ we will have to agree that as human practices 
change, so do standards of warranted assertibility. But then it might be the 
case that what one culture regards as true, or rationally acceptable, or for 
that matter as ethically acceptable, is very different from what we regard as 
true or acceptable. We will not then be in any way justified in criticizing their 
practices since there is no objective reality according to which they could be 
regarded as wrong. If some culture’s standards of warranted assertibility 
lead it to believe tha t the earth is hollow, that counter-induction is the 
best methodology for natural science and that female infanticide is morally 
commendable there is nothing for us to do save observing that these practices 
differ from ours.
W hat the Madhyamika should want to argue at this point is that any 
culture with which we can interact at all, tha t is one which shares a form of 
life with us is one which shares with us at least some evaluative standards. 
If it did not we would not be able to ascribe to it anything like rational 
forms of belief formation or ethical norms, so that the whole idea of rational 
or ethical divergence and rational or ethical criticism would lose its point.43 
The Madhyamika could then argue that even though different cultures can 
have different standards none of which can be regarded as ultimately true 
(since there is no such thing as ultimate truth) still some standards can 
be seen to be better than others, for example in terms of overall coherence 
with our practices (which are also a part of conventional truth) or in terms 
of their ability to reduce pain. Siderits44 discusses the interesting example 
of the conception of the self by Prasangika and Svatantrika writers. While
43This is essentially the point argued in Davidson (1973-1974, 19): ‘whether we like it
or not, if we want to understand others, we must count them right in most matters’.
44Siderits (1989, 241-243). See also (2003, 206).
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for the Prasahgikas the self is a mere label superimposed on the group of 
elements the Svatantrika regards it as a continuous series of inner moments 
of consciousness which take their inner states as objects. Of course the 
latter do not think that the self has any degree of ultimate reality but that 
amongst the variety of aggregates which make up the self we can identify one 
candidate (i.e. that part of our mind is aware of its own psychological states) 
which best coheres with our cognitive practices. So while there is no ‘best’ 
candidate amongst the entities which me might potentially identify with the 
self, because ultimately there is no such thing, according to the Svatantrika 
reading at least some candidates may be better than others.
Tillemans45 mentions the interesting example of the wine-taster in il­
lustration of this point. It is generally agreed that secondary properties, 
and particularly olfactory and gustatory properties do not have a mind- 
independent existence. If there were no human beings around there would 
not be the properties of tasting sour or smelling sweet, since these are not 
properties existing in the objects themselves, but are only produced by in­
teraction of the objects and our sensory faculties. Nevertheless, despite this 
mind-dependence we might want to argue that some ascriptions of secondary 
properties have more than a subjective validity. A wine-taster describing a 
wine as tasting acidic may be wrong, even though ultimately there is no prop­
erty of tasting acidic which the wine has or lacks. Even within the realm of 
conventional tru th  we therefore do not ‘make it all up! but there are ways of 
ranking different conventional statements in terms of better or worse, even 
though there is no best, i.e. ultimately true account.
While this is an enlightening example the case the critic worried about 
relativism is concerned with is probably less like the case of wine, and more
45 (2003, 110-111).
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like that of phenolthiourea. For genetic reasons this substance tastes bitter to 
about three-quarters of the population, while it is tasteless to the rest. Now 
if we separated the two populations we seem to end up with a case where 
one group has no reason to criticize the other’s taste-judgement as incorrect, 
because ultimately there is no fact to the m atter what phenolthiourea tastes 
like. And in this case it seems impossible to rank one taste-judgement as 
conventionally better or worse than another one. The only thing we could 
bring forward in response to this point seems to be the familiar Davidsonian 
observation that if such disagreement between two cultures was widespread, 
i.e. if it did not just concern simple taste sensations but also more com­
plex factual and moral judgements there would just be no basis for the two 
cultures to interact at all. Since their standards of rational justification or 
morality would be so different from ours the whole notion of factual and eth­
ical criticism would lose its meaning. We would therefore have to rely on the 
assumption that no two cultures which can interact would differ as radically 
in their conventions as illustrated by the example of phenolthiourea.
In order to understand Nagarj una’s project as a philosophically coherent 
enterprise it is useful take into account the ethical and soteriological implica­
tions of different standards one of which might be better than another, but 
none of which can be best in the sense of corresponding to the way reality 
really is. For Nagarjuna the conception of tru th  supported by the way things 
really are presents a subtle object of clinging and thereby ultimately a source 
of suffering. Such clinging is not is not as coarse as clinging to possessions, 
one’s body, or one’s self, but it still generates a kind of attachment which in 
turn supports a sense of selfhood as a subject who has realized the way things 
really are. For the Madhyamika, in order to become truly selfless on has to 
give up the view tha t we can obtain anything more than conventional truths,
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some of which might be evaluated as better than others, but none of which 
can constitute the last word. The resulting epistemic humility is therefore 
a product of considerations of selfhood and ethics seen as interlinked with 
considerations of tru th  and reality.
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